Court filing
Defendant Evan Edwards' Objections to Report and Recommendation — United States v. Evan Edwards (a/k/a Ian Heringa) and Joshua Edwards
No. 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP · Doc. 118 · Docket on CourtListener
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Case 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP Document 118 Filed 10/17/23 Page 1 of 9 PageID 565
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP
)
EVAN EDWARDS, )
)
Defendant. )
)
DEFENDANT EVAN EDWARDS’ OBJECTIONS TO
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [Dkt. 117]
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Evan Edwards, by and through the
undersigned counsel, and respectfully objects to the legal conclusions and factual
findings of the U. S. Magistrate Judge in her Report and Recommendation of
October 3, 2023, to the U. S. District Court [Dkt. 117], and in support thereof, states
as follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The District Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommendation or specified proposed findings to which an objection
is made.” United States v. Hernandez-Penaloza, 899 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272 (M.D.
Fla. 2012). “The District Court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, or may receive further evidence,
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or may recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS
OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
1. The Magistrate Judge found, based upon a Bureau of Prisons
[hereinafter “BOP”] forensic report, that Mr. Edwards is currently incompetent to
proceed to trial, consistent with the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). The parties
are not in dispute with respect to this issue. Dkt. 117, p. 1.
2. The Magistrate Judge concluded that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d)(1), commitment of a defendant for restoration is mandatory after a finding
of incompetence. Dkt. 117, p. 2. Specifically, this is the legal issue which the parties
briefed [Dkts. 108, 116, & Dkt. 111, filed under seal] for consideration of the
Magistrate Judge and the legal conclusion to which Mr. Edwards’ objections are
directed herein.
3. In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
recommended, consequently, that the District Court commit Mr. Edwards to the
custody of the Attorney General, who must then hospitalize Mr. Edwards for
treatment in a suitable facility for a reasonable time, not to exceed four months, as
is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the
foreseeable future, he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go
forward. Dkt. 117. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)-(2).
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4. In support of her recommendations, the Magistrate Judge stated that:
the period of confinement to assess restoration necessarily
involves a much more detailed evaluation and assessment,
focusing on the future. It “requires a more ‘careful and accurate
diagnosis’ than the ‘brief interviews’ and ‘review of medical
records’ that tend to characterize the initial competency
proceeding. United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Ferro, 321 F.3d at 72; Filippi, 211 F.3d at 651).
Dkt. 117, p. 13. The Magistrate Judge concluded that “with all due respect to Dr.
Kissin’s opinions, whether or not Evan Edwards is capable to restoration to
competency is not a foregone conclusion.” Id. This finding of fact is the primary
factual finding to which Mr. Edwards objects, as stated herein.
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
5. As set forth below, the Defendant’s view is that the Magistrate Judge’s
reliance on United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301 (11th Cir. 1990) is misplaced,
as the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. The issue
of permanency of the defendant’s incompetency was not at issue in the district court
in Donofrio, so the case is not on point. Id. at 1302-03. Here, the permanency of
the Defendant’s mental impairment has been determined by the government’s
experts, and a different result should obtain. The Court’s holding in Donofrio
appears to offer a blanket, mechanical rule that commitment for restoration is
mandatory under any circumstance. Id. at 1303. The mechanical application of an
absolute rule can lead to an absurdity. As posited by the undersigned at a prior
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hearing, despite the seemingly mandatory language of § 4241(d)(1), were the
defendant in a Terri Schaivo-like brain-dead state, no such commitment for
restoration would be appropriate. Similarly, here, the United States Bureau of
Prisons, via its expert doctor (as well as the internal review and approval structure
including other doctors who reviewed and approved the report in the instant case)
has determined that restoration is not indicated, given the Defendant’s mental and
physical condition. Consequently, on this factual predicate, the clear and
unambiguous conclusion of the Psy. D. employed by the United States Bureau of
Prisons merits more weight than the Magistrate Judge afforded it. This is in stark
contrast to the facts before the Court in Donofrio, which did present a situation
wherein the BOP had already concluded that restoration was not indicated. See
generally Donofrio, 896 F.2d at 1302-03.
6. Further, a mandatory return to the BOP for restoration implicates a
Defendant’s equal protection and due process rights. Sending the Defendant back
for “restoration” when he lacks the awareness of his situation nor is he able to glean
any benefit from such treatment is a paradigmatic example of a violation of the rights
described above. The defendant’s hospitalization and confinement must bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute. United States v. Donnelly, 41 F.4th
1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972)
(holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause prohibits a state from
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confining a defendant for an indefinite period simply because he is not competent to
stand trial”).
