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Government’s Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress ECF Nos. 109, 110 — United States v. Harris (Dkt. 123, D. Md.)

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The government's consolidated memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motions to suppress (ECF Nos. 109, 110) in United States v. Lawrence N. Harris, Case No. DLB-23-183, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, filed May 16, 2025 as Document 123 by Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Sarma. Its factual account covers a traffic stop of the defendant's Porsche, PFC Waters' recovery of marijuana and a firearm from the glovebox, the seizure of two iPhones and a search warrant for the cellphone. It recounts that a grand jury indicted Harris on May 28, 2023 for felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and returned a superseding indictment on December 7, 2023, and argues that the motions should be denied.

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Filed May 16, 2025 in Lawrence N. Harris; one of 1 filings from this case.

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Court	U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
Filed	2025-05-16

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“Government’s Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress ECF Nos. 109, 110 — United States v. Harris (Dkt. 123, D. Md.).” U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, No. 8:23-cr-00183, Doc. 123, filed 2025-05-16. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/court-filings/us-v-lawrence-n-harris/2025-05-16-government-s-consolidated-memorandum-of-law-in-opposition-to-dkt-123/, SHA-256 aacee0dfef1bfcba121431c5a5e7e904b76ebbfbbe87970a8f6e9f809e92b308.

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Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 1 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *
*
v. * Case No. DLB-23-183
*
LAWRENCE N. HARRIS, *
*
Defendant. *
*
*******

GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS ECF Nos. 109, 110

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION
A. Traffic Stop of Defendant................................................................................................. 2
B. PFC Waters Approaches the Porsche to Initiate the Traffic Stop Investigation ........ 3
C. PFC Waters Recovers Marijuana and a Firearm in the Glovebox of the Porsche..... 4
D. Law Enforcement’s Seizure of Two iPhones .................................................................. 5
E. The Issuance and Execution of a Search Warrant for the Defendant’s Cellphone .... 5
F. Search of the Defendant’s Black iPhone.............................................................................. 6
G. Search Warrant for the Defendant’s Camo iPhone....................................................... 7
H. Search of the Defendant’s Camo iPhone ........................................................................ 7
I. Search Warrant for Delmar Residence ............................................................................... 7
J. Execution of Search Warrant at Delmar Residence ........................................................... 9
I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE FROM THE PORSCHE BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID .............................................................................................. 11
A. The Unauthorized Level of Tint on the Defendant’s Vehicle Gave Law Enforcement
a Lawful Basis to Conduct a Traffic Stop on the Vehicle ................................................ 11
B. Law Enforcement Lawfully Extended the Traffic Stop by Ordering Harris to Exit
the Vehicle to Investigate the Invalid Registration Plates and the Presence of
Marijuana ............................................................................................................................. 13
1. The Traffic Stop was Lawfully Extended Based on Reasonable Suspicion that the
Defendant’s Vehicle was Displaying Invalid License Plates ........................................... 13
2. The Traffic Stop was Lawfully Extended Based on Reasonable Suspicion that the
Defendant had Marijuana in the Porsche......................................................................... 14
C. Law Enforcement had Probable Cause to Conduct a Warrantless Search of Harris’
Vehicle Under the Plain View Doctrine ............................................................................. 15

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 2 of 26

II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
THE PHONES AND RESIDENTIAL WARRANTS BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT
ARTICULATED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANTS, AND EVEN IF THEY
DID NOT, THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIES...................................................... 16
A. Legal Standard—Substantial Basis ............................................................................... 16
1. The Court Should Not Suppress the Evidence from the Phone Warrants. ........... 18
2. The Court Should Not Suppress the Evidence from the Residential Warrant. .... 23

INTRODUCTION
The United States of America, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits

the following response in opposition to Lawrence Nathaniel Harris’ (“the Defendant or Harris’”)

Motion to Suppress Motor Vehicle Search and Subsequent Search of Two Separate Cellphones,

ECF No. 109, and Motion to Suppress Evidence, ECF No. 110. The Defendant’s motions to

suppress should be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Traffic Stop of Defendant

On October 26, 2022, at approximately 11:40 a.m., Patrolman First Class Thomas Waters

(“PFC Waters”) saw a dark Gray Porsche Macan SUV (the “Porsche”) with heavily tinted

windows and windshield. ECF No. 109-1, USA_000106. 1 Because of the windows’ heavy tint,

PFC Waters 2 could not see how many people were in the vehicle. Id. PFC Waters saw that the

Porsche had temporary registration plates affixed to the front and back of the vehicle, bearing

Maryland tag number TR091586. Id. While in his cruiser, PFC Waters called into the Public

1
Because the Government is responding to the Defendant’s motions to suppress, the
Government relies primarily on the relevant search warrant affidavits to recount the factual
background. Notably, the Defendant does not argue that the affidavits to challenged search
warrants contain any falsehoods. At trial, the Government will establish the relevant facts through
various sources.
2
Because the Defendant does not contest the factual accuracy of the search warrant
affidavits, the Government does not intend to call PFC Waters to testify at the motions hearing
unless so directed by the Court.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 3 of 26

Safety Communications dispatch channel to check the validity of the temporary registration plates.

