Court filing
Order Denying Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 — Carl Bradley Johansson
No. 5:21-cr-00170-JGB · Doc. 150 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
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(JS-6)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
EDCR 18-0114-3 JGB
EDCR 21-0170-2 JGB
Case No. Date October 16, 2025
EDCV 24-2550 JGB
EDCV 24-2552 JGB
Title Carl Bradley Johansson v. United States of America
Present: The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAYNOR GALVEZ Not Reported
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter
Attorney(s) Present for Petitioner(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
Roger Hsieh
Michael Clough
Lindsay Bailey
Proceedings: Order (1) DENYING Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (EDCR
18-0114 Dkt. No. 461; EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 127; EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No.
1; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 1); and VACATING October 20, 2025 hearing (IN
CHAMBERS)
Before the Court is Defendant/Petitioner Carl Bradley Johansson’s (“Defendant”) motion
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (“Motion,” EDCR 18-
0114 Dkt. No. 461; EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 127; EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No. 1; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt.
No.1). Upon consideration of the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions,
the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty to: (1) a conspiracy to violate 49
U.S.C. § 5124 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) a violation of 49 U.S.C. § 5124 (welding without
required certifications in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 180.413(a)(1)); (3) a violation of 26 U.S.C. §
7201 (tax evasion); (4) conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1344 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349;
and (5) a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(2) and 3147 (bank fraud while on pre-trial release).
(EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 282; EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 47.)
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At the change of plea hearing on September 29, 2021 (EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 282; EDCR
21-0170 Dkt. No. 47), Judge Phillips made the following findings after conducting the plea
colloquy:
[T]he defendant and his lawyer having told the Court that they have thoroughly
discussed all aspects of these charges against the defendant and any defenses that
might apply; and the Court having observed the defendant as he answered my
questions, and I’ve had the opportunity to observe his demeanor and manner while he
answered questions, as well as his intelligence, and having inquired several times
during the proceedings as to whether the defendant feels he is competent to proceed;
and the Court also having observed that the defendant does not appear to be under
the influence of any medicine, drug, or other substance or factor that would affect his
actions or judgment in any manner; the Court finds that the defendant’s offer of his
plea of guilty to the counts aforementioned in the two Indictments, that the pleas
have a factual basis, are free of any coercive influence of any kind, are voluntarily
made with full knowledge of the charges against him and the consequences of his
guilty pleas, that no promises of any kind have been made to the defendant by
anyone, and no coercion or threats of any kind have been exerted upon him in any
manner.
(“Plea Transcript,” at 52-53, EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 390-1). These findings are
corroborated by the transcript of the plea colloquy at the change of plea hearing. Defendant
stated that he understood the charges against him. (Id. at 15, 19.) Defendant’s counsel
attested that Defendant signed the plea agreement in the presence of Defendant’s counsel and
that they discussed it “[a]t great length.” (Id. at 20.) After Defendant was sworn in, he
corroborated that he discussed the entirety of the plea agreement with his counsel and
confirmed that the contents of the plea agreement covered the entirety of the agreement in
Defendant’s cases. (Id. at 20-22.) Defendant attested that he understood he was pleading
guilty to felony charges and the consequences thereof. (Id. at 23.) Although Defendant
informed Judge Phillips that he felt “a little dizzy,” he assured her that he could proceed, that
he could think clearly, and confirmed that he had been able to answer her questions. (Id. at 24-
25.) After Judge Phillips asked the prosecuting attorney to state the maximum statutory
sentence for each charge to which Defendant had agreed to plead guilty, Defendant confirmed
that he understood the maximum statutory sentences for those charges. (Id. at 29-30.)
Defendant further confirmed that he understood that the maximum sentence he was facing
under those charges was 100 years of imprisonment, a five-year period of supervised release,
the greater of either a fine of $2,750,000 or “twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from
the offense,” and a $500 special assessment fee. (Id. at 29, 31-32.) Judge Phillips subsequently
asked Defendant if he was “feeling all right.” (Id. at 33.) Defendant responded: “I’m as good as
I felt in the last few months.” (Id.) Defendant confirmed that he had received no threats or
been made any promises besides those contained in the plea agreement. (Id. at 34.) He
confirmed that he understood the consequences of his guilty plea and responded affirmatively
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that he was “competent and able to make the decision to plead guilty” to the charges. (Id. at
35.) He admitted that he committed the acts of which he was accused. (Id. at 37.) He also
admitted that the prosecuting attorney would be able to prove each of the facts beyond a
reasonable doubt that would be necessary for a conviction if the case went to trial. (Id. at 42.)
