Order — United States v. Moller (Dkt. 257, D.R.I.)

Summary

An order by Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. in United States of America v. Michael Moller, C.A. No. 1:20-cr-088-JJM-LDA, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, dated September 12, 2025. It rules on Moller's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) (ECF No. 248), which the Government opposes (ECF No. 250). The order lists the reasons Moller gives as extraordinary and compelling, including his medical condition and the lack of aggregation of his sentence, and notes his request to reduce the sentence by twelve months to time served. The Court finds that, singly or together, the reasons do not equal extraordinary or compelling reasons and denies the motion.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Record facts

Full text

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM     Document 257    Filed 09/12/25   Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
                                      3567



                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                                         )
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               )
                                         )
      v.                                 )
                                               C.A. No. 1:20-cr-088-JJM-LDA
                                         )
 MICHAEL MOLLER,                         )
     Defendant.                          )
                                         )

                                     ORDER

       Michael J. Moller has moved to reduce his sentence (so-called

 “compassionate release”) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 248.1 The

 Government objects. ECF No. 250. And Mr. Moller has filed replies. ECF Nos.

 251-253, and 255.

       Mr. Moller alleges at least four separate “extraordinary and compelling”

 reasons why the Court should grant his motion: his medical condition, his

 mother’s ailing health and his need to be a caregiver, the lack of aggregation

 of his sentence, and other factors. He asks the Court to take a holistic approach

 as set forth in United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022) and

 reduce his sentence by twelve months to time served.            The Government

 responds by saying that the reasons for reducing Mr. Moller’s sentence do not



       1 Mr. Moller incorporated ECF Nos. 89-97; 102-106; 106-108; 111-114; 116-118;

 120-124, 126, 130, 133, and 145, and Judge Mary S. McElroy's denial order ECF
 No. 154, and the exhibits submitted in ECF Nos. 215, 222, 223. The Court has
 reviewed and considered all submissions.

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM      Document 257     Filed 09/12/25    Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
                                       3568



 singularly or collectively equal extraordinary and compelling reasons, and

 even if they did, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors do not support a sentence

 reduction.

  I.   LEGAL STANDARD

       A defendant seeking a sentence reduction must meet several requirements.

 United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 75 F.4th 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2023). First, they must

 properly raise the request by meeting the exhaustion requirements in 18 U.S.C.

 § 3582(c)(1)(A).2 Id. at 19. Second, they must present sufficient “extraordinary and

 compelling reasons” to call for the reduction.      Id.   Third, consideration of the

 sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) must weigh in favor of a reduction.

 Id.; United States v. Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2023). Finally, a

 defendant must not present “a danger to the safety of any other person or to the

 community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2).          The

 defendant bears the burden of proving that their circumstances qualify for early

 release. See Rivera-Rodríguez, 75 F.4th at 18–19.

       In 2023, the Sentencing Commission revised U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the applicable

 policy statement, because of the changes prescribed in the First Step Act. See 88 Fed.

 Reg. 28254, 28254-28281 (May 3, 2023); Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th at 84. The updated

 policy statement on compassionate release motions, both extended the “applicability

 of its policy statement to prisoner-initiated motions and expand[ed] the scope of what

 can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence


       2 Mr. Moller has exhausted his administrative remedies.



                                           2

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM        Document 257     Filed 09/12/25   Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
                                         3569



 reduction.” Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th at 84 (citing Rivera-Rodríguez, 75 F.4th at 18

 n.22).

          As revised, § 1B1.13 states that a district court may consider changes in law

 when deciding whether a defendant has presented an extraordinary and compelling

 reason justifying release. Relevant here are two subsections of revised Guideline

 § 1B1.13:

          (5) OTHER      REASONS.—The defendant presents any other
          circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by
          themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs
          (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs
          (1) through (4).

          Section 1B1.13(b)(5) is the catch-all provision that allows a court to consider

 any other circumstances that are similar in gravity to the listed circumstances.

