Defendant's Motion for Immediate Release — United States v. Jean-Jacques

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Defendant's Motion for Immediate Release and Opposition to Government's Motion for Revocation of Release Order in United States v. Sniders Jean-Jacques, Docket No. 26-cr-10030-RGS and 26-cr-10031-RGS, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Doc. 55, dated April 4, 2026. The motion argues that the government misinterprets the Bail Reform Act and that dangerousness is not an available ground for pretrial detention in an economic crimes case. It recounts that the defendant was arrested on February 9, 2026, and that a detention hearing took place on February 13, 2026, after which the magistrate judge ordered release subject to conditions. It asks the Court not to revoke the magistrate judge's order of release.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
: 
: 
: 
v. 
: Docket No.:  26-cr-10030-RGS and 
 
:                       26-cr-10031-RGS 
: 
SNIDERS JEAN-JACQUES 
: 
 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND OPPOSITION TO 
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR REVOCATION OF RELEASE ORDER 
 
 
Mr. Jean-Jacques opposes the government’s motion for revocation of the magistrate 
judge’s release order. The government, quite simply, misinterprets the Bail Reform Act in 
arguing that Mr. Jean-Jacques must be detained because of the danger he poses to the 
community. In an economic crimes case such as this one, dangerousness is not an available 
ground for pretrial detention. See United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988). The law 
requires that Mr. Jean-Jacques be released pending trial, and it is only if the government proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence that 1) Mr. Jean-Jacques poses a serious risk of flight, or 
serious risk to obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt 
to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror; and 2) that there is no possible 
combination of conditions of release that would “reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” that Mr. Jean-Jacques can be 
jailed pretrial under 18 U.S.C. §3142. For the reasons set forth below, under this proper legal 
framework, the magistrate judge was correct to order Mr. Jean-Jacques’ release subject to a 
number of conditions. Mr. Jean-Jacques asks this Court to reach the same conclusion and not to 
revoke the magistrate judge’s order of release. 
 
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I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mr. Jean-Jacques was arrested on February 9, 2026 in Florida, where he resides. He appeared 
in front of a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida the next day, at which time the 
government moved for his detention, citing only §3142(f)(2)(A). Tr. at 11. 1 Pretrial services 
interviewed Mr. Jean-Jacques and prepared a bail report, in which they recommended release 
subject to a number of conditions. See Exhibit B (filed under seal). 
A detention hearing was held on February 13, 2026. The government called one witness at 
the detention hearing in Miami: Special Agent Nelson Muñiz of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Office of Inspector General. At the hearing, the agent described the allegations in the 
indictments, including the potential loss amounts. Tr. at 14-15, 18-19. He described the fact that 
Mr. Jean-Jacques had previously been convicted of a fraud offense in the District of 
Massachusetts, and that the conspiracy alleged in the instant indictment was alleged to have 
begun a few months before the end of his supervised release. Tr. at 15-16. He also testified that 
when agents went to a residence to arrest Mr. Jean-Jacques, he was “not cooperative” and 
refused to come out for fifteen minutes before presenting himself to the agents. Tr. at 16-17. 
In arguing for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention, the prosecuting attorney in Florida cited the fact 
that Mr. Jean-Jacques was a “recidivist” who was still on supervised release at the time the 
instant conspiracy began, Tr. at 33, that he faces significant penalties, Tr. at 34, that he refused to 
answer questions by pretrial services about his international travel, Tr. at 35, that his brother was 
unable to corroborate some of his personal history, Id., that he was born in Haiti (although a 
United States citizen), Tr. at 36, that he has a mental health history, Id., and that it took him 15 
minutes to surrender himself to agents, Tr. at 37. 
 
