Court filing

Crim Flsd Unknown Us V Dennes Garcia Docx Complaint - Us V Dennes Garcia

Summary

A criminal complaint in United States of America v. Dennes Garcia in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, supported by an IRS-CI special agent's affidavit. It charges wire fraud, bank fraud, and attempt and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. The affidavit alleges that a cooperating source submitted a Paycheck Protection Program application for his company, Dhanda Corporation, a Georgia corporation, with purported Forms 941 and a forged bank statement, seeking $285,742 on a stated average monthly payroll of $114,297. It states that IRS records show Dhanda filed no Forms 941 for any quarter of 2019. According to the affidavit, after the loan proceeds arrived he wired a kickback of approximately $71,435.50, approximately 25 percent of the proceeds, to an account controlled by the source.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

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18 U.S.C.jj 1343and2

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vA/ire fraud

18U.S.C.jj1344and2

Bank fraud

18U.S.C.51349

Conspiracy/attemptto com mitwire fraud/bank fraud

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SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT.

Contillueklon the attaclled sllect.

A FFID AV IT

1,Sarah Conlon,being firstduly sw orn,hereby depose and state as follows:

INTR O DU CTIO N AND AG ENT BAC K G RO UN D

I m ake this Affidavit in support of a crim inal com plaint charging DEN N ES

GARCIA ('CGARCIA''or-ûDefendant''),withwirefraud,bankfraud,andattemptandconspiracy
to commitwirefraud and bank fraud,in violation ofl8 U.S.C.jj 1343,1344,1349,and 2,from
on oraboutM ay 26,2020,to atIeaston oraboutNovem ber20,2020,in the Southern D istrictof

Florida,andelsewhere(theik-rargetOffenses'').
Defendanthasparticipated in a conspiracy and schem e to obtain by fraud m illions

of dollars in forgivable Ioans through the Paycheck Protection Program (tûPPP'') and other
governm entprogram s. Defendantcom m itted the TargetOffenses w ith aperson now cooperating

with the investigation (CSCHS 255)and others. Defendantobtained a fraudulentPPP loan forhis
own company,Dhanda Corporation (çiDhanda''),a Georgia corporation,with CHS 2 providing
falsified docum ents and subm itting the application on Defendant's behalf in exchange for a
kickback from the loan proceeds. To intlate the size ofthese PPP loans,and the corresponding

kickbacks,the conspiratorsrelied on a variety offalse statem ents,including by subm itting falsified
bank statem ents and payroll tax form s. For exam ple, the conspirators used nearly identical
versions ofthe sam e fabricated bank statem ents,recycled in the PPP applications for m ultiple
companies,w ith m inorchanges.
The conspirators in the schem e planned or prepared at least 90 fraudulent
applications,m ostofwhich were subm itted. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed
to date,CHS 2,Defendant,and theirco-conspiratorsapplied forPPP Ioansthataretogetherworth

more than $34 m illion,with atleastapproximately 42 ofthose loansapproved and funded fora

totalofapproximately $17.6 m illion. Certain ofthose loan recipientsthen wired a kickback of
varying am ounts, often approxim ately 25% of the fraudulent loan proceeds, to an account
controlled by CH S 2.
lam a SpecialAgentw ith the Unitcd States Departm entofthe Treasury, lnternal

RevenueService,CriminalInvestigation(:1lRS-CI'')andhavebcenemployedinthiscapacitysince
N ovember20l8. lam presently assigned to the M iam iField Office. M y dutiesasa SpecialAgent

includethe investigation ofpossiblecriminalviolationsofthe lnternalRevenueCode (Title26of

theUnitedStatesCode),theBankSecrecyAct(Title31oftheUnitedStatesCode),andtheMoney
Laundering Statutes (Title l8 of the United States Code). lgraduated from the Criminal
Investigator Training Program atthe FederalLaw Enforcem entTraining Center in M arch 20 19
and the SpecialAgent Investigative Techniques program atthe NationalCrim inallnvestigation
Training Academ y in June 2019. In these tw o program s,Istudied a variety of Iaw enforcem ent
tactics and crim inalinvestigatortechniquesrelating to tax and financialcrim es. Since becom ing

an IRS-C ISpecialAgent,Ihave personally investigated and assisted in investigations relating to
the lnternalRevenue Law sand Gnancialcrim es. Recently,Ihave been assigned to work w ith the

U .S.D epartm entof Justice and other Iaw enforcem entpartners,including the FederalBureau of
Investigation and the Sm allBusiness A dl
m inistration Office of Inspector General,to investigate
possible fraud associated w ith the stim ulus and econom ic assistance program s created by the

federalgovernm entin response to the CO V ID-I9 pandem ic.
The facts in thisA ffidavitcom e from m y personalobservations,m y training and
experience,and inform ation obtained from othermem bersoflaw enforcem entand from w itnesses.

