Court filing

Response to Motion to Prohibit Transfer of Defendant Evan Edwards — United States v. Evan Edwards (a/k/a Ian Heringa) and Joshua Edwards

No. 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP · Doc. 82 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

Case 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP Document 82 Filed 02/22/23 Page 1 of 5 PageID 350

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASE NO. 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP

EVAN EDWARDS

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO PROHIBIT TRANSFER OF DEFENDANT
EVAN EDWARDS BY THE UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE

The United States of America by Roger B. Handberg, United States Attorney

for the Middle District of Florida, and in accordance with this Court’s Order (Doc.

80), hereby files this Response to Motion to Prohibit Transfer of Defendant Evan

Edwards by the United States Marshals Service (the “Motion”), and states:

1. The United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) has indicated to the parties

that the Defendant has been accepted into the “Just Care” program, a program for

inmates with complex medical issues. Specifically, the Defendant has been

designated to Columbia Regional Care Center (the “Medical Facility”) and could be

moved with 72 hours’ notice.

2. In the Motion, defense counsel takes issue with Defendant’s potential

move to the Medical Facility, claiming that such a move would impinge on

Defendant’s access to counsel and family members. However, as explained below, a

move to the Medical Facility would be an appropriate, temporary stop-gap until the

Defendant could be transferred for restoration of competency.
Case 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP Document 82 Filed 02/22/23 Page 2 of 5 PageID 351

3. The record is clear in this case that the Defendant is medically complex,

requiring 24-hour daily care. Accordingly, despite its diligent efforts, USMS has been

unable to find a local facility that will agree to house the Defendant. The record is also

clear that the Defendant’s ability to communicate with his counsel and to assist

properly in his defense is severely limited. In fact, the competency evaluation report

authored by Dr. Hall has already found that the appropriate course of action is to

commit the Defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment.

4. Thus, the proposed move to the Medical Facility would be a temporary

stop-gap until the Defendant’s competency is restored, until further action under

Section 4246 is deemed necessary, and/or until the extent of any malingering is

determined. Following restoration of competency, a better determination could be

made regarding an appropriate detention facility for the defendant pending trial.

Additionally, Defendant’s consultation with his counsel would also become more

pertinent following restoration of competency, as the Defendant appears to be unable

or unwilling to appropriately assist in his defense at this time. Accordingly, because

the Defendant appears unable to communicate with his counsel in the first instance,

purported concerns posed by a move to the Medical Facility are premature.

5. Moreover, while the Motion claims that a move to the Medical Facility

would “divest [Defendant] of any meaningful Sixth Amendment right of access to

counsel,” the Motion wholly ignores the fact that Defendant’s access to and ability to

consult with counsel through video conferences, writing, and telephone would remain.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez, No. 12-CR-83S, 2014 WL 4094561, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.
2
Case 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP Document 82 Filed 02/22/23 Page 3 of 5 PageID 352

18, 2014) (explaining that the statutory standard is whether a detainee has a

“reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel,” and leaving open the possibility that

such standard could be met through video conferences and telephone, despite a more

than 450 mile distance between detainee and counsel). 1

6. Further, defense counsel could travel to meet with the Defendant in

person if he deemed it necessary. While these modes of communication may be less

convenient, they are viable avenues of access to counsel. See United States v. Rodriguez,

No. 12-CR-83S, 2015 WL 1120157, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015) (“The Court

regrets that this arrangement will require more work for defense counsel, but the

standard imposed by the statute is one of necessity, not convenience.”) (citing U.S. v.

1
The interplay between the Section 3142 statutory standard and Sixth Amendment
standard is explained below:

The Sixth Amendment sets minimum standards for attorney conduct and
strategy that potentially affects the outcome of a case. Section
3142(i)(3) reaches above minimum conduct affecting case outcomes and
suggests how an attorney-client relationship ought to proceed leading up
to trial—it assumes that the attorney and client will consult each other
regularly and then mandates the removal of any impediment to ‘private’
consultations that are qualitatively and quantitatively
‘reasonable.’ Consequently, compliance with Section 3142(i)(3) virtually
guarantees compliance with the Sixth Amendment, so long as an
adequately skilled attorney works in good faith to stay in touch with a
client and to solicit the client's input regarding trial strategy.

United States v. Rodriguez, No. 12-CR-83S, 2015 WL 1120157, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
12, 2015); see also Falcon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.3d 137, 139 (7th Cir.1995)
(“Section 3142(i)(3) is designed to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and if that right is being infringed, [the Court] has the statutory authority to
protect [defendant's] access to counsel.”).

3
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Bolze, No. 3:09–CR–93, 2010 WL 199978, at *2 (E.D.Tenn. Jan.13, 2010)); see also

U.S. v. Acevedo–Ramos, 600 F.Supp. 501, 507 (D.P.R.1984) (rejecting an assertion that

pretrial detention interferes with pretrial preparation where “defendant, by counsel’s

own admission, has been able to consult with his attorneys”).

7. Regarding the suggestion that the Defendant could be cared for by his

family, the history of this case involving the family, including (1) malingering by the

Defendant’s co-conspirator and son that appears to have been pre-coordinated, (2) the

entire family’s prior flight from prosecution, and (3) safety concerns due to conduct by

the Defendant’s family resulting in the Defendant’s current health condition, all

illustrate that such placement would be inappropriate.

WHEREFORE, the United States requests that the Court enter an order

denying Defendant’s Motion; that the Court permit the Defendant’s movement to

Columbia Regional Care Center, if needed, as a temporary stop-gap prior to

restoration of competency; and that the Court ultimately commit Defendant to the

custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) for treatment.

Respectfully submitted,

ROGER B. HANDBERG
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Kara M. Wick
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov
4
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U.S. v. EVAN EDWARDS Case No. 6:22-cr-201-WWB-LHP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 22, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing

with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of

electronic filing to the following:

A. Brian Phillips
Counsel for Defendant (Evan Edwards)

Charles E. Taylor
Counsel for Defendant (Josh Edwards)

/s/ Kara M. Wick
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
Facsimile: (407) 648-7643
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov

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