Id. The dispatcher told PFC Waters that the temporary registration plates were not registered with

the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). Id. Based on the information obtained

from the dispatcher and the vehicle’s heavy tint, PFC Waters activated his emergency lights to

stop the Porsche. Id. The Porsche pulled into a Citgo gas station parking lot and came to a stop.

Seen above: The tint meter displaying the number “07” indicating that the tint on the driver’s
side window of Harris’ Porsche exceeded the legal limit.

B. PFC Waters Approaches the Porsche to Initiate the Traffic Stop
Investigation

PFC Waters exited his cruiser, walked up to the Porsche, and spoke with Lawrence

Nathaniel Harris (“Harris” or the “Defendant”) who was the sole occupant and driver. ECF No.

109-1, USA_000106. Upon request, the Defendant provided PFC Waters with his DC Learners

Permit as well as a temporary registration car for the Porsche. Id. During his conversation with

the Defendant, PFC Waters also smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the Porsche.

Id. Because of the non-valid vehicle registration and the smell of burnt marijuana, PFC Waters

ordered the Defendant out of the Porsche so that law enforcement could search the vehicle and

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 4 of 26

also check the VIN number. Id. After the Defendant left the Porsche, he sat on the police cruiser.

Id. Law enforcement then used the VIN number to conduct a registration check on the Porsche

and determined that the Porsche lacked an active registration. Id.

C. PFC Waters Recovers Marijuana and a Firearm in the Glovebox of the
Porsche

PFC Waters asked the Defendant if there were more drugs in the Porsche, and the

Defendant said there “wasn’t nothing illegal.” Id. During the search, law enforcement found

several grams of suspected marijuana in the Porsche. Id.

PFC Waters attempted to check the glovebox in the Porsche, but it was locked. Id. As

explained in the subsequent search warrant affidavit, based on his training, knowledge, and

experience, PFC Waters knew that “individuals involved in criminal activity often conceal items

of contraband, or illegal in nature, and of value inside locked cases and containers for transport in

vehicles, to include safes, center consoles, glove boxes and other security devices.” Id.

Additionally, PFC Waters had found firearms and drugs in prior searches of gloveboxes. Id.

Upon request, Harris provided PFC Waters the key fob to the Porsche so that PFC Waters

could open the glovebox. Id. at USA_000107. The Defendant told PFC Waters that there was

nothing illegal in the car, but PFC Waters observed that the Defendant was visibly nervous. Id.

PFC Waters found a Glock 27 Handgun loaded with a 30-round magazine. Id. A Glock Auto

Switch was attached to the Glock 27 Handgun. Id.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 5 of 26

D. Law Enforcement’s Seizure of Two iPhones

During the search of the car and the Defendant, law enforcement found two iPhones. First,

law enforcement found a black iPhone in a clear case (the “black iPhone”) on the Defendant.

During the traffic stop, officers observed the Defendant using the black iPhone. Id. at

USA_000108. For example, the Defendant called an associate named “Osama.” Id. After his

arrest and transport to the police station, he asked law enforcement to access the black iPhone to

retrieve certain numbers. Id.

Second, officers found an iPhone with a camo case (the “camo iPhone”) in the front

passenger seat of the Porsche. Ex. 1, USA_001028. The camo iPhone was next to the suspected

marijuana that law enforcement recovered. Id.

E. The Issuance and Execution of a Search Warrant for the Defendant’s
Cellphone

PFC Waters subsequently sought a search warrant to search the Defendant’s black iPhone

that was seized from him during his arrest. On October 27, 2022, the Honorable Wytonja Curry,

Prince George’s County Circuit Court Judge, authorized the requested search. ECF No. 109-1,

USA_000113. In the supporting affidavit, PFC Waters recounted the factual background

described above regarding the stop of the Porsche and the seizure of the gun and drugs. Id. at

USA_000105-107.

