Pandemic Darlings The pandemic economy, in original documents
Home Court filings U.S. v. Cortney Merritts Defendant's Motion in Limine to Prohibit Expert Testimony — U.S. v. Merritts

Court filing

Defendant's Motion in Limine to Prohibit Expert Testimony — U.S. v. Merritts

No. 1:25-cr-00076-JMC · Doc. 22 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

           Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC              Document 22          Filed 11/07/25         Page 1 of 6




                                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                               )
     Plaintiff,                                         )
                                                        )
v.                                                      )    No. 1:25-CR-76-JMC
                                                        )
CORTNEY MERRITTS,                                       )
     Defendant.                                         )

      DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PROHIBIT THE GOVERNMENT FROM
                 INTRODUCING EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL

           Defendant Cortney Merritts (“Merritts”), by and through his undersigned counsel, Justin

    K. Gelfand and the law firm Margulis, Gelfand, DiRuzzo & Lambson, respectfully moves this

    Court to enter an order prohibiting the Government from presenting expert testimony at trial.

           I.      Background

          On March 20, 2025, Merritts was charged in an indictment with two counts of wire fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 1 (Doc. 1). The indictment also contains a forfeiture allegation. Merritts

has pled not guilty to each count and has denied the forfeiture allegation.

           On April 14, 2025, Merritts formally requested discovery including all disclosures required

    under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G): “any and all evidence of any nature

    whatsoever and the names of any witnesses, including a written summary of any testimony the

    Government intends to use in its case-in-chief at trial under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 or

    705, which summary shall describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions,

    and the witness’s qualifications pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G).”

           On June 26, 2025, the Court issued a Pretrial Order setting forth deadlines in advance of

    the January 12, 2026 trial date of this case. (Doc. 11). The deadline for the Government to provide



1
 The defense maintains its position set out in its pending motions to dismiss the indictment. However, this motion is
being filed due to this Court’s deadline.
                                                        1
       Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC            Document 22       Filed 11/07/25       Page 2 of 6




expert disclosures, if any, was September 19, 2025. (Id.). No expert disclosures have been made

by the Government to date. Merritts is filing this motion out of an abundance of caution, because

some of the proposed exhibits provided by the Government to Merritts, as required under the

Court’s Pretrial Order, appear to present the need for expert opinion testimony and/or incorporate

expert opinions.

       II.     This Government Has Not Made Timely Disclosure of Any Expert Materials

       This Court’s Order set a hard deadline for disclosure of expert materials as governed by

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G)—September 19, 2025. (Doc. 11). Under that rule,

“[a]t the defendant’s request, the government must disclose to the defendant, in writing” the

following information “for any testimony that the government intends to use at trial under Federal

Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705 during its case-in-chief”:

  •   a complete statement of all opinions that the government will elicit from the witness in its
      case-in-chief, or during its rebuttal to counter testimony that the defendant has timely
      disclosed under (b)(1)(C);
  •   the bases and reasons for them;
  •   the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10
      years; and
  •   a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness has testified as an
      expert at trial or by deposition.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(iii).

      Under the new iteration of the rule, this Court “must”—as it has—“set a time for the

government to make its disclosures” and the deadline “must be sufficiently before trial to provide

a fair opportunity for the defendant to meet the government’s evidence.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(G)(ii). Furthermore, each expert witness “must approve and sign the disclosure.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(v).

      The Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 amendment states that the required production

under Rule 16 is intended to be comprehensive and “should cover not only written and oral reports,

                                                 2
        Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC            Document 22         Filed 11/07/25      Page 3 of 6




tests, and investigations, but any information that might be recognized as a legitimate basis for an

opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, including opinions of other experts.” See United

States v. Cerna, 2010 WL 2347406 *1 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (unpublished) (“[T]he bases and reasons

must be sufficient to allow counsel to frame a Daubert motion (or other motion in limine), to prepare

for cross-examination, and to allow a possible counter-expert to meet the purport of the case-in-

chief testimony”).

        The scope of the expert notice is significant. Federal courts have been clear that conclusory

letters or reports are insufficient. See, e.g. United States v. Caputo, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (N.D. Ill.

2005) (“It is exceedingly difficult to cross-examine a scientific expert witness about the results of

a scientific test without an opportunity to first review the test giving rise to the results”); United

States v. Robinson, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“If a defendant does not have the

bases for the government’s opinion, there is no way the defendant’s counsel can effectively cross-

examine the expert. It is this issue, which goes to the fairness of the trial, that the court must always

keep in mind in dealing with discovery issues in a criminal case”); United States v. Wilkerson, 189

F.R.D. 14, 16 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[M]ore is required than a statement to the effect that such and

such examiner will testify” about the test results).

