Panthera Training, LLC’s Motion for Award of Fees Against Bernstein-Burkley, P.C. — In re Panthera Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 2:19-bk-00787 (Doc 265)

Summary

Panthera Training, LLC filed this motion on 01/08/21 as Doc 265 in Case No. 2:19-bk-00787 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, asking the court to sanction the law firm Bernstein-Burkley, P.C. under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Training leased the debtor's 750 acre tactical training facility in Hardy County, West Virginia from June 1, 2018 and paid $52,000 monthly rent directly to the West Virginia Economic Development Authority. The motion argues that the firm filed a baseless complaint against Training in Adversary Proceeding No. 2:19-ap-51 without a reasonable investigation and for improper purposes, citing the Chapter 7 Trustee's finding that the claims were baseless. It asks the court to order the firm to show cause and to reimburse $63,556.00 in legal fees, backed by an affidavit of Training's Chief Executive Officer, Robert L. Starer.

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No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 1 of
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re:

PANTHERA ENTERPRISES, LLC Case No. 2:19-BK-787
Chapter 7

PANTHERA TRAINING, LLC’S MOTION FOR AWARD OF FEES AGAINST
BERNSTEIN-BURKLEY, P.C.

Now comes Panthera Training, LLC (“Training’’), by counsel, and states the following in
support of its Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees against the law firm of Bernstein-Burkley,
P.C. (“the Firm”) for violations of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 by; (1) failing to conduct a reasonable
investigation before filing a baseless Complaint (“Complaint”) in Adversary Proceeding, A.P.)
No. 2:19-ap-51 (“Adversary Proceeding”), and (2) filing the Complaint for improper purposes.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a Commercial Lease dated June 1, 2018 (“the Lease”), Training leased a 750
acre tactical training facility located in Hardy County, West Virginia (“the Facility”) from
Panthera Enterprises, LLC (“the Debtor’). Doc. #1 Ex. A.! Prior to June 1, 2018, the Debtor
leased the Facility to its subsidiary, Panthera Training Center, LLC (“Center”), which conducted
training courses for military and government agencies. The Lease recites that Center was not able
to pay its lease obligations, causing the Debtor to default on its two loans owed to the West
Virginia Economic Development Authority (““WVEDA”). The Debtor asked Training, and
Training agreed, to take over operations at the Facility and pay $52,000 monthly rent directly to

WVEDA in an effort to forestall WVEDA's foreclosing on the Facility. Doc. #1, Ex. A.

' References to documents filed in the Adversary Proceeding will be designated as “Doc. # °°,
and references to documents filed in the underlying bankruptcy matter will be preceded by
“Bankr.”.
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 2 of
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The record of this case reflects that WVEDA agreed to yet another forbearance agreement
with the Debtor when Training stepped in. Bankr. Doc. 53. WVEDA continued to forbear on the
exercise of its foreclosure rights until September 2019. Foreclosure was commenced after the
WVEDA learned that, among other things, the Debtor had failed to pay its 2017 real estate taxes
owed on the Facility, resulting in auction of the 2017 tax liens in November 2018 by the Hardy
County Sheriff. Jd. The foreclosure sale was scheduled for Monday, September 16, 2019. The
Debtor filed its voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection on Friday, September 13, 2019. Jd.

Training conducted business at the Facility, paid $52,000 on the first of each month
directly to WVEDA, and never heard any complaint from the Debtor regarding Training’s
performance under, or compliance with, the Lease until after the Debtor filed its petition for
bankruptcy protection. In the initial status conference, the Firm’s Robert Bernstein announced, to
Training’s surprise, that one of the Debtor’s fist actions was going to be to attempt to terminate
the Lease. True to his word, on October 17, 2019, the Firm initiated an adversary proceeding (No.
2:19-ap-00051) (“the Adversary Proceeding”) against Training with its Complaint for Turnover
and Possession of Real and Personal Property and for Preliminary Injunction Against Possession
of Property (“the Complaint”). Doc #1.

