Amended Memorandum of Decision and Order — United States v. Blackmon (Dkt. 47, W.D.N.C.)

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A memorandum of decision and order (amended) in United States v. Jeannetta Blackmon, Case 3:23-cr-00156-MOC-SCR, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, filed January 27, 2026 as Document 47. It addresses the defendant's amended motion to vacate, set aside or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and her motion for appointment of counsel. It recites that she fraudulently obtained PPP and EIDL funds for three businesses and that the court entered a consent forfeiture judgment of $619,000 and later a final order giving the government title to a Charlotte residence. She seeks to have the forfeiture judgment vacated and her residence returned, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on forfeiture issues; the court resolves the motion on the record without an evidentiary hearing and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
                              CHARLOTTE DIVISION
                                3:23-cr-156-MOC-SCR


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,           )
                                    )
                  Plaintiff,        )
                                    )                 AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF
      vs.                           )                 DECISION AND ORDER
                                    )
                                    )
JEANNETTA BLACKMON,                 )
                                    )
                  Defendant.        )
___________________________________ )

       THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Amended Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 42] and Defendant’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 39].

I.     BACKGROUND

       Between April 2020 and November 2021, Defendant Jeannetta Blackmon (“Defendant”)

fraudulently obtained Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan

(“EIDL”) funds on behalf of her three businesses, J Renee Enterprises, LLC; Jeannetta Renee Girls

Talk (“JR Girls Talk”), and Jrenee Investments (“JR Investments”); and on behalf of her

customers’ businesses. [Doc. 6: Factual Basis].

       Defendant was charged in a Bill of Information with one count of wire fraud in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived

property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. [Doc. 1: Bill of Information]. The Bill contained a notice

of forfeiture of proceeds of crime and property involved in money laundering. [Id. at 7]. It specified

that a money judgment of $1,675,328.60, the amount constituting the proceeds that went to



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     Case 3:23-cr-00156-MOC-SCR             Document 47        Filed 01/27/26       Page 1 of 7

Defendant and her customers, would be subject to forfeiture. [Id.]. This amount included inter alia

the real property at 10108 Barrands Lane, Charlotte, North Carolina (the “Real Property”), which

Defendant purchased with a loan and $120,707.94 in funds from accounts funded primarily if not

entirely by fraud proceeds. [Doc. 24-1 at ¶ 4: Elliott Aff.; Doc. 24-2].

        On July 25, 2023, Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts. [Doc. 8: Acceptance and Entry

of Guilty Plea; Doc. 2: Plea Agreement]. Pursuant to terms of the Plea Agreement, Defendant

consented to the money judgment and agreed to cooperate with financial disclosures and forfeiture,

including the satisfaction of the forfeiture money judgment by forfeiture of substitute property.

[Doc. 2 at ¶ 8]. Despite the Government’s multiple requests over many months, however,

Defendant did not consent to forfeiture or provide a financial statement to the U.S. Attorney’s

Office. [Doc. 24 at 2–3]. On February 28, 2025, the Government, therefore, moved the Court to

determine forfeiture at or prior to sentencing. [Id. at 3].

        At sentencing, the Court entered a Consent Order and Judgment of Forfeiture Pending Rule

32.2(c)(2) in the amount of $619,000, finding “such amount constituting the proceeds traceable to

the offense to which Defendant pled guilty.” [Doc. 25]. The Court varied downward and sentenced

the Defendant to term of imprisonment of 30 months and ordered restitution in the amount of

$1,549,737.00. [Doc. 27 at 2, 5: Judgment; Doc. 28 at 3: Statement of Reasons].

        Two weeks later, the Court granted the Government’s motion to determine forfeiture and

entered a money judgment and preliminary order of forfeiture. [Doc. 29; see Doc. 24]. The Court

held inter alia that, pending Fed. R. Civ. P. 32.2(c)(2),1 property derived from proceeds traceable

to Defendant’s fraud crime, including the Real Property, was subject to forfeiture. [Id. at 6]. The




1
 Under this provision, “the court must enter a final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary
order as necessary to account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(c)(2).
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Court also concluded that the Real Property was subject to forfeiture as property involved in a §

1957 transaction. [Id.]. The Court, therefore, ordered the forfeiture money judgment in the amount

of $619,000 and the Real Property forfeited pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) and authorized

the Government to take and maintain custody of this property. [Id. at 7]. After the Government

provided proper notice of this forfeiture and its intent to dispose of the property, consent orders

were entered resolving third parties’ interests in the Real Property. [Docs. 33, 36]. Thereafter, on

August 8, 2025, the Court granted the Government’s motion for Final Order of Forfeiture, giving

the Government clear title to the Real Property. [Docs. 37, 38]. Defendant did not file a direct

appeal.

