Memorandum Opinion — Panthera Enterprises, LLC (No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 317)

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No.SIGNED: April 1st, 2021
    2:19-bk-00787          Doc 317 Filed 04/03/21
   THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE DOCKET.
                                                                          ________________________________
                                                                    Entered 04/04/21 00:51:48 Page 1 of
                                                                                   Paul M. Black
   PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR ENTRY DATE.
                                             15                          UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE




                           IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
                         FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

   IN RE:                                                          )
                                                                   )        CHAPTER 7
   PANTHERA ENTERPRISES, LLC                                       )
                                                                   )        Case No. 2:19-bk-00787
         Debtor.                                                   )
                                                                   )

                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

              Before the Court is a Motion for Award of Fees Against Bernstein-Burkley, P.C. filed by

   Panthera Training, LLC pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 (the

   “Motion”). 1 Panthera Training alleges that Bernstein-Burkley, counsel for the Debtor, Panthera

   Enterprises, LLC (the “Debtor”), filed a complaint in bad faith and advanced it without first

   conducting a reasonable investigation. The Court held hearings on the matter on February 25,

   2021 and March 15, 2021. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Court took the matter

   under advisement. 2 Although the concerns expressed by Panthera Training about the actions

   taken by Debtor’s counsel are not without merit, if not outright disturbing, the Court will deny

   the Motion as untimely.




   1
    The individual attorneys at Bernstein-Burkley representing the Debtor were Robert S. Bernstein, who signed the
   Complaint, and John J. Richardson and Mark A. Lindsey, who advanced the litigation and defended the sanctions
   motion. No request for sanctions was made against any of them individually.
   2
       United States Bankruptcy Judge Paul M. Black, Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
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                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          A brief summary of the history and background of this matter is set forth below. A more

  detailed discussion of the various allegations in the Complaint will follow. The Debtor owns

  certain real property in Old Fields, West Virginia. AP ECF 1, p.2. 3 The property and its

  improvements (“the Facility”) are used to conduct military and law enforcement personnel

  trainings. Pursuant to a 2018 lease (the “Lease”), Panthera Training assumed operation of the

  Facility. AP ECF 1, Ex. A. The Lease required Panthera Training to pay the Debtor $52,000.00

  a month in “Base Rent” as well as “Additional Rent” according to a formula described in section

  four of the Lease. Id. It is uncontested that Panthera Training timely paid the Base Rent but the

  Debtor disputed the amount of Additional Rent due, along with other alleged defaults under the

  Lease. Notwithstanding express audit rights granted to it under the Lease, the Debtor did not

  undertake an audit of the Additional Rent calculations before filing the Complaint, nor did it hire

  a professional to do so on its behalf.

          On September 13, 2019, the Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. Bankr. ECF 1.

  On October 17, 2019, the Debtor filed a Complaint for Turnover and Possession of Real and

  Personal Property and for Preliminary Injunction Against Possession of Property (the

  “Complaint”) against Panthera Training which commenced Adversary Proceeding No. 2:19-ap-

  00051 (the “Adversary Proceeding”). AP ECF 1. Panthera Training filed an answer which

  asserted counterclaims of fraud, breach of contract, tortious interference, and included a request

  for a preliminary injunction. AP ECF 10. After it came to the attention of the parties that one of

  the Debtor’s principals, James Punelli, was diverting funds of the estate, the Debtor’s case was

  converted to Chapter 7 on July 21, 2020. Bankr. ECF 202. Aaron C. Amore was appointed the


  3
    All references to documents filed in Adversary Proceeding 2:19-ap-00051 will be preceded by “AP ECF” and
  references to documents filed in the in underlying bankruptcy case will be preceded by “Bankr. ECF”.

                                                        2
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  Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”). Shortly after being appointed, the Trustee filed an application

  to employ Kelly T. Smith, CPA of Smith, Elliot, Kearns & Company, LLC to investigate the

  allegations contained in the Adversary Proceeding. Bankr. ECF 216. The accountant

  investigated the allegations in detail and found them baseless. The Trustee then engaged in

  settlement discussions with Panthera Training, and a Rule 9019 motion to compromise was filed

  and properly noticed, requesting that the Court dismiss the Complaint and the parties’ various

  claims against each other with prejudice. The Order of dismissal with prejudice was entered on

  December 15, 2020. AP ECF 100. The Adversary Proceeding was administratively closed on

  January 4, 2021.

