Order Partially Granting Extension to File Objections to the Report and Recommendation — United States v. Gladys Harun (3:23-cr-3)

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    Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE            Document 80       Filed 05/12/26     Page 1 of 2




                       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                     FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

                                     DUBLIN DIVISION

GLADYS HARUN,                                  )
                                               )
              Petitioner,                      )
                                               )
       v.                                      )           CR 323-003
                                               )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                      )
                                               )
              Respondent.                      )
                                           _________

                                           ORDER
                                           _________

       The Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s request for an extension of time to file

objections to the Court’s April 30, 2026 Report and Recommendation. (Doc. no. 79.)

Petitioner, who is no longer incarcerated, requests nearly five times the standard fourteen-day

period of time to object so that she can “seek and obtain appointment of counsel” to help her

with her collateral attack. (Id. at 1.) There was no separate motion for appointment of counsel

filed along with the request for an extension of time to object.

       In any event, there is no automatic constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789,

794 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2006)); Hooks

v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1985). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), the

Court may appoint counsel for an indigent litigant seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but

such requests are discretionary when “due process or the ‘interests of justice’” so require.
    Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE           Document 80       Filed 05/12/26    Page 2 of 2




Hooks, 775 F.2d at 1438; Norris v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1979). 1 Moreover,

appointment of counsel is “a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances[.]”

McCall v. Cook, 495 F. App’x 29, 31 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

       Even if Petitioner had filed a motion, the Court does not find any exceptional

circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel. See id. Despite previously filing

voluminous pro se motions full of citations to case law and financial records, Petitioner now

claims she is unable to understand and address the analysis in the Report and Recommendation

of the very issues she raised. The record is clear Petitioner has had no problem communicating

with the Court and presenting her arguments for relief. Thus, even if Petitioner had submitted

a motion requesting appointed counsel, she is not entitled to such an appointment.

       Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court grants an extension of time through

and including June 22, 2026, to file objections to the Court’s April 30, 2026 Report and

Recommendation. (Doc. no. 79.)

       SO ORDERED this 12th day of May, 2026, at Augusta, Georgia.




       1
         In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions that were handed down
prior the close of business on September 30, 1981.



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