1 A copy of the February 13, 2026 detention hearing transcript is attached as Exhibit A. References to the transcript 
will appear as “Tr. at __.” 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, after considering the arguments by both the prosecutor and 
the defense attorney, the magistrate judge explained the legal standard applicable to the hearing 
and its reasoning in ordering release subject to conditions. Tr. at 42-46. After careful 
consideration, the court ordered Mr. Jean-Jacques’ release with the following special conditions:  
 
• $100,000 unsecured bond, co-signed by Mr. Jean-Jacques’ mother; 
• Report to Pretrial Services as directed;  
• Surrender passport and do not apply for any other travel documents; 
• Participate in a mental health assessment and treatment, if necessary, or continue 
participation in current treatment; 
• Do not work in any job with access to credit cards or the personal identification 
information of other individuals; 
• No contact with co-defendants in either case; 
• Refrain from possessing a firearm or any other dangerous weapon;  
• Cosigner of bond cannot encumber, mortgage or hypothecate in any way any real 
property that they own; 
• Travel restricted to Southern District of Florida and to the District of Massachusetts 
only court appearances. Notify Pretrial Services officer in advance of any travel to 
Massachusetts; and 
• Standalone electronic monitoring.  
Tr. at 55-58. At the conclusion of the hearing, the government requested a stay of the release 
order, which the Court allowed.  On February 17, 2026, the prosecuting attorney in this district 
filed an Emergency Motion to Stay and Revocation of Release Order. Following Mr. Jean-
Jacques’ arrival in this district, this Court scheduled a hearing on the government’s motion for 
April 7, 2026. 
II. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
At the detention hearing, the magistrate judge noted that the government only moved for Mr. 
Jean-Jacques’ detention under 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(A), and did not allow them to argue for 
detention on the basis of dangerousness. The court was correct to do so. Even so, the government 
now asks this Court to detain Mr. Jean-Jacques on the basis of dangerousness. However, where 
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Mr. Jean-Jacques is charged only with economic crimes, and not one of the crimes specified in 
18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1), dangerousness is not an available ground for pretrial detention. See 
United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988).  
In Ploof, the defendant was charged with economic crimes, but also had a history of domestic 
violence. The magistrate and district court held, after a hearing, that there was no combination of 
conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of the community and ordered the defendant’s 
pretrial detention. The First Circuit held that dangerousness was not a proper basis for detention 
in an economic crime: “where detention is based on dangerousness grounds, it can be ordered 
only in cases involving one of the circumstances set forth in § 3142(f)(1).” Id. at 11. Ploof 
remains the law in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Oquendo, 2025 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44732 at *5 (D.P.R. March 10, 2025) (holding, in bank fraud case, that “it is well-settled 
that where ‘detention is based on dangerousness grounds, it can be ordered only in cases 
involving one of the circumstances set forth in § 3142(f)(1).’”); United States v. Salgado, 2020 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147866 at *9 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2020). 
The government cites several out-of-circuit cases for the contrary position that detention 
can be authorized based on economic danger. See D.E. 18, Gov’t Emergency Motion for Stay 
and Revocation of Release Order, at 11-12. However, the cases cited by the government do not 
support this position, nor do they contradict the holding of Ploof. For example, in United States 
v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989), the Court considered dangerousness in the context 
of a revocation under §3148, a different standard than §3142. In that case, the Court did note that 
dangerousness meant more than “the mere danger of physical violence,” and specifically that 
“the risk that a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the 
‘safety of any other person or the community.’” Likewise, in United States v. Carpenter, No. 04-
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10029-GAO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71034, at *10 (D. Mass. May 232014), the Court 
considered economic danger posed by defendant in his request for bail pending appeal under 
§3143(b) – not pretrial release under §3142. The court noted the different standard for bail 
pending appeal, specifically that “even when the conviction does not involve a crime of violence 
or drug offense, detention (following conviction and sentencing) is mandatory,” unless the 
standard for exception is met. 
In United States v. Schenberger, 498 F.Supp.2d 738 (D.N.J. 2007), another case cited by 
the government, the Court was considering pretrial detention in a child pornography case, i.e. a 
case involving an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1). There, the Court noted that “danger to 
the community does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of ‘safety’ 
may include non-physical harm.” Id. at 742. However, the Court specifically mentioned that 
“[t]he government may move for detention on the basis of danger to the community only for an 
offense that is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) to (E),” consistent with the holding of Ploof. 
Id. at 741. 
In United States v. Persaud, No. 05-cr-00368, 2007 WL 1074906 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5 2007), 
the Court considered the danger of economic harm in setting appropriate conditions of release; it 
did not cite the danger of economic harm as a basis for detention. See also Ploof, 851 F.2d at 11 
(“Danger to the community present in the likelihood defendant would continue to commit 
offenses involving false identification could be considered only in setting conditions of release”) 
(quoting United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986)); United States v. Harris, 920 
F.Supp. 132, 133 (D. Nev. 1996) (considering risk of economic harm in fashioning defendant’s 
conditions of release). 
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Finally, in United States v. Giordano, 370 F.Supp.2d 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2005), a 35-count 
economic crimes case, the court ordered release and adopted the reasoning of Ploof: 
notwithstanding the Government's stated concession during the 
hearing that it understood it could not seek to detain the defendant 
strictly based upon danger to the community, it appears that the 
thrust of the Government's case was still based upon that perceived 
danger rather than a real serious risk of flight. The evidence of risk 
of flight was sparse and conclusory, while the evidence submitted 
showing the alleged pattern of fraudulent conduct on the part of 
this defendant was more identifiable. The statutory scheme as 
currently constructed, however, does not support the stronger part 
of the Government's case that the threat of continuing economic 
fraud triggers a right to detention. 
 