Page 2 of14

This Affidavitis intended to show merely thatthere issufficientprobable cause and does notset
forth allofm y know ledge aboutthism atter.1

PROBABLE CAUSE
The Pavcheck Protectlon Proqram

TheCoronavirusAid,Relief,andEconomicSecurity(:iCARES'')Actwasafederal
law enacted in oraround M arch 2020 and designed to provide em ergency financialassistance to
the m illions of Am ericans w ho are suffering the econom ic effects caused by the CO V1D-19
pandem ic. O ne source ofreliefprovided by the CA RES A ctw as the authorization offorgivable

loanstosmallbusinessesforjobretentionandcertainotherexpenses,throughaprogram referred
to asthe Paycheck Protection Program (-tPPP'').
In order to obtain a PPP Ioan, a qualifying business subm itted a PPP Ioan
application,which was signed by an authorized representative ofthe business. The PPP loan

application required the business (through its authorized representative) to acknowledge the
program rules and m ake certain affirm ative certitscations in orderto be eligible to obtain the PPP

Ioan. lnthePPP loanapplication (SmaIlBusinessAdministration (:ûSBA'')Form 2483),thesmall

business(throughitsauthorizedrepresentative)wasrequiredtoprovide,amongotherthings,its:
(a)averagemonthly payrollexpenses;and (b)numberofemployees.Thesefigureswereusedto
calculate the am ount of m oney the sm allbusiness w as eligible to receive under the PPP. In
addition,businessesapplying fora PPP loan were required to provide docum entation confirm ing
theirpayrollexpenses.

The conductand chargesdescribed in this A ffidavitare pal'
tofa largerinvestigation that
is being conducted in this District and elsew here. As a result, not al1num bered sources and
anonym ous individualsand entitiesare described in every filing. Ihave included in thisAffidavit
only those individualsand entitiesIhavedeem ed necessary to explain the particularfacts setforth
here.

Page 3 of14

A PPP loan application w as processed by a participating lender. lf a PPP loan

application was approved,the participating Iender funded the PPP Ioan using its own m onies.
W hile itwasthe participating lenderthatissued the PPP Ioan,the Ioan was 100% guaranteed by

the SBA . Data from the application,including inform ation aboutthe borrow er,the totalamount

ofthe loan,and the listed num bcrofem ployees,wastransm itted by the Ienderto the SBA in the
course ofprocessing the loan.
9.

PPP loan proceedswere required to be used by the businesson certain perm issible

expenses payrollcosts,intereston m ortgages,rent,and utilities. The PPP allowed the interest
and principalon the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the business spentthe loan proceeds on
these expense item sw ithin a designated period oftim e and used adefined portion ofthe PPP loan
proceeds on payrollexpenses.
FinancialInstitutions

10.

ThisA ffidavitreferencesfsnancialinstitutionsthatare headquartered in the United

Statesand insured by the FederalDepositlnsurance Corporation,including Bank 1,Bank 3,Bank
5,Bank 6,Bank 7,and Bank ll.
The Schem e to Obtaln FraudulentPPP Loans

On oraboutM ay l3,2020,Phillip J.Augustin (*kAugustin'')and CHS 2 worked
togetherto subm ita fraudulentPPP loan application on behalfofa com pany ow ned by Augustin.

Augustin submitted aPPP loan of$84,515 to a federally insured bank (hereinafterûiBank 3'5),
through a third-party company processor (hereinafter kkBank Processor 1''). The application
included bank statem entsthatare clearforgeries,and CH S 2 hasadm itted thatthe application was
based on docum entsthathe falsified forAugustin.

Page 4 of14

Follow ing the successofthatinitialfraudulentPPP application,A ugustin and CHS
2 began to w ork on obtaining m ore and larger PPP loans for A ugustin's associates and others,

generallyforseveralhundredthousanddollarsforeach Ioan,uptoasmuchasapproximately$1.24
1
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nillion.

