Court filing
Joint Pretrial Statement — United States v. Adams (Dkt. 217, D.D.C.)
Summary
A joint pretrial statement by the United States and counsel for Roberto Adams in United States v. Roberto Adams, Criminal No. 21-cr-625-APM, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, filed May 18, 2026 as Document 217. The parties do not agree on a neutral statement of the case for the jury and each proposes its own. The government's proposal says Adams is charged with one count of wire fraud and one count of expenditure money laundering, alleging that in January 2021 Adams fraudulently obtained a PPP loan of approximately $18,345 for SuperKlean LLC and used over $10,000 of the proceeds for a $12,110.91 expenditure, and that Adams has pleaded not guilty and denies the charges. The statement also sets out proposed voir dire and other pretrial matters. It runs 19 pages.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Filed May 18, 2026 in Roberto Adams; one of 4 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2026-05-18 |
Cite this document
“Joint Pretrial Statement — United States v. Adams (Dkt. 217, D.D.C.).”
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 1:21-cr-00625, Doc. 217, filed 2026-05-18. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/court-filings/us-v-roberto-adams/2026-05-18-joint-pretrial-statement-dkt-217/
, SHA-256 82f59424f79e8fd32e296d2292a6eee059bc0f9021d384a9369a533022e4b557.Full text
Case 1:21-cr-00625-APM Document 217 Filed 05/18/26 Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CRIMINAL NO. 21-cr-625-APM
ROBERTO ADAMS,
Defendant.
JOINT PRETRIAL STATEMENT
The United States and Counsel for Roberto Adams respectfully submit this Joint Pretrial
Statement containing: Proposed Neutral Statements of the Case; Proposed Voir Dire Questions;
Proposed Jury Instructions; Witness Lists; Proposed Verdict Form. The parties have agreed to two
stipulations, which are attached hereto.
I. Proposed Neutral Statements of the Case
The parties do not agree on the proposed neutral statement of the case, and each present
their proposed neutral statements below:
A. Government’s Proposal for Neutral Statement of the Case
This is a criminal case that began when the grand jury returned an Indictment. The
defendant, Roberto Adams has been charged with one count of wire fraud and one count of
expenditure money laundering. It is alleged that in January 2021, Mr. Adams fraudulently
obtained one pandemic-related loan, totaling approximately $18,345, through the Paycheck
Protection Program for a business he allegedly controlled named SuperKlean LLC. It is further
alleged that Mr. Adams used over $10,000 from the proceeds of those loans to make an expenditure
on January 29, 2021, in the amount of $12,110.91. Mr. Adams has pleaded not guilty and denies
each of these charges.
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B. Defendant’s Proposal for Neutral Statement of the Case
This is a criminal case. Officer Roberto Adams is the defendant. Officer Roberto Adams
has been charged with crimes related to alleged fraud involving a PPP loan application another
individual filled out on his behalf. Officer Adams denies the charges against him, he has pleaded
not guilty and is presumed innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty of every element of the offenses charged in the indictment. The Court will
instruct the jury as to the elements of the crimes charged and the applicable law at a more
appropriate time during trial.
II. Proposed Voir Dire Questions
A. Jointly Proposed
Knowledge of the Parties
1. The Defendant is Roberto Adams, a resident of the State of Maryland and at the time
relevant to this case he was employed as a Police Officer by the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department. Do you know him?
Experience with the Legal System and U.S. Government
2. Have you, or any members of your immediate family, ever studied law or had any legal
training, including paralegal training?
3. Have you, or any of your family, close friends, or household members, ever worked for
or with an office that handles prosecution? By “prosecution,” the question means
government agencies such as the United States Attorney’s Office, a district attorney’s
office, or an attorney general’s office.
4. Have you, or any of your family, close friends, or household members, ever worked for
or with a law enforcement agency? By “law enforcement,” this question means
government agencies like the U.S. Park Police, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agency (ICE), the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Corrections,
state and local police and fire departments; the Metropolitan Police Department; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, also known as the FBI; the Department of Justice; the
U.S. Marshal’s Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
also known as the ATF; the Drug Enforcement Administration, also known as DEA;
the Internal Revenue Service the U.S. Secret Service; the CIA; and probation and parole
officers.
