Motion for Summary Judgment

Date: 2021-05-20

Summary

Defendants Governor Kim Reynolds and Ann Lebo's resistance to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in The Arc of Iowa et al. v. Kim Reynolds, Case No. 4:21-CV-00264-RP-SBJ, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, served August 5, 2022. The plaintiffs' motion, Doc. 88, seeks declarations that Iowa Code § 280.31, which restricts school mask mandates, treats the ADA and Section 504 as other provisions of law, and cannot be cited to deny a student's accommodation request. The brief argues the motion should be denied because the case must be dismissed for lack of standing and mootness, because the declarations were not requested in the complaint, and because one declaration resolves no dispute while the other misstates the law. It is signed by Assistant Attorney General Samuel P. Langholz.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION

THE ARC OF IOWA et al., Case No. 4:21-CV-00264-RP-SBJ

Plaintiffs,
Defendants Governor Kim
v. Reynolds and Ann Lebo’s
Resistance to Plaintiffs’
KIM REYNOLDS, in her official Motion for Summary Judgment
capacity as Governor of Iowa, et al.

Defendants.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
I. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion should be denied because the entire
case must be dismissed for the reasons stated in the State Defendants’
motion to dismiss. .............................................................................................. 4
II. Plaintiffs can’t obtain summary judgment on a declaratory judgment that
they haven’t asked for in their complaint and is divorced from their
asserted claims................................................................................................... 6
III. Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment that the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act are “other provision[s] of law” should be denied because
it resolves no dispute. ........................................................................................ 8
IV. Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment that section 280.31 can never
be cited as a reason for denying an accommodation request is an inaccurate
statement of the law that flips section 280.31 and federal disability law
around backwards............................................................................................ 11
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 13
INTRODUCTION

Over a year ago, the Legislature passed, and Governor Reynolds signed,

legislation enacting section 280.31 of the Iowa Code into law. See Act of May 20, 2021

(H.F. 847), ch. 139, § 28, 2021 Iowa Acts 333, 340 (codified at Iowa Code § 280.31

(2022)). That statute became effective immediately, see id. § 31, and provides:

The board of directors of a school district, the superintendent or chief
administering officer of a school or school district, and the authorities in
charge of each accredited nonpublic school shall not adopt, enforce, or
implement a policy that requires its employees, students, or members of
the public to wear a facial covering for any purpose while on the school
district’s or accredited nonpublic school’s property unless the facial
covering is necessary for a specific extracurricular or instructional
purpose, or is required by section 280.10 or 280.11 or any other provision
of law.
Iowa Code § 280.31.

Plaintiffs sued Governor Reynolds, Iowa Department of Education Director

Ann Lebo, and ten school districts, alleging that section 280.31 violates title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and

the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARPA”) because it prevents their schools

from implementing universal mask mandates to protect their children. Compl., Doc.

1 ¶ 76–102. In their complaint, they seek a declaratory judgment of these violations.
See id. at 37, ¶¶ 1–3. And they seek to enjoin completely enforcement of the statute—

both preliminarily and permanently. See id. at 37, ¶¶ 4–5.

After their granted preliminary injunction of the statute was vacated by the

Eighth Circuit, see Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 33 F.4th 1042, 1044–45 (8th Cir. 2022),

they now seek something different. They ask for a declaratory judgment about the

scope of section 280.31. First, they want a declaration that “The term ‘other

provision[s] of law’ as it is used in Section 280.31 include [sic] Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Pltfs’ Mtn.

—2—
for Summary Judgment, Doc. 88, at ¶ 2. And second, they want one “That Section

280.31 cannot be cited as a basis to deny a student’s request for reasonable

modification or accommodation that includes requiring others to wear masks.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied for many reasons. First, they cannot obtain

any relief because their Complaint fails for all the reasons set forth in Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss and should instead be dismissed. See Defs Gov. Reynolds and

Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90; Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss,

Doc. 96-1. Second, they cannot obtain summary judgment on this relief because it’s

divorced from the claims asserted and relief requested in their complaint. Third, their

requested declaratory judgment that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are “other

provision[s] of law” should be denied because it resolves no dispute—the State has

argued throughout these proceedings that any requirement of those statutes falls

within that exception.

