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Government's Memorandum Regarding Detention and Competency Issues and Request for Speedy Trial Finding — United States v. Evan Edwards…
No. 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP · Doc. 78 · Docket on CourtListener
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Case 6:22-cr-00201-AGM-LHP Document 78 Filed 02/17/23 Page 1 of 12 PageID 324
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CASE NO. 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP
EVAN EDWARDS
GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM REGARDING DETENTION AND
COMPETENCY ISSUES AND REQUEST FOR SPEEDY TRIAL FINDING
The United States of America, by Roger B. Handberg, United States Attorney
for the Middle District of Florida, in accordance with this Court’s Order (Doc. 60) (the
“Order”) hereby files its Memorandum Regarding Detention and Competency Issues
related to defendant, Evan Edwards (the “Defendant”), and states as follows:
Introduction
The Court has asked the parties to address the issue of whether a detention
hearing can be properly held prior to a final competency determination (the “Issue”).
While there does not appear to be binding precedent directly on point, the relevant
authorities, along with the practical considerations of this particular case, support the
conclusion that the Court should proceed with a final competency determination prior
to holding a detention hearing.
The Court also asked the United States to address any speedy trials concerns.
Because competency has been at issue since the date of the Defendant’s arrest in this
case, speedy trial should be tolled. In an abundance of caution, the United States
herein requests that the Court make a finding that speedy trial has been tolled from the
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date of arrest, continuing through the date on which a final competency determination
is made.
Relevant Background
1. On December 7, 2022, the defendant was charged with violation of
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and visa fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ § 1344, 1349, and 1546, respectively. Doc. 1.
2. On December 14, 2022, the defendant was arrested, transported to the
federal courthouse, and scheduled for his initial appearance before United States
Magistrate Judge David A. Baker. However, the defendant was unable to participate
in an initial appearance due to reported medical issues. 1 The United States Marshals
Service ultimately transported the defendant to the Medical Provider, where he has
since remained. See Doc. 21 (ordering the defendant into the custody of USMS for
medical evaluation).
3. On December 27, 2022, and continuing through December 28, 2022, the
defendant’s initial appearance was held before United States Magistrate Judge Embry
J. Kidd. 2
1
The defendant’s initial counsel raised potential competency concerns at the time of the first
attempted initial appearance.
2
The defendant and his counsel appeared via teleconference from the defendant’s hospital
room. Due to the defendant’s physical and/or mental limitations and non-verbal responses,
the Court was unable to move forward with the defendant’s arraignment and unable to
complete the initial appearance, which was continued to December 28, 2022.
2
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4. On January 6, 2023, after continued competency concerns were raised,
the Court entered an order requiring Dr. Ryan C.W. Hall, M.D., P.A. to evaluate the
Defendant’s competency to proceed and to submit a written report of his findings.
Doc. 50. On January 16, 2023, Dr. Hall submitted his Competency Evaluation
Report (the “Competency Report”) for defendant, Evan Edwards. On January 17,
2023, the Competency Report was submitted to the Court. A copy of the Competency
Report has been filed under seal.
5. On January 26, 2023, at a status hearing following submission of the
Competency Report and by way of written motion (Doc. 56), Defendant’s counsel
indicated that he contests the findings of Dr. Hall and requested a detention hearing.
At that time, the Court raised the Issue and ordered the instant briefing.
6. In consideration of the below authorities and practical considerations
relevant to this case, the United States requests that the Court make a final competency
determination prior to addressing release or detention. Ultimately, the United States
submits that, as a result of a competency hearing, the Court should enter an Order
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), finding the defendant mentally incompetent and
committing the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
A. The Competency Standard, Generally
A defendant remains competent to stand trial if he: (1) “has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”; and (2) “has
3
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sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Consequently, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) requires a district court to conduct a
competency evaluation if “there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.” See James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992) (defendant
is entitled to a competency evaluation if “clear and convincing evidence” creates
a “real, substantial, and legitimate doubt” about his ability to understand those
things) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), the Court shall commit the defendant to
the custody of the Attorney General if, after a hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.” 3 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32
3
The express provisions of Section 4241 suggest that a defendant should be competent
before addressing release or detention under the Bail Reform Act. Specifically, § 4241(e),
explains that after a defendant is deemed to be restored to competency, then a defendant is
subject to the normal release and detention provisions of 18 U.S.C. § § 3141 et seq.:
4
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L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). (“[A] person charged … who is committed solely on account of
his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain
that capacity in the foreseeable future.”)