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5. Have you, or any of your family, close friends, or household members, ever done any
work for or with any person or organization that does criminal defense work, such as
the Federal Defender’s Office, the Public Defender’s office, the Innocence Project,
defense attorneys, or a private law firm? This question also includes work as a private
investigator.
6. Have you, or any of your family, close friends, or household members, ever worked at
a courthouse or for a court system, including D.C. Superior Court, or the U.S. District
Court, including the Pretrial Services Agency, CSOSA, or U.S. Probation?
7. Do you, or any of your family, close friends, or household members, have a pending
application for employment with the United States Attorney’s Office; a public defender
service; a law firm that does criminal defense work; with any local, state, or federal law
enforcement agency, as defined above; or with any courthouse or court system as
defined above?
8. Have you had any unpleasant experiences with the police or a prosecutor or other law
enforcement, whether here in D.C. or elsewhere? Or any unpleasant experiences with
a defense attorney or defense investigator, whether here in D.C. or elsewhere?
9. Do you have any beliefs or opinions about law enforcement officers that would affect
your ability to fairly and impartially evaluate the credibility of a law enforcement
officer, like any other witness, simply because he or she is a law enforcement officer?
10. Do you have any beliefs or opinions about the United States Attorney’s Office, the U.S.
Department of Justice, criminal defense attorneys, or the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that would make it difficult for you to remain fair and impartial to both
the government and the Defendant throughout the trial in this case?
Prior Jury Service
11. Has any member served as a juror in a case where in which an agreement as to a verdict
was not reached?
12. Has anyone served as a foreperson for a jury?
Ability to Serve and Deliberate
13. Is there anything about your political beliefs or affiliations that would prevent you from
following the law as I instruct you or reaching a verdict based solely on the evidence
you receive during the trial?
14. Does anyone have personal beliefs about the criminal justice system that would impact
their ability to render a verdict one way or the other, regardless of the evidence
presented at trial and regardless of the law as I instruct you?
15. Do you have any difficulty seeing or hearing that would make it difficult for you to
follow or receive the evidence presented in the case?
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16. Are you taking any medication or do you have any physical condition that could make
it difficult for you to sit as a juror and give your full attention to the trial and the
evidence in this case?
17. Do you have any difficulty speaking, understanding, reading, or writing the English
language?
18. Do you have any moral, religious, or ethical beliefs that prevent you from sitting in
judgment of another person in a criminal trial?
19. Is there anyone who believes that current laws are too harsh in prosecuting individuals
that commit fraud?
20. Is there anyone who believes that current laws are too lenient?
21. Is there anything about the charges being brought in this case that would cause you to
be prejudice or biased for or against the Federal Government, for or against any
witness, or for or against the Defendant?
22. Is there anything that comes to mind that could make you either consciously or
subconsciously feel strongly for or against either party, or affect your ability to be fair
and impartial in this case?
23. Are you familiar with the Paycheck Protection Program or Emergency Injury Disaster
Loan Program passed as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act—also known as the CARES Act?
24. Have you or anyone in your family or friends been a victim of fraud? If so, can you
still render a fair verdict despite you, a family member or friend being a victim of fraud?
25. Have you or anyone in your family or friends been accused of fraud? If so, can you
still render a fair verdict despite you, a family member or friend being accused of fraud?
B. Additional Voir Dire - Proposed by the Government to Which the Defendant
Objects
26. Have you had any dealings with the United States Government in which you feel the
government did not give you fair treatment?
• Defendant objects on grounds that it is duplicative of Additional Question 21.
27. Are there any among you who have any claim against the United States pending at this
time?
• Defendant objects on grounds that it is duplicative of Additional Question 21.
28. Do each of you understand that in federal court jurors determine whether a defendant
is guilty or not guilty from the evidence, and the punishment provided for the offense
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charged in the indictment is a matter for the Court and should not be considered by the
jury in any way in arriving at your verdict? Will that affect your ability to sit as a juror?
• Defendant objects on grounds that a jury does not determine guilt or innocence in
our Constitutional system. It determines whether the government proved every
element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt or not, which is why its
“guilty or not guilty” not “guilty or innocent.” The Defendant proposes the
following instead: “Are you able to follow the rule that the defendant is presumed
innocent throughout the trial unless and until the government proves every element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt?”
