Order Denying First Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release — United States v. Denis Casseus

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Case 2:23-cr-00009-KCD-DNF   Document 96     Filed 01/14/26   Page 1 of 3 PageID 482




                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
                         FORT MYERS DIVISION

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
            Plaintiff,
       v.                                      Case No.: 2:23-cr-9-KCD-DNF

 DENIS CASSEUS,
            Defendant,
                                     /

                                    ORDER

       Defendant Denis Casseus has moved for early termination of his

 supervised release. (Doc. 94.) The Government opposes the request. Because

 Defendant has not met the statutory time requirement, and because the

 interests of justice do not support early termination at this stage, the motion

 is DENIED.

       The first hurdle here is the calendar. Federal law sets a clear timetable

 for when a defendant may seek to end their supervision early. Under 18

 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may terminate a term of supervised release, but

 only “after the expiration of one year.” This statutory floor is not merely a

 suggestion. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. CRIM.A.3:99CR88-01, 2008

 WL 3271807, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 7, 2008).

       Defendant began his three-year term of supervised release on February

 18, 2025. (Doc. 94 at 1.) He filed this motion on November 7, 2025, and it is

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 now January 14, 2026. Simple arithmetic tells us that Defendant’s motion is

 premature. The statute explicitly requires the expiration of one year before a

 court may entertain terminating supervision. Consequently, the Court lacks

 the authority to grant the relief Defendant seeks. See, e.g., United States v.

 Ushamba, No. 19-20012-01-DDC, 2024 WL 3471344, at *1 (D. Kan. July 19,

 2024)

         Even if the Court were to look past the calendar, the result would be

 the same. The statute directs courts to consider the “interest of justice” and

 specific sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Here, the sentencing judge

 laid out a roadmap for Defendant regarding early termination. The Court

 explicitly noted the restitution owed—$116,495.45—and told Defendant: “[i]f

 you get it paid off early, there’s a possibility of early termination, if

 everything is paid. That’s an incentive to get it paid.” (Doc. 95 at 5.)

 Defendant has made payments, which is good. But he still owes

 approximately $114,000. (Id.) Terminating supervision while the vast

 majority of that debt remains unpaid would undermine the specific

 deterrence and restitution goals of the original sentence.

         Finally,   Defendant   argues that he has reintegrated into the

 community, maintained employment, and followed the rules. (Doc. 94 at 1.)

 This is commendable, but it is also what the law requires. Compliance with



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 the conditions of release is the baseline expectation for every defendant, not a

 bonus for which early termination is the automatic reward.

       Defendant’s request is, at bottom, premature. Congress has set a

 statutory floor of one year for early termination eligibility—a threshold

 Defendant has not yet crossed. Because the Court currently lacks the

 authority to grant the relief sought, and because the interests of justice do

 not otherwise warrant cutting the supervision term short, Defendant’s

 motion fails.

       ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on January 14, 2026.




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