Motion for Summary Judgment — Christie Punger v. Farrah Martinez, PLLC (Southern District of Texas)

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Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 07/23/25 in Christie Punger versus Farrah Martinez, PLLC, case 4:24-cv-02217, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Punger, a part-time paralegal for the Houston-based law firm from approximately April 2018, argues she was misclassified as an independent contractor while the legal assistants were employees, and seeks overtime under the FLSA for the last three years of her employment. The motion states that her duties grew after April 2022, that she regularly worked over 40 hours per week, and that Martinez contested her timesheets. It also alleges the firm withheld her paycheck for three pay periods after a July 19, 2023 payroll error, and states she obtained a PPP loan from Capital Plus Financial, LLC in April 2021.

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“Motion for Summary Judgment — Christie Punger v. Farrah Martinez, PLLC (Southern District of Texas).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/17-summary-judgment-6dfeeac6cb/, SHA-256 6d2b81508faf7a9ddc2847a3b564c43ddc409d3d329340d0848246cc8f7664d4.

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Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

CHRISTIE PUNGER §
Plaintiff, § C.A. NO. 4:24-CV-02217
§
v. §
§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
FARRAH MARTINEZ, PLLC §
Defendant. §
§
§

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Plaintiff Christie Punger and moves for summary judgment on her claims

against Defendant Farrah Martinez, PLLC (“Defendant” or “the Firm”). In support thereof,

Plaintiff respectfully shows the following:
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 2 of 19

Table of Contents
Table of Authorities ....................................................................................................................... 2
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 4
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................................................... 4
III. UNDISPUTED FACTS ............................................................................................................ 4
IV. AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................ 9
V. DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.............................................................................. 15
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 18

Table of Authorities
Cases
Brennan v. Heard,
491 F.2d 1, (5th Cir. 1974) ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Chicca v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Health Sys.,
858 F. Supp. 2d 777 (S.D.Tex. 2012) ...................................................................................................................... 14
Diaz v. Castro,
122 F. Supp. 3d 603 (S. D. Tex. 2014) .................................................................................................................... 12
Diggs v. Harris Hosp. – Methodist, Inc.,
847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................................................... 10
Garner v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P.,
834 F. Supp. 2d 528, (S.D.Tex. 2011) ............................................................................................................... 12, 13
Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am.,
545 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2008). .................................................................................................................................. 11
Johnson v. Hous. KP, LLC,
588 F. Supp. 3d 738 (S.D. Tex. 2022) ............................................................................................................... 10, 11
Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5,
717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................................................... 10
Klick v. Cenikor Found.,
94 F.4th 362 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Mares v. March,
777 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................................................. 10
Mata v. Caring for You Home Health, Inc.,
94 F. Supp. 3d 867 (S.D. Tex. 2015) ......................................................................................................................... 9
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318 (S.Ct. 1992) ....................................................................................................................................... 10
Nieddu v. Lifetime Fitness, Inc.,
38 F. Supp. 3d 849 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ....................................................................................................................... 14
Reeves v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
616 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980) ................................................................................................................................. 15
Seong Song v. JFE Franchising, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 3d 748, (S.D.Tex. 2019) ..................................................................................................................... 14
Statutes
29 U.S.C §203 .............................................................................................................................................................. 10
29 U.S.C 211 ................................................................................................................................................................ 14
29 U.S.C 216 ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
29 U.S.C 255 ................................................................................................................................................................ 14
Fed. R. Civ. 56................................................................................................................................................................ 9
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 3 of 19

Rules
29 CFR §778.316 ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
29 CFR §795.105 ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
29 U.S.C §216 .............................................................................................................................................................. 11
29 U.S.C 207 ................................................................................................................................................................ 12
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 4 of 19

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant is a law firm that has utilized several support staff members over the years,

including Plaintiff. During the last two to three years of her employment, Plaintiff regularly worked

over 40 hours per week, and her duties were that of an employee, but was misclassified as an

independent contractor. As such, the Plaintiff is entitled to overtime during the last three years of

her employment and moves for summary judgment on her claims.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed suit on June 11, 2024. Defendant filed its Answer on August 9, 2024. All

discovery has been completed as of the date of this Motion, the deadline for which is July 31, 2025.

