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Home Court filings Cedric May case — U.S. District Court, E.D. La. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Defendant’s Rule 17(C) Subpoena (Rec. Docs. 57, 58) — United States v. May (Dkt. 60-1, E.D. La.)

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Government’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Defendant’s Rule 17(C) Subpoena (Rec. Docs. 57, 58) — United States v. May (Dkt. 60-1, E.D. La.)

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The government's memorandum in support of its motion to quash the defendant's Rule 17(c) subpoena in United States v. Cedric May, Criminal No. 25-81, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, filed August 1, 2025 as Document 60-1 by Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark A. Miller. It addresses the defendant's request (Rec. Doc. 57) for a subpoena to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office custodian of records seeking all phone recordings of conversations between May and other parties on June 25, 2025. The government argues that it has standing to move to quash a subpoena that infringes its legitimate interests, and that the court must in any event assess every Rule 17 subpoena under the Nixon factors.

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Filed August 1, 2025 in Cedric May; one of 1 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Filed2025-08-01

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“Government’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Defendant’s Rule 17(C) Subpoena (Rec. Docs. 57, 58) — United States v. May (Dkt. 60-1, E.D. La.).” U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, No. 2:25-cr-00081, Doc. 60-1, filed 2025-08-01. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/court-filings/us-v-cedric-may/2025-08-01-government-s-memorandum-in-support-of-motion-to-quash-defend-dkt-60-1/, SHA-256 737de6b38dbad155fcaa48dc4754ded2640fd430014fdc5e17b2e031a8457088.

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Case 2:25-cr-00081-DJP-MBN            Document 60-1         Filed 08/01/25     Page 1 of 10




                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                        *           CRIMINAL NO. 25-81

       v.                                        *           SECTION: “P”

 CEDRIC MAY                                      *

                                         *       *       *

            GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
            QUASH DEFENDANT’S RULE 17(C) SUBPOENA (Rec. Docs. 57, 58)

       Now into court comes the United States by and through the undersigned Assistant United

States Attorneys and files its Memorandum in support of Motion to Quash Defendant’s Request

for a Rule 17(c) Subpoena. (Rec. Doc. 57).

                                   I.     LAW AND ANALYSIS

       A. Standing

       A “[p]arty has standing to move to quash a subpoena addressed to another if the subpoena

infringes on a movant's legitimate interest.” United States. v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 712 (7th Cir.

1982). “The prosecution's legitimate interests in quashing include preventing undue lengthening

of the trial, undue harassment of its witness, and prejudicial over-emphasis on the witness's

credibility.” United States v. Segal, 276 F.Supp.2d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Here, the Government

has a legitimate interest in ensuring that local law enforcement entities, such as the St. Tammany

Parish Sheriff’s Office who, pursuant to agreements with the United States Government, are

charged with housing and overseeing federal detainees awaiting trial, are not overburdened with

broad subpoena requests that fail to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 17. 1 See United



       1
           The U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) relies on state and local jails to house federal
prisoners through intergovernmental agreements (IGAs). These agreements allow the USMS to
rent jail space from local governments. These local entities provide also provide security and day
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States v. Mix, 2013 WL 394206 at 1 (E.D.La Feb. 1, 2013) (Duval, J.)(“While it is true that the

recipients of the subpoenas are not employees of the Department of Justice, defendant concedes

that “the subpoenas at issue were served upon individuals working for federal and quasi-federal

entities.” Doc. 188, p. 6. Additionally, the Court notes that all of the federal entities involved fall

under the umbrella of the “Executive” branch of the government, as does the Department of

Justice. Considering those factors, as well as defendant's failure to cite any case requiring that the

subpoena be challenged by the actual party subject to the subpoena, the Court is not persuaded that

the Government lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas at issue”); contra United States v.

Williams, Crim. No. 07-35, 2007 WL 2287819 (E.D.La. August 8, 2007) (Feldman, J.) Moreover,

whether the Government has standing to move to quash the subpoena is of no moment as courts,

including ones in the Eastern District of Louisiana, have consistently held that a district court has

an independent obligation to assess every Rule 17 subpoena for compliance with the Nixon factors.

United States v. Richardson, No. Crim. A. 13-86, 2014 WL 6475344, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 18,

2014) (finding “defendant's [standing] argument to be without consequence [because] regardless

of whether the government has standing, the Court is obligated under Rule 17 to assess each

subpoena for compliance with the Nixon factors.”) (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341

U.S. 214, 221 (1951)); United States v. Hankton, No. Crim. A. 12-1, 2014 WL 3385126, at *2, n.1

(E.D. La. July 9, 2014) (“even without the government's opposition, the Court is obligated under

Rule 17 to examine whether the request complies with the Nixon factors.”).