C. Additional Voir Dire - Proposed by the Defendant to Which the Government
Objects
29. A defendant is not required to present any evidence in this case, because the burden of
proof rests with the prosecution. If the defendant does not present any evidence in this
case, you cannot hold that against him. Are you able to follow that instruction?
• The Government objects to this question because it is duplicative of Burden of
Proof, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.107. If the Court
is inclined to ask this question, the Government requests that it be styled to be
consistent with the § 2.107 Burden of Proof jury instruction, and read as follows:
Every defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial unless and until the
Government has proven he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never
shifts throughout the trial. The law does not require Roberto Adams to prove his
innocence or to produce any evidence at all. Would anyone have an issue with
following this instruction?
30. You must acquit the defendant if the government fails to prove every element of the
offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt? Are you comfortable rendering a verdict
of not guilty if the government does not prove their case even if you believe the
defendant possibly, maybe, or even likely committed the offense?
• The Government objects because the first half of the question is not, in fact, a
question, but an instruction. The Government objects to the second half of this
question because it conflicts with and is inconsistent with the Court’s instruction
on the definition of Reasonable Doubt. See Reasonable Doubt, Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.108.
• The Government proposes that, if the Court is inclined to ask this question it be
styled to be consistent with Burden of Proof, Criminal Jury Instructions for the
District of Columbia § 2.107, and read as follows:
If you find that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of a particular offense with which Roberto Adams is charged, it is your
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duty to find him guilty of that offense. On the other hand, if you find the
Government has failed to prove any element of a particular offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find Roberto Adams not guilty of that offense.
Would anyone have an issue with following this instruction?
31. Do you have any strong feelings one way or the other about the Government providing
financial assistance during the pandemic or about the Government providing financial
assistance to citizens in general?
• The Government objects because this question is duplicative of Question 9 in the
Court’s proposed questions. See ECF 38-1 (“Do you have such strong feelings
about the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on small business that it would be
difficult for you to be fair and impartial in this case?”)
o Defense Response: this question is not duplicative of Question 9, which
deals with the impact of COVID-19 on small businesses whereas the
above question is intended to elicit whether a juror has bias towards
individuals who receive government assistance.
III. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The parties hereby propose the following jury instructions, subject to issues that arise
during trial. Proposed instructions that do not come from the Standardized Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District of Columbia (“Redbook”) are identified in the list below in bold, with
the proposed language following.
A. Joint Agreement as to the Instructions Below:
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS
1. Preliminary Instructions Before Trial, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 1.102
2. Notetaking by Jurors, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 1.105
3. Preliminary Instructions to Jury Where Identity of Alternates is Not Disclosed § 1.107
4. A Juror’s Recognition of a Witness or Other Party Connected to the Case § 1.108
ANTICIPATED INSTRUCTIONS DURING TRIAL
5. Cautionary Instruction on the Use of the Internet, Criminal Jury Instructions for the
District of Columbia § 1.202
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6. A Stipulation of Fact § 1.103
FINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
7. Function of the Court, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.101
8. Function of the Jury, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.102
9. Jury’s Recollection Controls, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.103
10. Evidence in the Case, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.104
11. Statements of Counsel, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.105
12. Indictment Not Evidence, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.106
13. Burden of Proof, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.107
14. Reasonable Doubt, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.108
15. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.109
16. Nature of Charges Not to be Considered, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.110
17. Number of Witnesses, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.111
18. Inadmissible and Stricken Evidence, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.112 (if applicable)
19. Credibility of Witnesses, Redbook Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.200
20. Child’s Testimony, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.201 (if
applicable)
21. Police Officer’s Testimony, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.207
22. Right of Defendant Not to Testify, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.208 (if applicable)
23. Defendant as Witness, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.209
(if applicable)
24. False or Inconsistent Statement by Defendant § 2.210 (if applicable)
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25. Effect of Refusal of Witness to Answer Question § 2.211 (if applicable)
26. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.212 (if applicable)
27. Character of the Defendant, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.213 (if applicable)
28. Cross-Examination of Character Witness, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.214 (if applicable)