PFC Waters then noted that the Defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms and

ammunition at the time of the stop. Id. at USA_000109. PFC Waters explained that he knew

“through training, knowledge and experience, that individuals who are prohibited from possessing

firearms, firearms components and ammunition are known to acquire said firearms often through

a third party source.” Id. And “oftentimes,” to acquire firearms, prohibited persons use “a cellular

device; whether it is through the use of text messaging, cell phone calls, social media or a third

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 6 of 26

party messaging application.” Id. Additionally, PFC Waters knew that individuals use “electronic

devices as a ledger” to memorialize the illegal sale of firearms.” Id. PFC Waters also explained

that he knew that “individuals involved in the sale, purchase and distribution of firearms, firearms

components and ammunition often send or receive digital photographs or communications of

themselves holding said firearms, firearms components and ammunition to send to potential

customers. Id. In order to do so, individuals must use the digital photograph taking capabilities

possessed by cellular devices or social media apps.” Id. at USA_000110. In a separate section to

the affidavit justifying “the place to be searched and the items to be seized,” PFC Waters reiterated

that “cellular phones may contain evidence relevant to the acquisition and possession of firearms,

firearms components and ammunition” and also that “persons illicitly possessing firearms will

engage in black-market sales of firearms . . . and that these sales are often facilitated via their

cellular phones.” Id. PFC Waters concluded the affidavit by attesting that evidence of illegal

firearms trafficking, along with other gun crimes, may be found on the phone. Id. at USA_000111

(citing Maryland Code, Criminal Law § 4-305.1 & Maryland Code, Public Safety § 5-144(a)(1)).

F. Search of the Defendant’s Black iPhone

When officers searched the Defendant’s black iPhone, they found a text message that the

Defendant sent to his co-defendant Ahmed Hussain that said, “Aye u gotta keep them bags . . . da

tucker rd spot and we gotta put all dese extra irons . . . dere too and just keep what we toatin!! At

least till I get off dis curfew and can change my addy u know I’m still on dis box . . . shyt dem

peoples cud come hit dis joint wenevaa.” ECF No. 110-1, USA_000125.

Additionally, the location information from the Defendant’s black iPhone revealed that the

phone pinged at 4325 Delmar Avenue, Temple Hills, Maryland (“Delmar Residence”) several

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 7 of 26

times between October 10 and 23, 2022. Id. at USA_000128. The Defendant provided this same

address when he was arrested on October 26, 2022. Id. at USA_000127.

G. Search Warrant for the Defendant’s Camo iPhone

PFC Waters next sought a search warrant to search the Defendant’s camo iPhone that law

enforcement found in the Porsche. On November 4, 2022, the Honorable Gladys M.

Weatherspoon, Prince George’s County Circuit Court Judge, authorized the requested search. Ex.

1, USA_001021.

In the supporting affidavit, PFC Waters recounted the factual background described above

regarding the stop of the Porsche, the seizure of the gun and drugs, and the contents of the black

iPhone. Id. at USA_001024-USA_001033. PFC Waters then justified searching the camo iPhone

for similar reasons that he articulated for searching the black iPhone. Id. at USA_001033.

H. Search of the Defendant’s Camo iPhone

When officers searched the Defendant’s camo iPhone, they found photos of the Defendant

at the Delmar Residence and also location pings establishing that the Defendant had lived at the

Delmar Residence for at least six months. ECF No. 110-1, USA_000129. The pictures on the

phone included one showing the Defendant sitting on a couch with a firearm and a large bag of

marijuana. Id. at USA_000130.

I. Search Warrant for Delmar Residence

PFC Waters—along with a co-affiant—applied for a search warrant to search the Delmar

Residence. On November 15, 2022, the Honorable Gladys M. Weatherspoon, Prince George’s

County Circuit Court Judge, authorized the requested search. Id. at USA_000115.

The affidavit recounted the traffic stop and the results from the searches of the black iPhone

and the camo iPhone. Id. at USA_000119-131.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 8 of 26

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 9 of 26

J. Execution of Search Warrant at Delmar Residence

On November 16, 2022, law enforcement executed the search warrant authorized for the

Delmar Residence.

At the time of the execution of the warrant, Harris and four other individuals were inside

the residence. After law enforcement announced their presence at Harris’ residence—but before

entering—two officers at the scene observed an individual toss a bag and a firearm out of one the

bedroom windows located on the second floor of the residence. The officers recovered a Glock,

Model: 42, .380 caliber, semi-automatic pistol, bearing serial number ADZT484. The firearm

contained eight rounds of .380 caliber ammunition. Upon further inspection, the officers

determined that the bag contained suspected marijuana.