The Firm vigorously prosecuted the Adversary Proceeding until the afternoon before the
scheduled July 17, 2020 hearing on Training’s and WVEDA’s Motion to Convert to a Chapter 7,
when apparently the Firm accepted the fact that the Debtor’s manager, James Punelli (“Punelli’”),
had been embezzling the Debtor’s funds. In their Motion to Convert, WVEDA and Training
pointed out substantial “red flag” irregularities in the Debtor's Monthly Operating Reports, which
showed funds being diverted to the Debtor's subsidiary, Center. (See Debtor’s October 2019

Operating Report, Bankr. Doc 63, p. 8.) Copies of Center’s bank records were obtained by
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 3 of
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Training pursuant to a subpoena served in a state court action against Center. These records
showed the Debtor's funds that were diverted to Center were then distributed to the Debtor's
principals or otherwise used for the personal benefit the Debtor’s principals. Bankr. Doc 162. If
the Firm had reviewed the Debtor’s October 2019 Operating Report and investigated the $134,160
that was noted as “paid in error” to Center, it could have easily obtained Center’s bank records,
which would have revealed the misappropriation of the Debtor’s funds, and prevented Punelli’s
ensuing embezzlement, and the filing of the baseless Complaint.

Consistent with its inattention to the Debtor’s Operating Reports, the evidence
demonstrates that the Firm signed and filed the Complaint in bad faith and in violation of Rule
9011(b)(1) and (3). The Firms did not conduct a reasonable inquiry of the facts before filing the
Complaint. The Complaint was baseless. Moreover, as determined by Aaron Amore, Esq., the
Chapter 7 Trustee (“Trustee”), “evidence to directly refute the claims was readily available.” Doc
#245, p. 13-14.

In addition to the Complaint being baseless, the Complaint was filed for improper purposes.
After conducting his investigation into whether there were any the merits in the Debtor’s claims
asserted in the Complaint, and engaging a CPA to audit Training’s books and records, the Trustee
concluded that the Adversary Proceeding “appear[ed] to have been a tactic to breach the lease with
[Training] to regain possession of the training facility without any real lawful basis.” Doc #247, p.
8. Training further contends that the Adversary Proceeding was also initiated as a ruse to give the
Debtor an excuse to withhold payment of $172,000 owed to Training. This facilitated Punelli’s

embezzlement of most of the Debtor’s funds.
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LEGAL AUTHORITY

As addressed below, a court may impose sanctions if it finds a violation of any one of the
four subdivisions of Rule 9011(b). The four subdivisions of Rule 9011(b) generally fall into two
categories: the frivolousness clauses (or the objective component), and the improper
purpose clause (or the subjective component). The frivolousness clauses correspond to Rule
9011(b)(2)-(4) and require that a party's attorney must perform a reasonable preliminary
investigation of the facts and the applicable law before filing a paper in federal
court. The improper purpose clause corresponds to Rule 9011(b)(1) and prohibits the filing of a
pleading for an improper purpose.

The Complaint was frivolous, and it was filed for improper purposes, in violation of case
law addressing bad _ faith ffilings, and in violation of Rule 9011(b).

Frivolous Pleadings. “The legal papers that an attorney files in a case must be grounded

in both a nonfrivolous legal theory and well-founded factual contentions and/or denials that, at a
minimum, have a reasonable possibility of having evidentiary support after further investigation
and discovery. Because objective reasonable inquiries must first be made, good faith per se is not
enough to comply with the frivolousness clauses. A court's inquiry should focus on the merits of
the motion gleaned from the facts and law known or available to the attorney at the time of filing.
See In re Dernick 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1345, 15*.

As stated in Dernick, the Court must first determine whether the attorney’s filing was
objectively frivolous, in view of the law or facts, and then, if it is, whether the attorney would have
been aware of its frivolousness if he had conducted a reasonable inquiry. If the attorney “failed to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the matter, the Court is obligated to impose sanctions even if

[the attorney] had a good faith belief that the [pleading] was sound.” Jd.
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A bankruptcy court may independently assess violations of Rule 9011. See Rule
9011(c)(1)(B). On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct
that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.". See Flemino v. Vulcan Recoveries,
LLC. 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 977*.

Under Rule 9011(c)(1)(B), bankruptcy courts have the authority to sanction attorneys who
present, through signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading that is frivolous.
Winterton v. Humitech of N. Cal. LLC (In re Blue Pine, Inc.), 457 B.R. 64, 75 (9 Cir.
2011). According to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit, "[t]he word 'frivolous,'
when used in connection with sanctions denotes a filing that is both baseless—lacks factual
foundation—and made without reasonable competent inquiry." /d. (citing Townsend v. Holman
Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9™ Cir. 1990). An attorney, then, "has a duty to conduct a
reasonable factual investigation as well as to perform adequate legal research that confirms that
his position is warranted by existing law (or by a good faith argument for a modification or
extension of existing law." Id. (citing Christian y. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9" Cir.
2002)). "Thus, a finding that there was no reasonable inquiry into either the facts or the law is
tantamount to a finding of frivolousness." Jd. (citing Townsend, 929 F, 2d at 1362).