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS
A. Plaintiff’s Work before April 2022
The Defendant is a Houston-based law firm with one principal lawyer, Farrah Martinez

(“Martinez”), that has had several staff members providing secretarial and legal support over the

last several years.1 One of these support staff members is Plaintiff Christie Punger (“Plaintiff”),

who began working for Defendant in approximately April 2018 as a part-time paralegal for

litigation matters.2 From April 2022 until August 2023, Martinez went through four support staff

members, while Plaintiff remained with the Firm on a part-time basis.3 Operating on her general

understanding, without any employment law experience or education, and reviewing no documents

or consulting experts in the matter, Martinez classified all four support staff as employees of the

Firm.4 Contrarily, Martinez classified Plaintiff as an independent contractor.5 Plaintiff had never

been employed as an independent contractor before her work for the Defendant.6 Defendant

1 Exhibit A - Defendant’s Combined Discovery Responses – Response to Interrogatory No. 1.
2 Exhibit B - May 13, 2025, Deposition of Christie Punger, p.54.
3
Id. at p.147-154.
4 Exhibit C – May 12, 2025, Deposition of Farrah Martinez, p.37-38.
5 Id. at p.43.
6 Ex. B, p. 90.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 5 of 19

required Plaintiff to pass a background check to begin working for the Firm. 7 Working at the Firm

alongside Martinez and Ms. Punger was one full-time employee, the legal assistant, McLaughlin.8

Immediately after McLaughlin, Martinez hired and (shortly thereafter) fired Vicki Olwar. 9

Followed by Brittany Davis (“Davis”). 10 Then, Jami Watkins (“Watkins”), who worked fully

remote and, like Plaintiff. 11 Then, Watkins was terminated, and Chasity Ferguson (“Ferguson”)

was hired and was the legal assistant for the Firm until February 2024. 12

Martinez assigned Plaintiff’s daily tasks and work and closely monitored and supervised

her progress.13 During this period of her employment, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included: drafting

motions, drafting pleadings, drafting 1801 affidavits, reviewing and organizing and labeling

medical and billing records, drafting discovery requests and responses, communicating with

clients, and other miscellaneous paralegal-type tasks assigned by Martinez. 14

Martinez required she approve Plaintiff’s work before it was sent or filed on behalf of the

Firm.15 Martinez also checked in with Plaintiff multiple times a day regarding her work for the

Firm via email, text, Microsoft Teams, or Zoom. 16 Plaintiff’s title was Paralegal for Defendant,

with a Firm email that only Plaintiff and the Firm administrator had access.17 Plaintiff believed she

was an employee of the Firm until April 2019, after Martinez required her to provide her own

software to complete Bates stamping and other Firm tasks.18 When Plaintiff applied for the PPP

loan in approximately 2021, she did not understand the difference between an employee and an

7 Ex. B, p. 92.
8 Id. at p.141.
9 Id. at p.150.
10 Id. at p.151.
11 Id.
12 Exhibit D - May 8, 2025, Deposition of Chasity Ferguson, p.10.
13 Ex. C, p.33.
14 Ex. B, pp.54-55.
15
Ex. C, p.70.
16 Ex. B, pp.125-26.
17 Id. at p.87, 97.
18 Id. at pp.91-93, 147.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 6 of 19

independent contractor.19 Using information gleaned from a social media advertisement, Plaintiff

applied and was approved for a PPP loan from Capital Plus Financial, LLC in April 2021. 20

Plaintiff marked that she received a 1099 from her employer, which she did, still having no real

understanding of the difference between a contractor and an employee and how she should have

been classified.21

B. Changes to Plaintiff’s Job - April 2022 – January 2024

When Julie McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”) separated from the Firm in April 2022, Plaintiff’s

work circumstances drastically changed.22 Martinez placed the day-to-day tasks McLaughlin

managed on Plaintiff.23 Plaintiff’s Beginning in April 2022, Defendant went through four legal

assistant replacements for McLaughlin, requiring Plaintiff to manage the training for each new

hire until her eventual termination in January 2024.24 Watkins worked fully remote and was issued

a Firm laptop and equipment. 25 Plaintiff trained Watkins and graded her performance for