Once law enforcement entered the residence, the officers observed a large hole in the screen

located in one of the three bedrooms located on the second floor of the residence. Law enforcement

discovered Harris’ clothes and shoes, and a television mounted on the wall inside of the bedroom.

In the other two bedrooms, law enforcement discovered identification cards and the like for the

other two residents.

In the attic of the residence, law enforcement seized the following relevant items:

• A Black Ruger AR-15 .556 Caliber, bearing serial number 855-95377;
• A Black Chiappa PAK 9mm Rifle, bearing serial number RON2025342;
• Three magazines, two of which were loaded;
• Two fifty round load drums;
• A masterpiece Arms 9mm “Mac 9”, bearing serial number F15430, loaded with an
extended magazine containing approximately 38 rounds of ammunition;
• A .45 Automatic, semi-automatic pistol, Model 21, bearing serial number
BLEY949 that was equipped with a full-auto sear switch;
• A large duffle bag that contained approximately 26 pounds of marijuana.
• A large red duffle bag that contained approximately 11 pounds of marijuana.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 10 of 26

Seen above: Photographs of the marijuana and firearms that were recovered from the attic at the
Delmar Residence taken by law enforcement at the scene.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2023, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland returned an indictment

against Harris for one count of felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §922(g)(1). ECF No. 1. Harris was arraigned on September 6, 2023. ECF No. 31.

On December 7, 2023, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland returned a

superseding indictment charging Harris with one count of felon in possession, in violation of 18

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 11 of 26

U.S.C. §922(g)(1), one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846, and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). ECF No. 57. Harris was arraigned on January 5, 2024. ECF No. 63.

On April 24, 2025, Harris moved to suppress the evidence that resulted from the traffic

stop and the three search warrants. ECF Nos. 109, 110.

DISCUSSION

I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE FROM THE PORSCHE BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID

PFC Waters had probable cause to conduct a lawful stop on the Porsche because he

observed the Defendant commit several traffic law violations. See Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where

the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). For example, PFC

Waters immediately noticed that Harris’ windows and windshield were excessively tinted in

violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. §§ 22-406(i)(1) and 22-101. In addition, the dispatcher

reported to PFC Waters that the temporary registration plates affixed to Harris’ vehicle were

invalid in violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 13-411(e)(1).

A. The Unauthorized Level of Tint on the Defendant’s Vehicle Gave Law
Enforcement a Lawful Basis to Conduct a Traffic Stop on the Vehicle

1. The Traffic Stop was Valid Under Maryland’s Window Tint Statute

PFC Waters had a lawful basis to stop the Porsche based on his observation of a heavily

tinted windshield and windows that were not within the legal limit. Maryland Transportation Code

prohibits vehicles from installing any tint materials to its windows that does not allow a light

transmittance through the window of at least 35%. Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 22-406(i)(1)(i). Here,

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 12 of 26

PFC Waters had at the very least reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle after he

observed what appeared to be an unauthorized level of tint on the Porsche’s windows and

windshield. United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “illegally

tinted windows are alone ‘sufficient to justify’ a traffic stop”).

2. In the alternative, the Traffic Stop was Valid Under Maryland’s Unsafe
Vehicle Statute

PFC Waters also had reasonable suspicion to stop the Porsche based on Md. Code Ann.,

Transp. § 22-101—the unsafe vehicle statute—which prohibits any person from driving “any

vehicle” in an “unsafe condition as to endanger any person”. Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 22-

101(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

As a threshold matter, heavily tinted windows create a safety concern for the driver and

those in the vicinity of that driver. In Maryland, the legislature has determined that passenger

vehicles must allow at least 35% of light transmittance. See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 22-

406(i)(1)(i). As Judge Hollander has explained, “The purpose of the tint regulation derives from

concerns about officer safety in the context of traffic stops.” United States v. Brandon, 2023 WL

6961937, at *15 (D. Md. Oct. 19, 2023); see also United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 978

(4th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that “the substantial government interest in officer safety which

exists when law enforcement officers must approach vehicles with heavily tinted windows far

outweighs any minimal privacy interest the suspect retains in the otherwise visible interior

compartment of his vehicle”). Specifically, regarding the unsafe vehicle statue, the Maryland

Court of Appeals has noted that a tinted vehicle lacking a label denoting the post-manufacturing

light transmittance “may justify a citation under § 22–101 or § 23–105(a), a repair order, and some

further investigation.” See State v. Williams, 934 A.2d 38, 48 n. 3 (Md. 2007)

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 13 of 26

Here, the evidence establishes that PFC Waters saw the Porsche driving on a public road

with heavily tinted windows and windshield such that PFC Waters could not determine how many

occupants were inside the Porsche. Then, as he approached the Porsche on foot, he directed the

Defendant to lower the back windows because he could not appropriately see into the Porsche.