On June 25, 2020, investigators arrested CH S 2 and another person now

cooperating withtheinvestigation (CCCHS 3'')and executed searchwarrantsattheirresidences.
Follow ing theirarrests,CHS 2 and CHS 3 chose to cooperate w ith the investigation in the hope of
obtaining favorable consideration in connection w ith their pending charges. CH S 2 was
interview ed on that day,and has continued to cooperate w ith the investigation after obtaining

counsel. CHS 3 has also been interviewed num erous tim es and has continued to cooperate w ith
the investigation after obtaining counsel. M ost of the statem ents related herein have been
corroborated by recordsobtained from third parties orrecovered from theirelectronic devices.
l4.

Based on the evidence investigators have review ed so far,CHS 2 and A ugustin

collectively coordinatedapplicationsforIE
'PP loansthataretogetherworthmorethan$34 million

dollars.TheevidencealsoshowsmanymorePPP Ioanswereattemptedbutrejectedbybanksor
their partners, or w ere planned and prepared, but not subm itted before CHS 2's arrest. The
evidence suggests that alI or nearly aII of those Ioan applications were fraudulent, including
Defendant'sIoan application.

Investigators have obtained m any other PPP loan applications that CH S 2 has
adm itted he subm itted aspartofthisschem e,based on falsified docum ents,and have also obtained
draftdocumentsused orintended to be used in those applicationsorothers. These applicationsaIl
follow the sam e pattern of fraud m any with obviously counterfeit February 2020 bank

statements,and aIlwith fabricated IRS Forms 94l (titled,tkEm ployer's Quarterly FederalTax

Page5 of 14

Return'')withthesame indiciaoffraud found inAugustin'sinitialapplication butgenerallywith
even largerintlated payrollnum bers,thusyielding m uch largerloans.2 CH S 2 has explained to
investigatorsthatthe figures in the Form s 94l were the productofa form ula thatallowed him to
startw ith atargetloan am ount,and then 'kback into-'the payrollfigureson the form . Heexplained

how heusedfiguresthatwould produceanaveragemonthly payrollfor2019 that, when m ultiplied
by 2.5,would yield the requested loan am ount. In turn, the num berof em ployees reported was
chosen based on fictionalpayrolltsgures, chosen to avoid an average em ployee salary thatm ight
raise suspicion.

CH S 2 has also explained that he tried to use bank statem ents show ing thatthe
com pany had a large balance. Because so few com panies had such a statem ent,and Iikely also
because itw aseasierthan keeping track oftheirtrue statem ents, CH S 2 repeatedly subm itted near-

replicasofthe sam e falsified bank statem ents. In particular,CHS 2 appearsto have recycled one
statem ent each from Bank l,Bank 6,and Bank 7. In recycling a statem ent,CH S 2 generally
changed only the account num ber and the account holder's nam e and address,such that each
version ofthe statem enthad identicalGgures and line item sthroughoutthe statem ent.
A review ofrecords forbank accountscontrolled by C HS 2 atBank 5 confirm ed
CHS 2's adm issions that he received num erous kickbacks,often of approxim ately 25% of the
am ount ofthe Ioans,and thathe regularly w ired A ugustin a share ofthatkickback in the early
stagesofthe schem e.CH S 2 explained thatthey were doing so m any loansby the end ofM ay that

Som e loan applications also included voided checks thatappearto be falsified, such as a

purported check from a bank (kiBank 51-)thatappearsto havebeen produced on a com puterand,

asthesubjectlineofanemailtransmitting thevoided checkread,iiconvertedto PDFg,1''rather
than a scan ofan authentic check.

Page 6 of14

he changed course,instead w iring largerlump sum s,collecting Augustin'ssharesofthe kickbacks
form ultiple loans in one w ire.

Investigators are stillreceiving and analyzing records,butbased on a prelim inary

analysis,asofAugust31,2020,investigatorshad identifiedatotalofapproximately$2,367,765.82
in transfersto CHS 2'saccountsfrom entitiesthateach obtained a sizable PPP loan and thatwere
identified in the PPP files seized from CH S 2's and another co-conspirator's residences, as

described below

orfrom individualsassociated w ith those entities.

The PPP Ioans identified above as im plicated in the foregoing kickback paym ents
to CH S 2 represent only a fraction of the overallschem e. In executing search warrants atthe

respective residencesof CHS 2 and CH S 3,federalagents found stacksof paper printed outand
organized by entity,containing an iiintake form ,''fabricated Form s 94l,orboth for each entity.