And finally, their requested declaration “That Section 280.31 cannot be cited

as a basis to deny a student’s request for reasonable modification or accommodation

that includes requiring others to wear masks” gets the law backwards. Section 280.31

bans mask mandates unless section 504 or the ADA require the mandate. And this

state statute should be considered when conducting any reasonable-accommodation

analysis. Plaintiffs’ proposed declaration would only be accurate if any and every

mask mandate requested by any student is always the only reasonable

accommodation. Plaintiffs don’t attempt to make an argument that this is true as a

factual matter. Nor would such an argument succeed—especially as a matter of law

under this early, pre-answer summary judgment motion.

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment

outside the bounds of their complaint and inconsistent with the law should be denied.

Rather, Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted.

—3—
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court should grant summary judgment where “the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord United States v. Story Cty.,

28 F. Supp. 3d 861, 867 (S.D. Iowa 2014). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

give “[d]ue deference” to the “rights of litigants to have their claims adjudicated by

the appropriate finder of fact . . . equal deference must be given under Rule 56 to the

rights of those defending against such claims to have a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of the action where the claims have no factual basis.” Anderson v.

Indus. Elec. Reels, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (D. Neb. 1993). Summary judgment

thus is appropriate where resolution of a question of law is controlling. See Ferezy v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (S.D. Iowa 2010).

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion should be denied because the
entire case must be dismissed for the reasons stated in the State
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

All Defendants have moved to dismiss this case because it is defective as a

matter of law. See Defs. Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 86; Defs.

Ankeny Cmty. Sch. Dist. et al. Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 96; Def. Council Bluffs Cmty.

Sch. Dist.’s Mtn. to Dismiss and Joinder in Mtn. to Dismiss Filed by Dists., Doc. 97;

Def. Iowa City Cmty. Sch. Dist. Partial Joinder in Dists. Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 98.

Because the complaint fails, Plaintiffs can’t obtain the declaratory judgment they now

seek in this case. All Defendants’ arguments made for dismissing the complaint in

these motions to dismiss are thus reasons this motion should be denied. And instead,

the case should be dismissed.

As the State argues there, Plaintiffs lack standing for two reasons. They aren’t

injured by section 280.31 because—as the Eighth Circuit recognized, Arc of Iowa, 33

—4—
F.4th at 1045—the statute doesn’t prevent schools from complying with federal law.

And any injury isn’t redressed by this suit because enjoining section 280.31’s

enforcement won’t provide them a universal mask mandate. Indeed, by the time of

the Eighth Circuit decision vacating their preliminary injunction of the statute, none

of Plaintiffs’ school districts had universal mask mandates in place. See Samantha

Hernandez, Des Moines Public Schools Drops Mask Mandate Following Federal

Changes, D.M. Register (Mar. 3, 2022), available at https://perma.cc/7AE8-C2YK

(noting Des Moines Public Schools was the last school to drop its mandate). See Defs

Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 5–11.

Their claims are also moot. The Eighth Circuit held that their request for a

preliminary injunction was moot because of the changed circumstances of the

pandemic. See Arc of Iowa, 33 F.4th at 1044–45. That decision is now law of the case.

And since they seek the same relief permanently as an injunction or declaratory

judgment, the suit as a whole is also moot. See Defs Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in

Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 11–12.

And Plaintiffs are barred from asserting their federal-disability-law claims

because they haven’t exhausted administrative remedies. See Defs Gov. Reynolds and

Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 12–17. Even looking past this

defect, the novel claims fail as a matter of law because section 280.31 is a neutral,

nondiscriminatory State policy set in statute and thus doesn’t violate federal

disability law. Universal mask mandates in schools are not a reasonable modification

to this policy because it would be an undue burden, fundamentally alter the nature

of the State’s education program, and infringe on the rights of others. What’s more, a

contrary interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns. See Defs Gov.

Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 17–24.

—5—
Finally, Plaintiffs’ alternative claim based on ARPA also fails. Neither the text

of the ARPA statute nor the agency guidance requires schools to impose—or have the

discretion to impose—universal mask mandates. Interpreting either to impose such

a requirement would raise serious constitutional concerns. And regardless, ARPA

provides no private cause of action to enforce whatever requirements might be hidden

somewhere in it. See Defs Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss,

Doc. 90, at 24–29.

All Defendant school districts also moved to dismiss because the Complaint

fails to state a plausible claim against the districts or articulate how it is that they’re

indispensable or otherwise proper parties. See Defs. Ankeny Cmty Sch. Dist. et al.

Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 96-1 at 4–6. The State made a similar point

in its motion to dismiss in explaining that the entire complaint should be dismissed

against all parties. See See Defs Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to

Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 4 n.1. And all but one school district also argue—like the State—

that this case is moot. See Defs. Ankeny Cmty Sch. Dist. et al. Br. in Support of Mtn.

to Dismiss, Doc. 96-1 at 3–4. These are more valid reasons that this motion for

summary judgment should be denied.

It’s time for this suit to end. Rather than entering a declaratory judgment, the

court should dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)

II. Plaintiffs can’t obtain summary judgment on a declaratory judgment
that they haven’t asked for in their complaint and is divorced from
their asserted claims.

It’s fundamental that a Plaintiff cannot seek summary judgment for claims

they don’t allege in their complaint and relief they did not request in it. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or

defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is

sought.” (emphases added)); Winfrey v. City of Forrest City, Ark., 882 F.3d 757, 758–

—6—
59 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff could not bring a new claim at the summary

judgment stage that wasn’t alleged in the complaint); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald &

Co, 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff “may not amend her

complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary”); Crow v. Fabian, Civ. No.

08-3350, 2010 WL 2464865, at *18 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2010) (“If a party cannot raise a

new, previously unpled, claim in opposition to another party’s summary judgment

motion, then a party certainly cannot seek summary judgment for himself on a new

clim that has not been pled in his complaint.”); A.L. ex rel. Limkemann v. Jake’s

Fireworks, Inc. , 456 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1082 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (refusing to consider

new theories of negligence liability raised in summary judgment briefing and not pled

in complaint); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. HCS 410 Holdings, LLC, No. SA-19-CV-00780,

2021 WL 1550352, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021) (denying summary judgment on

declaratory relief “that is not requested in the Complaint”).

In this motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment

about the scope of section 280.31. First, they want a declaration that “The term ‘other

provision[s] of law’ as it is used in Section 280.31 include [sic] Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Pltfs’ Mtn.

for Summary Judgment, Doc. 88, at ¶ 2. And second, they want one “That Section

280.31 cannot be cited as a basis to deny a student’s request for reasonable

modification or accommodation that includes requiring others to wear masks.” Id.

But this isn’t what they ask for in their complaint.

There, they seek a very different declaratory judgment that section 280.31 and

its implementation “violates the ADA,” “subject[s] the Plaintiffs to discrimination in

violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,” and “is preempted by the American

Rescue Plan Act.” Compl., Doc. 1, at 37 ¶¶ 1–3. And they seek to “[p]reliminarily and

permanently enjoin the Defendants from enforcing” section 280.31. Id. ¶ 5. This

—7—
requested relief makes sense given that Plaintiffs asserted claims—and their

jurisdictional basis for being in this federal court—are that “Defendants have violated

the regulations and provisions of the ADA,” Compl, Doc. 1, ¶ 82; that they “have

violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,” Id. ¶ 92; and that section 280.31 is in

“direct conflict with federal law” and “must fall” because it is “preempted by the

American Rescue Plan Act. Id. ¶ 102; see also id. ¶ 28 (asserting federal question

jurisdiction “based upon claims brought under” the ADA and section 504).

Nowhere in their complaint do Plaintiffs seek a declaration about the meaning

of section 280.31 and the proper implementation of its express exception with

requests for modification or accommodation to schools. See Compl, Doc. 1, at 37 ¶¶ 1–

7. And this new relief doesn’t fit into the declarations they did seek because it’s not

alleging any violation of federal law—the only declarations that they sought. See id.

¶¶ 1-3. Even if they had made such a request—or it could somehow find a home

hidden in the relief requested—Plaintiffs don’t bring a claim of federal law that would

support such requested relief. See Compl, Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 76–102. The relief isn’t based

on any violation of federal law—and violations of federal law is all they allege in their

three claims. See id. Indeed, Plaintiffs requested relief here could be viewed as a

concession that their claims of a federal law violation or preemption lack merit.

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is thus a mismatch with their

complaint. It must be denied.

III. Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment that the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act are “other provision[s] of law” should be denied
because it resolves no dispute.

A court should only issue a declaratory judgment where it will resolve some

real dispute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(1) (“In a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction . . . .”); Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2012) (“‘Basically,

the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,

—8—
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal

interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

judgment.’” (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941);

see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647–48 (3d Cir. 1990)

(holding declaratory judgment improper where Defendant did not contest underlying

legal issue and the declaration—like this one—was conditioned on a hypothetical);

Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Dep’t of Rev. of State of Or., 724 F.2d 1294, 1298–99 (7th Cir.

