Second Circuit Summary Order — United States v. Lewis

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · No. 1:21-cr-00729-LAK · Doc. 142-1 · 2025-01-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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24-504
United States v. Lewis
United States Court of Appeals 
For the Second Circuit 
August Term 2024 
Submitted: December 12, 2024 
Decided: January 3, 2025 
No. 24-504 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Appellee, 
v. 
CHANETTE LEWIS, a.k.a. Netty Hott, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
TATIANA BENJAMIN, a.k.a. Ta Banks, a.k.a. Lyric Muvas, TATIANA DANIEL, a.k.a. 
Kimora Daniel, HEAVEN WEST, 
Defendants.*
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York 
No. 21-cr-729, Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge. 
Before:  SULLIVAN, MENASHI, and KAHN, Circuit Judges. 
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
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AFFIRMED. 
Colleen P. Cassidy, Federal Defenders of New 
York, Inc., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. 
Michael D. Neff, James Ligtenberg, Assistant 
United States Attorneys, for Edward Y. Kim, 
Acting United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee. 
 
Chanette Lewis appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.) following her 
guilty plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with a 
COVID-19 relief program, an unemployment insurance program, and the New 
York City Housing Authority.  The district court sentenced Lewis to thirty-six 
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release, and 
ordered forfeiture and restitution.  For Lewis’s term of supervised release, the 
district court imposed the mandatory conditions required under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(d); the standard conditions recommended under U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines section 5D1.3(c); and four special conditions, which were set forth in 
the presentence investigation report (the “PSR”) and which Lewis and her attorney 
acknowledged they had read.  Prior to imposing sentence, the district court asked 
the parties if they wished for the court to read aloud the special conditions set forth 
in the PSR.  Counsel for each party replied, “No.”
On appeal, Lewis now argues that the district court erred by (1) failing to 
orally pronounce the special conditions at the sentencing hearing, (2) failing to 
explain the reasons for the special conditions, and (3) imposing an overly broad 
electronic search condition.  We disagree, and hold that when a defendant declines 
the court’s invitation to read aloud a condition of supervised release referenced in 
the PSR, she waives any argument on appeal that the district court failed to orally 
pronounce that condition.  We also reject Lewis’s other arguments and conclude 
that the district court’s reasons for imposing each of the four special conditions are 
self-evident in the record, and that the electronic search condition is narrowly 
tailored.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
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PER CURIAM: 
Chanette Lewis appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.) following her 
guilty plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, in connection with a COVID-19 relief program, an unemployment 
insurance program, and the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”).  The 
district court sentenced Lewis to thirty-six months’ imprisonment, to be followed 
by three years’ supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution.  For 
Lewis’s term of supervised release, the district court imposed the mandatory 
conditions required under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); the standard conditions 
recommended under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) section 5D1.3(c); 
and four special conditions, which were set forth in the presentence investigation 
report (the “PSR”) and which Lewis and her attorney acknowledged they had 
read.  Prior to imposing sentence, the district court asked the parties if they wished 
for the court to read aloud the special conditions set forth in the PSR.  Counsel for 
each party replied, “No.” 
On appeal, Lewis now argues that the district court erred by (1) failing to 
orally pronounce the special conditions at the sentencing hearing, (2) failing to 
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explain the reasons for the special conditions, and (3) imposing an overly broad 
electronic search condition.  We disagree, and hold that when a defendant declines 
the court’s invitation to read aloud a condition of supervised release referenced in 
the PSR, she waives any argument on appeal that the district court failed to orally 
pronounce that condition. We also reject Lewis’s other arguments and conclude 
that the district court’s reasons for imposing each of the four special conditions are 
self-evident in the record, and that the electronic search condition is narrowly 
tailored.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
I. BACKGROUND
From April 2020 until September 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 
pandemic, Lewis was an organizer and leader of three fraudulent schemes 
involving various government entities.  In March 2020, New York City established 
the COVID-19 Hotel Room Isolation Program (the “Hotel Program”) to provide 
free hotel rooms to patients recovering from COVID-19 and to healthcare workers 
who needed to isolate because they had been exposed to the virus during their 
work duties.  The Hotel Program was subsequently expanded to other at-risk or 
infected individuals who did not have a safe place to self-isolate.  At the time, 
Lewis worked at a call center that handled reservations for the Hotel Program, 
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which provided Lewis with access to the personally identifiable information (the 
“PII”) of healthcare workers.  Lewis exploited this position and conspired with her 
co-defendants to fraudulently reserve hotel rooms, make them available to 
ineligible individuals for a fee, and keep the proceeds.  Part of this scheme 
involved using the PII of healthcare workers to create fraudulent documents so 
that ineligible individuals could book hotel rooms.  Lewis used Facebook to 
organize the conspiracy, advertise the hotel rooms, and communicate with 
customers, and she received payments from customers through electronic fund 
transfer services such as CashApp, Zelle, Chime, and PayPal. 