Pleadings filed for an Improper Purpose. As the Court referenced during the December

17, 2020 hearing on the Firm’s Fee Application, Rule 9011 informs that when the Firm filed the
Complaint, its attorney certified “that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed
after an enquiry reasonable under the circumstances”, that; (1) the Complaint was not being filed
“for any improper purpose”, and (2) “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 6 of
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further investigation or discovery”. Rule 9011(c)(1)(B) provides that, “On its own, the court may
order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specified in the order has not
violated Rule 11(b).”

The existence of an improper purpose under Rule 9011(b)(1) is a "subjective," "fact-
specific inquiry." Jn Re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 662 (Bankr, N.D. Ill. 2000).

ARGUMENT

A review of the evidence that was known by, or that was readily available to, the Firm,
contrasted with the Complaint’s false claims, establishes that the Firm’s attorneys signed and filed
the Complaint in bad faith, in violation of Rule 9011, without first conducting a reasonable inquiry
into the existence of any evidence to support their allegations. Further, the evidence is clear and
unambiguous that the Firm acted in bad faith; it filed the Complaint for improper purposes. It is
only with the imposition of appropriate sanctions that the Firms’ attorneys, and those who would
follow in their footsteps, will learn to respect the mandates of Rule 9011 and the integrity of the
judicial system.

The Firm signed and filed a “baseless” Complaint. Following conversion of this matter

to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the Trustee investigated whether there were any merits in the Debtor’s
claims asserted in the Complaint. To assist his investigation, the Trustee engaged Mr. Kelly T.
Smith, CPA (“the CPA”) to review Training’s accounting and financial records, including but not
limited to invoices, receipts, bank statements and accounting reports. The CPA reviewed
documents representing hundreds of thousands of dollars of Training’s transactions. Upon receipt
of the CPA’s report presenting his findings, and after conducting his separate investigation into
the specific terms of the Lease and the conduct of the parties, on November 9, 2020, the Trustee
filed a Motion to Compromise/Settle Adversary Proceeding (the “Motion”), asking to dismiss the

Adversary Proceeding. Doc #245.
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In his Motion, the Trustee attached, and provided a detailed review of the CPA’s report
and of his findings with respect to the claims asserted in the Complaint. The Trustee found “that

the claims asserted in this adversary proceeding are baseless. The Trustee did not uncover facts

that would support the claims asserted in this adversary proceeding. Not only were facts to support

the claims absent, but evidence to directly refute the claims was readily available.” (emphasis

added). Doc #245, p. 13-14.

Evidence to refute the Complaint’s claims was readily available. Contrary to the claims

made in the Complaint, and consistent with the Trustee’s findings, the evidence establishes that
Training performed its obligations under the Lease - unless performance was prevented by the
Debtor’s prior acts. A detailed review of the Firm’s factually unsupported claims asserted in the
Complaint, and the readily available evidence refuting those claims is as follows.

Real estate taxes. Pursuant to Section 8 of the Lease, Training agreed to pay all real and

personal property taxes assessed on the Facility and its personal property during the term of the
Lease. In the Complaint, the Firm falsely alleged that Training breached its obligation to pay real
property taxes. Doc #1, § 19. A reasonable inquiry by the Firm would have revealed that the Debtor
was delinquent in its payment of its real and personal property taxes for periods prior to the
commencement of the Lease. Indeed, the Firm had actual knowledge that the 2017 tax liens for
the delinquent taxes on the Facility were auctioned by the Hardy County Sheriff in November of
2018 and certified to the West Virginia State Auditor's Office for disposition. The Debtor's
Bankruptcy Schedules were filed by the Firm on September 27, 2019. The Debtor's Schedule D
scheduled a "2017 tax lien" of unknown value in favor of the Sheriff of Hardy County (# 2.3) and
unpaid taxes for 2017, 2018, and 2019 in the amount of $79,145.56, owed to the Sheriff of Hardy

