Memorandum Decision and Order — United States v. Anderson (Dkt. 89, D. Idaho)

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A memorandum decision and order of Chief U.S. District Court Judge David C. Nye in United States v. Patrick Wayne Anderson, Case No. 1:21-cr-00089-DCN, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, dated and filed February 6, 2024 as Dkt. 89. It denies Anderson's Motion to Reduce Sentence (Dkt. 84), which the government opposed (Dkt. 86), without oral argument. The order recounts that Anderson was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, found in a locked safe in his car during a drunk driving investigation, and sentenced to 84 months. It describes the motion as a form, virtually identical to others from inmates at FCI Sheridan, alleging problematic conditions there because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Case 1:21-cr-00089-DCN Document 89 Filed 02/06/24 Page 1 of 4




                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                            Case No. 1:21-cr-00089-DCN
          Plaintiff,
                                                            MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
    v.                                                      ORDER

    PATRICK WAYNE ANDERSON,

          Defendant.


                                         I. INTRODUCTION

         Before the Court is Defendant Patrick Anderson’s Motion to Reduce Sentence. Dkt.

84. The Government opposes the Motion. Dkt. 86. Anderson never replied.

         Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds the facts and legal arguments

are adequately presented. Accordingly, the Court will decide the Motion without oral

argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B).1 Upon review, and for the reasons set forth

below, the Court DENIES Anderson’s Motion.

                                          II. BACKGROUND

         Anderson was charged with, and convicted of, Possession with Intent to Distribute

Methamphetamine and Fentanyl. Dkts. 53, 77. The charges stemmed from a drunk driving

investigation that ultimately led to the discovery of a locked safe in Anderson’s car. Inside



1
 Although this is a criminal case, the local civil rule regarding hearings applies as there is no corresponding
criminal rule. See Dist. Idaho Loc. Crim. R. 1.1(f) (explaining that “all general provisions of the Local
Rules of Civil Practice apply to criminal proceedings unless such provisions are in conflict with or are
otherwise provided for by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Local Rules of Criminal
Practice”).


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the safe were trafficking quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Ultimately, the

Court sentenced Anderson to 84 months imprisonment. Dkt. 77.

        Recently, Anderson filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence. Dkt. 84. Anderson’s Motion

is virtually identical to other motions the Court has recently received from inmates housed

at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon (“FCI Sheridan”). This form

motion—that, as will be explained below, was likely written by another inmate—alleges

problematic conditions at FCI Sheridan because of the COVID-19 pandemic and requests

a reduction in Anderson’s sentence. See generally Dkt. 84.

                                     III. LEGAL STANDARD

        Anderson seeks compassionate release under the First Step Act (“FSA”), amended

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which allows a court to modify a sentence under certain

circumstances. In order to grant compassionate release, a district court must, as a threshold

matter, determine whether a defendant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies.

Id. Next, a district court may grant compassionate release only if “extraordinary and

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and the reduction is “consistent with

applicable policy statements” issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.2 Id. If the latter

criteria are met, the district court must then consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable. Id.; United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.



2
  Congress did not define what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons; instead, it deferred
consideration of the matter to the Sentencing Commission. Rodriguez, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 681 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 994(t) (“The Commission, in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing
modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18, shall describe what should be considered
extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list
of specific examples.”).


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Supp. 3d 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

                                          IV. DISCUSSION

        In this case, the Court never reaches the merits of Anderson’s motion because he

has failed to comply with the applicable mandatory exhaustion requirements.

        The FSA allows a motion for modification to be made by either the Director of the

BOP, or by a defendant “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to

appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30

days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever

is earlier[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

        In his Motion, Anderson claims he submitted a “cop-out” to the Warden at FCI

Sheridan on August 13, 2023. Dkt. 84, at 1. Anderson included a copy of his purported

request in conjunction with his motion. Id. at 6. The problem, however, is that FCI Sheridan

has no record of Anderson submitting anything during that timeframe.3 Dkt. 86, at 5.

        As noted above, the Court is dealing with multiple identical motions from

individuals at FCI Sheridan. At the top of the present Motion is an inmate identification

number. That number (16664-006) belongs to another inmate at FCI Sheridan (Robin

Gattis). Anderson’s inmate number is 39109-509. It appears that Gattis (and/or another

individual) created this “fill-in-the-blank” style pleading and circulated it to other inmates

for use. Regardless, FCI Sheridan has no record of Anderson submitting any type of request



3
  The obvious question, then, is where did the included copy come from? The Court suspects each inmate
filled out an individualized grievance form with his own identifying information for purposes of the present
motion, but never actually sent it to the Warden. Again, however, this outstanding question aside, the fact
remains that FCI Sheridan never received a grievance as required.


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to the Warden as statutorily required. Dkt. 86-2.

       Exhaustion under Section 3582(c) is mandatory. As the Ninth Circuit has made

clear, “a district court may not reach the merits of a compassionate release motion if the

government has properly objected in the district court to the defendant’s failure to exhaust.”

United States v. Ransom, 859 F. App’x 58, 59 (9th Cir. 2021). See also United States v.

Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 2021) (a district court may not overlook a timely

exhaustion objection because “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s administrative exhaustion requirement is

mandatory and must be enforced when properly raised by the government”).

       Here, the Government properly raised an exhaustion objection in its Motion to

Dismiss. Dkt. 86, at 5. Anderson did not respond to the argument and the time to do so has

long passed. Ultimately, there is no evidence in the record that Anderson exhausted his

administrative remedies. Nor is there any indication exhaustion was not available under the

circumstances.

       Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Anderson’s Motion for failure to comply with

the administrative requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A).

                                        V. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS:

       1. Anderson’s Motion to Reduce Sentence (Dkt. 84) is DENIED.

                                                    DATED: February 6, 2024


                                                    _________________________
                                                    David C. Nye
                                                    Chief U.S. District Court Judge


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