         After the Adversary Proceeding was closed, on January 8, 2021, Panthera Training filed

  the Motion in the main bankruptcy case asserting that Bernstein-Burkley failed to conduct a

  reasonable investigation before filing the Complaint and that they filed the Complaint for

  improper purposes. Bankr. ECF 265. Bernstein-Burkley filed an objection to the Motion asking

  the Court to deny the Motion for various reasons, including that the movant did not comply with

  Rule 9011(c) and that Bernstein-Burkley had ample bases on which to file the Complaint.

  Bankr. ECF 278. The Court held an initial hearing on February 25, 2021 and gave the parties

  time to attempt to resolve the dispute. At the second hearing on March 15, 2021, the parties

  advised that they were unable to reach an agreement and asked the Court to resolve the

  controversy, which it now does.

                                          JURISDICTION

         This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

  1334(a) and 157(a). The Court concludes that this matter is a “core” bankruptcy proceeding

  within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409.



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                                      CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

           I.     Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 (“Rule 9011”)

           All attorneys before a federal court, including those representing the estate of a debtor in

  possession, have duties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”). Rule 9011

  conforms to Rule 11, and accordingly, “[c]ourts may look to case law interpreting Rule 11 when

  deciding cases under Bankruptcy Rule 9011.” In re Babcock, 258 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. E.D.Va.

  2001) (citing McGahren v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (In re Weiss), 111 F.3d 1159, 1170

  (4th Cir. 1997)); In re Atlas Mach. & Iron Works, Inc., 190 B.R. 796, 806 (Bankr. E.D.Va.

  1995).

           Rule 9011 provides, among other things, that the signature of an attorney on a pleading

  constitutes a certificate that the content of the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted

  by existing law. The “well grounded in fact” requirement demands, at least, that the attorney not

  accept the client’s version of certain facts “on faith.” At a minimum, the attorney has a duty to

  probe the client carefully for the facts before including them in any document signed by the

  attorney or in any other way presented to the court. See Fleming Sales Co., Inc. v. Bailey, 611

  F.Supp. 507, 519 (D.C.Ill. 1985).

           The primary purpose of Rule 11 is “to deter baseless filings ... and thus, … streamline the

  administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.

  384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). The focus of Rule 11 “is ex ante (what should have been

  done before filing) rather than ex post (how things turned out)”. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental

  Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989). Rule 9011, like Rule 11, “only applies to acts

  undertaken in a case before the court.” Davant v. Bailey (In re Bailey), No. 09–2564, Adv. No.




                                                     4
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  10–15, 2010 WL 3277908, at *2, (Bankr. N.D.W.Va. Aug. 13, 2010). Rule 9011 provides in

  part:

          (a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, written motion, and other paper, except a
          list, schedule, or statement, or amendments thereto, shall be signed by at least one
          attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name. …
          (b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
          filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other
          paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s
          knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
          circumstances,
                 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
          to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
                 (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
          by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
          reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
                  (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
          or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
          reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
                  (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
          specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
          (c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
          determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
          conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law
          firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the
          violation.
  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(a)-(c).

          Determining whether an investigation was reasonable pursuant to Rule 9011(b)(3)

  requires a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis dependent on all the circumstances. Cooter &

  Gell, 496 U.S. at 404. If a court finds that Rule 9011(b) has been violated, Rule 9011(c) permits

  the court, within its discretion, to impose sanctions upon the offending attorney or party. See

  Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Even if the district court concludes

  that the assertion of a given claim violates Rule 11, however, the decision whether or not to




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  impose sanctions is a matter for the court’s discretion.”). That same discretion applies to a

  bankruptcy court.

  II.    Rule 9011(c)(1)(A): Safe-harbor Provision

         If Rule 9011 sanctions are sought by motion, the movant must comply with the safe-

  harbor provision contained in Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) which requires the offending party be given

  notice and an opportunity to cure the offending conduct. “The safe-harbor provision is a strict

  procedural requirement.” Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory,

  Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012). Specifically, the safe-harbor provision requires:

         The motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court unless,
         within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
         prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is
         not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(1)(A).

         Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) grants “a time period between the time of service and the time for

  filing, [which] is designed to allow for the correction of the alleged violation.” 10 Collier on

  Bankruptcy ¶ 9011.06[1][b] (15th ed. rev. 2010). In Rector v. Approved Federal Savings Bank,

  265 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2001), the Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]he primary purpose for [the 1993

  amendment that added the safe-harbor provision] was to provide immunity from sanctions to

  those litigants who self-regulate by withdrawing potentially offending filings or contentions

  within the 21–day period.” Id. at 251 (citing Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 (6th

  Cir. 1997)). Consistent with that purpose, the court held in Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v.

  Datanet Engineering, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2004), that an award of sanctions was not




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  permissible where the party who filed the offending motion was not provided an opportunity to

  withdraw the motion in question before the court ruled on the motion. 4

  III.     Analysis

           Panthera Training alleges that Bernstein-Burkley filed the Complaint in bad faith and for

  improper purposes without first conducting a reasonable investigation as Rule 9011 requires.

  Bankr. ECF 265, p.1. Panthera Training seeks sanctions, in the total amount of $63,556.00, as

  reimbursement for attorneys’ fees incurred by Panthera Training in defense of the Complaint. Id.

  at 13.

           A. Application of Rule 9011

           This case pivots on the procedural requirements of Rule 9011. Rule 9011(c)(1)(A)

  requires a party seeking Rule 11 sanctions first to serve a proposed motion on the opposing party

  and to give that party at least 21 days to withdraw or correct the offending matter. Only after 21

  days has passed may the motion be advanced. As the Seventh Circuit put it: “[t]o mix naval

  metaphors, the party seeking sanctions must first fire a warning shot that gives the opponent time

  to find a safe harbor.” N. Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.

  2017).

           Here, the party seeking sanctions failed to comply with that procedure. First, Panthera

  Training fired no warning shot. Counsel did not send the proposed motion for sanctions or even a

  notice to Bernstein-Burkley before filing it with the Court. 5 See Brickwood, 369 F.3d at 396



  4
   Other courts similarly have concluded that a failure to comply with the safe-harbor provision contained in Rule 11
  and Rule 9011 precludes the imposition of sanctions pursuant to subparagraph (c)(1)(A). See, e.g., Gordon v.
  Unifund CCR Partners, 345 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789
  (9th Cir. 2001); Aero–Tech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528–29 (10th Cir. 1997); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213,
  216 (5th Cir. 1995); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1995).
  5
   Whether a notice is sufficient to comply with the warning-shot/safe-harbor requirement is controversial. Most
  circuits, including the fourth, say no. See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Dev. Corp., 773 F.3d 764, 767–68 (6th Cir.

                                                           7
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  (“Failure to timely raise the safe-harbor issue amounts to a forfeiture of the issue” and “a district

  court exceeds its authority by imposing sanctions requested through a procedurally-deficient

  Rule 11 motion”). Assuming for present purposes the Complaint was frivolous, more on that

  later, Bernstein-Burkley was not afforded the opportunity to self-regulate. This contravenes the

  entire purpose of the safe-harbor provision. See Rector, 265 F.3d 248. This procedural defect

  alone is fatal.

           Second, in the circumstances of this case, the Motion is untimely. As to timing, the

  Fourth Circuit has observed that a motion for sanctions should be “served promptly after the

  inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, [it] may be viewed as untimely.” Hunter v.

  Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory

  committee’s note). Moreover, “the ‘safe harbor’ provisions of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) preclude the

  serving and filing of any Rule 11 motion after conclusion of the case.” Id.; see also In re Pennie

  & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 89 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ‘safe harbor’ provision functions as a

  practical time limit, and motions have been disallowed as untimely when filed after a point in the

  litigation when the lawyer sought to be sanctioned lacked an opportunity to correct or withdraw

  the challenged submission.”). 6 Here, the Motion was filed after the Adversary Proceeding was

  already settled, dismissed with prejudice, and closed. 7 If the Adversary Proceeding was as




  2014) (reviewing circuit split: Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have rejected
  “substantial compliance,” and only Seventh Circuit has adopted it).