Defendant confirmed that his medications did not interfere with his ability to “think clearly and
understand.” (Id. at 44-46.) After Defendant stated that he suffered from anxiety and
depression, Judge Phillip asked again if he could understand the plea colloquy to which
Defendant assented. (Id. at 47.) Defendant did not express the need for any psychiatric care.
(Id.) Defendant responded in the negative to Judge Phillip’s question as to whether she should
not accept his guilty plea for any reason. (Id. at 48.) Defendant’s counsel confirmed that
Defendant understood the plea colloquy and the consequences of his guilty plea. (Id. at 49.)
Defendant’s counsel attested that a guilty plea was in Defendant’s best interests. (Id. at 50.)
Defendant confirmed that he had enough time to review the plea with his counsel and that he
was satisfied with his representation. (Id. at 50-51.) Accordingly, Judge Phillips made her
findings. (Id. at 51-52.)
On November 6, 2022 Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (“Motion to
Withdraw,” EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 390.) On December 5, 2022 Judge Phillips denied
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw. (EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 414.) Judge Phillips held that
Defendant’s plea was not involuntary based on promises made in the plea agreement, that the
attached psychiatric report did not place in doubt Defendant’s ability to understand the charges
against him or the consequences of his guilty plea, and rejected Defendant’s attempts to assert
new facts establishing his innocence. (See id.) On December 5, 2022, Judge Phillips sentenced
Defendant to serve 120 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and to pay
$1,252,979.00 in restitution, and the $500 special assessment fee. (EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 420;
EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 110.)
Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit. (EDCR 18-0114
Dkt. No. 422.) The Ninth Circuit denied Defendant’s appeal on the basis of the valid appeal
waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement. (“Ninth Circuit Opinion,” EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 458.)
On November 13, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion. (See Motion.) On March 11, 2025,
the government filed an ex parte application authorizing disclosure of certain attorney-client
communications. (EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 468; EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 138; EDCV 24-2550 Dkt.
No. 7; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 11.) On March 24, 2025, the Court granted the government’s ex
parte application. (EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 470; EDCR 21-0170 Dkt. No. 140; EDCV 24-2550 Dkt.
No. 9; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 13.) On July 24, 2025, Defendant filed a response to
interrogatories. (EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No. 14; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 18.) The government filed
an opposition on September 10, 2025. (“Opposition,” EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 479; EDCR 21-
0170 Dkt. No. 149; EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No. 22; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 26.) On September 15,
2025, Defendant filed a document entitled “Receipt of Attorney Edward Robinson Interrogatory
Questions.” (EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No. 19; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 23.) Defendant filed a reply on
September 26, 2025. (“Reply,” EDCV 24-2550 Dkt. No. 23; EDCV 24-2552 Dkt. No. 27.)
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Section 2255
28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a prisoner in federal custody to collaterally attack their
sentence upon proper motion on the grounds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If a court finds that any of the
aforementioned grounds for relief exist, the Court must vacate the sentence and either set the
judgment aside and discharge the prisoner, resentence them, or grant them a new
trial. Id. § 2255(b).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In order to successfully establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner
must demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and that (2) “any deficiencies in counsel’s performance [were] prejudicial.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–92 (1984). In assessing the reasonableness of
counsel’s representation, a Court must reconstruct the circumstances at the time of counsel’s
challenged conduct, presume counsel’s reasonableness, and be “highly deferential” of counsel’s
performance. Id. at 669. “With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper
standard requires the Petitioner to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the grounds he
received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial attorney resulting in an involuntary plea,
his attorney retained for his motion to withdraw guilty plea, and his appellate attorney. (See
Motion.) At the outset, the Court notes its skepticism of Defendant’s assertions at this stage of
his proceedings.
Because the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees “the right to counsel,” it
also guarantees “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To establish
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the first prong under Strickland for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show
that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. The
reasonableness of counsel’s performance must be judged “on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690. When deciding a habeas petition, the
court should make “every effort” to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). “Given that the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct must
be evaluated based on the time it occurred, courts have articulated a rule that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims generally cannot be predicated on counsel’s failure to anticipate
changes in the law.” United States v. Juliano, 12 F.4th 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis
added). It follows that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails when a petitioner merely
asserts that his counsel failed to anticipate a later decision. Put another way, “Strickland does
not mandate prescience, only objectively reasonable advice under prevailing profession
norms.” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 870 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lowry v.
Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).
Strickland’s second prong is actual prejudice. 466 U.S. at 692. Actual prejudice
“requires the Petitioner to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
In light of the presumption of counsel’s reasonable assistance, the deference accorded to
counsel’s performance, and the requisite of dispositive prejudice, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s
high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). If Defendant fails
to establish either component of the Strickland test, the Court “must dismiss the claim.” United
States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 672 (9th Cir. 2002).