29. Evaluation of Prior Inconsistent Statement, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District
of Columbia § 2.216 (if applicable)
30. Evaluation of Prior Consistent Statement, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.217 (if applicable)
31. Motive, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.307
32. Other Crimes Evidence, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.321
(if applicable)
33. Multiple Counts—One Defendant, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.402
34. Late Disclosure or Non-Disclosure of Evidence § 2.322 (if applicable)
35. “On or About,” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 3.103
36. Aiding and Abetting, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 3.200
37. Proof of State of Mind, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 3.101
38. Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
39. Expenditure Money Laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1957
40. Redacted Exhibits, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.500
41. Exhibits During Deliberations, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia
§ 2.501
42. Selection of Foreperson, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.502
43. Possible Punishment Not Relevant, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of
Columbia § 2.505
44. Unanimity—General, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.405
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45. Verdict Form Explanation, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.407
46. Furnishing the Jury with a Copy of the Instructions, Criminal Jury Instructions for the
District of Columbia § 2.100
47. Cautionary Instruction on Publicity, Communication, and Research, Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.508
48. Communication Between Court and Jury During Jury’s Deliberations, Criminal Jury
Instructions for the District of Columbia § 2.509
49. Attitude and Conduct of Jurors in Deliberations, Criminal Jury Instructions for the
District of Columbia § 2.510
50. Excusing Alternate Jurors, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia §
2.511
51. Defendant’s Theory of the Case § 9.100
B. Additional Instructions Proposed by Defense to which the Government Objects:
52. Missing Witness or Other Evidence § 2.300.
o The Government objects to the inclusion of this instruction and has filed a
Motion in Limine regarding such arguments by the Defense. See ECF 208.
53. Willfully Causing an Act to be Done § 3.102.
o The Government objects to the inclusion of this instruction because it is
contrary to law and inconsistent with the statute. The proposed instruction for
the violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 is sufficient. The
Government also notes that this instruction was not included in similar cases
recently tried in D.D.C. and involving violations of Section 1343. See United
States v. Venkata, 20-CR-66 (RDM), 2022 WL 1093584 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022);
United States v. Milligan, 19-CR-424 (TJK), 2021 WL 3186473 (D.D.C. July
23, 2021); United States v. Barrow, 20-CR-127 (CKK), 2021 WL 5358721
(D.D.C. June 24, 2021); United States v. Abou-Khatwa, 18-CR-67 (TSC), 2019
WL 12337740 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019).
54. Venue
The Indictment alleges that some act [or acts] in furtherance of the crime charged occurred
in the District of Columbia. There is no requirement that [all aspects of the crime charged] take
place here in the District of Columbia. Before you may return a verdict of guilty, however, if that
is your decision, the government must convince you that [some act in furtherance of the crime
charged] took place in the District of Columbia.
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[Define the specific geographic boundaries of the venue, if needed.]
Unlike all the specific elements of the crime[s] charged that I have described elsewhere in
these instructions, this fact regarding venue need only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. This means the government need only convince you that it is more likely than not that
[some act in furtherance of the crime charged] took place here.
The government, however, must prove all the offense-specific elements of any crime
charged, as I have described elsewhere in these instructions, beyond a reasonable doubt. The lesser
standard of preponderance of the evidence only applies to your decision on the issue of venue.
Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions 6.32 Venue
• The Government objects to the inclusion of this instruction. Venue is a jury question
if “(1) the defendant objects to venue prior to or at the close of the prosecution’s case-
in-chief, (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to proper venue, and
(3) the defendant timely requests a jury instruction.” United States v. Haire, 371 F.3d
833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 327 (3d Cir.
2002)), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005) (emphasis added). Because
there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to proper venue in this case, the
jury is not required to make a determination on this issue and the instruction is not
appropriate. See United States v. Fahnbulleh, 752 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(“It
is well established law in this circuit with respect to venue instructions that a venue
instruction is necessary only when the question of venue is genuinely in issue.”
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The Government is not aware of any
evidence that the Defendant was not in the District of Columbia when he sent an
interstate wire signal to G.B. in North Carolina, as set forth in Count 2 of the Second
Superseding Indictment.
C. Additional Instructions Proposed by the Government to which the Defendant
Objects:
55. Suppression or Fabrication of Evidence by Defendant, Criminal Jury Instructions for
the District of Columbia § 2.303
o Defendant objects to inclusion of this instruction.
56. Deliberate Ignorance (Parties reserve argument until the close of evidence)
Next, I want to explain something about proving a Defendant’s knowledge.