  6
    Consistent with Hunter, the Northern District of West Virginia has previously interpreted this “safe harbor”
  provision to not only provide a party the opportunity to cure a defect, but also to preclude Rule 11 motions once a
  matter has been ultimately decided by the court. Balcar v. Bell & Assocs., LLC, 295 F.Supp.2d 635, 638–39
  (N.D.W.Va. 2003); Givens v. Criswell, No. 5:08CV25, 2010 WL 10862445, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. June 24, 2010), aff'd
  sub nom. Givens v. Main St. Bank, No. 5:08CV25, 2010 WL 2949621 (N.D.W. Va. July 22, 2010).

  7
    In bankruptcy, adversary proceedings generally are viewed as “stand-alone lawsuits,” and final judgments issued
  in adversary proceedings are usually appealable as if the dispute had arisen outside of bankruptcy. See generally 16
  Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction 2d § 3926.2 (2d ed.1996). In re Boca Arena,

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  baseless as Panthera Training contends, it should have acted sooner. Much sooner. To follow

  the Seventh Circuit’s lead and use another naval metaphor, that ship has sailed. 8

           While the Court shares many of Panthera Training’s misgivings about Bernstein-

  Burkley’s conduct, and will address those deficiencies in the subsequent section, the Court will

  not contravene the plain language of Rule 9011. The Motion’s procedural defects preclude the

  Court from granting the relief requested.

           B. Counsel’s Conduct of the Case

           Though Bernstein-Burkley has avoided sanctions under Rule 9011, the Court is troubled

  by the Motion and what transpired in this case. The Court would be remiss if it did not address

  those concerns. Had the Motion abided by the Rule 9011(c)(1)(A) procedural safeguards, and

  had the Court been on the case at the time, the Motion may well have been granted. The record

  reveals a scant, if any at all, investigation by the Chapter 11 debtor’s counsel into the facts. A

  great deal of time, effort, and money was expended in this litigation that easily could have been

  avoided.

           At a minimum, Rule 9011(b)(3) places on attorneys a duty to make some affirmative

  investigation into the facts represented in documents submitted to the court. In re Obasi, No.

  10–10494 SHL, 2011 WL 6336153 at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2011). While “the

  investigation performed by a signatory need not be to the point of certainty to be reasonable,” a

  “signer must explore readily available avenues of factual inquiry.” Id. Though an attorney may



  Inc., 184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999). A request for Rule 11 sanctions in stand-alone litigation is one that
  should have been brought in the stand-alone litigation.

  8
   At argument on the Motion, counsel for Panthera Training alternatively asked that the Court exercise its inherent
  authority and impose sanctions. However, that request was never made in Panthera Training’s pleading, and the
  Court will neither award that relief now nor consider it in a second follow up. This matter has been fully briefed and
  argued. The Court trusts that this opinion will give Bernstein-Burkley the opportunity to reflect on its litigation
  conduct going forward.

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   generally rely on objectively reasonable client representations, the attorney must independently

   verify publicly available facts to determine if the client representations are objectively

   reasonable. Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp. 48 F.3d 1320, 1329 (2d Cir. 1995). There is no

   evidence that was done here.

          Here, even a perfunctory investigation by Bernstein-Burkley into Panthera Training’s

   financial records could have stopped this litigation at the outset. The gravamen of the Complaint

   is that Panthera Training owed the Debtor “Additional Rent … for the months of October 2018,

   November 2018, December 2018, April 2019, May 2019, and June 2019 in the total amount of

   $218,469.00.” AP ECF 1, p. 3. Section four of the Lease defines “Additional Rent” as “an

   amount equal to fifty-percent (50%) of the Tenant’s prior month’s Profit” based upon Panthera

   Training’s taxable income. AP ECF 1, Ex. A. Further, section four provides: “[u]pon request of

   Landlord, Tenant shall fully cooperate with a request to audit Tenant’s books and records,

   supplying all documents and backup requested.” AP ECF 1, Ex. A. At both the February 25,

   2021 and March 15, 2021 hearings, counsel for Panthera Training advised the Court that he had

   urged Bernstein-Burkley to inspect Panthera Training’s financials records. Panthera Training

   contends it was apparent all along that no additional rents were owed based upon the formula set

   out in the Lease. Yet, despite its ability to do so, the Debtor never exercised its audit rights.