       B. Analysis

       Defendant Cedric May is charged with Kalius James in a six-count superseding indictment

that was returned on May 30, 2025. Rec. Doc. 49. Both the Defendant and James are charged in


to day care for these detainees. The IGAs outline the terms for housing federal detainees. See
USMS website.
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Count One with Conspiracy to Commit Bank Robbery, in Count Two with Bank Robbery and in

Count Three with possession of a stolen vehicle. The Defendant is also charged in Counts Four,

Five and Six with Obstruction of Justice. Id. Trial is set on September 8, 2025.

       On July 24, 2025, the Defendant filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Subpoena (R.

Doc. 57). The motion stated that:

       “Undersigned counsel hereby request the issuance of the attached subpoena to the St.
       Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office- Custodian of Records for the purpose of obtaining
       certain records as identified in the attached subpoena relating to Defendant, Cedric May.

       The Defendant states that this information is material to the defense of this case, and
       therefore, it is necessary to subpoena these records to prepare his defense.

The subpoena attached to the motion seeks “[A]ll phone recordings of phone conversations

between Cedric May and any other parties on June 25, 2025, and all phone conversations between

Cedric May and Marcus Garner at the following number 601-810-5946.”                 Rec.Doc. 57-2.

(emphasis added). The Court ordered that the subpoena be issued on July 25, 2025.

       The purpose of a Rule 17(c) subpoena is “to implement the Sixth Amendment guarantee

that the defendant shall have compulsory process to obtain evidence in the defendant's favor.”

United States v. Ferguson, Crim. No. 3:06CR137, 2007 WL 2815068, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 26,

2007) (citing 25 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 617.08[1] (3d ed.2007). Rule

17(c)'s “chief innovation was to expedite trials by providing a time and place before trial for the

inspection of the subpoenaed materials.” 2 United States v. Potts, Crim. No. H–16–0147–012017

WL 1314193 at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2017) quoting Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.

214, 220, (1951). Rule 17(c) is intended exclusively for use at trial or a formal hearing. United



       2
          Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) provides that “[a] subpoena may order the
witness to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.
The court may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before
they are to be offered into evidence.”
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   Case 2:25-cr-00081-DJP-MBN           Document 60-1         Filed 08/01/25      Page 4 of 10




States v. Pereira, 353 F.Supp.3d 158, 160 (D.P.R. 2019). Thus, the production of documents

allowed by Rule 17 is intimately related to the attendance of witnesses at the trial or hearing.

United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F.Supp. 43, 46 (D.P.R. 1995). The subpoena is limited to

evidentiary materials and cannot be used as a fishing expedition to “see what may turn up.” United

States v. Poimboeuf, 331 F.R.D. 478, 480 (W.D.La. 2019) (citing 2 Wright & Henning, Federal

Practice & Procedure, § 275 at pp. 264-265 and fns. 24 & 25); see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700.

Therefore, requests for “any and all” documents relating to a category of subject matter are not

appropriate. See United States v. Gas Pipe, No. 3:14-cr-298-M, 2018 WL 5262361 at *2 (N.D.

Tex. June 18, 2018)

       A Rule 17 subpoena is not a discovery device. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698

(1974). In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court noted “certain fundamental characteristics

of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases” and the “required showing” and “test” by which

its proper use must be evaluated. Id. at 698-99. The Court recognized that Rule 17 “was not

intended to provide a means of discovery.” Id. at 699. Therefore, to require production before

trial, the defendant must show:

       (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant;

       (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise
           of due diligence;

       (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and
           inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may
           tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and

       (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general
           “fishing expedition.”

Id. at 699. “Thus, the defendant seeking a subpoena must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2)

admissibility; (3) specificity.” Id. at 700; see also Gas Pipe, 2018 WL 5262361 at *1 (citing

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United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 345 (5th Cir. 1992)). On a motion to quash a 17(c)

subpoena, the subpoena's proponent bears the burden of proving that the subpoena requests

documents that are “relevant,” “admissible,” and “requested with adequate specificity” and should

therefore be enforced. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699–700, Ferguson, 2007 WL 2815068, at *2; United

States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 149 (5th Cir. 2005).

A “Rule 17(c) subpoena reaches only evidentiary materials,” not all discoverable materials.”