Later, when he tested the tint level of the Defendant’s windows—it registered at 7% total light

transmittance. Given the safety risks posed by heavily tinted windows, law enforcement had

reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant under § 22-101(a)(1)(i) because his excessive window

tints constituted an “unsafe condition as to endanger any person.”

B. Law Enforcement Lawfully Extended the Traffic Stop by Ordering Harris to
Exit the Vehicle to Investigate the Invalid Registration Plates and the Presence of
Marijuana

PFC Waters lawfully extended the traffic stop to investigate traffic and criminal violations

after smelling marijuana in the Porsche. When an officer observes a traffic violation, the officer

“is justified in stopping the vehicle for long enough to issue the driver [the requisite warning or]

citation and determine that the driver is entitled to operate his vehicle.” United States v. Branch,

537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). To extend the encounter with law enforcement beyond a traffic

stop into an investigatory stop, the officer must lawfully obtain the driver’s consent or have

“reasonable suspicion” that illegal activity is afoot. Id. at 336. Here, PFC Waters had two lawful

bases to extend the traffic stop: 1) to investigate the temporary registration plates affixed on the

Porsche and 2) to investigate potential criminal activity after smelling the odor of burnt marijuana

emanating from the Porsche.

1. The Traffic Stop was Lawfully Extended Based on Reasonable
Suspicion that the Defendant’s Vehicle was Displaying Invalid License Plates

Under Maryland law, vehicles are required to display license plates issued by the MVA for

the current registration period. Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 13-411(d)(1). Here, the dispatcher

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 14 of 26

informed PFC Waters that the temporary Maryland tags displayed on the Porsche were not

registered with the MVA before he initiated a traffic stop. To further investigate the validity of the

Defendant’s vehicle registration, PFC Waters asked the Defendant for his driver’s license and

registration. After receiving a temporary registration card and a Washington D.C. learner’s permit,

PFC Waters instructed the Defendant to exit the Porsche so that he could access the VIN number

to conduct a second registration check through the dispatch channel. Thus, PFC Waters’

investigation of the Defendant’s registration for his Porsche provided a lawful basis to initiate and

extend the traffic stop.

2. The Traffic Stop was Lawfully Extended Based on Reasonable
Suspicion that the Defendant had Marijuana in the Porsche

PFC Waters lawfully extended the traffic stop of the Defendant because he smelled

marijuana coming from inside the Porsche and then saw marijuana inside the Porsche, which

established probable cause to search the Porsche. 3 See United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175,

184 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Once the car was properly stopped and the narcotics officers smelled

marijuana, the narcotics officers properly conducted a search of the car.”). And to effectuate the

search of the Porsche, officers “were entitled to order [the Defendant] out of the vehicle while their

search was accomplished.” United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 198 (4th Cir. 2010).

Contrary to the Defendant’s contention (at 5), PFC Waters did not need to cease the traffic

stop after issuing the Defendant a traffic citation because he smelled marijuana from inside the

Porsche. “There is no Fourth Amendment requirement that officers first complete the original

purposes of a traffic stop when new circumstances arise that provide the officers with reasonable

3
The stop happened on October 26, 2022. Starting July 1, 2023, Maryland prohibited
law enforcement from searching vehicles based on the odor of marijuana. See Md. Code Ann.,
Crim. Proc. § 1-211 (a)(1).

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 15 of 26

suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Davis, No. 20-4315, 2022 WL

94529, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (citing United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir.

2008)). The Defendant cites no case law to support his argument that PFC Waters needed to cease

the stop after issuing the traffic citation.

At this point, the purpose of the stop now included whether the Defendant was violating

criminal law with respect to the odor and presence of marijuana inside the Porsche. As part of his

investigation, PFC Waters asked the Defendant if there was any additional marijuana present other

than what was in the front passenger-seat of the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant

acknowledged that he did have an amount of marijuana in the vehicle consistent with personal use.

Based on this evidence, PFC Waters had probable cause to search the Porsche for additional

contraband.

C. Law Enforcement had Probable Cause to Conduct a Warrantless Search of
Harris’ Vehicle Under the Plain View Doctrine

Once PFC Waters observed the marijuana in plain view, he had an additional basis to search

the Porsche. See United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that

plain view doctrine allows the warrantless search and seizure of evidence when an officer is

lawfully in the area in which he sees the object, has lawful access to the object, and the

incriminating nature of the object is apparent).