While engaging in the Hotel Program fraud, Lewis also fraudulently 
obtained unemployment insurance benefits.  In particular, she submitted an 
application under her own name, claiming that she was unemployed due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic when, in fact, she was employed at the above-referenced call 
center.  Lewis also conspired with another individual to submit an unemployment 
insurance application for her brother, who was incarcerated at the time and thus 
ineligible for these benefits.  Both applications were submitted online. 
Finally, Lewis enabled individuals to obtain NYCHA public-housing 
benefits to which they were not entitled, in exchange for a fee.  Specifically, Lewis 
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helped new residents obtain NYCHA housing and existing NYCHA residents 
secure larger apartments and emergency transfers within NYCHA by creating and 
submitting false documents on their behalf.  Recognizing that the demand for 
NYCHA housing is exceptionally high, resulting in long wait times for applicants 
to receive NYCHA benefits or unit transfers, Lewis discovered that NYCHA often 
expedited this process for crime victims and individuals with certain medical 
conditions.  She therefore created fake orders of protection bearing the name of a 
certain state-court judge, falsified letters from the medical practice of a specific 
doctor, and forged letters from the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office stating that 
the applicant was either a crime victim or a trial witness.  Lewis used electronic 
devices to create these false records, advertised her scheme using Facebook, 
submitted applications using NYCHA’s online portal, and accepted payment via 
CashApp. 
On December 22, 2022, Lewis pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiring to 
commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Lewis then appeared for 
sentencing on February 8, 2024.  The district court determined the Guidelines 
range to be 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment, which neither party disputed.  The 
district court then imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 36 months’ 
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imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently and to be followed by three years 
of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture in the amount of $289,536 and 
restitution in the amount of $360,330.  In addition to the mandatory and standard 
conditions of supervised release, the district court imposed four special conditions 
that were recommended in the PSR and that required Lewis to (1) provide the U.S. 
Probation Office with access to her financial information, (2) obtain the approval 
of the Probation Office before incurring any new credit charges or opening 
additional lines of credit, (3) participate in an outpatient mental-health treatment 
program, and (4) submit her person and property, including any computers, 
electronic communications devices, and data storage devices, to a search by the 
Probation Office upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of a condition of 
supervised release or any other unlawful conduct.  Lewis timely appealed her 
sentence. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We ordinarily review challenges to conditions of supervised release for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2019). 
However, when a defendant is on notice that a condition of supervised release will 
be imposed and fails to object, we review the defendant’s arguments on appeal for 
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A. Lewis waived any argument on appeal that the district court
erred by not orally pronouncing the special conditions.
Lewis first argues that the district court erred by failing to orally pronounce 
the four special conditions of supervised release at her sentencing.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the district court first confirmed that Lewis had ample time to 
review the PSR, “had read the whole thing,” and did not have “any unresolved 
objections” to the report.  Lewis App’x at 79.  When pronouncing its sentence, the 
 
plain error.  See United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).  To 
establish plain error, a defendant must show “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is 
clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected 
the [defendant’s] substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Moore, 
975 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The defendant 
bears the burden of establishing each of these elements.  See United States v. 
Dussard, 967 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2020).  We have warned that “reversal for plain 
error should be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a 
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”  United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 
204, 209 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. 
DISCUSSION
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district court indicated its intention to impose “the special conditions of 
supervision set forth at pages 48 through 50 of the [PSR].”  Id. at 96.  The district 
court then asked, “In view of the fact that the defendant said she has read the entire 
presentence report, does either counsel want me to read out the conditions?”  Id.  
Lewis’s defense counsel responded, “No, your Honor.”  Id. 
