Reply on Motion to Remand — Williams v. Small Business Administration (Central District of California)

Summary

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response in Opposition to Motion to Remand, Document 17 in Brandon Joe Williams v. United States Small Business Administration, No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK, filed 12/06/24, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, running 8 pages. Williams, pro se, argues that the case belongs in the Superior Court of California because his claims arise solely under state law, specifically the California Commercial Code, and that the SBA's role administering loans under the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program is a commercial function. He disputes the SBA's sovereign immunity and Federal Tort Claims Act defenses, citing Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt and United States v. Cooper Corp. He also rejects the description of his arguments as sovereign citizen rhetoric. The hearing is noticed for December 23, 2024, at 9:00 a.m.

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  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK       Document 17     Filed 12/06/24   Page 1 of 8 Page ID
                                        #:147

BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®
P.O. Box 1962
Glendale, California 91209
747-273-0799
Brandon Joe Williams, Attorney-in-fact
Brandon@williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com

                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          CENTRAL DISTRICT of CALIFORNIA
                          WESTERN DIVISION (LOS ANGELES)

                         CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK


BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®,                   Honorable Judge R. Gary Klausner
            Plaintiff,
      v.                                 PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO
                                         DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN
UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS             OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
ADMINISTRATION,                          REMAND


           Defendant.



                                         Date: December 23, 2024
                                         Time: 9:00 a.m.
                                         Courtroom: 850




                                PLAINTIFF’S REPLY

INTRODUCTION

      Plaintiff submits this Reply to address Defendant’s arguments opposing the

Motion to Remand. While Defendant provides a lengthy response invoking complex

federal defenses, Plaintiff contends that the fundamental issues at hand remain
  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK        Document 17      Filed 12/06/24   Page 2 of 8 Page ID
                                         #:148

unaddressed: (1) the proper jurisdiction over this matter, (2) the accurate definition of

the parties involved, and (3) the distinctions between incorporated and unincorporated

governmental entities and their legal capacities.

      This case should be remanded to the Superior Court of California because

Plaintiff’s claims are grounded entirely in state law under the California Commercial

Code (CCC). Defendant’s reliance on sovereign immunity and federal defenses under 28

U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) are misplaced in this context. Adjudicating these claims in federal

court would undermine principles of federalism and judicial efficiency.

ARGUMENT

I. Federal Jurisdiction is Improper Under the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

      Federal jurisdiction must arise from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, not from

defenses raised by Defendant (Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)). The

Ninth Circuit has consistently held that removal statutes are to be strictly construed

against removal and in favor of remand to state court (Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,

582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009)).

      Plaintiff’s claims arise solely under state law, specifically the CCC, which

governs commercial transactions within State of California. Defendant’s reliance on 28

U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) is misplaced because this statute applies only when a federal officer

or agency is sued for actions taken under color of federal office (Watson v. Philip

Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 152 (2007)). The SBA’s role in administering loans under
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                                        #:149

the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program is a commercial function subject to

state law—not an exercise of sovereign authority.

II. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Claims Arising from Commercial Activities

   Defendant erroneously invokes sovereign immunity to shield itself from liability in

this case. However, as established by United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600

(1941), federal agencies acting as juristic persons in commercial contexts are not entitled

to sovereign immunity protections typically afforded to sovereign entities.

   The Supreme Court’s decision in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652

(1945), provides three distinct definitions of “United States”:

   1. As a sovereign entity within the family of nations;

   2. As territorial jurisdiction under its sovereignty; and

   3. As the collective name for states united under the Constitution.

   Defendant conflates these definitions by assuming sovereign immunity for the SBA

based on its status as a federal agency under Hooven’s first definition. However, as an

incorporated federal agency engaged in commercial activities, the SBA falls under

Hooven’s third definition and functions as a juristic person subject to suit under state

law.
  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK        Document 17    Filed 12/06/24   Page 4 of 8 Page ID
                                         #:150

   Defendant’s reliance on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is similarly misplaced

because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise from tortious conduct but from breaches of

obligations governed by state commercial law.

