Memorandum Opinion — Pretrial Motions, United States v. Jerel Andre Williams (E.D. Pa.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
: 
Criminal No. 2:20-cr-00143-JMG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
JEREL ANDRE WILLIAMS  
 
 
:  
  
 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
: 
_________________________________________ 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
GALLAGHER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            June 30, 2021 
Defendant Jerel Andre Williams has filed pretrial motions seeking (1) a bill of particulars; 
(2) to compel the production of Brady materials; and (3) to compel the production of instructions 
used before the grand jury.  See ECF Nos. 20–22.  The Government has responded to each motion.  
See ECF Nos. 23–25.  For the reasons provided below, we will deny Williams’ motions for a bill 
of particulars and to compel the production of grand jury materials.  We will grant in part Williams’ 
motion to compel the production of Brady materials, and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 5(f)(1), issue an order confirming the Government’s compliance with Brady. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Williams is charged with eight counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, one 
count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 3559(g), and two counts of filing a false 
tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).  See ECF No. 5.  These charges stem from an 
alleged multiyear scheme to defraud Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”) of computer hardware.  Id.  The 
Superseding Indictment alleges that Williams and a co-schemer secured “approximately 157 
warranty replacement products” by submitting “false warranty claims and . . . various false 

 
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statements” to Cisco.  Id. at 4.  Williams and his co-schemer purportedly hid their identities by 
using email addresses with false domain names.  Id. at 3. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars 
Williams first moves for a bill of particulars.  See ECF No. 20.  “A bill of particulars is ‘a 
formal written statement by the prosecutor providing details of the charges against the defendant.’”  
United States v. Islam, No. 20-cr-00045, 2021 WL 312580, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2021) (quoting 
N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 421, 429 (3d Cir. 2016)).  Its purpose “is to 
inform the defendant of the nature of the charges brought against him to adequately prepare his 
defense, to avoid surprise during the trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an 
inadequately described offense.”  United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 63–64 (3d Cir. 1971).   
Williams seeks a bill of particulars on the grounds that the Superseding Indictment “is 
vague and indefinite concerning certain allegations in Counts 1–9 regarding the alleged scheme 
and the registering of false domain names to hide his identity.”  ECF No. 20 at 2.  He therefore 
requests further information on how he allegedly “registered false domain names to hide his 
identity,” and how he is connected to the alleged 157 false warranty claims referenced in the 
Superseding Indictment.  Id. at 3.  The Government responds that the Superseding Indictment 
“thoroughly sets forth the fraud scheme in question and apprises the defendant of the nature of the 
charges so as to enable him to prepare a defense.”  ECF No. 23 at 6.  The Government further 
notes that it has produced thousands of pages of discovery, plus audio and video evidence, and 
even engaged in a “reverse proffer” with Williams.  See id. at 6–7.1 
 
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At this “reverse proffer” session, the Government outlined its case against Williams.  ECF 
No. 23 at 7 n.1.  The Government has indicated its willingness to perform another “reverse proffer” 
at Williams’ request.  Id. 

 
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Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f), a court can direct the Government to file 
a bill of particulars.  See also Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 64 (“[T]he granting of a bill of particulars 
remains a discretionary matter with the trial court . . . .”).  While the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure “encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts toward bills of particulars,” FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 7 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments, “a bill of particulars is not a tool for 
broad factual discovery.”  Islam, 2021 WL 312580, at *2; see also United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 
1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985) (“A bill of particulars, unlike discovery, is not intended to provide the 
defendant with the fruits of the government’s investigation.”); United States v. Smukler, 330 F. 
Supp. 3d 1050, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Defendant is not entitled to wholesale discovery of the 
Government’s evidence . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Rather, we should 
only order the production of a bill of particulars “if an indictment is so vague that it ‘significantly 
impairs the defendant’s ability to prepare his defense or is likely to lead to prejudicial surprise at 
trial.’”  United States v. Evans, No. 12-616-9, 2015 WL 1072217, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2015) 
(quoting United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1066 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Smith, 776 F.2d at 
1111 (a bill of particulars “is intended to give the defendant only that minimum amount of 
information necessary to permit the defendant to conduct his own investigation”).   
With this guidance in mind, a bill of particulars is unnecessary here.  The Superseding 
Indictment sufficiently “inform[s] [Williams] of the nature of the charges brought against him.”  
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Further, the ample discovery in this case lessens the need for a bill of particulars.2  See, 
 
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To that end, Williams does not allege any deficiencies with the Government’s production 
of discovery.  Rather, he takes issue with the Government’s “avalanche of produced discovery,” 
which purportedly fails to give “adequate notice of the parameters of the [G]overnment’s case 
against him.”  ECF No. 20 at 3–4.  Williams’ request will be denied because we find that the 
Superseding Indictment is sufficiently detailed, “the [G]overnment has provided basically open 

