Government's Letter Brief Seeking Detention Pending Sentencing — United States v. Daniel Dadoun (D.N.J.)

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U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey · No. 2:23-mj-08137-JSA · Doc. 32 · 2025-04-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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United States Attorney 
 
District of New Jersey 
 
      
 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Katherine M. Romano 
970 Broad Street, 7th floor 
 
973-645-2700 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
  
 
 
April 3, 2025 
 
The Honorable Robert Kirsch 
United States District Judge 
Clarkson S. Fisher Bldg. & U.S. Courthouse 
402 East State Street 
Trenton, New Jersey 07808 
 
Re:  United States v. Daniel Dadoun 
 
Dear Judge Kirsch: 
 
 
On April 8, 2025, defendant Daniel Dadoun is expected to enter a plea 
of guilty to an Information charging bank fraud and money laundering.  
Following entry of defendant’s plea, the United States will move for 
defendant’s detention pending sentencing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143. The 
United States respectfully submits this letter brief in support of its 
anticipated motion seeking detention pending sentencing.  
 
Background and Procedural History 
 
 
On November 9, 2023, defendant was charged by criminal complaint 
with four counts of bank fraud and two counts of money laundering 
associated with a scheme to defraud the U.S. Paycheck Protection Program 
(“PPP”) of over $3.2 million in federal COVID-19 emergency relief funds, 
based on false and fraudulent loan and forgiveness applications. Defendant 
was arrested at JFK Airport on or about November 12, 2023, upon arrival in 
the United States on a flight from China.  
 
On or about February 6, 2025, defendant signed a plea agreement to 
plead guilty to a two-count information charging bank fraud, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1344, and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
Defendant’s plea hearing is scheduled for April 8, 2025. 
 
 
U.S. Department of Justice 
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Defendant consented to detention at the time of his arrest but he later 
sought release on bail. (ECF Nos. 5, 18.) The Government opposed 
defendant’s release, but the Court granted bail on September 19, 2024 and 
imposed strict conditions of home incarceration with GPS monitoring. (See 
ECF Nos. 19, 20.) The terms of defendant’s home incarceration require him to 
remain at home on 24-hour lockdown except for attorney visits, medical 
necessities, court appearances, and – as of March 6, 2025 – religious services 
at an approved location and times. (See ECF Nos. 20, 31.) As explained in 
more detail below, defendant has violated the term of his release several 
times.  
 
Legal Standard 
 
 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3143 provides that the Court 
must order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is 
awaiting imposition of a sentence be detained, unless the Court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a 
danger to the safety of any other person or the community.  
 
Courts have observed that 18 U.S.C. § 3143 “establishes a rigorous 
evidentiary test” to evaluate risk of flight, and that the defendant “bears the 
burden of meeting this high standard.” United States v. Holtz, Cr. No. 92-459 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3075, *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1995). “[T]here can be no 
question that proof by clear and convincing evidence is a more stringent 
standard than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. 
Askari, 222 F. App’x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit has favorably 
cited the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s definition of “clear and convincing 
evidence,” as “that which ‘produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm 
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, 
evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the 
factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the 
precise facts in issue.’” Id.  
 
A. Defendant Presents a Serious Risk of Flight and Cannot 
Overcome the Presumption in Favor of Detention.  
 
“The factors to be considered in assessing the risk of flight post-
conviction are the same as those applied pre-trial and include: (1) the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, (2) the defendant’s family ties, (3) the 
defendant’s employment status, (4) the defendant’s financial resources, (5) 
the defendant’s character and mental condition, (6) the length of defendant’s 
residence in the community, (7) any prior criminal record and (8) any flight or 
failures to appear in court proceedings prior to or during the time of trial.” 
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United States v. Chaudhry, Cr. No. 06-771, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119047, *2 
(D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2007).   
 
 
In this case, the factors weigh in favor of detention. Defendant is not a 
citizen of the United States and he lacks legal status. He has no work 
authorization and, accordingly, is unemployed. He is a citizen of three 
countries: Israel, France, and Canada. He holds passports for all three 
countries, and before his arrest in this case he primarily resided in Israel. 
Defendant’s entire family resides in Israel, he has no family in the United 
States, no permanent residence in the United States, and no longstanding 
ties to the community. Defendant has significant financial resources and is 
believed to control numerous foreign bank accounts including accounts in 
Israel, Canada, and Vietnam. He admitted to receiving $3.2 million in 
fraudulently obtained PPP loans as a result of the present offense; none of 
the loans have been repaid. 
 