          When the Trustee was appointed, he promptly hired Kelly T. Smith, CPA as an

   independent accountant to conduct an audit. The Trustee’s audit revealed Panthera Training’s

   taxable income did not merit any “Additional Rent” due under the Lease. The audit cost the

   estate only $6,102.00, and tens of thousands of dollars of attorney’s fees have been attributed to

   this litigation on both sides. The Court finds Bernstein-Burkley’s explanations for failure to




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   audit Panthera Training’s books and records before filing the Complaint strain credibility. 9 It

   had the express contractual right to do so and chose not to. To the extent it relied on James

   Punelli as the primary basis for its factual investigation, that was clearly grossly deficient. 10 As

   stated in In re Wilde Horse Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 841 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991), “the

   Rule provides, among other things, that the signature of an attorney on a petition, pleading or

   motion constitutes a certificate that to the best of the attorney knowledge, information or belief

   ‘formed after reasonable inquiry,’ the content of the document is ‘well grounded in fact and is

   warranted by existing law....’ The ‘well grounded in fact’ requirement demands, at least, that the

   attorney not accept the client’s (or the client’s principal’s) version of certain facts ‘on faith,’ but

   at a minimum the attorney has a duty to probe the client carefully for the facts before they are

   included in any document signed by the attorney or in any other way presented to the Court.”

            The Court is also troubled by the Debtor’s misconduct documented elsewhere in this

   case, and counsel’s failure to bring that to the surface in a timely manner. Such conduct has

   caused substantial legal fees to be incurred by both the estate and other parties. This led the

   Court to enter an order effectively reducing Bernstein-Burkley’s fee request as Chapter 11

   counsel by approximately fifty percent in the main bankruptcy case. Bankr. ECF 311. However,

   the procedural posture being as such, the Court will be guided by the Fourth Circuit’s admonition

   in Brickwood that a trial court “exceeds it authority by imposing sanctions requested through a

   procedurally-deficient Rule 11 motion.” Brickwood, 369 F.3d at 396.




   9
     Panthera Training ascribes various ulterior motives to the Debtor’s conduct, including manufacturing a breach of
   the Lease in an attempt to regain possession of the property, to which the Court expresses no opinions.
   10
     The Debtor alleged other breaches of the Lease by Panthera Training, such as failure to pay real estate taxes and
   failure to maintain proper insurance, which were also subsequently debunked and proven meritless.

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                                         CONCLUSION

         For all of the above reasons, the Motion is denied. A separate Order will be entered

   contemporaneously herewith




                                                 12
         No. 2:19-bk-00787                  Doc 317            United States
                                                              Filed  04/03/21Bankruptcy Court 04/04/21 00:51:48 Page 13 of
                                                                                   Entered
                                                                             15of West Virginia
                                                              Northern District
In re:                                                                                                Case No. 19-00787-pmb
Panthera Enterprises, LLC                                                                             Chapter 7
       Debtor
                                                     CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE
District/off: 0424-2                                                  User: ad                                                                    Page 1 of 3
Date Rcvd: Apr 01, 2021                                               Form ID: pdfdoc                                                           Total Noticed: 12
The following symbols are used throughout this certificate:
Symbol          Definition
+                Addresses marked '+' were corrected by inserting the ZIP, adding the last four digits to complete the zip +4, or replacing an incorrect ZIP. USPS
                 regulations require that automation-compatible mail display the correct ZIP.


Notice by first class mail was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center on Apr 03, 2021:
Recip ID                   Recipient Name and Address
db                         Panthera Enterprises, LLC, 2506 Fishpond Road, Old Fields, WV 26845
aty                    +   Mark A. Lindsay, 707 Grant Street, Suite 2200, Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1945
cr                     +   Darrick and Emily Gust, c/o Spencer D. Elliott, Lewis Glasser PLLC, 300 Summers Street Suite 700, Charleston, WV 25301 US
                           25301-1632
acc                    +   John Lantzy, Smith, Elliott, Kearns & Company, LLC, 19405 Emerald Square, Suite 1400, Hagerstown, MD 21742-3666
acc                    +   Kelly T. Smith, Smith, Elliot, Kearns & Company, LLC, 19405 Emerald Square, Suite 1400, Hagerstown, MD 21742-3666
cr                         Panthera Training, LLC, 2506 Fish Pond Road, Old Fields, WV 26845
cr                     +   SMI, LLC, 123 East Main Street, 5th Floor, Charlottesville, VA 22902-6800
cr                     +   West Virginia Economic Development Authority, 180 Association DR, Charleston, WV 25311-1217
cr                     +   West Virginia Paving, Inc., c/o Stephen L. Thompson, Barth & Thompson, P. O. Box 129, Charleston, WV 25321 UNITED STATES
                           25321-0129
cr                         West Virginia State Tax Department, Bankruptcy Unit, P.O. Box 766, Charleston, WV 25323-0766