1984) (holding that prudential considerations of comity with state agency made a

declaratory judgment inappropriate where state hadn’t yet taken adverse action).

Now that Plaintiffs acknowledge what the Eighth Circuit found the statute states

“unambiguously,” Arc of Iowa, 33 F.4th at 1045, there is no dispute to be resolved by

the first half of Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment.

Section 280.31 doesn’t prohibit any actions of a school where “the facial

covering . . . is required by . . . any other provision of law.” Iowa Code § 280.31 (2022).

The State has pointed to this express exception in the statute since its very first filing

in this proceeding. See TRO Resist., Doc. 21, at 4–5; Prelim. Inj. Resist., Doc. 42, at

6. And it continued to do so on appeal. See Pltfs’ App’x, R. Doc. 88-3, at 81. It is

Plaintiffs that disagreed with or ignored this interpretation and thus sought to

completely enjoin section 280.31. See Prelim. Inj. Reply, Doc. 48-1, at 9–10. But as

evidenced by the declaratory judgment they now seek, Plaintiffs apparently no longer

take this position. And properly so.

The Eighth Circuit rejected Plaintiffs prior position, agreeing with the State

that “[i]f another state or federal law requires masks, Section 280.31 does not conflict

with that law—and thus should not be completely enjoined.” Arc of Iowa, 33 F.4th at

1045. The court reasoned that section 280.31 “unambiguously states that Section

280.31 does not apply where ‘any other provision of law requires masks.’” Id. And it

—9—
explained that “‘[a]ny’ makes ‘provision of law’ a broad category that does not

distinguish between state or federal law.” Id. Thus, the court “emphasize[d] that the

parties and district court should pay particular attention to” this exception “to the

extent that this case continues.” Id.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention here, the Eighth Circuit didn’t “invite[]” or

“almost call[] on, the district court to enter such a judgment.” Pltfs’ Br. in Support of

Summary Judgment, Doc. 88-1, at 12. The Eighth Circuit’s analysis and emphasis for

“the parties and district court” was an explanation for why the statute “should not be

completely enjoined” as it had been before. The Eighth Circuit didn’t suggest any

relief is necessary or appropriate. Far from a call to action, the court even took care

to be clear it wasn’t even assuming the case should continue by conditioning its

admonition: “to the extent that this case continues.”

If Plaintiffs still think there is some confusion about whether the ADA and

section 504 of the rehabilitation are “any other provision of law” under section

280.31’s exception, the Eighth Circuit ended it. Besides being “unambiously state[d]”

in the Iowa Code, it’s now in the Federal Reporter. And if a dispute remains about

what requirements exist in the ADA or section 504, the proposed declaration does

nothing to resolve that dispute. Interests of comity between the federal courts and

state government make the declaratory judgment even less appropriate. See Alcan

Aluminum Ltd., 724 F.2d at 1298–99; Dixon v. City of St. Louis, 950 F.3d 1042, 1056

(8th Cir. 2020). The first half of Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment—while not wrong—

resolves no dispute and should not be entered.

— 10 —
IV. Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory judgment that section 280.31 can
never be cited as a reason for denying an accommodation request is
an inaccurate statement of the law that flips section 280.31 and federal
disability law around backwards.

The second half of Plaintiffs’ proposed declaratory judgment fares no better.

They propose declaring “That Section 280.31 cannot be cited as a basis to deny a

student’s request for reasonable modification or accommodation that includes

requiring others to wear masks.” Pltfs’ Mtn. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 88, at ¶ 2.

But this gets the law backwards. And if the Court reaches the merits of Plaintiffs’
request, it must be denied because its an inaccurate statement of the law.

Section 280.31 states that schools “shall not adopt, enforce, or implement a

policy that requires its employees, students, or members of the public to wear a facial

covering for any purpose while on the school district’s or accredited nonpublic school’s

property” unless one of its exceptions applies. Iowa Code § 280.31. One of those

exceptions would be if “the facial covering . . . is required by” section 504 or the ADA.

Id.; see also Arc of Iowa, 33 F.4th at 1045. But this still means that section 280.31

bans mask mandates in schools unless section 504 or the ADA require the mandate.