The intake form s contained fieldsforthe inform ation needed to fabricate the docum ents and fill
outotheraspects ofthe PPP application:identifying inform ation aboutthe ow nerand company,
asw ellasbank accountinform ation forreceiving the loan.A section atthe end m arked ûIBELO W

IS OFFICE USE ONLY''included blank fieldsforthe ûiNumberofEmployeesg,l''llMonthly
PayrollExpensel,l''and SSSBA Loan Pre-ApprovalAmount.'' Between CHS 2'sand CHS
residences,investigatorsseized paperfilesforPPP Ioan applicationsforapproxim ately 80 different
entities.

20.

Data obtained from the SBA showed additional PPP loan applications from

additional entities that text m essage and em ail records show had been referred to CHS 2 by
m em bers ofthe conspiracy.

Page 7 of14

In an unrelated business venture in early 2020,CHS 3 worked with GA RC IA to
assistGA RCIA w ith repairing hiscredit. CHS 3 subsequently contacted GA RC IA regarding the
PPP conspiracy described above.
The FraudulentPPP Loan D isbursed to GA RCIA 's Companv:D handa

A ccording to G eorgia'sCorporationsD ivision website,D handa w asestablishcd
asa G eorgiacorporation on oraboutM ay 4,2017;GA RCIA is Iisted asthe com pany'sChief
Executive Officer,Chief FinancialO fficer,and Secretary'
,and itsprincipaladdress isthe same
addressthatappearson GA RCIA 'SGeorgia D epartm entofDriverServicesrecord.
On or about M ay 26, 2020, GA RCIA sent CH S 3 an Stintake form '' from

-ldennesgg3@ gmail.com.''Underthe'kpersonalinformation''sectionoftheintakeform,GARCIA
includedhissocialsecuritynumber,dateofbirth,andthettdennesgg3@gmail.com''emailaddress.
24.

On or about M ay 29,2020,a PPP Ioan application package on behalfof Dhanda

waselectronicallysubm itted to Bank 3through Bank Processor1. Internetprotocol(çtlP'')session
recordsfrom Bank Processor 1 forthe Ioan application show thata com puterw ith an IP address

(ending in 170)associated with CHS 2'sresidence in Broward County,Florida,logged into the
Dhanda loan accountasearly as on or aboutM ay 28,2020. The session records also revealfour

additionalloginsbythesameIP address(ending in l70)onthesameday,aswellasloginsonor
aboutM ay 28 and on oraboutM ay 29,2020 by a computerwith an IP address(ending in 37.3)
associated w ith the w ork addressofG A RCIA .

TheIoan applicationpackageincluded,am ong otherdocuments:(1)fourpurported
Forms 94l for each quarterof 20l9 in the name of Dhanda;(2) a purported company bank
statementforDhanda from Bank 7;and (3)a BorrowerApplication Form fora PPP Ioan request
of$285,742 forDhanda based upon a purported average monthly payrollof $114,297 for l5

employees(the'%PPP Application Form'').
Page 8 of 14

26.

The purported Form s 94 lsubm itted w ith Dhanda's PPP loan application package

showed quarterly payrollofover$324,893eachquarter,forl5 employees.Thatquarterlypayroll
figure yielded the PPP loan application'sikAverage M onthly Payroll''figureof$114,297,which

determ ined the $285,742 amountoftheIoan.Each Form 941wassigned by hand withthe name
biDenncs G arcia''as the com pany ow ner, and also listed tiDennes G arcia'' as the com pany's
designee and as a tkpaid Preparer,''although GA RC IA isnota paid tax preparer.3
27.

The purported Form s 94 lsubm itted with Dhanda'sPPP Ioan application package

follow the sam e style and pattern,including the indicia offraud,asthem any otherForm s94lthat
CH S 2 acknow ledged thathe helped create and subm it in the course ofthe schem e,asdescribed
above.'
l The purported Form s 94l, however,do contain the contact inform ation GA RCIA had
provided to CH S 3 on his -lintake form .''

M oreover,IRS records show thatDhanda did not,in fact,t5le any Form s 94l for
any quarter of 2019 or the first quarter of 2020. And the State of Georgia Departm ent of

CH S 2 adm itted during interview s w ith law enforcem entthatCHS 2 signed m any ofthe
Form s 94lincluded in the PPP applications. The signatureon Dhanda'sForm s941included w ith
itsPPP applications resem blesa signaturethatCH S 2 identified asone thatCHS 2 forged.
A s noted above,GA RCIA was listed as both ow ner and paid preparer. Dozens ofother
Fonns 94l subm itted in this schem e evidence the sam e error. CH S 2 has adm itted that these

documentssharethatfeaturebecausehemisunderstoodtheform,and he(orsomeonefollowing
his instructions) prepared the Forms 941 atissue. The contentof the forms also indicate
falsification. Dhanda subm itted four identical94ls the form s include w age figures thatare

identicaldowntothepenny inreported fsgures).They alsoevidenceapatternofpayrollspending
thatislikely false:each ofthe quartersshow ssignificantincreasesfrom the firstto second to third
m onth ofthe quarter. Foreach identicalform ,the sam e figuresare reported forthe tax liability
incurred in the Grstm onth of each quarter,the sam e fsgure forthe second m onth ofeach quarter