Martinez.26 Then, Watkins was terminated and Chasity Ferguson (“Ferguson”) was hired and was

the legal assistant for the Firm until February 2024.27 At this point, Plaintiff’s duties mirrored those

of these legal assistants.28 Notably, during this time period, each time the legal assistants left or

were fired, their responsibilities would fall back on Plaintiff. 29 This cycle repeated thrice before

Plaintiff was ultimately terminated from the Firm.30 All legal assistants were classified as

employees.31

19 Ex. B, p.147.
20 Id. at p.146.
21 Id. at p.147.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at p.149-154.
25 Id.
26 Id. at p.149-51, Exhibit E - June 23, 2025, Deposition Upon Written Questions of Jami Watkins, Q. 26.
27 Ex. D, p.10.
28
Id. at p.16.
29 Ex. B, pp.149-51.
30 Id. at pp.152-54.
31 Ex. C, p. 73.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 7 of 19

Plaintiff did not work over 40 hours in any given workweek before 2022.32 After 2022,

Plaintiff’s new responsibilities, in addition to the duties during her employment from 2018 – 2022,

included: client intake, pre-litigation matters, drafting demands, drafting medical record

summaries, drafting deposition summaries, communicating with adjusters, communicating with

medical providers, managing the fax communications for the Firm, requesting medical records and

billing records.33

In September 2022, Martinez offered to reclassify Plaintiff as an employee. 34 And, even

though Plaintiff asked Martinez for clarification on the differences between an independent

contractor and employee regarding the offer to reclassify Plaintiff, Martinez never explained the

difference or the ultimate effects on Plaintiff; further conversation discussing this transition never

occurred.35

In October 2022, Plaintiff was issued a laptop by Martinez, granted access to all of the

Firm’s Google account passwords, as well as login credentials for third-party medical record

retrieval companies. 36 During Plaintiff’s employment, Martinez required Plaintiff to attend CLE

courses as a condition of her employment.37 Plaintiff was required to attend weekly staff meetings

via Zoom alongside Firm staff, as if she were just another employee.38

C. Defendant’s Policy of Not Paying Overtime, even if worked

Martinez first began this Firm in 2005, and the present purpose of all employees of the

Firm is to provide legal representation for those involved in personal injury conflicts.39 Martinez

32 Ex. B, p.123; see, Exhibit F.
33 Ex. B, p.148; see, supra Part III.A; see, Exhibit G.
34 Ex. B, p.127.
35 Id. at pp.90, 127.
36
Id. at pp.78, 148.
37 Id. at p. 92.
38 Ex. C, pp.6-8.
39 Id. at pp.5-8.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 8 of 19

forced employees to seek approval before working over 40 hours per week.40 Ferguson testified

that she was only paid overtime once while employed with the Firm.41 McLoughlin testified to

working enough hours to qualify for overtime and instead of being paid her overtime, Martinez

would instruct her to simply come in later the next day.42 On at least five different occasions,

Plaintiff submitted timesheets reflecting more than 40 hours worked in a week, and each time,

Martinez would schedule a phone conversation to discuss the submitted timesheet. 43 Defendant

did not allow employees to collect overtime. 44 Anytime Plaintiff worked over 40 hours, Martinez

would contest the her timesheet. 45 There were times Martinez would ask the Firm staff to come in

late the day after working overtime to offset payment.46

Employees of the Firm are made to individually track and submit their hours to Martinez

for remittance of their wages.47 Defendant required the use of a Firm-specific timesheet in 2023;

before that, Plaintiff prepared and submitted an itemized billing timesheet.48 Defendant regularly

rejected, revised, and contested Plaintiff’s hours.49

Defendant also made deductions from Plaintiff’s pay, without Plaintiff’s express consent.50