Yet Plaintiffs’ proposed declaration that section 280.31 can never be cited when

an accommodation or modification request is made under those statutes assumes that

a mask would always be required. That’s not the law. And Plaintiffs don’t even try to

make such an argument in their briefing. See Pltfs’ Br. in Support of Summary

Judgment, Doc. 88-1, at 11–14 (emphases added).

Assuming that federal disability requires reasonable modifications to a neutral

policy like this statute, but see Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 754, 756–

57 (8th Cir. 1998), the first step of the proper analysis of section 280.31 and federal

disability law is for the school to determine what would be reasonable

accommodations. In making this determination, they can and must consider Iowa

law—including section 280.31, which generally sets a policy of no mask mandates in

— 11 —
schools. Only if the school determines that the requested mask mandate is the only

reasonable accommodation—and thus is “required” by federal disability law, would it

be permitted to impose a mandate under the exception to section 280.31. See E.T. v.

Paxton, No. 21-51083, 2022 WL 2914732, at *4 (5th Cir. July 25, 2022) (“It’s well

settled that defendants—not plaintiffs—get to choose between reasonable

accommodations(s), and plaintiffs’ preferences between reasonable accommodation(s)

are irrelevant.”); E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2021). Valentine v.

Am. Home Shield Corp, 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1396 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Defs Gov. Reynolds

and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90, at 17–23.

Plaintiffs don’t present any argument that they could meet this standard. They

only go so far as to contend “masking requirements may be required as a reasonable

modification” or describing their claim as an allegation that “masking requirements

can be ‘a reasonable modification.’” Pltfs’ Br. in Support of Summary Judgment, Doc.

88-1, at 12 (emphases added). But a request for a teacher to mask when interacting

closely with a child is a very different request than a universal mandate on a

classroom, building, or district—all of which would be encompassed in Plaintiffs’

proposed blanket declaration. That’s wrong.

Indeed, the reasonable modification analysis is factually intensive and should

be conducted on a case-by-case basis. That’s why this suit, among other defects, is

barred by the exhaustion requirement and is not amenable to blanket declaratory

relief. See Defs Gov. Reynolds and Lebo’s Br. in Support of Mtn. to Dismiss, Doc. 90,

at 12–17. And even the dissenting opinion cited by Plaintiffs suggests the

determinations are to be “‘determine[d] on an individualized, case-by-case basis’” by

a school. Pltfs’ Br. in Support of Summary Judgment, Doc. 88-1, at 12 (quoting Arc of

Iowa, 33 F.4th at 1050 (Kelly, J., dissenting).

— 12 —
If Plaintiffs try to shift their arguments and assert that there is a factual basis

now to support such a blanket declaration, the State would seek leave to move to

delay ruling on summary judgment to have more time for discovery and development

of the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The State hasn’t done so already because

further factual development is irrelevant to the motion as currently argued by

Plaintiffs. And for many reasons it should be denied without having to delay

consideration further. Indeed, Defendants still have motions to dismiss pending. All

discovery deadlines have been stayed. See Text Order of June 22, 2022, Doc. 84. And

Defendants haven’t yet answered. It would be premature to grant summary judgment

resting on factual determinations that haven’t yet been fully developed.

While the State has indeed opined that “Plaintiffs might be able to request

some relief” to resolve their disputes over the scope of federal disability law’s

requirement, it didn’t suggest this declaratory relief. Pltfs’ Br. in Support of Summary

Judgment, Doc. 88-1, at 13. And the relief requested in this summary judgment

motion is no more appropriate than their now-vacated preliminary injunction

request. This motion should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be denied. And the Court

should instead grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss this case.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS J. MILLER
Attorney General of Iowa

JEFFREY S. THOMPSON
Solicitor General

/s/ Samuel P. Langholz
SAMUEL P. LANGHOLZ
Assistant Attorney General

— 13 —
Iowa Department of Justice
1305 E. Walnut Street, 2nd Floor
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
(515) 281-5164
(515) 281-4209 (fax)
sam.langholz@ag.iowa.gov
jeffrey.thompson@ag.iowa.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
GOVERNOR KIM REYNOLDS AND
ANN LEBO

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing instrument was
served upon all parties of record by delivery in the following
manner on August 5, 2022:

U.S. Mail Email
Hand Delivery Overnight Courier
Federal Express Other
CM/ECF

Signature: /s/ Samuel P. Langholz

— 14 —

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Motion for Summary Judgment

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