United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195 (3rd Cir. 1981). Materials that have no potential

value other than for purposes of impeachment are not subject to subpoena under Rule 17(c). Gas

Pipe, 2018 WL 5262361 at *2; see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701-02; United States v. Hughes, 895

F.2d 1135, 1146 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding Rule 17(c) did not require production of documents

merely for impeachment purposes); United States v. Fields, 663 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1981)

(“The only evidentiary use that defendants have been able to advance is that the statements and

transcribed interviews of witnesses could be used for impeachment purposes. This use is generally

insufficient to justify the pretrial production of documents...and we see no basis for using a lesser

evidentiary standard merely because production is sought from a third party rather than from the

United States”). The information must be relevant to the Government's case or a valid defense.

United States v. Weisberg, No. 07-cr-66-A, 2008 WL 234186, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2008);

Gas Pipe, 2018 WL 5262361 at *2. Moreover, a Rule 17(c) subpoena is improper where it requires

the production of Brady, Jencks Act, or Giglio material. Gas Pipe, 2018 WL 5262361 at *2.

The final hurdle, specificity, requires the subpoena provide a description that “contains sufficient

details to identify the particular materials sought and demonstrates a request for evidence, and not

an improper attempt to expand discovery.” United States v. Carriles, 263 F.R.D. 400, 405 (W.D.

Tex. 2009); United States v. Ocasio, No. EP-11-CR-2728-KC, 2013 WL 12442496 at *5 (W.D.



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Tex. May 28, 2013). “The specificity requirement is intended to provide the subpoenaed party

with enough knowledge about the [data] being requested to lodge objections based on relevancy

and admissibility.” Potts, 2017 WL 1314193, at *2 (citing United States v. Ruedlinger, 172 F.R.D.

453, 456 (D. Kan. 1997)). Specificity serves to prevent the conversion of a subpoena into a license

for a “fishing expedition to see what may turn up.” Poimboeuf, 331 F.R.D. at 480; Bowman Dairy,

71 S. Ct. at 679 (“Rule 17(c) was not intended to provide an additional means of discovery. Its

chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the

inspection of subpoenaed materials.”); see also United States v. Brown, No. CRH-17-567-1, 2023

WL 5672836 (S.D. Tex Sept. 1, 2023); Gas Pipe, Inc., 2018 WL 5262361 at *2 (“[I]f the

requesting party ‘cannot reasonably specify the information contained or believed to be contained

in the documents sought but merely hopes that something useful will turn up, this is a sure sign

that the subpoena is being misused.’ ”).

Instructive in this case, is the holding in United States v. Denson. United States v. Denson, Crim.

No:15-12, WL 6473218 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2016). In Denson, the Government filed a motion to

quash subpoena duces tecum issued to the Sheriffs of St. Charles, St. Tammany, and Tangipahoa

Parishes for recordings of all jail telephone calls of six potential Government witnesses for a

specific amount of time. Denson, WL 6473218 at *2. As in this case, the Defendant in Denson

did not review the recordings sought prior to making the subpoena request. Id. The Court granted

the Government’s motion finding in the first instance that the subpoena sought impeachment

evidence which is not permitted. Id. It was also noted the Defendant failed to identify any other

“other valid potential evidentiary uses” that would overcome the general rule denying production

of impeachment evidence and as such, had not demonstrated the required evidentiary and relevant

nature of the recordings sought. Id.



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   Case 2:25-cr-00081-DJP-MBN              Document 60-1         Filed 08/01/25      Page 7 of 10




Other courts have addressed Rule 17(c) subpoenas aimed at obtaining inmate prison

correspondence as well as telephone calls and reached a similar result. In United States v. Rivera,

No. 13–CR–149, 2015 WL 1540517 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015), the district court denied defendant’s

request for subpoenas “of telephone and email communications made by cooperating witnesses

from any jail facility and the pertinent call logs.” Id. at *3. The district court held that defendant’s

request did not satisfy the admissibility, relevance, or specificity requirements under Nixon.

Moreover, it rejected defendant’s argument that the subpoenaed materials would be relevant based

on defense counsel’s speculation that “often communications by inmates discuss pressure or

inducements offered by the government, personal grudges or biases against the defendant on trial,

and attempts to fabricate testimony.” Id. at *4 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). The

district court held that defendant’s “speculative requests” constituted the “type of fishing

expeditions which are expressly prohibited under Rule 17.” Id. (internal quotations and brackets

omitted). Indeed, the district court found that defendant had not even demonstrated “articulable

suspicion” that the subpoenaed documents were relevant, admissible, and specific. Id.: see also

United States v. Barnes, 560 F. App’x 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2014) (district court did not abuse its

discretion when it quashed subpoena by defendant for, inter alia, telephone calls and emails of

cooperating government witnesses).