On July 19, 2023, there was a payroll error that overpaid everyone in the Firm.51 instead of seeking

a deduction or reimbursement through proper means, Defendant withheld Plaintiff’s paycheck for

three pay periods (which were two weeks long) until Plaintiff “worked off” the error of the payroll

company.52 In other words, Plaintiff had to work 6 weeks without pay and was not given the option

40 Ex. A, Interrogatory Response No.8.
41 Ex. D, p. 21-22.
42 Exhibit H - May 7, 2025, Deposition of Julie McLoughlin, p. 17.
43 Ex. B, p. 123; see, Exhibit I.
44 Ex. F, p. 17.
45 Ex. B, p. 123; Ex. C, p. 45.
46 Ex. F, p. 17.
47 Ex. A, Response to Interrogatory No.9.
48 Ex. B, pp. 100, 124.
49
Ex. A, Request for Admission No.16, No. 17; Ex. C, p. 45.
50 Ex. A, Request for Admission No.18.
51 See, Exhibit J.
52 Ex. B, pp.101-102.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 9 of 19

to return money.53 Ferguson experienced the same, Defendant withheld payment of her wages for

one pay cycle.54 Strangely, Defendant handled the error differently with everyone yet, Plaintiff was

not given any other option to resolve the error. 55

Defendant has no identifiable retention policy for keeping and maintaining documents

related to an employee or independent contractor hours worked.56 Defendant only keeps available

tax documents to attest to an employee’s payroll and timekeeping records.57

IV. AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENTS
A. Standard of Review

A district court must grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.58 A fact is material if

it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law and is genuinely in dispute only

if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 59 The nonmovant cannot satisfy

its burden with “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions which are

either entirely unsupported, or supported by a mere scintilla of evidence. 60

B. Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claims

a. PLAINTIFF WAS MISCLASSIFIED AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

A worker is only an independent contractor, as distinguished from an “employee” under

the FLSA, if the worker is, as a matter of economic reality, in business for themself. 61 A court must

53 Ex. B, pp. 102-103.
54 Ex. D, p. 25.
55 Ex. B, p. 103; Ex. D, p. 25.
56 Ex. C, pp. 74-75.
57 Id.
58
Fed. R. Civ. 56(a).
59 Mata v. Caring for You Home Health, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 867, 870-71 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
60 Id. at 871.
61 29 CFR §795.105(b).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 10 of 19

consider, among other factors, the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which

the product is accomplished. 62

The 5th Circuit applies the “economic realities/common law control test,” a variation of the

common law agency test, in determining whether a party is an employee or an independent

contractor.63 The economic-realities portion of the test asks whether punitive employees, “as a

matter of economic reality, are dependent upon the business to which they render service.” 64 The

common law control portion of the test, which courts should emphasize over the economic realities

portion, assesses “the extent to which the one for whom the work is being done has the right to

control the details and means by which the work is to be performed.65 An evaluation of economic

reality depends on the totality of the circumstances.66 To aid in the inquiry as to whether the worker

qualifies as an employee, the 5th Circuit relies on the Hopkins test:

(1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer (lack of supervision
over minor regular tasks cannot be bootstrapped into an appearance of real
independence.67); (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the
alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit or
loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in
performing the job (whether plaintiffs have “some unique skill set, or some ability
to exercise significant initiative within the business.68); and (5) the permanency of
the relationship((1) whether a plaintiff “worked exclusively” for defendant, (2) the
total length of relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant, and (3) whether
the work was on a “project-by-project” basis.).69

Martinez required she approve Plaintiff’s work before it was sent or filed on behalf of the

Firm. Martinez admitted to rejecting or revising Plaintiff’s hours before approving her payments.

Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Martinez reviewed and approved Plaintiff’s work on a

62 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
63 Diggs v. Harris Hosp. – Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1988).
64 Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2013).
65 Mares v. March, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985).
66
Klick v. Cenikor Found., 94 F.4th 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2023).
67 Johnson v. Hous. KP, LLC, 588 F. Supp. 3d 738, 744 (S.D. Tex. 2022).
68 Id.
69 Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 11 of 19

micromanaging level. Martinez checked in with Plaintiff daily via email, text, Microsoft Teams,

and/or Zoom, Plaintiff was not treated like she had her own business but was a Firm employee.

Plaintiff had a Firm e-mail and a Firm-issued computer. Martinez required Plaintiff to attend CLE’s

courses as well as weekly staff meetings on Zoom alongside the other Firm staff, all of which were

classified as employees. Plaintiff was required to pass a background check and clear a security

clearance before joining the Firm. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant to provide legal services,

Plaintiff held no paralegal or legal assistance certifications. Unlike a typical independent

contractor, Plaintiff worked for Defendant for years, this was not a temporary client-business

owner relationship. from April 2018 until she was terminated in January 2024 (approximately 68

months).

b. DEFENDANT IMPROPERLY DEDUCTED WAGES FROM PLAINTIFF

Any employer who violates §206 or §207 of the FLSA shall be liable to the employee

affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as

the case may be, and in an additional an equal amount as liquidated damages.70

Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, she prepared an itemized billing timesheet for

Martinez to review. Martinez contested the work performed by Plaintiff and made deductions to

Plaintiff’s pay. On a minimum of five different occasions, Plaintiff submitted timesheets showing

she worked more than 40 hours in a week, and each time, Martinez would schedule a phone

conversation to discuss the submitted timesheet. Martinez would reject and revise the hours

submitted by Plaintiff before eventually paying her for 40 hours or less.

On July 19, 2023, there was a payroll error that resulted in duplicate payments to everyone

in the firm. Defendant knowingly withheld Plaintiff’s paycheck for three pay periods until Plaintiff

70 29 U.S.C §216(b).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 12 of 19

“worked off” the error. Plaintiff was not given an option to repay the money or any other means of

resolution.

c. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PAY PLAINTIFF HER OVERTIME

No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek … is employed in

an enterprise engaged in commerce … for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such

employee received compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a

rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [she] is employed. 71 If an

employer knows its employee worked overtime, it must pay overtime wages even if the employee

does not claim overtime compensation. 72 Management cannot sit back and accept benefits without

compensating for them. 73 An announcement by an employer that no overtime work will be

permitted, or that overtime work will not be compensated unless authorized in advance, will not

impair the employee’s right to compensation for work he actually suffers or is permitted to

perform.74 A plaintiff need not prove each hour of overtime with unerring accuracy or certainty. 75

In the absence of rebuttal by defendants, plaintiffs’ recollection and estimate of hours worked are

presumed to be correct.76

It is the duty of the management to exercise its control and see that the work is not

performed if it does not want it to be performed. 77 The employer bears the burden of exercising its

control to ensure that overtime work is not performed if it is prohibited by the employer. 78 The

plaintiff must show that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that he was working

71 29 U.S.C 207(a)(1).
72 Garner v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., 834 F. Supp. 2d 528, 544-45 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
73 Id. at 545.
74 29 CFR §778.316.
75
Diaz v. Castro, 122 F. Supp. 3d 603, 611 (S. D. Tex. 2014).
76 Id.
77 Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., at 545.
78 Id.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 13 of 19

overtime.79 Constructive knowledge exists if an employer "exercising reasonable diligence" would

become aware that an employee is working overtime.80

Defendants purpose is to provide legal representation for those involved in personal injury

conflicts. Defendant’s employees are told not to work over 40 hours per week unless approved by

the Defendant in advance. Martinez made clear that the Firm would not be paying anyone

overtime. Martinez keeps available tax documents only to attest to an employee’s payroll and

timekeeping records. Plaintiff kept track of her hours and submitted them to Defendant for review

and approval. After the legal assistant McLaughlin separated from the Firm and the Defendants’

dependence on Plaintiff and repeated failed attempts on finding and retaining proper help. On a

minimum of five different occasions, Plaintiff submitted timesheets showing she worked more

than 40 hours in a week, and each time, Martinez would schedule a phone conversation to discuss

the submitted timesheet. Martinez rejected and revised the hours submitted by Plaintiff before

paying her. Plaintiff’s work was often contested and deductions were made to her pay accordingly.