County (# 2.4). Bankr. Doc. 23, Schedule D.
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With the Firm’s actual knowledge that the Debtor had not paid its 2017 real property taxes
and that the Lease did not commence until June 1, 2018, West Virginia Code §11A-11-7 informed
the Firm that the Debtor’s outstanding delinquent taxes from prior periods served to prevent
Training from paying real estate taxes for the periods following commencement of the Lease.
Specifically, West Virginia Code §11A-11-7 states that the sheriff “shall decline to receive current
taxes on any land where it appears to his or her office that a prior year’s real property taxes are
unpaid.” Accordingly, the Debtor’s failure to pay taxes for prior periods legally prevented Training
from paying subsequent periods’ real estate taxes. Similar facts and the law found at West Virginia
Code §11A-11-7a, prevented Training from paying the Debtor’s personal property taxes that were
otherwise payable by Training during the term of the Lease.

Liability Insurance. Section 9 of the Lease required Training to maintain $2 million

dollars of liability insurance coverage. Doc. #1, Exhibit A, p. 3. Proof of Training’s insurance
coverage was readily available. As noted by the Trustee, Training had provided proof of insurance
to the Court and to the Trustee. Doc 245, p. 12. Nevertheless, the Firm falsely claimed that Training
breached its obligation to maintain liability insurance coverage as required by the Lease. Doc #1,

Training voluntarily provided financial information. Section 4 of the Lease required

Training to cooperate with a request by the Debtor to audit its books and records. The Lease does
not require Training to give the Debtor copies of Training’s confidential financial records. Doc

#1, Exhibit A, 7 4. Nevertheless, on July 19, 2019 Training voluntarily transmitted to the Debtor

* Equally troublesome, the Firm filed numerous Debtor Operating Reports that falsely reported
that Training owed the Debtor over $200,000 for non-payment of the Debtor’s insurance premiums
when Training had no obligation to pay the Debtor’s insurance premiums. See October Operating
Report, Bankr. Doc 63, p. 10.
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a copy of its profit and loss statements, including a copy of its general ledger. Doc #17. After the
Firm announced, on September 25, 2019, its intention to file a lawsuit against Training, Training
reaffirmed its willingness to “fully cooperate” with an audit request pursuant to section 4 of Lease.
Doc #17. The Debtor never requested an audit of Training’s books and records until its bankruptcy
case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding when the Trustee initiated an audit. As the Trustee
observed, when the CPA visited Training’s offices to review its books and records, Training
“offered to open its books and records and continues to do so without delay or limit.” Bankr. Doc
245, p. 13.

There was no Additional Rent payable. Paragraph 4 of the Lease contains a formula for

profit-sharing in the form of “Additional Rent” payments to the Debtor based on Training’s
Taxable Income, as adjusted. Training’s financial statements that were provided to the Debtor
revealed that Training had not realized any Taxable Income.’ If the Firm had untaken an audit as
encouraged by Training, or if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry through discovery, it would
have learned the same thing as the Trustee - that there was no Additional Rent payable. Without
conducting any investigation, the Firm falsely alleged that Training defaulted on its Lease
obligations to pay Additional Rent to the Debtor. (See Doc. #1, 412). Contrary to the Firm’s
uninformed allegations, the Trustee and the CPA he engaged concluded there was no evidence to
support the Firm’s claim that Training owed the Debtor any Additional Rent, and that evidence to
refute that claim was readily available. Bankr. Doc 245, p. 10.

Lodging Revenue. The Complaint falsely alleged that Training diverted lodging revenues

such that these revenues were not reflected on Training’s books and records. Doc #1, 919. A

> Training’s Profit and Loss statements reported significant losses from operations on the cash
basis of accounting. Since all cash receipts were included in income but non-cash expenses such
as depreciation were not deducted, it follows that Training did not have any Taxable Income.
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cursory inquiry by the firm would have informed it that there was no lodging located on the Facility
and that the Additional Rent calculation was based on Taxable Income “derived from Tenant’s

operations conducted on the Property”. (emphasis added). Doc #1, Ex. A, 44. Further, discovery

would have readily revealed, as the Trustee found after specific instructions to the CPA to
investigate lodging revenues, that the CPA did not uncover any diversion of revenues from
inclusion in Training’s books and records. Bankr. Doc 245, p. 13.