No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring the obvious. If you are
convinced that the defendant deliberately ignored a high probability that a scheme to fraudulently
obtain Paycheck Protection Program loans existed, then you may find that he knew of the scheme
to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Program loans.
But to find this, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
aware of a high probability that the scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Program
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loans existed, and that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what was obvious.
Carelessness, or negligence, or foolishness on his part is not the same as knowledge, and is not
enough to convict. This, of course, is all for you to decide.
Source: Sixth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, 2.09
• Defendant objects to inclusion of this instruction so long as the government proceeds
on an actual knowledge theory. If the facts at trial prove the defendant purposely
contrived to avoid learning all the facts or was aware of a high probability of wire fraud
and consciously avoided confirming that fact, U.S. v. Bisong, 645 F.3d 384, 399-400
(citing United States v. Alston Graves, 435 F33d 331, 341), then the defense proposes
the following instruction:
You may find the defendant acted knowingly if you find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant:
1. Was aware of a high probability that G.B. was engaged in a wire fraud scheme, 1 and
2. Deliberately avoided learning the truth.
You may not find such knowledge, however, if you find that the defendant actually
believed G.B. was engaged in the lawful business of loan processing, or if you find that
the defendant was simply negligent, careless, or foolish.
Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, 5.8 Deliberate Ignorance
1 The Government notes that, to the extent that Court adopts the Ninth Circuit’s instruction on
Deliberate Ignorance, the Government objects to the Defendant’s insertion of “G.B. was engaged
in a wire fraud scheme” and “G.B. was engaged in the lawful business of loan processing” as G.B.
actions are not the subject of the Second Superseding Indictment and G.B. is not on trial. It is
Defendant’s knowledge and conduct related to a “scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck
Protection Program loans” that is the subject of the trial. Defendant’s proposed instruction appears
to be an attempt to convert the instruction into a second “theory of defense” instruction.
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D. Instructions as to Substantive Counts to which the Parties are in Partial Agreement:
Proposed Instruction 39: Count Two —Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment charges the Defendant with Wire Fraud.
Elements of the Offense
To prove the defendant is guilty of wire fraud, the Government must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The defendant knowingly 2 devised a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or
property by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises;
2 The Defendant objects and requests that the phrase “and willingly” be added to this element.
The defense agrees with the United States Justice Department Criminal Resource Manual that cites
to case law stating “willingly” or “voluntarily” as an element of the offense. See United States
Department of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, CRM 500-999, 941. 18 U.S.C. 1343—
Elements of Wire Fraud. The section of the manual is copy and pasted verbatim below:
The elements of wire fraud under Section 1343 directly parallel those of the mail
fraud statute, but require the use of an interstate telephone call or electronic
communication made in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Briscoe, 65
F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d
232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d
Cir. 1994) (wire fraud is identical to mail fraud statute except that it speaks of
communications transmitted by wire); see also, e.g., United States v. Profit, 49 F.3d
404, 406 n. 1 (8th Cir.) (the four essential elements of the crime of wire fraud are:
(1) that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised or participated in a
scheme to defraud another out of money; (2) that the defendant did so with the
intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire
communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire communications were
in fact used) (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District
Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1341 (West 1994)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2289
(1995); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1994) (two elements
comprise the crime of wire fraud: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) use of
interstate wire communication to facilitate that scheme); United States v. Faulkner,
17 F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (essential elements of wire fraud are: (1) a scheme
to defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications
to execute the scheme), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 193 (1995); United States v.
Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (to prove wire fraud government must show
(1) scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant's knowing and
willful participation in scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate
wire communications in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Maxwell, 920
F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Wire fraud requires proof of (1) a scheme to
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2. The defendant did so with the intent 3 to defraud; and
defraud; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication to further the
scheme.")(emphasis added)
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-941-
18-usc-1343-elements-wire-fraud.
Government’s position: the addition is contrary to law and inconsistent with the statute, prior
precedent, and jury instructions given in recent D.D.C. trials. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; See United
States v. Venkata, 20-CR-66 (RDM), 2022 WL 1093584 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022); United States v.
Barrow, 20-CR-127 (CKK), 2021 WL 5358721 (D.D.C. June 24, 2021); United States v. Abou-
Khatwa, 18-CR-67 (TSC), 2019 WL 12337740 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019); United States v. Scott, 19-
cr-00030 (RLW), 150 F.4th 580 (D.C. Cir. 2025).