TOTAL: 10

Notice by electronic transmission was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center.
Electronic transmission includes sending notices via email (Email/text and Email/PDF), and electronic data interchange (EDI). Electronic transmission is in Eastern
Standard Time.
Recip ID                 Notice Type: Email Address                                     Date/Time                 Recipient Name and Address
aty                    + Email/Text: kburkley@bernsteinlaw.com
                                                                                        Apr 01 2021 19:26:00      Bernstein-Burkley, P.C., 707 Grant Street, Suite
                                                                                                                  2200, Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1945
cr                     + Email/Text: brapp@wtplaw.com
                                                                                        Apr 01 2021 19:26:00      PJSC Aviation Company Ukrainian Helicopters,
                                                                                                                  c/o Brandy M. Rapp, Esq., Whiteford, Taylor &
                                                                                                                  Preston LLP, 10 S. Jefferson Street, Suite 1110,
                                                                                                                  Roanoke, VA 24011-1314

TOTAL: 2


                                                       BYPASSED RECIPIENTS
The following addresses were not sent this bankruptcy notice due to an undeliverable address, *duplicate of an address listed above, *P duplicate of a
preferred address, or ## out of date forwarding orders with USPS.
Recip ID         Bypass Reason Name and Address
cr                             Anthony McIntyre
cr                             Bruce Hardy
cr                             Rob Duncan, Manager/Duncan Development Group, LLC
cr                             Rob Duncan, Manager/TR&L, LLC,, a Virginia Limited Liability Company, Successor to SMI, LLC,, a Virginia Limited Liability
                               Company
cr                             Stacie Hardy
cr                             Timothy Miller

TOTAL: 6 Undeliverable, 0 Duplicate, 0 Out of date forwarding address


                                                      NOTICE CERTIFICATION
I, Joseph Speetjens, declare under the penalty of perjury that I have sent the attached document to the above listed entities
in the manner shown, and prepared the Certificate of Notice and that it is true and correct to the best of my information and
belief.
District/off:
        No. 0424-2
              2:19-bk-00787              Doc 317           FiledUser: ad
                                                                 04/03/21     Entered 04/04/21 00:51:48                           PagePage
                                                                                                                                       14 2ofof 3
Date Rcvd: Apr 01, 2021                                         Form ID:15
                                                                         pdfdoc                                                         Total Noticed: 12

Meeting of Creditor Notices only (Official Form 309): Pursuant to Fed .R. Bank. P.2002(a)(1), a notice containing the
complete Social Security Number (SSN) of the debtor(s) was furnished to all parties listed. This official court copy contains
the redacted SSN as required by the bankruptcy rules and the Judiciary's privacy policies.

Date: Apr 03, 2021                                        Signature:            /s/Joseph Speetjens




                                CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
The following persons/entities were sent notice through the court's CM/ECF electronic mail (Email) system on April 1, 2021 at the address(es) listed below:
Name                             Email Address
Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Defendant Panthera Enterprises LLC amorewvt@gmail.com,
                                 aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 amorewvt@gmail.com aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Plaintiff Aaron Amore Trustee amorewvt@gmail.com,
                                 aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Counter-Defendant Panthera Enterprises LLC amorewvt@gmail.com,
                                 aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Trustee Aaron C. Amore amorewvt@gmail.com aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Counter-Claimant Panthera Enterprises LLC amorewvt@gmail.com,
                                 aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Aaron C. Amore
                                 on behalf of Plaintiff Panthera Enterprises LLC amorewvt@gmail.com,
                                 aca@trustesolutions.net;jackiewvt@gmail.com;annwvt@gmail.com

Anita M. Swaton
                                 Anita_Swaton@wvnb.uscourts.gov

Brandy M. Rapp
                                 on behalf of Creditor PJSC Aviation Company Ukrainian Helicopters brapp@wtplaw.com twhitt@wtplaw.com

Debra Lee Allen
                                 on behalf of Plaintiff West Virginia Economic Development Authority dallen@spilmanlaw.com