 
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e.g., id. at 772 (“[A]ccess to discovery further weakens the case for a bill of particulars here.”); 
United States v. Ligambi, No. 09-00496-01, 2012 WL 2362638, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2012) 
(“[W]hen the government supplements a detailed charging document with substantial discovery, 
defendant’s claim for a bill of particulars is further weakened.”).  Finally, a bill of particulars is 
inappropriate to the extent Williams seeks “disclosure of every detail of the theory of the 
Government’s case.”  United States v. Reed, No. 18-0101, 2019 WL 80252, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 
2, 2019); see also id. (noting that a defendant is “not entitled to discover the Government’s strategy 
nor an outline of its case”). 
B. 
Motion to Compel Production of Brady Materials 
Williams next moves to compel the production of Brady materials.  See ECF No. 21.  Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), established that “the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  The 
Brady rule was later refined to require the disclosure of “materials that might affect the jury’s 
judgment of the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 
342, 357 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2002)).   
Last year, Congress passed the Due Process Protections Act.  See Due Process Protections 
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-182, 134 Stat. 894 (2020).  That law amended Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 5, which now requires that “[i]n all criminal proceedings . . . the judge shall issue an 
oral and written order to prosecution and defense counsel that confirms the disclosure obligation 
 
discovery of its evidence . . . and the length of time, from the filing of the indictment and the 
production of the [G]overnment’s evidence, until the date of trial, provides ample opportunity for 
preparation.”  United States v. Kemp, No. 04-cr-370, 2004 WL 2757867, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 
2004). 

 
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of the prosecutor under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and the possible 
consequences of violating such order under applicable law.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(f)(1).   
Williams does not allege prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Brady.  See ECF No. 21 
at 10.  Rather, he seeks a prophylactic order “to ensure all Brady material is provided in advance 
of trial.”  Id.  He further requests that the Government “review all of the information” already 
produced to identify any Brady material.  Id. at 7.  In response, the Government notes that it “is 
well aware of its Brady obligations” and “is not holding on to discovery to produce it later.”  ECF 
No. 24 at 1–2.   
While there is no indication that the Government has violated, or will violate, its Brady 
obligations, the Due Process Protections Act compels an order confirming the Government’s 
compliance with Brady.  See, e.g., United States v. Hossain, No. 19-CR-606, 2020 WL 6874910, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020) (issuing order under the Due Process Protections Act); United 
States v. Ryan, No. 20-65, 2021 WL 795980, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2021) (same).  The 
accompanying order reminds the Government of its obligation to timely disclose information 
favorable to the defense as to criminal liability on the charged offenses or mitigation of any 
punishment that may be imposed.  Such favorable information includes information that may cast 
doubt on the credibility of government witnesses.  Possible consequences for violating this order 
include exclusion of evidence, dismissal of charges, contempt proceedings, disciplinary referral, 
and any other relief authorized by law.  
C. 
Motion to Compel Production of Grand Jury Instructions 
Williams finally moves to compel production of the instructions used before the grand jury.  
See ECF No. 22.  There is a “long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceedings in the federal courts.”  Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966) (quoting 

 
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United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958)).  Nevertheless, Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(ii) authorizes disclosure “of a grand-jury matter . . . at the request 
of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter 
that occurred before the grand jury.” 
“As a matter of public policy, grand jury proceedings generally must remain secret except 
where there is a compelling necessity.”  United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 
1989).  In other words, a party seeking access to grand jury materials must make “a strong showing 
of particularized need . . . before any disclosure will be permitted.”  United States v. Sells Eng’g, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983); see also McDowell, 888 F.2d at 289 (“[A] party must show a 
particularized need for that information which outweighs the public interest in secrecy.”). 
Williams has not met this high standard.  In support of his motion, Williams notes that 
there was “a significant prospect for error in the Government’s instructions to the Grand Jury.”  
ECF No. 22 at 6.  Because the Superseding Indictment alleges that Williams fraudulently obtained 
over 100 products from Cisco, he is unsure how “the Government possibly could have provided 
guidance to the Grand Jury before it made its determination that probable cause existed to indict 
[him] on Count 9, for Mail Fraud.”  Id. at 5.   
Mere speculation that the Government improperly instructed the grand jury does not pass 
muster.  Indeed, “courts generally reject unsupported beliefs and conjectures as grounds for 
disclosure of grand jury materials to defendants.”  United States v. Shane, 584 F. Supp. 364, 367 
(E.D. Pa. 1984).  That principle has been invoked in similar cases, and it applies with full force 
here.  See, e.g., United States v. Holzwanger, No. 10-00714, 2011 WL 1741920, at *10 (D.N.J. 
May 4, 2011) (rejecting defendants’ speculation “that there is a likelihood that the Government 
improperly instructed the jury on the law”); United States v. Chalker, No. 12-0367, 2013 WL 

 
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4547754, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2013) (“[A] bald assertion, without any factual basis, is 
insufficient to meet [the] heavy burden of establishing a particularized need for disclosure.” (citing 
Shane, 584 F. Supp. at 367)).  Accordingly, we will deny Williams’ motion to compel production 
of grand jury materials. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Williams’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.  An 
appropriate order follows. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ John M. Gallagher  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN M. GALLAGHER 
 
  
United States District Court Judge

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