7. As the Magistrate Judge correctly states in the Report and
Recommendation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and
other circuits have held that the restoration determinations are mandatory in many
contexts and in varying factual circumstances. Contrary authority was not
discovered by the undersigned, nor by the United States. However, this appears to
be a result of these exact facts not yet coming before a court for a reported decision.
The government’s own expert has determined restoration to be inappropriate, stating
that such a prospect is “not indicated.” Dkt. 98, filed under seal. Clearly, when the
mechanical application of an absolute rule produces unintended, harsh, and/or
absurd result, the District Court may fashion relief in accordance with equal
protection and due process principles.
8. In criminal law, the court must construe penal statutes with the rule of
lenity. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979); United States v. Smith, 35
F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994). While Mr. Edwards does not go so far as to urge the
Court to ignore the plain meaning of the word “shall” in 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), instead
he asks the District Court to create a unique and fact-specific departure from the
harsh operation of a rule which Congress simply did not anticipate.
9. In Smith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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reversed the District Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d), a perjury statute,
which turned on an analysis of whether the term “and” in the statute meant “and” or
“or.” Smith, 35 F.3d at 345-46. The Circuit Court held that even though the District
Court had followed existing authority (including other Circuit Courts) in construing
the statutory language against its plain meaning, a “flagrant injustice” would result
if it adopted the District Court’s interpretation. Id. at 346. Such is the result here if
the District Court does not go beyond the plain text of the statute and craft a result
that comports with the statutory scheme, allowing for a fact-specific and proper
diversion from the absolute nature of the text.
10. Neither Mr. Edwards nor the government can benefit from restoration
treatment. Mr. Edwards has dementia, in the form of irreversible neurological
damage. Dkt. 98, p. 8, filed under seal. Further, Mr. Edwards’ delicate physical
condition requires substantial ongoing medical care that has been difficult and
expensive for the government to accommodate. The nature of Mr. Edwards’
confinement must be reasonably related to important governmental purposes
justifying such detention under the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate in Jackson v.
Indiana. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (holding that “[a]t the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed.”). Such purpose is not present here,
but rather is a waste of scarce executive branch resources.
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11. The Magistrate Judge relied on dicta from cases in other jurisdictions
to reach a factual finding that the period of commitment for restoration involves a
more detailed evaluation and assessment than the initial competency determination.
Dkt. 117, pp. 12-13. Those cases, namely United States v. Brennan, 928 F.3d 210
(2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007); and
United States v. McKown, 930 F.3d 721 (5th Cir 2019), are from other judicial
circuits and not binding on this Court. It is of note, however, that no testimony or
direct evidence has been presented as to how the restoration determination would
differ from the initial competency determination, other than that the Report by the
BOP’s doctor has already reached the conclusion that restoration is not indicated on
these facts. It is common knowledge that the BOP’s psychologist-doctor is an expert
and deals regularly with restoration matters. She has, correctly, concluded that
restoration was not indicated as Mr. Edwards is not expected to benefit from
educational interventions in light of his neurological disorder. Dkt. 98, p. 8, filed
under seal. There is no record evidence to the contrary – there is only the United
States’ argument that the statutory scheme is mandatory and inviolable.
12. More narrowly stated, the Defendant objects to the conclusion that a
more “detailed evaluation and assessment” is indicated here. Dkt. 117, p. 13. The
BOP’s conclusive findings are clear, unambiguous, and unrefuted. Consequently,
they should given due deference. Neither the government nor society at large can
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benefit from the fruitless exercise of commitment for restoration.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Evan Edwards, objects to the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendations and hereby moves the District Court to find
that the Magistrate Judge erred, for the varying reasons stated above, in interpreting
the language of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and in applying the relevant facts thereto.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2023.
s/A. Brian Phillips
A. BRIAN PHILLIPS, ESQ.
Fla. Bar No. 0067113
A. BRIAN PHILLIPS, P.A.
912 Highland Avenue
Orlando, Florida 32803
Telephone: (407) 872-0777
Telecopier: (407) 872-0704
Email:Brian.Phillips@Phillips-Law-Firm.com
Counsel for Defendant, Evan Edwards
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of October, 2023, I filed a copy of
the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF system. I further certify
that all parties to this case are equipped to receive service of documents via that
system.
s/A. Brian Phillips
A. BRIAN PHILLIPS, ESQ.
Fla. Bar No. 0067113
A. BRIAN PHILLIPS, P.A.
912 Highland Avenue
Orlando, Florida 32803
Telephone: (407) 872-0777
Telecopier: (407) 872-0704
Email: Brian.Phillips@Phillips-Law-Firm.com
Counsel for Defendant, Evan Edwards
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