In this case, as explained below, it has not been shown that the defendant is
competent to proceed. Instead, the record evidence supporting incompetence is
strong. The Court has not, however, made a finding of incompetence to trigger §
4241(d) commitment to the custody of the Attorney General. Thus, if a detention
hearing were held, it would be governed by the provisions of the Bail Reform Act.
B. The Defendant is Not Currently Competent
The record evidence does not support the Defendant’s competence. Not only
has defense counsel expressed ongoing concern regarding the Defendant’s
competence, but Dr. Hall’s Competency Evaluation Report finds that § 4241(d)
commitment to the custody of the Attorney General is the prudent path to allow the
Defendant to undergo the appropriate treatment. Moreover, the Defendant’s
videoconference appearances in these proceedings have shown the Defendant’s mental
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly
in his defense, the court shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in
which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or other proceedings.
Upon discharge, the defendant is subject to the provisions of chapters 207 and 227.
18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(e) (emphasis added).
5
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and physical limitations, including a limited ability to communicate either verbally or
non-verbally. Based on this evidence, it is difficult to fathom how the Defendant
could understand the proceedings against him, let alone have sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with any degree of rational understanding.
C. Here, a Competency Determination Should be Made Prior to a Hearing on
Release or Detention
Courts have deferred detention hearings because of a pending competency
determination. For example, in United States v. McCrary, the District Judge denied
defendant's motion for release pending trial, stating that he had terminated the pretrial
hearing because he was “ordering that a competency determination with respect to
Mr. McCrary occur before further proceedings.” The court, sua sponte, characterized
the delay as “raising the question of defendant's competency to participate in the
hearing and, a fortiori, to stand trial.” Trial was postponed and the hearing was
adjourned until such time as defendant could be examined and his competency
determined. United States v. McCrary, 569 F.2d 429, 429 (6th Cir. 1978).
The McCrary case highlights a threshold matter: that a defendant must be
competent at all critical stages of the proceedings. See United States v. Meyer, No. 2:11-
CR-43-FTM-29SPC, 2011 WL 1519724, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2011) (“In order
for a criminal case to proceed, a defendant must be competent at all critical stages of
the proceedings.”). 4 A detention hearing is a critical stage of the criminal
4
In Meyer, the court addressed detention at the same time as addressing competency, moving
forward with a detention hearing but ultimately relying on the competency concerns to
commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for competency evaluation,
6
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proceedings. Id.; see United States v. Flores, 856 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(explaining that detention hearings are an important part of criminal proceedings, and
motions by the government to detain a person should be viewed as a serious matter).
It follows the Defendant should be competent at any detention hearing, which the
record evidence currently shows he is not. Thus, proceeding with a detention hearing
at this point is premature.
Additionally, and especially instructive here, are the practical concerns
associated with attempting to move forward with a release or detention determination
when the Defendant has severe mental limitations. For example, in United States v.
Peppi, the court considered the ongoing detention of a defendant who had been found
incompetent under § 4241 and had not been restored to competency. While the Peppi
court’s analysis arises in a different context, the practical concerns it raises regarding
the imposition of release conditions are informative:
The Court fails to see how bail, as a practical matter, could be imposed
on Mr. Peppi. His mental state clearly precludes any reasonable finding
that Mr. Peppi, no matter the conditions, could form the requisite linear
thought progression to appreciate and accept his bail conditions, adhere
to them, then appear at the scheduled date and time at the scheduled
location. Of course, the Government may seek to impose all of Mr.
Peppi’s bail conditions on his family, but such a request would not
succeed for two reasons. First, fairness and liberty interests dictate that
any bail conditions must, at least in part, apply directly to the defendant.
Because of his incompetence, Mr. Peppi cannot reasonably be expected
citing to defendant’s inability to engage in any meaningful conversation regarding the nature
and seriousness of the charges nor any meaningful defense, among other things.
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to comply with any mandates from any court. Were these requirements
to rest directly and fully on the shoulders of those with the obligation and
compassion to care for him, their weight would fall, too, on the
conscience of this Court. Second, by imposing Mr. Peppi’s bail
conditions on his family, the Court would essentially create a new and
arbitrary paradigm where one defendant with a family will be treated
differently from an identical defendant without such support.
United States v. Peppi, No. CRIM. 06-157(AET), 2007 WL 674746, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb.
28, 2007).