The Firm’s excuse for not conducting a reasonable investigation. During this Court’s

December 17, 2020 hearing on Objection’s to the Firm’s Fee Application (“the Hearing”), the
Court asked the Firm’s representative, Mark Lindsay, Esq., several times why the Firm did not
conduct an audit as provided in the Lease in order to satisfy itself regarding financial questions
before filing the Complaint. Mr. Lindsay offered the excuse that the Debtor could not afford to
conduct an audit. First, it should be noted that the Firm could have served discovery on Training,
asking for copies of the financial documents the CPA later examined. This would have cost the
Debtor nothing. The record of this case reflects that the Firm did not request a copy of Training’s
bank statements or any other financial records in discovery before resorting to the “nuclear” option
of filing the baseless Complaint.

Further, contrary to Mr. Lindsay’s representation that the Debtor could not afford an audit,
the Firm knew; (1) that the Debtor’s Monthly Operating Report for September 2019 (Bankr. Doc
37, p. 10) reported that $177,883 was due from the DEA, and (2) that the $172,000 was received
from the DEA in October (Bankr. Doc 63, p. 13). More than ample funds to conduct an audit.

Before filing the Complaint, the Firm knew that the Facility represented the Debtor’s
primary asset and that the Lease was an encumbrance on that asset. Yet incredibly the Firm

admitted that it conducted no investigation into the existence of evidentiary foundation for the
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 11 of
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claims it asserted in the Complaint. As Mr. Lindsay reluctantly conceded during the Hearing, the
Firm simply relied on what Mr. Punelli said, and on whatever documents Mr. Punelli provided.
The Firm must not have looked at the documents Mr. Punelli possessed, because as addressed
above, those documents would have readily refuted all of the Complaints false allegations.

The Improper Purposes Behind Filing the Complaint.

Following his investigation into the Complaint’s claims, the Trustee concluded that the
Adversary Proceeding “appears to have been a tactic to breach the lease with [Training] to regain
possession of the training facility without any real lawful basis.” Doc #247, p. 8. Training agrees
with the Trustee’s conclusion.

Training contends that the Complaint was filed for the further improper purpose of giving
the Debtor a plausible excuse to withhold the $172,000 that was owed to Training in October 2019
for a course Training conducted post-petition, in September 2019, for the DEA. Each of the
Debtor’s monthly Operating Reports falsely reported significant amounts owed to the Debtor by
Training due to its purported breach of the Lease. With almost $800,000 being falsely reported in
the Operating Reports as owed to the Debtor by Training (See Bankr. Doc 63, p. 10), based on the
Complaint’s baseless allegations, the Debtor could argue it was justified in withholding Training’s
funds. The bulk of these funds were then embezzled by Mr. Punelli.‘

Given the expressly stated purpose of the Complaint, the lack of any evidentiary support
whatsoever for any of its claims, and the purposes behind the Firm’s actions, it is beyond

peradventure that; (1) the Complaint was filed for improper purposes, (2) the Firm filed the

4 Mr. Lindsay’s representations during the Hearing, that Mr. Punelli returned the funds he embezzled, are false. A
review of the records of this case reflect that Mr. Punelli only returned a portion of the Debtor’s funds he had
taken — after his embezzlement was uncovered by Training. The balance of the money that had been “erroneously”
diverted to Center was returned to the Debtor by Center, not by Mr. Punelli, using funds that Center owed to, but
did not pay, to Training for separate contract services Training had performed for Center.
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 12 of
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Complaint without conducting an investigation that would have been reasonable under the
circumstances, and (3) the Complaint was baseless, without any evidentiary support whatsoever —
all in clear violation of Rule 901.

Conclusion

Before the Firm filed the Complaint, it knew that Training had been successful in
forestalling WVEDA’s foreclosure on the Debtor’s Facility for over sixteen months. The Firm also
knew, or should have known pursuant to a reasonable investigation, that the Debtor had not
expressed any concern about Training’s performance under the Lease prior to filing for Bankruptcy
protection on the eve of WVEDA’s September 2019 foreclosure. Mr. Lindsay admitted that the
Firm filed the Complaint, seeking to terminate Training’s rights to operate it business at the
Facility, without first conducting a reasonable investigation of the existence of any facts to support
its claims. During the Hearing, Mr. Lindsay did not even venture to argue that any of the claims
presented in the Complaint were grounded in fact. The Firm merely relied on what Mr. Punelli
said. The Firm could not have reviewed the documents Mr. Punelli provided because, as the
Trustee determined, the documents available to the Firm readily refuted the claims asserted in the
Complaint. The record reflects that the Firm continued to prosecute these false claims until
Training proved that the Debtor’s representative had been embezzling the Debtor’s funds, while
the Firm’s efforts were focused on damaging Training instead of learning the truth.