370 F.Supp. 2d at 1258. The court noted “even in a case involving serious economic crimes that 
may have been financially lucrative,” “section 3142 presumes that this defendant is eligible for 
bond.” Id. 
Accordingly, the only available grounds for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention are under 
§3142(f)(2). There is a presumption of release. The Court must engage in a two-step analysis in 
considering release. United States v. Butland, No. 25-mj-03231-JDH, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
174463 at *3 (D.Mass. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting the government’s “dual burden” in seeking pretrial 
detention). First, it must determine whether the government has proven that Mr. Jean-Jacques 
presents a serious risk of flight or a serious risk of obstructing justice or intimidating witnesses. 
If the Court finds that he does pose such a risk, then the Court must consider conditions of 
release to mitigate that risk. Mr. Jean-Jacques may only be detained if the government has 
proven that there exist no possible combination conditions of release that would reasonably 
assure Mr. Jean-Jacques’ appearance. Pretrial detention is a last resort. See United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial 
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or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 
1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Only in rare circumstances should release be denied…Doubts regarding 
the propriety of release should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”). 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
 
A. The Government Has Not Shown That Mr. Jean-Jacques Presents a Serious 
Risk of Flight or a Serious Risk of Obstructing Justice or Intimidating 
Witnesses. 
The government’s first hurdle is proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jean-
Jacques is either a serious risk of flight or a serious risk of obstructing justice or intimidating 
witnesses. While the government offers various reasons in support of their position, ultimately 
those reasons are either speculative or misconstrued. Mr. Jean-Jacques is not a serious risk under 
either 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(A) or (B), and should be released. 
The government argues that the fact that Mr. Jean-Jacques faces a significant sentence 
weighs in favor of detention. In their motion, they assert that his guidelines are 188 to 235 
months, while at the detention hearing they asserted they were 121 to 151 months. Tr. at 11. The 
government has repeated the allegations in the indictment, and asserted loss amounts without 
evidence to support it. In fact, at the detention hearing in Florida, the only loss amount that was 
described in any detail are two transactions described in the indictment that were likely less than 
$100,000. Tr. 29-30. 
 