3
The Defendant objects and requests that the word “specific” be added to appear before intent.
See United States v. Venkata, 20-CR-66 (RDM), 2022 WL 1093584 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022).
Government’s position: the addition is contrary to law and inconsistent with the statute and prior
precedent. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Barrow, 20-CR-127 (CKK), 2021 WL 5358721
(D.D.C. June 24, 2021); United States v. Abou-Khatwa, 18-CR-67 (TSC), 2019 WL 12337740
(D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019). The addition of “specific” is superfluous. “Specific Intent” is not a defined
term in this instruction. Further, its addition would be confusing to the jury because it would
mislead them into believing that the Defendant need to be aware that he was violating the specific
wire fraud statute as opposed to the Defendant’s awareness he was participating in a scheme to
defraud. See United States v. Kahn, 88 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(“A mail fraud conviction
requires proof of an intent to deceive and cause financial loss to another or cause financial gain to
oneself. [] The specific intent required under the mail fraud statute is the intent to defraud, rather
than the intent to violate a statute.”)(internal citations omitted). Indeed, in Khan, the D.C. Circuit
specifically stated that “[t]he Court in U.S. v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1989) did not
determine that subjective knowledge of the unlawfulness of one’s action is always required in a
conviction for mail fraud.” Kahn, 88 F.3d at 1279 (emphasis added). Defendant’s reliance on
Rhone, as set forth below, is misplaced. There is no requirement that the Defendant be aware of
the wire fraud statute or, as Defendant phrases it below, “presumed to know the law.” A majority
of the circuits do not include the word “specific” in the instruction. See Pattern Crim. Jury Instr.
1st Cir. 4.13 (1998); Mod. Crim. Jury Instr. 3rd Cir. 6.18.1343 (2023); Pattern Jury Instructions
for Federal Criminal Cases, District of South Carolina § 1343 (2020 Online Edition); Pattern
Crim. Jury Instr. 6th Cir. 10.02 (2023); Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. 1341 & 1343[1] (2022 ed.);
Model Crim. Jury Instr. 8th Cir. 6.18.1343 (2021); Model Crim. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 15.35 (2023);
Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. OI O51 (2020)
Defendant’s position: the central issue at trial is whether the defendant had the specific intent to
defraud the government and that failing to include the word “specific” could allow the jury to infer
that the government meets its burden of proving the requisite intent simply on the basis that the
defendant was presumed to know the law. See United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.
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3. That, in carrying out or furthering the scheme to defraud, the defendant transmitted
or caused to be transmitted a writing, sign, or picture by means of a wire
communication in interstate commerce.
Definitions
As to the first element, a “scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property” means any
deliberate plan of action or course of conduct by which someone intends to deceive or to cheat
another or by which someone intends to deprive another of something of value by using materially
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, or by concealing material facts.
The terms “false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” includes actual,
direct false statements, as well as half-truths and/or the knowing concealment of facts that are
material or important to the matter in questions and that were made or used with the intent to
defraud.
A pretense, representation, or promise is material if it has the natural tendency to influence
or is capable of influencing a decision by the person or entity to whom it is addressed. However,
whether a pretense, representation, or promise is material does not depend upon whether a person
was actually deceived, or relied on it, or should have known it was false or fraudulent. Moreover,
it is irrelevant whether the person acting on the pretense, representation, or promise did so
negligently, carelessly, irresponsibly, or could have done something more to prevent the offense.
As to the second element, to act with an “intent to defraud” means to act knowingly and
with the intention or the purpose to deceive and deprive another of something of value. 4 An intent
1989). In addition, the inclusion of the word “specific” is not superfluous nor is it confusing to
the jury. The instruction does not state with “the specific intent to commit wire fraud”—merely
the specific intent to defraud, which is the requisite mens rea of the offense. The government cites
to Khan, an unpublished opinion, that merely states the obvious, which is the “specific intent
required under the mail fraud statute is the intent to defraud, rather than the intent to violate a
statute.” (citation omitted). Neither the government’s position nor the holding in Khan contradict
the fact that a wire fraud conviction requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the defendant had the “specific intent to defraud,” which is what the defense proposes.