Strickland “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In the plea-bargaining context, “the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.
Additionally, Strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Miller v. Keeney,
882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989).
Defendant raises three grounds for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Because
Defendant’s arguments are either contradicted by his sworn statements in accepting the plea
agreement or legally insufficient to support habeas relief, the Court DENIES the Motion.
1. Representation in Plea Process
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel Mark Werksman (“Trial Counsel”) failed to
provide effective assistance of counsel rendering Defendant’s guilty plea involuntary and
invalid. (Motion at 22-23.) Defendant contends that Trial Counsel engaged in unauthorized
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plea negotiations with the government. (Id. at 17.) As a result, and pursuant to Trial Counsel’s
instructions, Defendant signed, but did not date, the plea agreement as a sign of “good faith” in
the plea negotiations with the government. (Id. at 18-19.) Defendant did not intend the
signed, but undated, plea agreement to serve as a final plea agreement. (Id.; Reply at 18-19.)
Nevertheless, according to Defendant, Trial Counsel co-signed and dated the Plea Agreement.
(Mot. at 19.) Defendant did not learn of Trial Counsel’s alleged actions until over a month later
and just a few days before the Change of Plea hearing. (Id. at 19.) Although Defendant noted
the plea agreement contained multiple errors and did not have enough time to review the full
plea agreement, Trial Counsel urged Defendant to accept the plea agreement despite
Defendant’s reluctance. (Id. at 20-22.) Trial Counsel informed Defendant that the testimony of
Defendant’s co-conspirators would result in Defendant’s loss at trial and that the Government
would indict his son and wife and seize his sister’s property if Defendant did not assent to the
plea agreement. (Id. at 21-22.) Defendant asserts that he signed the plea deal based on this
information and, because it constituted bad advice, Defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary.
(Id. at 22.)
Defendant’s assertions in his Motion contradict his sworn statements during the plea
colloquy. First, Defendant stated that he fully discussed the plea agreement with Trial Counsel
and had no further questions about the plea agreement. (Plea Transcript at 21-22). Defendant
stated that he signed the agreement in the presence of his counsel, and that the plea
agreement covered the full extent of the agreement. (Id. at 22.) Defendant denied that he
assented to the agreement as the result of any threats. (Id. at 34.) Defendant admitted that he
was guilty of the charges and that the government would be able to meet its burden proving
the underlying facts at trial. (Id. at 35, 42.) Defendant did not provide Judge Phillips with any
reason why she should not accept Defendant’s guilty plea. (Id. at 48.) Defendant finally stated
that he had enough time to discuss the plea agreement and his guilty plea with Trial Counsel
and that Trial Counsel had fully considered his legal defenses. (Id. at 50.) Thus, Defendant’s
sworn statements contradict his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. “[S]tatements made
by a criminal defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be accorded great weight” as
“[s]olemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Chizen v.
Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74
(1977)). Defendant provides no reason to doubt his statements made at the plea colloquy. In
fact, Defendant made many of these arguments at his sentencing hearing. (“Sentencing
Transcript,” at 33-51, EDCR 18-0114 Dkt. No. 445.) Judge Phillips then noted that Defendant’s
claims were “belied by the plea colloquy.” (Id. at 50.) She also noted that Defendant had
mentioned that his biggest mistake in a 1998 criminal case similarly arising out of the death of a
welder operating on one of Defendant’s oil cargo tanks was mistakenly pleading guilty. (Id. at
51.) Yet, Defendant claimed to have repeated that mistake again in his current cases at the
Motion to Withdraw stage and now again makes that claim with this Motion. Then, as now, the
Court is unconvinced. (Id.)
Furthermore, Trial Counsel succeeded in simultaneously resolving both of Defendant’s
criminal cases, recommending a sentence of no more than ten years, preventing the forfeiture
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of Defendant’s bond, precluding the indictment of Defendant’s son, and convincing prosecutors
to dismiss several counts. (Opp. at 14.) Although Defendant expresses surprise at receiving a
plea agreement from counsel, the California Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to
“promptly communicate to the lawyer’s client . . . all terms and conditions of a proposed plea
bargain or other dispositive offer made to the client in a criminal matter.” Cal. R. Prof. Conduct
1.4.1(a). Thus, Defendant merely proves that Trial Counsel properly complied with the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. These actions all belie Defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Even if Defendant had suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court finds it
unlikely that this ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced Defendant. Defendant argues that
his inability to take his case to trial, where he would have been acquitted, and his lengthy ten-
year sentence, demonstrate the prejudice he faced. Under the pre-sentence report, Defendant
claims that he should have only faced a sentence of 90 months, and, had Trial Counsel correctly
objected to various sentence enhancements, Defendant should have only faced a sentence of
60 months. (Reply at 11-12.) However, the Sentencing Transcript belies Defendant’s claims.