Here, PFC Waters observed marijuana in the front-passenger seat of the Porsche while

Harris’ driver’s side door was ajar. Given that PFC Waters observed the marijuana while he was

conducting a registration check on the Defendant’s vehicle, he was in a lawful position to view the

contraband. Further, PFC Waters had a lawful right to access the marijuana because the traffic stop

investigation was ongoing and the Defendant was not yet arrested. Lastly, PFC Waters explained

in his Affidavits that the “green leafy substance” was immediately apparent to him as suspected

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 16 of 26

marijuana based on his knowledge, training, and experience. ECF No. 109-1, USA_000106; Ex.

1, USA_001025. Therefore, the subsequent warrantless search of the Defendant’s vehicle and

seizure of the evidence was legally permissible.

The Court should deny the Defendant’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from the

two phone search warrants as well as the residential search warrant because all three warrants

were supported by probable cause, and they were not overly broad because law enforcement

understood that it could seize only items that were relevant to the crimes it was investigating.

Even if the Court finds that the phone and residential warrants did not contain sufficient probable

cause, the Defendant’s argument that the good-faith exception should not apply to either warrant

is without merit.

A. Legal Standard—Substantial Basis

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When reviewing the validity of a search

warrant, the district court’s role is “not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but

only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate’s

decision to issue the warrant.” Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984); United States

v. Lawlor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1581 (4th Cir. 1993) (the question is “whether the magistrate judge

had a substantial basis for the decision”).

A court reviewing a probable cause determination “must consider only the information

presented to the magistrate who issued the warrant.” United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 17 of 26

(4th Cir. 1996). In this regard, “[a]n accused is generally not entitled to challenge the veracity

of a facially valid search warrant affidavit” by way of a motion to suppress. United States v.

Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171

(4th Cir. 2011)). In other words, reviewing the magistrate judge’s probable cause finding is

generally limited to “the four corners of the application documents.” United States v. Somerlock,

602 F. Supp. 3d 791, 799 (D. Md. 2022) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

The magistrate judge’s decision to issue the warrant is given “‘great deference,’” and it

should not be invalidated “‘by interpreting [an] affidavi[t] in a hypertechnical, rather than a

common sense, manner.’” Lawlor, 996 F.2d at 1581 (alterations in original) (quoting Gates, 462

U.S. at 236). A determination of probable cause is “one on which ‘reasonable and prudent people

would rely.’” United States v. Jones, 952 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Florida v. Harris,

568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)). Probable cause plainly “exist[s] where the known facts and

circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696

(1996). The probable cause standard gives law enforcement officers “leeway to draw reasonable

conclusions.” Taylor v. Farmer, 13 F.3d 117, 121-22 (4th Cir. 1993).

Even when a search warrant lacks probable cause, as long as officers are “reasonably

relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate,” the exclusionary rule does not

apply because of the good-faith exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). In

Leon, the Supreme Court identified four instances where the good-faith exception did not apply:

1. “[T]he issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role”;

2. The “warrant [is] so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume
it to be valid”;

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 18 of 26

3. The “affidavit [is] so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable”; or

4. “[T]he issuing judge ‘was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.’”

United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).

1. The Court Should Not Suppress the Evidence from the Phone
Warrants.

a) The Phone Warrants Contained Sufficient Probable Cause.

Contrary to the Defendant’s motion, ECF No. 109, PFC Waters’ affidavits provided

sufficient probable cause to support the warrants to search the Defendant’s black and camo

iPhones. As described in the factual recitation above, PFC Waters explained in each warrant the

basis for the stop of the Porsche. Then, in writing for the iPhones, PFC Waters explained how he

had seized a gun and drugs from the Porsche. ECF No. 109-1, USA_000106-107; Ex. 1,

USA_001025-1031. Lastly, in justifying the searches of the iPhones by noting that in his training,

knowledge, and experience, cellphone evidence often establishes how an individual unlawfully

purchased a firearm. See ECF No. 109-1, USA_000109-110; Ex. 1, USA_001032-1033.

The Court should reject the scattershot theories that the Defendant raises for suppressing

the phones.

First, the Defendant mischaracterizes the affidavits when he suggests that the affidavits

rely on his “mere presence” in the Porsche. ECF No. 109 at 7. This argument ignores that PFC

Waters found a gun in the Porsche and that he justified searching the phones based on the unlawful

gun possession.

Second, the Defendant argues that “a hearing in this matter will reveal that law enforcement

accessed the phones to acquire information even before the acquisition of the warrants.” ECF No.