Defendant made deductions from Plaintiff’s pay. When other employees of the Firm worked more

than 40 hours a week, Martinez would ask them to come in later the next day instead of rendering

proper wages.

d. THE FIRM DOES NOT COLLECT, KEEP, OR MAINTAIN STATUTORILY
REQUIRED RECORDS

Every employer shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by

[her] and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment…and shall

preserve such records for such periods of time. 81 An employer may not escape the record-keeping

provisions by delegating that duty to their employees.82

79
Id.
80 Id.
81 29 U.S.C 211(c).
82 Id.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 14 of 19

Martinez was the only individual involved in the preparation, review, and approval of

payroll and timekeeping records. Defendant left Plaintiff to track her own hours, then made her

revise them so she could justify paying Plaintiff less. This is a record-keeping violation on its face.

e. DEFENDANT WILLFULLY VIOLATED THE FLSA

A cause of action based on a willful violation of the FLSA can be initiated within three

years after the cause of action arises.83 An employer willfully violates the FLSA only if it “either

knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by law.” 84 The

presumption of willfulness remains unless there is clear and strong evidence of good faith. 85

Knowledge is generally imputed to the offending employer. 86

Martinez is the one (and only) principal lawyer of the Firm and has under her control

several staff who provide secretarial and legal support. Martinez referenced no relevant law and

consulted no experts in the matter, made employment decisions for the Firm using only her general

understanding of labor law. Plaintiff explicitly asked Martinez for clarification on the differences

between an independent contractor and employee. Martinez never explained the difference or the

ultimate effects on Plaintiff. Plaintiff kept track of her hours and submitted them to Defendant for

review and approval. Plaintiff prepared and submitted an itemized billing timesheet each week

work was completed. On at least five different occasions, Plaintiff submitted timesheets reflecting

more than 40 hours worked in a week, and each time, Martinez contested her timesheet.

f. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of 29 U.S.C. shall

be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or

83
29 U.S. Code §255(a).
84 Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 F.3d 110, 117 (5th Cir. 1994).
85 Reeves v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 616 F.2d 1342, 1353 (5th Cir. 1980).
86 Id.
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 15 of 19

their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as

liquidated damages.87

A. Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses

a. DEFENSE RELATING TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Actions under the FLSA may be commenced within two years after the cause of action

accrued…except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within

three years after the cause of action accrued. 88

Plaintiff filed her original complaint on June 11, 2024.89 Plaintiff began reporting overtime

around April 2022. Defendant presented evidence of Plaintiff reporting over time well into 2023,

as recent as July 1, 2023. Further, Martinez began withholding payment due to an “overpayment

issue” on July 19, 2023. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges she was misclassified as an independent

contractor until January 2024. Plaintiff's complaint was filed no later than two years, and well

within the statute of limitations under Chapter 29. Should there be a finding of willfulness in

Defendant’s actions alleged within Plaintiff’s complaint, the statute of limitations on these claims

is extended to three years. 90 This defense does not apply under these facts and as such, Plaintiff

moves for summary judgment on this defense.

b. DEFENSE REGARDING DEFENDANT’S ACTING IN GOOD FAITH

An employer has a substantial burden of proving to the satisfaction of the trial court that

its acts giving rise to the suit are both in good faith and reasonable. 91 Good faith requires a duty to

87 29 U.S.C 216(b).
88
29 U.S.C §255(a).
89 See generally, Doc. 1.
90 29 USC §255(a).
91 Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1415 (5th Cir. 1990).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 16 of 19

investigate potential liability under the FLSA, and ignorance cannot be the basis of a reasonable

belief.92 Good faith requires some duty to investigate potential liability under the FLSA."93

Martinez used her “general understanding” of the difference between an independent

contractor and an employee. Defendant has not published a handbook. Further, Martinez cannot

recall having ever taken any classes, attending any CLE, or completing any self-study regarding

the classification of employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Martinez cannot recall

reviewing and website or regulations, guidelines by the Department of Labor regarding the

classification of employees versus independent contractors. Martinez never accepted or worked on

anything regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act.