(increasedsubstantiallyfrom thefirstmonth),andthesamefigureforthethirdmonthofthequarter
(increasedsubstantially from thesecondmonth).Theresultisthatthecom pany reportsaperfectly
repeating cycleofascending payrollcosts within each quarter. CHS 2 hasexplained thatthisw as
due to a form ula he used,allocating differentpercentages ofthe quarterly payrolltax liability to
each m onth ofeach quarter.

Page 9 of14

Revenue'sLegalA ffairs& Tax Policiescertified thatDhanda hasnotfiled any G eorgia em ployee

w ithholding taxes between 20l8 and 2020.
The purported com pany bank statem ent for Dhanda subm itted w ith its PPP loan
application package,w hich was subm itted in electronic form at as a PD F,is a clear forgery. It

purports to bc a February 2020 bank statem cnt from Bank 7; but,according to the PDF t5le
'lproperties,''the February 2020 statem entwas created using bCPDFFILLER,''a program used to

editelectronic PD F files,and w asççm odified using i'
lkxt.''The m etadatashow sthet5lew ascreated
on oraboutM ay 14,2020 and m odified on oraboutM ay 28,2020.A nd,the statem entisarecycled
version ofthe sam e falsified Bank 7 statem entused in other fraudulentapplicationssubm itted as
partofthisschem e.

30.

The PPP Application Form required the borrow er to electronically initialand/or

sign (via Docusign,as explained below) a number of Slcertifications,''including:(1) thatthe
applicant was in operation on February l5, 2020 and had em ployees to whom it paid

salaries/payrolltaxesorpaid independentcontractors,asreportedon Formts)1099;(2)thatthe
funds w ould be used to retain w orkers,m aintain payroll,orm ake m odgage/interesvlease/utility

paym entsasspecified by the PPP rule and thatunauthorized use could resultin charges forfraud;

and (3)thatthe information provided in the application,including in supporting documents,was
'ûtrue and accurate in alI material respects,'' and that making false statem ents could result in
crim inalcharges.

Like the purported Form 941s,the PPP A pplication contained G ARCIA 'S actual
contactinformation and identifiersthatG ARCIA had provided to CHS 2 and CHS 3 on thetlintake
form ''

Page 10 of14

32.

Based on the falst and fraudulent representations m ade in the PPP Application

Form and supporting docum ents,Bank Processor lapproved the PPP Ioan application forD handa.
A sexplained in greaterdetailbelow , Bank 3wiredapproximately $285,742 in PPP Ioan proceeds

to Dhanda on oraboutJune l,2020.
RecordsShow thatGARCIA Viewed and Sizned the Ppp A pplication Form
In connection w ith this investigation, law enforcem ent obtained records from

Docusign pursuantto 18 U.S.C.j 2703(d). Based on a review ofthe records,law enforcement
believesG ARCIA signed thePPP application forDhanda using Docusign. The Docusign records
show thatthe userassociated w ith GA RC IA 'S em ailaddress signed the PPP A pplication from an

IPaddress(endingin37.3)associatedwithGARCIA'Splaceofemployment.
Specifically, the records show that on M ay 29, 2020, at 9:1l:07 a.m ., Bank
Processor l sentthe PPP Application Form to the Docusign user kkDennis Garcia''atthe em ail

addressikdennesgg3@gmail.com.''
TheuserSûDennisGarcia''attheemailaddressdennesgg3@ gmail.com viewedthe
PPP Application Form on M ay 29,2020 at9:ll:20 a.m .,and signed the PPP A pplication Form ,
from an IP addressassociated w ith GA RCIA 'S place ofem ploym ent,on M ay 29,2020 at9:ll:39
Jt.m .