109 at 8. The Defendant provides no basis for this speculative assertion.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 19 of 26

Third, the Defendant argues that “there is not even the slightest support present for any

nexus between the cellphones in question and for which the search warrants were sought and any

likelihood that those items listed in the addendum to the search warrant would be found in that

location.” ECF No. 109 at 9. That argument again ignores that PFC Waters found a gun in the

Porsche.

The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Henderson illustrates the

deficiencies in the Defendant’s nexus argument. No. 22-4447, 2025 WL 1318001, at *1 (4th Cir.

May 7, 2025). There, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that law enforcement did not

have any nexus between the alleged crime and his cellphones that were recovered from the

residential search warrant. Id. at *3. In that case, the officer recovered methamphetamine and a

firearm during a traffic stop. Id. The driver told law enforcement that his out-of-state

methamphetamine source of supply was currently staying at the residence armed with a gun. Id.

The officer requested a residential search warrant of the driver’s home. Id. at *1. In the

affidavit, the officer explained based, in part, on their training and experience, that drug traffickers

typically maintain evidence of their activity on their “persons, inside their residences or nearby

locations.” Id. The officer requested to seize and search for items related to drug distribution such

as records, messages, photographs, and telephone numbers on cellphones by explaining that such

items could be located on digital devices, such as cellphones. Id. Law enforcement executed the

residential search warrant and seized two cellphones that belonged to the defendant, Henderson.

Id. Law enforcement recovered text messages indicative of drug dealing and photographs

containing methamphetamine and a large amount of cash. Id.

Like the officer in Henderson, PFC Waters recovered a firearm and drugs from a vehicle

during a traffic stop. Furthermore, as stated in his affidavits for the Defendant’s black and camo

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 20 of 26

iPhones, PFC Waters sought search warrants for the two cellphones based, in part, on his training

and experience that firearms trafficking is often facilitated via cellphones. USA_000111; Ex. 1,

USA_001032. PFC Waters requested to seize and search for items related to firearms trafficking

in his search warrant affidavits such as text messages, photographs and video, and address books.

USA_000112; Ex. 1, USA_001033. Given the similarities between the items sought to be searched

and the justifications provided to search the defendant’s cellphones in the Henderson search

warrant affidavit and the Defendant’s black and Camo iPhones search warrant affidavit,

Henderson should apply, and the Court should dismiss the Defendant’s argument that no nexus

existed between the Defendant’s cellphones and the items that law enforcement requested to

search.

b) Neither of The Phone Warrants Was Overbroad.

The Defendant asserts that the phone warrants are overbroad because “the requests were

absent the type of particularity required by the [C]onstitution…” This argument fails because both

phone warrants were sufficiently particular.

At its core, the Fourth Amendment protects against general warrants
that authorize “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings . . .
by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized.” The
particularity requirement is fulfilled when the warrant identifies the
items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes and when
the description of the items leaves nothing to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 21 of 26

United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427

U.S. 463, 480-82 (1976)) (internal citations omitted).

When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, it is limited in
scope by the terms of the warrant’s authorization. The terms of the
warrant are not to be interpreted in a hypertechnical manner. Rather,
they should be read with a commonsense and realistic approach, to
avoid turning a search warrant into a constitutional straight jacket.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The phone warrant for the black iPhone was limited to “electronically stored contents” that

were “[r]elated to the crime being investigated.” ECF No. 109-1, USA_000113. The Defendant

does not—and cannot—argue why this limiting language is insufficient to address particularity.

Admittedly, the search warrant for the camo iPhone did not include the phrase “related to

the crime being investigated” but other sections of both phone warrants and affidavits provide

sufficient particularity. Notably, both warrants specifically “incorporated” the affidavits. ECF

No. 109-1, USA_000113; Ex. 1, USA_001034.

First, the affidavits for both warrants made clear that law enforcement was seeking to seize

specific “electronically stored contents” within the iPhones. No. 109-1, USA_000113; Ex. 1,

USA_001035; see United States v. Lustyik, 57 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The

inclusion of an illustrative list of seizable items brings the Warrants within the Fourth

Amendment’s particularity parameters.”).

Second, both affidavits listed the specific criminal statutes that law enforcement was

investigating. ECF No. 109-1, USA_000111; Ex. 1, USA_001032. This limitation renders the

warrants specific. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, 436 F. Supp. 3d 707, 726–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

(denying motion to suppress where “each warrant notes, prior to the search and seizure

authorization, that there is probable cause to believe that the target email accounts contain evidence

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 22 of 26

of involvement in money laundering, offering a false instrument for filing, and falsifying business

records”); Wieber v. Porter, No. 2023 WL 3371050, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 2023) (denying

motion to suppress where warranted “cite[d] the items to be searched and seized, and describe[d]

the nature of the crimes being investigated, aff’d, No. 23-1158, 2025 WL 635753 (10th Cir. Feb.

