Notice of Supplemental Authority (Huisha-Huisha) — Wall v. CDC

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Orlando Division) · No. 6:21-cv-00975-PGB-DCI · Doc. 149 · 2021-09-21 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
ORLANDO DIVISION 
 
 
LUCAS WALL,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
Case No. 6:21-cv-975-PGB-DCI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
District Judge Paul Byron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE   
 
 
 
: 
Magistrate Judge Daniel Irick 
CONTROL & PREVENTION et al.,    
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
Defendants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY  
Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, No. 21-100 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2021) 
 
 
COMES NOW plaintiff, pro se, and advises the Court to please TAKE NOTICE of 
supplemental authority in support of my Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
All Federal Defendants on Counts 1, 4-6, 9, 12, 19, & 22-23 of the Complaint. Doc. 
83; amended at Doc. 127-1.  
 
Local Rule 3.01(i)(2) permits a party identifying a supplemental authority to cite 
“a specification by page … of the issue or argument in the earlier paper that the au-
thority supplements.” The decision in Huisha-Huisha that Defendant Centers for 
Disease Control & Prevention exceeded its statutory authority under the Public 
Health Service Act supports my arguments on Pages 5-15 of my Amended Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Doc. 127-1.  
 
Local Rule 3.01(i)(3) permits a party identifying a supplemental authority to cite 
“succinct quotation from the authority,” and the rule requires that a notice “must 
Case 6:21-cv-00975-PGB-DCI   Document 149   Filed 09/21/21   Page 1 of 2 PageID 4840

 
2
not exceed two pages inclusive of all parts.” “Plaintiffs argue that the CDC Orders 
instituting the Title 42 Process exceed the authority granted by Congress pursuant 
to [42 USC] Section 265. … The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiffs have shown 
that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim.” Huisha-Huisha at 32. 
 
“The lack of express terms within the statute is significant: even ‘broad rulemak-
ing power must be exercised within the bounds set by Congress,’ Merck & Co. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 385 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92, 94 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 
962 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that ‘agencies are ‘bound, not only by the 
ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it has deemed appropri-
ate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes’); and the CDC ‘does not [have 
the] power to revise clear statutory terms,’ Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 
327 (2014).” Id. at 34. 
 
“[T[he plain language of [42 USC] Section 265 … evinces no intention to grant 
the Executive the authority to expel or remove persons from the United States. … 
Neither does neighboring Section 264 contemplate the removal of persons from the 
United States. … Furthermore, even beyond Sections 264 and 271, the statute as a 
whole does not contain ‘a word about the power of the [CDC] to expel anyone who 
has come into the country.’ … Accordingly, the CDC is not entitled to deference with 
respect to its interpretation.” Id. at 36-38 & 43. 
 
 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of September 2021. 
Lucas Wall, plaintiff 
Case 6:21-cv-00975-PGB-DCI   Document 149   Filed 09/21/21   Page 2 of 2 PageID 4841

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.flmd.390847.149.0.pdf

Size

168,725 bytes

SHA-256

8a8ee4e2d97cb0c3af1e76011a41a6375338316eb7590ad47adce34330890494

Our copy

gov.uscourts.flmd.390847.149.0.pdf

Original

archive.org