4
Defendant objects and requests that the instruction read “As to the second element, to act with
a ‘specific intent to defraud’ means a conscious, knowing, intent to deceive or cheat someone.”
See United States v. Venkata, 20-CR-66 (RDM), 2022 WL 1093584 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022). For
the same reasons stated above, the Government objects to the insertion of “specific.” See United
States v. Barrow, 20-CR-127 (CKK), 2021 WL 5358721 (D.D.C. June 24, 2021); United States v.
Abou-Khatwa, 18-CR-67 (TSC), 2019 WL 12337740 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019). The Government
also notes that the Defendant’s objection to the explanation of the second element further
demonstrates the superfluousness of “specific,” as it does nothing to further instruct the jury of the
meaning of the term and appears to be nothing more than an attempt to add a heightened intent
standard that is inconsistent with the law.
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to defraud is accompanied, ordinarily, by a desire or a purpose to bring about some gain or benefit
to oneself or some other person or by a desire or purpose to cause some loss to some person.
As to the third element, a “wire communication in interstate commerce” includes the use
of the internet to send a message or to communicate with a website from one state to another state.
For the purpose of the wire fraud statute, a wire transmission from a state outside of the District of
Columbia to the District of Columbia is considered a transmission in interstate commerce.
The Government need not prove that the Defendant intended that anything be transmitted
in interstate commerce to further, advance, or carry out the scheme. The Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that a wire transmission in interstate commerce was, in fact,
used in some manner to further, advance, or carry out the scheme.
It is also not necessary that the Government prove that the material transmitted by wire
communications was itself false or fraudulent, or that the use of the interstate wire communications
facilities was intended as the specific or exclusive means of accomplishing the alleged fraud. What
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the use of the interstate wire communications
facilities was closely related to the scheme because the Defendant either wired something or caused
it to be wired in interstate commerce in an attempt to execute or carry out the scheme.
To “cause” interstate wire communications to be used is to do an act with knowledge that
the use of the wire communications facilities will follow in the ordinary course of business or
where such use can reasonably be foreseen.
Each use of interstate wires to further or to carry out the scheme may be a separate violation
of the wire fraud statute. 5
Sources: Adapted from Adapted from 2A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 47:07, 47:08, 47:13, 47:14,
47:15; 3d Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 6.18.1343-1, Wire Fraud – “Transmits by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate commerce” – Defined (“The use of the Internet to
send a message, such as an e-mail, or to communicate with a web site may constitute a wire
transmission in interstate commerce.”); see also United States v. Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 871-873
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (identifying the elements of wire fraud and noting that a fax transmission from
Virginia to the District of Columbia was used to support the interstate communication required);
United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (identifying the elements of
wire fraud); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting that it is a
defense to wire fraud where the “persons defrauded unreasonably believed the misrepresentations
made to them. . . . [I]t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to defraud
are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright. . . . The only issue is whether there is a plan, scheme or
artifice intended to defraud.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1338-43 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing the definition of a scheme to defraud
and intent to defraud); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The mail
and wire fraud statutes prescribe a penalty for each use of the mails or wires ‘for the purpose of
5
Defendant objects to this language because there is only one count filed and this seems to
suggest the jury could find Officer Adams guilty on additional uncharged counts.
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executing’ a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false pretenses.”); see
United States v. Venkata, 20-CR-66 (RDM), 2022 WL 1093584 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2022) (Jury
Instruction for Wire Fraud); United States v. Barrow, 20-CR-127 (CKK), 2021 WL 5358721
(D.D.C. June 24, 2021) (Jury Instruction for Wire Fraud); United States v. Abou-Khatwa, 18-CR-
67 (TSC), 2019 WL 12337740 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019) (Jury Instruction for Wire Fraud).
Proposed Instruction 40: Count Three — Expenditure Money Laundering, 18 U.S.C. §
1957
Count Three of the Second Superseding Indictment charges the Defendant with
Expenditure Money Laundering.
Elements of the Offense
The elements of this charge, each of which the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, are the following:
1. The Defendant engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transaction in or
affecting interstate commerce;
2. That the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property of a value
greater than $10,000;
3. That the property was derived from specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud;
4. That the defendant acted knowingly, that is with knowledge that the transaction
involved proceeds of a criminal offense; and
5. That the transaction took place in the United States.
Definitions
The first element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the
defendant engaged in a monetary transaction in or affecting interstate commerce.