The government also cites Mr. Jean-Jacques “foreign ties.” While it is true that Mr. Jean-
Jacques is an immigrant born in Haiti, who continues to care for the people of Haiti as they suffer 
through political, economic, and natural disasters, he has lived in the United States since he was 
a child and is a naturalized citizen. Most of his close family resides in the United States, 
including his mother, siblings, and children. And while on supervised release for three years, he 
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never traveled outside of the jurisdiction without permission. The government also speculates 
that Mr. Jean-Jacques could “live underground” in the United States, alleging that he has done so 
before, when there is absolutely no evidence that he has lived “underground” at any point in his 
life. The government asserts that Mr. Jean-Jacques has no stable residence and no means of 
employment, both of which are simply untrue. Mr. Jean-Jacques intends to return to work for 
Lyft, as he did during his period of supervised release. See Exhibit C (Memorandum from 
Probation). He will live with his mother, who owns her own home in Florida, and is also willing 
to co-sign a bond in this case. This is the same residence at which Mr. Jean-Jacques resided 
during his period of supervised release. Id. While the government attempts to implicate Mr. Jean-
Jacques’ family in his alleged criminal activity, these accusations again are based on nothing 
more than speculation. 
The government also points to the circumstances of Mr. Jean-Jacques’ arrest, and claims 
that he “barricaded” himself inside his house when police came to arrest him. This issue was 
discussed at length at Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention hearing. Ultimately, the judge there concluded: 
“This is not a situation as far as the evidence I was presented where he barricaded himself in or 
law enforcement had to go in and get him, where he took off from the residence and tried to flee 
from law enforcement. So I don't think that a 15-minute delay in coming to the door is 
particularly concerning as to whether or not he's going to appear here in court.” Tr. at 45. The 
Florida court’s finding about the significance of Mr. Jean-Jacques delay in coming to the door is 
correct and properly supported by the evidence. 
 
The government also alleges that Mr. Jean-Jacques was engaged in the criminal acts 
alleged in the indictment during his period of supervised release. However, the only support for 
this are the dates stated in the indictment and a single sentence, that states, “On or about May 15, 
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2018, Kelly Michel messaged Jean-Jacques a listing of available tradelines and the cost of each.” 
Docket No. 26-cr-10030-RGS, D.E. 1 at ¶19a. The fact that Mr. Jean-Jacques received this 
message in May 2018 does not mean he was engaged in criminal activity at that time. There is 
nothing to indicate he actually did anything illegal during his period of supervised release. 
 
Lastly, the government speculates that Mr. Jean-Jacques has access to an “influx of cash” 
without providing any financial records to substantiate this claim. Mr. Jean-Jacques, as the 
government also notes, has no current employment, and has now been detained for almost two 
months. 
In addition, despite not moving for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention under §3142(f)(2)(B) at 
his initial appearance or at his detention hearing, the government now asserts that Mr. Jean-
Jacques should be detained because he presents a serious risk of intimidating witnesses or 
obstructing justice. The government points to several incidents, none of which have resulted in a 
criminal conviction, and most of which were unsubstantiated and uncharged. 2 None of them 
involve the violation of a court order, and none of them involve interference with a criminal 
investigation. Cf. United States v. Courture, No. 21-10172-NMG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29911, 
at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2022) (detaining defendant under both §3142(f)(2)(B) and §3148 where 
he violated condition of release not to contact witnesses and attempted to influence witness 
testimony).  
In short, Mr. Jean-Jacques is a United States citizen with family support and significant 
ties in the community. He has serious medical and mental health needs that keep him tied to his 
treatment providers in the community. He has a perfect track record of being able to comply with 
conditions of supervised release, see Exhibit C, and no history of fleeing court or not appearing 
 