Recordsobtained from Google show thatiiDennesGarcia''istheaccountholderfor

theemailaddressdennesgg3@gmail.com. The cellphonecontactnumberisthesamenumber
GA RCIA included on his Slintake form '' and w ith w hich he com m unicated w ith CHS 3.
addition,law enforcem entobtained GA RCIA'S cellphone pursuantto a federalsearch warrant

(20-M C-2348N .D.Ga.Dec.4,2020).Thecellphone,which wasseized from GARCIA'Sperson,
utilized the same phone num berincluded on G ARCIA 'Sûtintake form ,''PPP application,Google
account,bank records,and w here further noted elsewhere in this A ftsdavit. Furtherm ore,the
Page 11 of14

search ofGA RCIA 'S cellphone revealed thatGA RCIA w as signed into an ic loud accountusing

the email dennesgg3@ gmail.com and an email account for the email address
dennesgg3@gmail.com.
GARCIA usedboththeemailaddressdennesgg3@gmail.com andGARCIA'Scell
phone to com m unicate w ith CHS 3 in connection w ith the fraudulentPPP Ioan for Dhanda.
Based on the D ocusign records,itisreasonable to inferthatG A RCIA viewed and
signed the PPP Application Form on oraboutM ay 29,2020.
As to the m isspelling of GA RCIA 'S first nam e on the Docusign form as iiDennis

Garcia''rather than iûDennes G arcia,''based on information provided by CHS 3,the application
w ascreated by CH S 2. In textm essagesbetw een CHS 2 and CHS 3,CHS 3 tellsCHS 2 thatCH S

2 spelled GA RCIA 'Snam e w rong and thatitisSidennesnotdennis.''
GA RCIA was also aware ofthe m isspelled nam e. In N ovem ber2020,GA RCIA

contacted Bank 3 regarding his PPP Ioan. Atthe sam e tim e that GARCIA was interacting w ith
Bank 3 via autom ated text m essaging, GA RCIA w as com m unicating w ith a friend via instant
m essaging on GA RCIA 'Scellphone regarding the loan.GA RCIA stated,ti-f'he m ore l'm realizing

Igotthisbruh.ThemoreIreadmypaperwork.Imightbeabletojustwalkawayfrom thiswhole
thing.W hywouldImisspellU/clmyownname...lmao.''
RecordsandConfirm GARCIA 'sReceintofthePppLoanandFurtherDemonstrateGARCIA 's
Knowinz Participation in the Fraud
part of its investigation, Iaw enforcem ent obtained bank records
com m unications between CHS 3 and GA RCIA ,including textm essagesand em ailsprovided by
CH S 3 to law enforcem ent.

42.

Bankrecordsshow thatDhandahadanaccountatBank llending in *9398(ûûBank

ll*9398'').Customerinform ation forthe Bank 1l*9398accountshowsthatGARCIA hasbeen
Page 12 of14

acustomeratBank 11sinceonoraboutJune13,20llandincludesdennesgg3@ gmail.com asthe
contactem ailaddressforG ARC IA .
On or about June l,2020,the Bank l1 +9398 account received via bank w ire

approximately $285,742in loanproceedsfrom Bank3 asaresultofDhanda'sfraudulentPPP loan
application.
A lso on oraboutJune l,2020,GA RCIA senta textm essage to CH S 3 stating that

the funds had 'ihit''G ARCIA 'S account and that GA RCIA w ould go to the bank as soon as it
opened to w ire CH S 3 hisfunds. CHS 3 responded,ikGreat.''
On oraboutthe follow ing day,June 2,2020,GA RCIA w ired a kickback paym ent

of approximately $71,435.50, which equaled approximately 25 percent of the proceeds of
Dhanda's PPP loan,from the Bank ll *9398 accountto an accountcontrolled by CH S 2 atBank

46. Based on m y review of the bank records discussed above,G A RCIA has spenta
significantam ountof the rem aining PPP Ioan proceeds. Between or aboutJune 2,2020 and or
aboutJune 3,2020,in addition to the w ire to CHS 2,GA RCIA sentw irestotaling approxim ately

$58,l56.72. On oraboutJune 3,2020,GARCIA also wrote acheck of$100,000 from Bank 11
*9398 to anotheraccountatBank l1,ending in *9798. Bank l1 Account*9798 isin GA RCIA 'S
nam e and his m other's nam e. That sam e day,GA RCIA texted a friend filust wrote myself a

$l00,000check.'47. M oreover,itdoesnotappearthatany oftheproceedsofthe PPP loan were used for
legitim ate businessexpensesorpayrollrelated expendituresto any em ployee otherthan GA RC IA
him self.

4 Recorded Callwith CHS 3 Conflrms GARCIA '#KnowinR Participation in theFrpl4#

Page 13 of14

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