          The First Circuit instructs district courts to consider almost “any complex of

 circumstances” that a defendant alleges as a potential extraordinary and compelling

 reason for early release. United States v. Gonzalez, 68 F.4th 699, 704 (1st Cir. 2023),

 cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 217 (2023). The only limitations imposed on a district court’s

 discretion3 were “rehabilitation alone,” the “mere fact of a ‘pre-First Step Act

 mandatory life sentence . . .standing alone,’” and “classic post-conviction arguments,

 without more . . . .” Id. at n.3; see also Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th at 83. The First

 Circuit “made pellucid that district courts ‘may conduct a holistic review to determine




          3 “District courts reviewing such motions [have] discretion to ‘consider any

 complex of circumstances raised by a defendant as forming an extraordinary and
 compelling reason warranting relief,’ including non-retroactive changes to the law.”
 Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th at 83.

                                             3

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM      Document 257      Filed 09/12/25   Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
                                       3570



 whether the [prisoner’s] individualized circumstances, taken in the aggregate,

 present an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to grant compassionate release.’”

 Quirós-Morales, 83 F.4th at 83 (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 27).

       A district court faced with a compassionate release motion has ample,
       yet not boundless, discretion at both steps. District courts may consider
       any complex of circumstances raised by a defendant as forming an
       extraordinary and compelling reason warranting relief. Because the
       whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, district courts must be
       mindful of the holistic context of a defendant’s individual case when
       deciding whether the defendant’s circumstances satisfy the
       extraordinary and compelling standard. Yet this standard is narrow
       and stringent, because whether a reason is extraordinary and
       compelling is logically guided by the plain meaning of those terms.

 United States v. D’Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

 II.   DISCUSSION

           A. Medicals

       Mr. Moller alleges that Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) “staff have failed to provide

 timely adequate care for my serious medical conditions, and that these circumstances

 are similar in gravity to 1B1.13(b)(1)(C)4 pursuant to (5) Other Reasons.” ECF

 No. 248 at 6. Specifically, he alleges that he was misdiagnosed while at FCC Butner,

 and that doctors need him to have a colonoscopy and endoscopy for them to give him

 a true diagnosis. Id. at 3–4. The problem with this, he asserts, is that “the wait time

 for these procedures is about 6 months.” Id. at 4. And because he does not have a




       4 This provision provides: “The defendant is suffering from a medical condition

 that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and
 without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.”

                                           4

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM      Document 257     Filed 09/12/25   Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
                                       3571



 proper diagnosis, the BOP has placed a medical hold on him, keeping him from being

 transferred to a halfway house to serve out part of his sentence. Id.

       The medical and prison records the Court has reviewed, do not establish that

 the treatment Mr. Moller has received from the BOP rises to the level of

 extraordinary and compelling circumstances to support a sentence reduction.

 Waiting for diagnostic procedures is often an ordinary vexation of our health care

 system – and especially so in the prison system. There is no evidence before the Court

 that Mr. Moller has suffered any extraordinary negative repercussion from the delay

 or even any alleged misdiagnosis. The evidence shows that Mr. Moller has received

 extensive and adequate medical care.

       Mr. Moller argues that he has been denied access to placement in a residential

 reentry center (“RRC”) by the alleged misdiagnosis and delay in scheduling diagnostic

 tests. The placement in an RRC is not a right, nor is the failure to be placed in an

 RRC an extraordinary or compelling reason to reduce Mr. Moller’s sentence.

           B. Mother Caretaker

       Next, Mr. Moller argues that his sentence should be reduced because his

 elderly mother has a “complex set of medical issues,” and she has surgery

 scheduled. Id. at 7. He also points out that sadly his brother has recently

 passed away and that his nephew is no longer able to help in her care.5



       5 Mr. Moller acknowledges that while “this may not rise to the Caretaker
 provision itself [he] believe[s] it is ‘SIMILAR IN GRAVITY’ to that provision, and
 taken in combination with the [ ] rest of my circumstances, satisfies ‘OTHER
 REASONS,’ under 1B1.13(5).” ECF No. 248 at 7.