2 For example, despite claims made by unnamed witnesses that Mr. Jean-Jacques possessed a firearm, no firearm has 
ever been found in Mr. Jean-Jacques possession. 
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when required. Serious risk of flight cannot be based on speculation or made-up scenarios. 
“Serious risk of flight has been defined by some courts as more than mere ordinary risk and is 
certainly different than risk of non-appearance. It requires intentional and active movement 
outside the jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction to avoid appearing in court.” Garcia-Oquendo, 
supra, at *8-9. It has been described as “a great risk—beyond average—that the defendant will 
intentionally and actively move within or outside the jurisdiction to avoid court proceedings or 
supervision.” Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Jean-Jacques does not present this sort of “great risk” 
warranting pretrial detention, nor does he pose any similar sort of risk of interfering in the 
criminal investigation and prosecution against him. 
B. Even if the Court Finds That Mr. Jean-Jacques Does Present a Serious Risk of 
Flight or of Obstructing Justice, Conditions Can Be Fashioned to Reasonably 
Assure His Appearance and the Safety of the Community. 
The magistrate judge in Florida found that Mr. Jean-Jacques did pose a serious risk of flight, 
but held that there were conditions of release that would mitigate his risk of flight and assure the 
safety of the community. Even though a District Court considers detention de novo, the Court 
should defer to the Magistrate Judge when that judge issues a careful and considered decision. 
See United States v. Simone, 317 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In reviewing the 
magistrate judge’s detention orders, the court must undertake an independent review, giving her 
decision such deference as the care and consideration manifested by the magistrate judge 
warrant.”) (Wolf, D.J.). Magistrate Judge Fulgueira Elgenbein applied thorough care and 
consideration here. She held an evidentiary detention hearing, carefully considered the arguments 
of counsel and the recommendation of Pretrial Services, and issued an order of release on 
conditions with a detailed basis for her order provided orally at the conclusion of the hearing. See 
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Ex. A at 42-58. On this record, the Court should defer to the Magistrate Judge (and Pretrial 
Services), affirm her decision, and release Mr. Jean-Jacques. 
Where the Court finds there is a serious risk, conditions must be considered “to see if they 
will serve as a reasonable guard.” United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1991). It 
is in this context that the court may consider any potential economic danger Mr. Jean-Jacques 
poses in fashioning appropriate conditions of release. See, e.g., Persaud, supra at 5. Reasonable 
conditions can be fashioned to “reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.” 
These conditions include a $100,000 appearance bond, co-signed by Mr. Jean-Jacques’ mother, 
with whom he will reside; a requirement that he reside with his mother and not change his 
residence without probation’s prior approval; that he surrender his passport and not obtain a new 
travel document while the case is pending; that his travel be restricted to the Southern District of 
Florida, and to the District of Massachusetts only for the purposes of meeting with his attorney 
or attending court; regular reporting to probation; continued engagement with mental health 
treatment; and standalone electronic monitoring. Likewise, conditions can be fashioned to 
reasonably assure “the safety of any other person and the community,” such as continued 
engagement in mental health treatment; a prohibition against possessing any dangerous weapons; 
a prohibition against contact with any co-defendants or witnesses in the case, except in the 
presence of counsel; and restrictions on employment to ensure Mr. Jean-Jacques is not in a job 
where he has access to financial or personal identifying information of any person. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Pretrial detention is a last resort and an “interference … with the important and 
fundamental right of liberty, despite the presumption of innocence pending trial.” United States v. 
Butland, No. 25-mj-03231-JDH, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174463, at *4 (D. Mass. Sep. 8, 2025) 
(citing United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Mass. 1992) (cleaned up)). Here, both 
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the magistrate judge and Pretrial Services believe Mr. Jean-Jacques should be released subject to 
certain conditions. This Court should reach the same conclusion, where there is a presumption of 
release and conditions that can be fashioned to mitigate any risk Mr. Jean-Jacques poses.  
 
 
Respectfully Submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SNIDERS JEAN-JACQUES, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By His Attorney, 
 
/s/ Jane F. Peachy 
 
Jane F. Peachy, she/her 
BBO #661394 
Peachy Hackett & Sunderland 
88 Broad Street, Suite 101 
Boston, MA 02110 
(617) 302-8466 
jpeachy@phsllp.com 
 
Dated: April 4, 2026 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent electronically 
to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on April 4, 
2026. 
/s Jane F. Peachy 
Jane F. Peachy 
 
 
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