According to the record, Defendant’s counsel requested 57 months of imprisonment, in line
with Defendant’s requested 60 months. (Sentencing Transcript at 30.) Although the
government requested 120 months of imprisonment, Judge Phillips was inclined to sentence
Defendant to 240 months “given the extent of the fraud, the harm that was caused,” and
additional factors. (Id. at 21.) Judge Phillips additionally doubted the sentence reduction
Defendant received in the presentence report for acceptance of responsibility. (Id.) She also
doubted whether the criminal history category of 2 accurately reflected Defendant’s criminal
history and likelihood of recidivism. (Id.) The record indicates that Defendant narrowly avoided
a more severe sentence. Thus, the Court is persuaded that Defendant likely faced a higher
sentence without Trial Counsel and was not prejudiced. Defendant fails to prove that “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
2. Representation in Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty
Defendant next argues that his counsel Edward Robinson, who represented him for
purposes of his Motion to Withdraw, (“Motion Counsel”) failed to provide effective assistance
of counsel. Defendant claims that Motion Counsel was insufficiently argumentative and
adversarial. (Motion at 24.) Defendant’s main contention is that Motion Counsel only
addressed three of the seven factors in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1984).
However, Motion Counsel only cites to Carr once in the Motion to Withdraw for the proposition
that a finding that the government would be prejudiced by granting the Motion to Withdraw
would not automatically defeat the Motion to Withdraw. (Motion to Withdraw at 4.)
Defendant seems to believe that Motion Counsel failed to apply binding case law governing his
Motion to Withdraw. However, Carr holds no precedential authority in the Ninth Circuit as it is
a case decided by the Fifth Circuit. Therefore, Defendant fails to persuade the Court that “his
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counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” or that Defendant
suffered prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S at 688, 692.
3. Representation in Appeal
Defendant finally argues that his appellate counsel Rachael A. Robinson (“Appellate
Counsel”) ineffectively argued the appeal of his Motion to Withdraw. (Mot. at 52.). However,
even if Appellate Counsel had made the arguments Defendant claims would have amounted to
effective assistance of counsel, Defendant would still not have prevailed as the Ninth Circuit
dismissed his appeal on the basis of the valid appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.
(See Ninth Circuit Opinion.) In response, Defendant argues only that Appellate Counsel should
have argued that his plea was involuntary. (Mot. at 57.) As the government notes, however,
Appellate Counsel was limited to the arguments raised in the Motion to Withdraw, which asked
Judge Phillips to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea on the “fair and just reason” standard.
(See Opp. at 35-36; Motion to Withdraw at 2-4.) “A party normally may not press an argument
on appeal that it failed to raise in the district court.” One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., Inc.,
578 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the standard to revoke a plea for
involuntariness on appeal is higher than the “fair and just” standard for a Motion to Withdraw.
(Opp. at 35 (citing United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 844-845 (9th Cir. 2004).)
Accordingly, the Court finds that Appellate Counsel’s representation did not fall “below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 688. Even if Appellate Counsel
had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court is not persuaded that Defendant was
prejudiced in light of the appeal waiver in the plea agreement and rule that appellate courts will
not consider arguments not previously raised. Id. at 692.
In sum, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
B. Certificate of Appealability
When a district court denies relief under Section 2255, a petitioner must obtain a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal “the final order in a proceeding under
section 2255.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. §
2253(c)(2). A “substantial showing” includes “a showing that reasonable jurists could debate
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal citations omitted). The COA must “indicate which specific
issue or issues satisfy [the substantial] showing” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). Otherwise,
the Court must “state its reasons why a certificate should not be granted.” United States v.
Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, Defendant requests a COA for the first time in his Reply. (Reply at 33-34.)
“[R]eply briefs are limited in scope to matters either raised by the opposition or unforeseen at
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the time of the original motion.” Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 1150,
1179 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court need not consider this new
request. Even if the Court were to consider it, the Court would deny the COA. Defendant’s sole
argument for granting the COA is the conclusory statement that “he has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” (Reply at 33.) However, “[j]udicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (1984).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “Strickland’s standard . . . is highly
demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). Defendant has not met his
burden in showing that “reasonable jurists could debate” whether he meets Strickland’s high
bar to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and that his Motion should therefore be
granted. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. The Court DENIES a Certificate of Appealability on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES the Motion. The Court DENIES a Certificate of
Appealability. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close EDCV 24-2550 JGB and EDCV 24-2552 JGB. The
hearing scheduled for October 20, 2025 is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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