      Critically, where—as here—the Government does not timely disclose expert materials, this

Court may prevent the expert from testifying. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). Indeed, the Government’s

disclosure to a defendant of its intended use of expert witness testimony is of the utmost

importance. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia explained why

exclusion of the Government’s proposed expert witness when the Government fails to comply with

the mandates of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) is the appropriate remedy.

United States v. Robinson, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347-48 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The Court reasoned:


                                                   3
        Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC           Document 22         Filed 11/07/25      Page 4 of 6




       A defendant […] is never required to introduce any evidence and, therefore, the
       defendant has a right to predicate a trial strategy solely on an attack of the opinion
       evidence offered by the government. If a defendant does not have the bases for the
       government’s opinion, there is no way the defendant’s counsel can effectively
       cross-examine the expert. It is this issue, which goes to the fairness of the trial, that
       the court must always keep in mind in dealing with discovery issues in criminal
       cases.

       There are also concerns of judicial economy and the legitimate expectation of the
       public and of the defendant in the speedy disposition of criminal cases. In this case
       the relevant portions of Rule 16 tell the Assistant United States Attorney what he
       must do. He was ordered by the United States Magistrate Judge to comply with his
       Rule 16 obligations generally and this one in particular. […]

       As best this court can determine, the failures of the government in this case to
       comply with its Rule 16 obligations were begun in lethargy and a lackadaisical
       acknowledgment of the mandates of Rule 16 and ended with inattention to the order
       of the court, a stubborn refusal to understand the requirements of Rule 16, and a
       somnolent review of the materials being produced.

       To be sure, the court could have granted yet another continuance for the government
       to get it right. The court might have even invited the expert witness to chambers
       and assisted that expert in dictating a proper report to the judge’s secretary. This
       matter, however, ought to be at an end. Failing to impose a sanction on this record
       would be to establish a precedent countenancing a disregard of discovery
       obligations which will assure either a snail like progression of the 800 felony cases
       filed in this court annually or a succession of trials in which the United States
       Department of Justice is allowed to flaunt the law it exists to support and defend.

Id.


      Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has affirmed a district court’s exclusion of an expert witness

based on a party’s failure to comply with its pretrial disclosure obligations. See United States v.

Day, 524 F.3d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In Day, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[t]rial courts have

the discretion to weigh various options in deciding how to address a party's violation of a discovery

rule” and “exclusion of evidence and testimony can be a proper sanction.” Id. Further, the D.C.

Circuit has “rejected the suggestion that Taylor, [484 U.S. 400 (1988)], requires a trial court to

conduct some sort of least restrictive alternative analysis before excluding evidence as a sanction.

                                                  4
        Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC         Document 22        Filed 11/07/25    Page 5 of 6




Id. (internal quotations omitted).

        III.       Conclusion

        Based on the foregoing, Merritts respectfully requests that this Court grant this motion,

entering an Order preventing the Government from presenting expert opinion testimony of any

nature at trial.



                                            Respectfully submitted,

                                            Margulis Gelfand DiRuzzo & Lambson, LLC

                                             /s/ Justin K. Gelfand
                                            JUSTIN K. GELFAND (D.C. Bar 90023996)
                                            GREGORY P. BAILEY (D.C. Bar 1781925)
                                            1325 G St., NW, Suite 500
                                            Washington, DC 20005
                                            Telephone: 314.390.0234
                                            Facsimile: 314.485.2264
                                            justin@margulisgelfand.com
                                            greg@margulisgelfand.com




                                               5
       Case 1:25-cr-00076-JMC          Document 22         Filed 11/07/25     Page 6 of 6




                                     Certificate of Service

      I hereby certify that the foregoing was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court to be

served by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system upon the Office of the United States

Attorney and all other counsel in this case.



                                               /s/ Justin K. Gelfand
                                               JUSTIN K. GELFAND (D.C. Bar 90023996)
                                               GREGORY P. BAILEY (D.C. Bar 1781925)
                                               1325 G St., NW, Suite 500
                                               Washington, DC 20005
                                               Telephone: 314.390.0234
                                               Facsimile: 314.485.2264
                                               justin@margulisgelfand.com
                                               greg@margulisgelfand.com




                                                  6


File and source

File
gov.uscourts.dcd.278640.22.0.pdf
Size
222,921 bytes
SHA-256
49d9ef3c3dec119fe92373dc8a974d7bf0fbc6a7b0f7f86e2aacfe694bbebfc3
Our copy
gov.uscourts.dcd.278640.22.0.pdf
Original
PACER (login required)
Back to top