          On September 18, 2025, Defendant filed the pending § 2255 motion to vacate. [Doc. 42].

Defendant wants the forfeiture judgment vacated and her residence, presumably the Real Property,

returned to her. [Id.]. As grounds for this relief, Defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel

relative to various forfeiture-related issues. She claims her attorney induced her to sign a

“repayment agreement,” which operated as a forfeiture agreement and included Defendant’s home;

failed to ensure that the record reflected the exclusion of Defendant’s residence from forfeiture in

accordance with this Court’s intent at sentencing; and failed to fulfill her duties relative to

forfeiture proceedings. [Id.]. Defendant has also moved for appointment of counsel. [Doc. 39].

II.       STANDARD OF REVIEW

          A federal prisoner claiming that his “sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution

or the laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,

or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to

collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct

the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).



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         Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that courts are to

promptly examine motions to vacate, along with “any attached exhibits and the record of prior

proceedings . . .” in order to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief on the claims

set forth therein. After examining the record in this matter, the Court finds that the motion to vacate

can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing based on the record and governing case law. See

Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970).

III.     DISCUSSION

         The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions,

the accused has the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI.

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must first establish deficient performance by

counsel and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).

         Assuming in arguendo that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective relative to the forfeiture

proceedings here, however, § 2255 “may not be used for the sole purpose of challenging fines or

restitution orders.” United States v. Hudgins, 201 Fed. App’x 142, 143 (4th Cir. 2006); Mamone

v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009) (a movant cannot utilize § 2255 to challenge

a restitution order, even if cognizable claims seeking release from custody are also raised);

Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he language of § 2255 is best read

as requiring a challenge to custody…. [C]ollateral challenges have historically been permitted

through habeas only when an interest as compelling as freedom from custody is at stake.”); United

States v. Fabian, C/A No. CCB-09-2810, Cr. No. CCB-07-0355, 2011 WL 2791085, at *30 (D.

Md. July 14, 2011) (collecting cases) (a noncustodial component of a sentence, such as restitution

or forfeiture order, cannot be attacked in a § 2255 petition); but cf. United States v. Luessenhop,



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143 Fed. App’x 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2005) (allowing, without discussion of propriety of proceeding

under § 2255, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where defendant made showing that the

amount of loss and amount of restitution would have been substantially less).

       Here, Defendant seeks relief from the Court’s order forfeiting the Real Property on grounds

of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Doc. 42 at 12]. This relief is unavailable under § 2255.

Moreover, characterizing Defendant’s motion as one for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is also

unavailing. See United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he monetary

component of a sentence is not capable of satisfying the ‘in custody’ requirement of federal habeas

statutes.”); Arnaiz v. Warden, 594 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (restitution order

not challengeable in a Section 2241 petition); but cf. Fontanez v. O’Brien, 807 F.3d 84 (4th Cir.

2015) (distinguishing a § 2241 challenging the validity of the restitution order, which is not

cognizable under § 2241, from a challenge to the execution of the restitution portion of the

sentence, which is cognizable under § 2241).

       Also pending is Defendant’s motion for appointment of counsel, which the Court construes

a motion for appointment of counsel to represent Defendant in the pending § 2255 proceedings.

[Doc. 39]. Defendant requests court-appointed counsel to “assist with a Money Judgment and

Preliminary Order of Forfeiture … because a lien has been placed on [her] property against the

Judge’s Order in [her] Case.” [Id.]. As grounds, Defendant states she is no longer able to afford

her retained counsel, Kenneth Snow. [Id.]. In § 2255 actions, appointment of counsel is governed

by the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, Rules 6(a) and 8(c), which mandate the appointment

of counsel where discovery is necessary or if the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing. Id.

Moreover, there is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a § 2255 proceeding.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). The Court may appoint counsel to a financially



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eligible habeas petitioner if justice so requires. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). This Court finds

that Defendant has not shown that appointment of counsel is appropriate in this case. Moreover,

Defendant’s motion is also moot in any event given the denial of her § 2255 motion.

IV.     CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies and dismisses Defendant’s § 2255 motion to

vacate and denies Defendant’s motion for appointment of counsel.

        The Court further finds that Defendant has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a

constitutional right. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 336-38 (2003) (in order to satisfy § 2253(c), a “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong”)

(citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000)). Defendant has failed to demonstrate both

that this Court’s dispositive procedural rulings are debatable, and that the Motion to Vacate states

a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484–85.

As a result, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See Rule 11(a), Rules

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

                                             ORDER
        IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Amended Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 42] is DENIED and DISMISSED.

Additionally, Defendant’s original Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 40] is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

        IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

[Doc. 39] is DENIED.

        Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 and Section 2255 Cases, this

Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

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                         Signed: January 27, 2026




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