Debra Lee Allen
                                 on behalf of Defendant West Virginia Economic Development Authority dallen@spilmanlaw.com

Debra Lee Allen
                                 on behalf of Creditor West Virginia Economic Development Authority dallen@spilmanlaw.com

Douglas Kahle
                                 on behalf of Creditor Panthera Training LLC dkahle@basnightkinser.com

Douglas Kahle
                                 on behalf of Plaintiff Panthera Training LLC dkahle@basnightkinser.com

Douglas Kahle
                                 on behalf of Defendant Panthera Training LLC dkahle@basnightkinser.com

Douglas Kahle
                                 on behalf of Counter-Claimant Panthera Training LLC dkahle@basnightkinser.com

Elizabeth B. Carroll
                                 elizabeth_carroll@vawb.uscourts.gov

Eric Michael Wilson
                                 on behalf of Creditor West Virginia State Tax Department eric.m.wilson@wv.gov lora.l.rutledge@wv.gov

Gary O. Kinder
                                 on behalf of U.S. Trustee United States Trustee gary.o.kinder@usdoj.gov

John J. Richardson
                                 on behalf of Debtor Panthera Enterprises LLC jrichardson@bernsteinlaw.com
District/off:
        No. 0424-2
              2:19-bk-00787         Doc 317           FiledUser: ad
                                                            04/03/21     Entered 04/04/21 00:51:48                            PagePage
                                                                                                                                   15 3ofof 3
Date Rcvd: Apr 01, 2021                                    Form ID:15
                                                                    pdfdoc                                                       Total Noticed: 12
John J. Richardson
                            on behalf of Attorney Bernstein-Burkley P.C. jrichardson@bernsteinlaw.com

Julia A. Chincheck
                            on behalf of Counter-Claimant Panthera Training LLC jchincheck@bowlesrice.com

Julia A. Chincheck
                            on behalf of Plaintiff Panthera Training LLC jchincheck@bowlesrice.com

Julia A. Chincheck
                            on behalf of Creditor Panthera Training LLC jchincheck@bowlesrice.com

Julia A. Chincheck
                            on behalf of Defendant Panthera Training LLC jchincheck@bowlesrice.com

Michael R. Proctor
                            on behalf of Plaintiff Panthera Training LLC mproctor@bowlesrice.com, lcrown@bowlesrice.com

Robert S. Bernstein, Esq
                            on behalf of Debtor Panthera Enterprises LLC rbernstein@bernsteinlaw.com,
                            cwirick@bernsteinlaw.com;cwirick@ecf.courtdrive.com;rbernstein@ecf.courtdrive.com

Sabrina B. Lee
                            sabrina_lee@vawb.uscourts.gov

Salene Rae Mazur Kraemer
                            on behalf of Debtor Panthera Enterprises LLC skraemer@bernsteinlaw.com, salene@ecf.courtdrive.com,

Spencer D. Elliott
                            on behalf of Creditor Darrick and Emily Gust selliott@lgcr.com

Stephen L. Thompson
                            on behalf of Creditor West Virginia Paving Inc. sthompson@barth-thompson.com,
                            office@barth-thompson.com;chris@barth-thompson.com

Travis Alan Knobbe
                            on behalf of Creditor West Virginia Economic Development Authority tknobbe@spilmanlaw.com dambrose@spilmanlaw.com

United States Trustee
                            ustpregion04.ct.ecf@usdoj.gov

William J. Leon
                            on behalf of Counter-Defendant Bill V. Neff Sr. jayleon@comcast.net

William J. Leon
                            on behalf of Creditor SMI LLC jayleon@comcast.net

William J. Leon
                            on behalf of Plaintiff Bill V. Neff Sr. jayleon@comcast.net

Zachary James Rosencrance
                            on behalf of Plaintiff Panthera Training LLC zrosencrance@bowlesrice.com, ajones@bowlesrice.com

Zachary James Rosencrance
                            on behalf of Defendant Panthera Training LLC zrosencrance@bowlesrice.com, ajones@bowlesrice.com

Zachary James Rosencrance
                            on behalf of Creditor Panthera Training LLC zrosencrance@bowlesrice.com, ajones@bowlesrice.com

Zachary James Rosencrance
                            on behalf of Counter-Claimant Panthera Training LLC zrosencrance@bowlesrice.com, ajones@bowlesrice.com


TOTAL: 40


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