Similarly in United States v. Crews, Crim. No. 10–663–4, 2012 WL 93176 (E.D. Penn. Jan. 12,

2012) a defendant moved for an order authorizing the issuance of subpoenas for recorded phone

calls and visitor logs for two potential government witnesses. At a hearing on his motion, the

defendant testified that he believed that the cooperating witnesses were “coercing/coordinating the

testimony [of other individuals] against him based on three sources of information.” Id. at *3.

Defendant further testified that the basis of his belief was three-fold: (1) conversations he had with



                                                   7

   Case 2:25-cr-00081-DJP-MBN            Document 60-1        Filed 08/01/25      Page 8 of 10




one of the cooperating witnesses; (2) conversations he had with co-defendants in his case; and (3)

conversations he had with an individual who placed three-way calls with one of the cooperators.

Id. The court noted that defendant “did not identify any specific phone calls or visitor logs” he

sought to subpoena under Rule 17(c). Id. at *4. Instead, the defendant was “engaged in a fishing

expedition, merely hoping to find material that he may be able to use to impeach the Government’s

witnesses against him.” Id. (citing United States v. Merlino, CRIM.A. No. 99–0363. 2001 WL

283165, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001). The court denied defendant’s motion for the subpoenas.

See also Merlino, 2001 WL 283165, at *7 (subpoena for recordings of prison telephone calls of

cooperating witnesses was fishing expedition).

Here, the requested/issued subpoena fails to meet the requirements of Rule 17(c) for many of the

same reasons found in Denson and the other cited authority above. First, the request, other than

offering a conclusory sentence that the items sought are relevant and admissible, advances no

analysis or explanation as to how they are relevant or admissible. See e. g Denson at WL 6473218

at *2.   This failure alone makes the use of this subpoena improper. Second, there is no

identification of specific conversations that contain admissible evidence regarding a specific

defense or an aspect of the Government’s case. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700. Instead, the

subpoena asks for “all conversations.” This phrase, “all conversations” evidences a clear indication

that it is a fishing expedition for potential exculpatory or Giglio evidence. See Potts, 2017 WL

1314193 at *2 (All but one of Potts’ requests references ‘all’ documents or other materials

pertaining to the identified category. Such sweeping requests are suspect”); Gas Pipe, Inc., 2018

WL 5262361 at *2 (“A request for entire files as opposed to individual documents is suggestive of

a fishing expedition.”); see also United States v. Frank, 23 F.R.D. 145, 147 (D.D.C. 1959)

(explaining that “this rule does not permit blunderbuss inspection of the Government’s evidence



                                                 8

   Case 2:25-cr-00081-DJP-MBN            Document 60-1        Filed 08/01/25      Page 9 of 10




in an attempt to learn something not known; it is not a discovery provision.”); . This lack of

specificity not only denies an opponent the opportunity to provide specific objections to the items

sought, but it also does not provide this court with a valid reason to issue the subpoena. Moreover,

because it is so broad, it burdens the STPSO’s for it requires them to “ferret through voluminous

recordings” to find the ones that answer the subpoena request. See generally Order, United States

v. Fortia, Case No. 14-131, Rec. Doc. 617 at 3 (E.D.La. May 5, 2017) (Engelhardt, J.) (Attached

Ex. A). If the requesting party “cannot reasonably specify the information contained or believed

to be contained in the documents sought but merely hopes that something useful will turn up, this

is a sure sign that the subpoena is being misused.” United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480,

1493 (S.D. Fla. 1991). It is for all these infirmities that this subpoena should be quashed.




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                                        II.     CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that this Court to

grant the Government’s Motion to Quash the Subpoena issued in it order of July 25, 2025. (Rec.

Doc. 58)

                                                      Respectfully submitted,


                                                      MICHAEL M. SIMPSON
                                                      ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY



                                                      /s/ Mark A. Miller
                                                      Mark A. Miller (MS Bar Roll No. 105138)
                                                      Assistant United States Attorney
                                                      650 Poydras Street, Suite 1700
                                                      New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
                                                      Telephone: (504) 680-3012
                                                      Email: mark.a.miller@usdoj.gov

                                                      /s/ Troy L. Bell
                                                      Troy L. Bell (LA Bar Roll Number 37424)
                                                      Assistant United States Attorney
                                                      650 Poydras Street, Suite 1700
                                                      New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
                                                      Telephone: (504) 680-3087
                                                      Email: troy.bell@usdoj.gov

                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that on this 1st day of August 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to
counsel of record.

                                                      /s/ Mark A. Miller
                                                      Mark A. Miller
                                                      Assistant United States Attorney




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