                                           5

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM    Document 257   Filed 09/12/25   Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
                                     3572



       Mr. Moller has failed to prove that he the only available care giver for

 his mother. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C). Without revealing all of Mr. Moller’s

 personal family situation, the Court has concluded that Mr. Moller has not

 carried his burden to show that his mother’s medical condition and health care

 needs is an extraordinary or compelling reason that is substantially like the

 guidance from the Sentencing Commission on this topic.

          C. Aggregation of Sentence

       The Court sentenced Mr. Moller in CR20-88-MSM (bank fraud – 18

 U.S.C. § 1344(2)) to “70 months to be served consecutive to the sentence

 imposed in CR20-81-MSM.”        ECF No. 42.    In CR20-81-MSM (supervised

 release violation in an armed bank robbery case), the Court sentenced Mr.

 Moller to “12 months and one day to run prior to the sentence imposed in CR20-

 88-MSM.”    ECF No. 21 in 20-cr-81-MSM.       He now asserts that he is not

 receiving “Earned Time credits” to which he believes he is entitled, and he has

 not “ever received a day off under the” First Step Act. ECF No. 248 at 7. He

 argues that he was harmed when the BOP did not follow the judge’s directive

 that he serves his supervised release violation sentence first before his bank

 fraud sentence. Id. He further posits that the Government misrepresented

 (perhaps as an “honest mistake”) to the Court that he suffered no harm because

 his pattern score was such that he would not be able to obtain “low recidivism”

 to allow him to earn credit. Id. at 7–8.


                                        6

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM       Document 257     Filed 09/12/25    Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
                                        3573



       Mr. Moller’s argument that his two sentences should have been aggregated is

 not compelling for several reasons. First, the plea agreement contemplated two

 sentences.   The parties jointly agreed to recommend that Mr. Moller receive a

 separate consecutive year of imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised

 release for bank robbery. Mr. Moller did not request aggregation at sentencing.

       Second, Mr. Moller’s ability to earn First Step Act credits was unaffected by

 the fact that his sentences were not aggregated. While Mr. Moller had earned 280

 days of First Step Act credit, he cannot apply those credits toward early release

 because he has been determined to be at a medium risk of recidivism. See 18 U.S.C.

 § 3624(g)(1)(D)(A). An individual determined to be at a high risk of recidivism (55

 points or more), or a medium risk of recidivism (40-54 points) cannot apply earned

 FSA credits toward early release without approval of the Warden. See 18 U.S.C.

 § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II). Mr. Moller has received 53 points.6 The ordering and lack of

 aggregating of the sentences has had no bearing on Mr. Moller’s ability to earn or

 apply First Step Act credits.

           D. Other Reasons

       Mr. Moller also raises the difficulties he encountered when he was

 transferred from FCI Schuylkill to FCC Butner – including the mess hall being

 closed, resulting in the substitution of food that was less than adequate, short


       6 It is correct, as Mr. Moller points out, that five points were added because Mr.

 Moller is serving a violent offense (the bank robbery offense that is the subject of the
 violation of supervised release). Even if those five points were removed, however, Mr.
 Moller would still have 48 points. He would still be a “Medium” risk of recidivism (40
 to 54 points).

                                            7

Case 1:20-cr-00088-JJM-AEM    Document 257     Filed 09/12/25   Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
                                     3574



 staffing, increased lockdowns, and the like. None of these conditions rise to

 the level, individually or collectively, to extraordinary or compelling reasons to

 reduce Mr. Moller’s sentence.


 III.   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Moller is set to be released on August 3, 2026—in less than eleven

 months. While petition for a reduction in sentence presents many of the

 difficulties of life in prison, neither singularly nor collectively do they equal

 extraordinary or compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.          Mr. Moller’s

 Motion to Reduce his sentence is DENIED. ECF No. 248.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.



 _________________________________
 John J. McConnell, Jr.
 Chief Judge
 United States District Court


 September 12, 2025




                                         8

File and source

File

257.pdf

Size

114,631 bytes

SHA-256

8a86adc2b1ced4c80dd0084a0f45608a0d636222347765cca1625b75b8fea2f1

Our copy

257.pdf