III. The California Commercial Code Governs This Dispute

      The CCC provides a comprehensive framework for resolving disputes involving

commercial transactions within California and governs all claims at issue here. Plaintiff

asserts that these claims involve specific provisions of the CCC that require

interpretation and enforcement by California courts with expertise in state law.

      Federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims arising exclusively under state law

unless there is a substantial federal question embedded within those claims (Grable &

Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)). No such

question exists here; Defendant’s assertion of federal defenses does not transform this

case into one arising under federal law.

      Additionally, Defendant’s attempt to invoke exclusive federal jurisdiction ignores

that Congress has not preempted state regulation of commercial activities like those

governed by the CCC.

IV. Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Entities: Legal Distinctions

   Defendant misunderstands key legal distinctions between incorporated and

unincorporated entities in this case:
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                                        #:151

      The SBA, as an incorporated federal agency, operates as a juristic person distinct

       from unincorporated sovereign entities.

      Plaintiff Brandon Joe Williams acts as attorney-in-fact for BRANDON JOE

       WILLIAMS®, an incorporated entity subject to State of California law.

   These distinctions clarify that Defendant cannot claim sovereign immunity for its

commercial activities conducted through an incorporated framework.

V. Federalism and Judicial Efficiency Favor Remand

       Retaining this case in federal court undermines principles of federalism by

encroaching on California’s authority to regulate commercial transactions within its

borders (Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)). State courts are

better equipped to interpret and apply state laws like the CCC.

       Judicial efficiency also favors remand because adjudicating these claims in state

court avoids unnecessary entanglement with complex federal defenses irrelevant to

Plaintiff's core claims.

VI. Defendant Mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s Arguments

       Defendant inaccurately attempts to frame Plaintiff’s arguments as “sovereign

citizen” rhetoric—a mischaracterization which is professionally lazy, unfounded and

irrelevant.
  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK       Document 17     Filed 12/06/24    Page 6 of 8 Page ID
                                        #:152

      Plaintiff’s position is firmly grounded in established legal principles

distinguishing between incorporated entities subject to suit and unincorporated

sovereign entities (Hooven & Allison Co.). The differentiation between Plaintiff

Brandon Joe Williams (unincorporated “freeman” of the “Union,” as quoted from the

Honorable Mr. Justice MILLER in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)) and

BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS® (incorporated juristic person [known as a “sole

proprietorship”] – described as a “person,” “individual,” or “natural person”) is based on

statutory interpretation—not fringe theories.

      By focusing on these distinctions, Plaintiff demonstrates that Defendant’s

invocation of sovereign immunity is wholly inapplicable here.

CONCLUSION

      For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion

to Remand and return this case to the Superior Court of California for adjudication under

State law.



Dated: December 6th, 2024              RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,


                                       BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®


                                       BY: /s/ Brandon Joe Williams
                                       Brandon Joe Williams, agent, PRO SE
                                       P.O. Box 1962
  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK         Document 17     Filed 12/06/24     Page 7 of 8 Page ID
                                          #:153

                                         Glendale, California 91209
                                         Brandon@williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com
                                         (747) 273-0799



             LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      The undersigned Plaintiff, pro se, certifies that this Reply to Defendant’s

Response in Opposition contains 1190 words and is 8 pages in length which complies

with the word limit set by Local Rule 11-6.1 and the page limit is set by the Court’s

Standing Order at Docket #6.

            LOCAL RULE 7-3 MEET AND CONFER REQUIREMENT

      Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, on November 20, 2024, Plaintiff provided

Defendant’s counsel with the Notice of Motion and Motion to Remand and subsequently

initiated a telephonic meet and confer to discuss the basis for the motion. Despite these

efforts, the parties were unable to reach a resolution regarding the subject matter

jurisdiction issues raised in the motion, necessitating this filing.




                             CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


      I hereby certify that on December 6th, 2024, a copy of the foregoing was filed with
the Clerk of this Court by ECF.
  Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK     Document 17   Filed 12/06/24   Page 8 of 8 Page ID
                                      #:154

Distribution:

Alexander L. Farrell
Assistant United States Attorney
300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 894-5557
Alexander.Farrell@usdoj.gov


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