The Firm represented that its attorneys spent 28 hours preparing to file the Complaint.
Bankr. Doc. 238-3, p. 44 and 45. Rule 9011 mandates that the Firm should have used some of this
time to investigate the facts, whether by conducting discovery, simply asking Training for copies
of financial and other documents that were readily available that would have revealed the truth, or

by other means. The Debtor, its creditors, and Training would have been saved many thousands
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of dollars if the Firm’s attorneys had done what all litigation counsel must do; comply with Rule
9011.

In defense of the Complaint filed by the Firm in violation of Rule 9011, Training incurred
$32,655.00 in legal fees with its general counsel, Basnight Kinser Leftwich & Nuckolls, P.C., and
additional $30,901 in legal fees with its West Virginia bankruptcy counsel, Bowles Rice, LLP, for
a total of $63,556 in legal fees in defense of the Complaint filed and prosecuted in (See Affidavit

of Robert L. Starer, Training’s Chief Executive Officer, attached as Exhibit A).

WHEREFORE, based on the authority and reasons set forth above, Panthera Training,
LLC requests that the Court, (1) ORDER the Firm to Show Cause why it did not violate Rule 9011
when it filed the Complaint, (2) FIND that the Firm violated Rule 9011 by failing to conduct a
reasonable investigation before filing the Complaint, and by filing the Complaint for improper
purposes; (3) ORDER the Firm to reimburse Training’s legal fees incurred in defense of the

Complaint in the amount of $63,556.00, and (4) GRANT such further relief as this cause merits.

PANTHERA TRAINING, LLC

By:___/s/ Douglas E. Kahle
Douglas E. Kahle, Esq.

VSB # 15964
DKahle@basnightkinser.com
Admitted Pro Hac Vice

308 Cedar Lakes Drive, 2"! Floor
Chesapeake, VA 23322

Phone: (757) 547-9191

Fax: (757) 547-9135

Counsel for Panthera Training, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Douglas E. Kahle, Esq., do hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of Panthera
Training, LLC’s Motion for Award of Fees has been served via CM/ECF and/or email on this
8th day of January, 2021, to the following:

Via E-Mail:

Aaron C. Amore, Esq. aaron@amorelaw.com

John J. Richardson, Esq. jrichardson@bernsteinlaw.com
Mark A. Lindsay, Esq. mlindsay(@bernsteinlaw.com
Via CM/ECF:

Debra Lee Allen, Esq. dallen@spilmanlaw.com

Julia A. Chincheck, Esq. jchincheck@bowlesrice.com
Zachary James Rosencrance, Esq. zrosencrance@bowlesrice.com
Gary O. KinderUnited States Trustee gary.o.kinder@usdoj.gov

By:___/s/ Douglas E. Kahle
No. 2:19-bk-00787 Doc 265 Filed 01/08/21 Entered 01/08/21 09:18:09 Page 15 of
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EXHIBIT “A”

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re:

PANTHERA ENTERPRISES, LLC Case No. 2:19-BK-787
Chapter 7

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

HARDY COUNTY, to-wit:

This day personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the jurisdiction
aforesaid, Robert L. Starer, who, after being duly sworn, states as follows:

1. I am the Chief Executive Officer of Panthera Training, LLC (“Panthera Training”).

In my capacity as Chief Executive Officer I am familiar with Panthera Training’s financial
records.

2. Panthera Training incurred legal fees with its West Virginia bankruptcy counsel,
Bowles Rice, LLP, in the amount of $30,901 in defense of the claims asserted and prosecuted in
Adversary Proceeding A.P. No. 2:19-ap-51.

3. Panthera Training incurred additional legal fees with its general counsel, Basnighi,
Kinser, Leftwich & Nuckolls. P.C., in the amount of $32,655 in defense of the claims asserted and
prosecuted in Adversary Proceeding A.P. No. 2:19-ap-51.

Further the Affiant saith not.

Robert T L. ~Siaer

The aforesaid Affidavit was sworn to and acknowledged before me this 8th day of January,
2021, by Robert L. Starer, who is personally known to me.

My Commission expires: c=: August. te, 68
Registration number;,_


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