27, 2025).

Third, both affidavits authorized law enforcement to “seize the following items, evidence,

and/or contraband.” ECF No. 109-1, USA_000113; Ex. 1, USA_001034. The references to

“evidence” and “contraband” demonstrate that the magistrate judge was permitting law

enforcement to size only evidence of the illegal activity being investigated.

Because of the limitations contained within the affidavit itself, neither warrant authorized

the government to “hav[e] ‘unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private

effects.’” United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 337 (4th Cir.) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556

U.S. 332, 345 (2009)). Treating the camo iPhone warrant as a general warrant because it omits

the phrase “related to the crime being investigated” would require impermissibly reading the

warrant “in a hypertechnical manner.” Williams, 592 F.3d at 519.

c) The Defendant Cannot Argue That the Good Faith Exception Does
Not Apply to the Phone Warrants.

Even if the Court were to find that the phone search warrant affidavits did not provide

probable cause for the searches, the Court should not grant the suppression motions because of the

good-faith exception. Simply put, none of the four factors that would vitiate the good-faith

exception applies here.

First, there is no indication that the Prince George’s County Circuit Court judges who

authorized the at-issue affidavits “wholly abandoned” their judicial role in signing these warrants

or that they were not neutral when signing the warrants. See Perez, 393 F.3d 457.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 23 of 26

Second, the warrants were not “facially deficient” because they effectively set forth the

places that law enforcement intended to search, and the evidence law enforcement could seize. Id.

Third, the iPhone affidavits were not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that the

Court should suppress the warrant. Rather, as described above, the affidavits contained probable

cause to support returning of the warrants.

Fourth, the Defendant does not argue that PFC Waters misled the Prince George’s County

Circuit Court judges in any respect—let alone knowingly did so.

2. The Court Should Not Suppress the Evidence from the Residential
Warrant.

a) The Warrant Contained Sufficient Probable Cause.

Like his motion to suppress evidence from the iPhones, the Defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence from the residential search ignores the contents of the affidavit. The Defendant argues

that the search warrant affidavit relied in large part on text messages and lacked nexus to the

Delmar Residence. ECF No. 110 at 5.

As to the first argument, PFC Waters’ affidavit highlighted a variety of inculpatory

evidence tying the Defendant to the Delmar Residence. The affidavit showed pictures of the

Defendant with bags of marijuana within the Delmar Residence. Additionally, he highlighted a

text message where the Defendant directed his co-defendant to move all guns out of the Delmar

Residence. ECF No. 110-1, USA_000125, USA_000130, USA_000134.

As to the second argument, PFC Waters linked the Defendant to the Delmar Residence

because the Defendant had told law enforcement that he lived at the Delmar Residence and location

data from the Defendant’s phones showed that he was residing at the Delmar Residence. ECF

No. 110-1, USA_000127-129.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 24 of 26

b) The Defendant Cannot Argue That the Good Faith Exception Does
Not Apply to the Residential Warrant.

Even if the Court found that the residential search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause,

the good-faith exception permits the Government to introduce evidence recovered from the Delmar

Residence. The Defendant contends that the good-faith exception should not apply to the

residential search warrant affidavit in part because the “requisite nexus between the address for

which the search warrant was sought and any likelihood that those items listed in the addendum to

the search warrant would be found in that location was slim” and the officers knew about the

nonexistent nexus. ECF No. 110 at 5. Yet, legal precedent dictates that the affidavit sufficiently

articulated the nexus between the Defendant criminal activity and his residence. See United States

v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (“the nexus between the place to be searched and

the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of

where one would likely keep such evidence”) (internal citation omitted). The residential affidavit

not only identified the Delmar Residence as the home of the Defendant, but it also requested the

Court to seize items related to the criminal offenses that gave rise to the warrant, which was

unlawful possession of marijuana and a firearm with a Glock switch.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny without an evidentiary hearing the

Defendant’s motions to suppress any evidence obtained from searches of his vehicle, cellphones,

and residence. ECF Nos. 109 and 110.

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 25 of 26

Respectfully submitted,

Kelly O. Hayes
United States Attorney

By: /s/
Christopher Sarma
Assistant United States Attorney

Lanay Mitchell
Special Assistant United States Attorney

Case 8:23-cr-00183-DLB Document 123 Filed 05/16/25 Page 26 of 26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 16, 2025, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed

through this Court’s CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all parties.

/s/ Christopher Sarma
Assistant United States Attorney

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