For Martinez’s failure to seek knowledge, as a practicing attorney, about the legitimacy of

the actions taken in connection with Plaintiff’s compensation under any of the guidance from the

Department of Labor, negates any claim of those actions being taken in good faith. For these

reasons, the affirmative defense of Defendants’ good faith necessary to bar Plaintiff’s claims under

29 U.S.C. §259 is invalid. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on this defense.

c. DEFENSE REGARDING DEFENDANT NOT HAVING KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVING
OF PLAINTIFF’S HOURS

Defendant denies Plaintiff’s ability to recover the amounts owed for the overtime hours

Plaintiff worked because they were not known by Martinez and were not approved. 94 An employer

who is armed with [knowledge that an employee is working overtime] cannot stand idly by and

allow an employee to perform overtime work without proper compensation. 95 An employee’s proof

of employment during the time for which [she] seeks overtime compensation requires a showing

that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of the

92
Barcellona v. Tiffany English Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 469 (5th Cir. 1979).
93 Id. at 468-469.
94 See, Doc. 6, ¶ 1-9.
95 Newton v. City of Henderson, 47 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1995).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 17 of 19

overtime.96 Constructive knowledge exists if an employer would become aware that an employee

is working overtime by exercising reasonable diligence. 97 Work not requested but suffered or

permitted is work time.98

Plaintiff submitted weekly timesheets to Martinez, each summarizing the hours worked by

the Plaintiff in excess of 40 hours. In response to Plaintiff’s timesheets, Martinez testified that she

would regularly contest the hours worked by the Plaintiff. Defendant’s claim of lack of knowledge

is directly in opposition to her sworn testimony and is therefore not a viable affirmative defense to

be considered by this court.

d. DEFENSES REGARDING THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT & MOTOR CARRIER ACT
EXEMPTION
The Portal-to-Portal Act limits an employer’s liability under the FLSA for any failure(s) to

pay an employee minimum wages or overtime for any activity of any employee engaged in before

May 14, 1947.99 The Motor Carrier Act Exemption found under section 13(b)(1) of the FLSA

applies to employees who are (1) employed by a motor carrier or motor private carrier; (2) drivers,

drivers helpers, loaders, or mechanics whose duties affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles

in transportation on public highways in interstate or foreign commerce; and (3) not covered by the

small vehicle exception. 100

There is no evidence that these acts apply to Plaintiff, Defendant, or the facts of this case.

For that reason, we move for summary judgment on these defenses.

96 Newton v. City of Henderson, 47 F.3d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1995).
97
Brennan v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1973).
98 29 CFR 785.11.
99 Portal-to-Portal Act of 1942, 29 U.S.C. § 252(a).
100 Motor Carrier Act Exemption, 29 U.S.C. 13(b)(1).
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 18 of 19

B. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Christie Punger requests that this Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff also requests the Court award them all recoverable damages and

fees resulting from these violations, attorney’s fees and court costs, and any other relief to which

she justly is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,
SPACE CITY LAW FIRM

/s/ Jasmine Williams____________
Bridget Davidson
State Bar No.: 24096858
SDTX No.: 3005005
Jasmine Williams
State Bar No.: 24146239
SDTX No.: 3918801
SPACE CITY LAW FIRM
440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1110
Houston, Texas 77002
bdavidson@spacecitylaw.com
jwilliams@spacecitylaw.com
Tel: 713.568.5305
Fax: 713.583.1107

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Case 4:24-cv-02217 Document 17 Filed on 07/23/25 in TXSD Page 19 of 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of July 2025, I served a true and correct copy of this
document upon all counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF system, which sends an automatic
notice to all parties of record.

/s/ Jasmine Williams
Jasmine Williams

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