Defendant’s potential sentencing exposure is significant. Bank fraud 
carries a statutory maximum sentence of 30 years in prison and defendant is 
statutorily ineligible for a sentence of probation as to bank fraud, a Class B 
felony. Defendant has stipulated to a Guidelines calculation that, at 
minimum, contemplates an offense level of 21 and a Guidelines range of 37 to 
46 months.1 Defendant has a criminal history, having previously received a 
conditional discharge for an obstruction of justice offense which, according to 
publicly available sources, arose from lying to police officers regarding the 
electrocution of one of his employees at a New Jersey-based business. 
Defendant has appeared for all court appearances as required in this case, 
but has not been compliant with the terms of his pretrial release, as 
described in greater detail below.      
 
The nature and circumstances of this offense are also serious. 
Defendant lied on several PPP loan applications to get a total of over $3.2 
million in PPP loans, and then lied on forgiveness applications so that he 
would not have to pay back the government loans. Defendant then diverted 
the funds for his own purposes, including to foreign bank accounts.  
 
Because defendant presents a significant risk of flight and cannot 
establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not likely to flee, the 
Court should order that he be detained pending sentencing pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3143. See, e.g., Holtz, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3075 at *9-13 (denying 
bail pending sentencing where defendant had minimal ties to the community, 
 
1 An offense level of 21 would apply if defendant falls within Criminal 
History Category I and qualifies under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 as a “Zero Point 
Offender.” Otherwise, the offense level would be higher.   
 
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“almost certainly has access to substantial assets,” and faced a sentence of 24 
to 30 months).  
 
 
B. Defendant Has Not Been Compliant with Conditions of Home 
Incarceration 
 
Defendant has not remained compliant with the terms of his home 
incarceration. Pretrial Services has determined that defendant violated the 
terms of his pretrial release conditions on multiple occasions: 
 
• On January 16, 2025, defendant purportedly had a medical 
appointment, but instead went shopping for approximately two 
hours. Defendant denied traveling to a particular shopping 
center, but GPS monitoring showed that he had been at the 
shopping center. Defendant failed to provide proof of attendance 
at the appointment. 
• On January 19, 2025, defendant purportedly had a medical 
appointment, but instead traveled around Manhattan. 
Defendant failed to provide documentation verifying this 
medical appointment. 
• On March 21, 2025, defendant visited a synagogue that was not 
approved by Pretrial Services, contrary to the Court’s order 
which permitted travel only to a verified synagogue.2  
• On March 22, 2025, defendant deviated from his approved plan 
to attend religious services to make an unauthorized stop at a 
private residence. Defendant told Pretrial Services he was at 
that location for 20 minutes, when in fact he was there for over 
an hour. 
• On March 29, 2025, after having been warned about the prior 
instances of noncompliance, defendant again deviated from his 
approved plan to attend religious services to make an 
unauthorized stop at a private residence. Defendant told 
Pretrial Services that he was at that location for 20 minutes, 
when in fact he was there for 40 minutes.  
 
Defendant has disregarded the conditions of his release set by the 
Court. When asked to explain, he has lied to Pretrial Services. Defendant 
appears to be using the accommodations that the Court has provided for 
 
2 The order permitting defendant’s attendance at religious services limited 
defendant’s attendance to a particular synagogue that was willing to verify his 
attendance.   
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medical appointments and religious services to circumvent his conditions of 
release and travel freely in the community, despite Pretrial Services officers 
warning and instructing him not to do so. Defendant’s failure to comply with 
the current terms of pretrial release further suggests a risk of flight and a 
risk that he will fail to appear for sentencing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, the United States respectfully submits that 
following entry of defendant’s guilty plea, the Court should order him to be 
detained pending sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
ALINA HABBA 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s/ Katherine M. Romano     
 By: KATHERINE M. ROMANO 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
 
cc: 
Anthony J. Pope, Jr., Esq. (via ECF and email) 
 
David Hernandez, Senior U.S. Pretrial Services Officer (via email) 
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