The term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in
or affecting interstate of foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instruction by, through, or to a
financial institution.
The term “interstate or foreign commerce” means commerce between any combination of
states, territories or possessions of the United States, or between the United States and a foreign
country.
The second element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that
the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property having a value in excess of $10,000.
The term “criminal derived property” means any property constituting, or derived from,
proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.
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The Government is not required to prove that all of the property involved in the transaction
was criminally derived property. The Government is not required to prove that legitimate funds
were not commingled with the criminally-derived funds. In other words, the Government is not
required to prove that the criminally-derived funds were kept separate from any lawfully obtained
funds. The Government also is not required to trace criminal funds that are commingled with
legitimate funds. 6
The third element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the
Defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction was the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity.
I instruct that this element refers to a requirement that the Defendant knew the property
involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which
form, of activity that constitutes a criminal offense under state or federal law. I instruct you as a
matter of law that wire fraud is a criminal offense.
The fourth element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that
the defendant knowingly engaged in an unlawful monetary transaction, as defined above.
I instruct you that in a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is
required to prove that the Defendant knew the particular offense from which the criminally derived
property was derived. However, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant knew that the transaction involved criminally derived property, which, I remind you,
means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.
If you find that the Government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
Defendant knew that the transaction involved property derived from a criminal offense, then this
element is satisfied.
The fifth element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the
transaction took place in the United States.
Sources: United States v. Howard, 271 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing elements of
offenses under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957). United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102
(2nd Cir. 2017).
IV. WITNESS LISTS
A. Government’s Witness List
6
The Defendant objects to the inclusion of this paragraph. It is the Government’s position that
this language relates to the “tracing issue.” During a hearing on May 4, 2023, before the prior
trial, the Court indicated that it was inclined to rule that the Government was not required to trace
the illicit funds. Defendant requested additional time to brief the issue and the Court set a briefing
schedule. Defendant never filed a brief related to this issue in connection with the first trial or the
instant trial.
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1. Nora Hobbie, Attorney Advisor, Small Business Administration
2. Jacoby Taylor, Metropolitan Police Department
3. Gary Ciapa, Agent, Internal Affairs, Metropolitan Police Department
4. Clint Hemberg, Special Agent, FBI
5. Nicholas Bunker, Special Agent, FBI
6. Matt Spaulding, Financial Analyst, FBI
7. George Earl Buckmon, Jr., Buckmon’s Tax Service
8. Carl J. Wilson, Detective, Seattle Police Department
9. Riccardo Jones, DDS
10. Charles Benton
11. Michael Cole
12. Sterling Christian
13. Nikkia R. Brown
14. Sashana Blair
15. Kiyana Blair
16. Samiya Blair
17. Zanaya Donato
B. Defendant’s Witness List
1. Roberto Adams
2. Gerrika Bunche
3. Wesley Collier
4. Agent Clint Hemberg
5. Agent David DeFilipis
6. Agent John Y. Nagashima
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Case 1:21-cr-00625-APM Document 217 Filed 05/18/26 Page 19 of 19
7. Any and all witnesses the government subpoenaed to the grand jury investigation
8. Any and all witnesses called by the United States government in its case-in-chief
IV. EXHIBIT LISTS
Forthcoming
V. PROPOSED VERDICT FORM
The proposed verdict form is attached as Exhibit 1.
VI. STIPULATIONS
The agreed upon stipulations are attached as Exhibits 2 and 3.
Dated: May 18, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Jeanine Ferris Pirro
United States Attorney
/s/ Joseph A. Scofano By: /s/ Caelainn Carney
Joseph A. Scofano (Bar No. 994083) Caelainn Carney (N.Y. Bar No. 5751672)
Gretchen Pousson (VA Bar No. 39087) Sarah C. Santiago (GA Bar No. 724304)
Scrofano Law, P.C. Assistant United States Attorneys
600 F Street N.W. United States Attorney’s Office
Suite 300 601 D Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001 Washington, D.C. 20530
Email: jas@scrofanolaw.com Email: caelainn.carney@usdoj.gov
Telephone: (202) 870-0889 Telephone: 202-714-6433
Counsel for Defendant Roberto Adams
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