We have previously explained that a defendant waives her challenge on 
appeal when she makes an “intentional decision not to assert a right or . . . acts 
intentionally in pursuing, or not pursuing, a particular course of action.”  United 
States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2019) (alteration accepted and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A true waiver “extinguishes the claim altogether” and 
“will negate even plain error review.”  United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 
1121–22 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Waiver may be found 
“where a party actively solicits or agrees to a course of action that [s]he later claims 
was error.”  United States v. Spruill, 808 F.3d 585, 597 (2d Cir. 2015).   
Consistent with these precedents, we hold that when a defendant, such as 
Lewis, declines the district court’s invitation to read aloud a condition of 
supervised release referenced in the PSR, she waives any argument on appeal that 
the district court did not orally pronounce that condition.  See United States v. 
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B. The district court’s reasons for imposing the special conditions
are self-evident in the record.
Lewis next contends that the district court failed to explain its reasons for 
imposing the four special conditions.  Our caselaw is clear that “[a] district court 
retains wide latitude in imposing conditions of supervised release.”  United States 
1 We also reiterate the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[n]either paid nor appointed counsel 
may . . . consume the time and the energies of the court or the opposing party by advancing 
frivolous arguments.  An attorney, whether appointed or paid, is . . . under an ethical obligation 
to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal.”  McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 436 
(1988). 
 
Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 259 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] negative response on the record to 
a district court[’s] invitation to voice objection[] does more than forfeit the 
unraised objection; it waives it.”).  Indeed, we have repeatedly held in summary 
orders that defendants waived their claims on appeal that the district court failed 
to orally pronounce conditions of supervised release when the defendants 
consented to the incorporation of those conditions by reference to the PSR.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Overstreet, No. 21-3034, 2023 WL 4286035, at *1 (2d Cir. June 
30, 2023); United States v. Washington, No. 22-688, 2024 WL 2232464, at *2 (2d Cir. 
May 17, 2024); United States v. Bartley, No. 21-2898, 2024 WL 4284727, at *1–2 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 25, 2024).  Consistent with those decisions, we reject Lewis’s argument 
and conclude that she waived appellate review of this issue here.1 
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v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2008).  Special conditions of supervised 
release must be “reasonably related to certain statutory factors governing 
sentencing, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary 
to implement the statutory purposes of sentencing, and [be] consistent with 
pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements.”  United States v. Eaglin, 913 
F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (alterations accepted and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The relevant sentencing factors include “the nature and circumstances 
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1), as well as “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct[,] to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant[,] [and] to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D).  We have held that “[a] district court is required 
to make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a 
special condition of supervised release, and to state on the record the reason for 
imposing it.”  United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018).  However, if 
the district court does not provide such an explanation, we may still uphold the 
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condition imposed “if the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although Lewis argues that we should apply a relaxed form of plain-error 
review, our caselaw is clear that traditional plain-error review applies when, as 
here, a defendant has notice that a condition of supervised release will be imposed 
and fails to object.  See Dupes, 513 F.3d at 343 & n.2.  Lewis fails to meet that 
standard because the district court’s reasoning for imposing the special conditions 
is self-evident in the record.   
With respect to the conditions that Lewis provide the Probation Office with 
her financial information upon request and refrain from opening new lines of 
credit without approval from the Probation Office, such conditions were justified 
by the need to ensure that Lewis complies with the monthly payment schedule for 
her court-ordered restitution.  Indeed, the Guidelines expressly recommend a 
condition that requires a defendant to provide the Probation Office with access to 
requested financial information when the court imposes restitution or forfeiture, 
see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(3), as well as a condition pertaining to new lines of credit 
when “an installment schedule of payment of restitution . . . is imposed,” id. 
§ 5D1.3(d)(2).  And we have previously explained that conditions recommended
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by the Guidelines are “necessary to the administration of supervised release” and 
thus “presumed suitable in all cases.”  United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 119 n.1 
(2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In this case, the district court’s 
decision to order restitution and forfeiture makes clear why the court imposed the 
financial conditions. 
The reasons for the district court’s imposition of a mental-health treatment 
condition are similarly self-evident in the record.  The PSR documented Lewis’s 
extensive history of mental-health challenges – including diagnoses for 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, panic attacks, anger-management problems, and 
antisocial behavior – dating back to 2007 when she was fourteen years old.  Indeed, 
Lewis’s sentencing submission repeatedly stressed her “long-standing struggle 
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder” as a reason for a noncustodial sentence. 