The same practical concerns arise in this case. Even without a final
determination of incompetence in this case, it is clear that the Defendant does not have
the mental ability to “form the requisite linear thought progression to appreciate and
accept his bail conditions, adhere to them, then appear at the scheduled date and time
at the scheduled location.” Moreover, the Defendant cannot reasonably be expected,
at least at this time, to comply with any mandates from the Court. Further, putting
the responsibility on the Defendant’s family members is improper, especially in this
case where there are concerns regarding the family members’ care for the Defendant
and their prior involvement in attempted flight from criminal charges. 5
There are non-binding cases, however, suggesting that a court may proceed with
detention despite pending competency issues. In United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d
5
Also from a practical perspective, it seems the more prudent path forward would be to move
expeditiously forward with a final competency determination, after which the Defendant
would either be moved directly to a BOP medical facility for treatment (following a finding
of incompetence), or a detention hearing would be held (following a finding of competence).
This would likely eliminate, or at least minimize, multiple movements of a medically
compromised Defendant.
8
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387, 412–14 (2d Cir. 2008), the defendant contended on appeal that § 3142 could not
authorize his detention after the date the district court found him incompetent
pursuant to § 4241(d), because § 3142 applies only to cases “pending trial,” and due
process prohibits the trial of an incompetent defendant. The Second Circuit rejected
the defendant’s argument that he was no longer “pending trial” after the date of finding
of incompetency, and, therefore, no longer detainable under § 3142. See also United
States v. Brennan, 354 F. Supp. 3d 250, 267 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 928 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.
2019) (noting that the detention hearing had been held in abeyance due to competency
proceedings, but that defendant was free to request such a hearing) (citing United States
v. Smith, 764 F.Supp.2d 541, 545 (finding “no reason why a detention hearing cannot
be held” while competency issues are being addressed)).
In light of the above, and without binding authority requiring the Court to hold
a detention hearing prior to a final competency determination, the United States
submits that a final competency determination should be made prior to detention
proceedings under § 3142.
D. The Pending Competency Issue Tolls Speedy Trial
The competency of the Defendant has been at issue since the date of the
Defendant’s arrest on December 14, 2022. The competency concerns continued and
the Court entered an Order requiring the Defendant’s competency evaluation. The
Defendant was found to be incompetent by the local evaluator, Dr. Hall, but that
finding is contested by defense counsel. Thus, to date, competency remains at issue
because the Court has not made a final determination.
9
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Concerns regarding the Defendant’s physical capacity have, likewise, been at
issue since his arrest. In fact, the Defendant was admitted to the hospital on the day of
his arrest and has undergone medical treatment and/or evaluation since that time.
Moreover, based on the medical records, a summary of which have been filed under
seal with the Court, it is likely that the Defendant has either been mentally incompetent
and/or physically unable to stand trial since his arrest.
Thus, pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (“delay resulting
from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental
competency or physical capacity of the defendant”); (h)(1)(D) (“delay resulting from
any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing
on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion”); and (h)(4) (“Any period of delay
resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable
to stand trial”), the United States submits that the entire period of time since
Defendant’s arrest on December 14, 2022 is excludable time for speedy trial purposes.
In an abundance of caution, the United States respectfully requests that this
Court make a finding that speedy trial has been tolled for the duration of this case. See,
e.g., United States v. Brennan, 354 F. Supp. 3d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y.) (excluding time
under the Speedy Trial Act for delay resulting from proceedings to determine the
mental competency of the defendant), aff'd, 928 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2019); see also United
States v. De Matteis, No. 5:19-CR-75-AKK-GMB, 2020 WL 4210501, at *3 (N.D. Ala.
10
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Mar. 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CR-75-AKK-GMB, 2020
WL 4201857 (N.D. Ala. July 22, 2020).
WHEREFORE, the United States complies with this Court’s order and submits
its memorandum concerning competency and detention issues and requests the Court
make a finding that speedy trial has been tolled from the date of the Defendant’s arrest
and will be tolled through the date of a final competency determination.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER B. HANDBERG
United States Attorney
By: /s/ Kara M. Wick
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
Facsimile: (407) 648-7643
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that undersigned counsel electronically filed the
foregoing Notice with the Clerk of Court on February 17, 2023, by using the CM/ECF
system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to counsel of record:
A. Brian Phillips, Esq.
Charles Taylor, Esq.
By: /s/ Kara M. Wick
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
Facsimile: (407) 648-7643
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov
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