Lewis App’x at 59–61.  Her sentencing submission also noted that she was 
“experiencing manic symptoms consistent with her bipolar disorder” while 
committing the instant offenses and argued that “her manic mental state 
contributed to her enthusiasm for the illicit venture” and “made it especially easy 
for her to put aside any worries or moral qualms.”  Id. at 62; see id. at 64 (“While in 
the throes of a mental health crisis, she defrauded several government 
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programs.”); id. at 66 (“Ms. Lewis committed her crimes while she was suffering 
from an acute manifestation of her mental illness.”); see also id. (“With the help of 
better mental health treatment, she has been able to . . . avoid any further 
involvement with the criminal justice system.”).  Lewis’s defense counsel 
reiterated these same arguments at her sentencing hearing, and Lewis herself 
indicated that she “never probably would have [committed the crimes] if [she was] 
on the medication.”  Id. at 89; see also id. at 90 (“If I was on that medication, none 
of this would have been happening.”).  A mental-health treatment condition was 
clearly justified by Lewis’s personal history and characteristics, the need to protect 
the public from future crimes committed by her, and the need to provide Lewis 
with medical care in the most effective manner.   
Likewise, the electronic search condition was amply supported by the 
record in this case.  “We have frequently approved of such conditions where the 
conduct underlying a conviction . . . has involved the use of computers or other 
electronic devices.” United States v. Thomas, 827 F. App’x 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2020).  As 
documented in the PSR, Lewis repeatedly used electronic devices to carry out the 
three fraudulent schemes charged here.  In the COVID-19 hotel scheme, Lewis 
used Facebook to coordinate with her co-conspirators, advertise hotel rooms, and 
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communicate with her customers.  She also used electronic payment services to 
receive compensation from her customers.  In the unemployment scheme, Lewis 
used electronic devices to submit the fraudulent unemployment applications. 
And in the NYCHA scheme, she used electronic devices to prepare the forged 
documents, submit the NYCHA applications, advertise the scheme via Facebook, 
and receive payment using services such as CashApp.  Indeed, Lewis’s defense 
counsel acknowledged in his sentencing submission that the three fraudulent 
conspiracies were committed “largely over the internet.”  Lewis App’x at 62.  And 
when Lewis’s counsel asked the district court to impose a term of home detention 
instead of incarceration, he stated that the court could, “in terms of deterrence, 
have her computer [and] any Internet access monitored by the probation office.” 
Id. at 85.  Therefore, as the PSR noted, the electronic search condition was justified 
by the need to “provid[e] the [P]robation [O]ffice with a necessary means to 
effectively monitor and discourage the defendant from engaging in any further 
criminal activity as well as protect[] the public.”  PSR at 47. 
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in imposing the four 
special conditions of supervised release because the reasons for imposing each of 
them are self-evident in the record. 
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C. The electronic search condition is narrowly tailored.
Finally, Lewis challenges the electronic search condition as overbroad and 
“neither particularized [n]or narrowly tailored to this case.”  Lewis Br. at 3.  To be 
sure, a special condition of supervised release must “involve no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory 
purposes of sentencing,” and when the condition implicates “fundamental liberty 
interests,” the condition must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.”  United States v. Farooq, 58 F.4th 687, 694 (2d Cir. 2023) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Both of those requirements are satisfied here.  
We have made clear that “[a]n offender on supervised release has a diminished 
expectation of privacy that is inherent in the very term ‘supervised release.’”  United 
States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plus, the electronic search condition at issue is circumscribed and narrowly 
tailored:  The Probation Office must have reasonable suspicion to search Lewis’s 
electronic devices, and the search must be “conducted at a reasonable time and in 
a reasonable manner.”  Lewis App’x at 103.  “As we have repeatedly explained in 
affirming [similar] search conditions, th[e]se conditions do not constitute a greater 
deprivation than reasonably necessary because they require reasonable suspicion.”  
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 315 (2d Cir. 2024); see also United States v. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
 
Rakhmatov, No. 21-151, 2022 WL 16984536, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (“[T]he 
condition’s limitations on searches to circumstances in which reasonable suspicion 
of a supervised release violation exists and to a reasonable time and manner of 
search ensure that the condition imposes no greater restraint on liberty than is 
reasonably necessary.” (alteration accepted and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Stiteler, No. 22-2732, 2023 WL 4004573, at *1 (2d Cir. June 
15, 2023) (affirming electronic search condition because it required reasonable 
suspicion).  We therefore conclude that the district court did not err, let alone 
plainly err, in imposing the electronic search condition at issue here. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION
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