Memorandum & Order — Sentencing of Gianni Stewart (24 Months)

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A sentencing memorandum and order by U.S. District Judge William F. Kuntz, II in United States of America v. Gianni Stewart, 21-CR-411 (WFK), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, dated May 10, 2024 and filed as Document 259. Stewart pled guilty on January 24, 2023 to Count One, conspiracy to commit access device fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b)(2). The order states that between June 2020 and April 2021 Stewart and co-conspirators submitted approximately 250 fraudulent unemployment insurance claims to the New York State Department of Labor, receiving more than $1,750,000.00, and that Stewart's own claims for at least 23 victims yielded approximately $178,800.00. The court imposes 24 months of incarceration, one year of supervised release, restitution and forfeiture of $178,800.00 each, and a $100.00 special assessment.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
y. ; MEMORANDUM & ORDER
21-CR-411 (WFK)
GIANNI STEWART,
Defendant. :
X

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, I, United States District Judge:

On January 24, 2023, Gianni Stewart (“Defendant”) pled guilty to Count One of an Indictment
charging him with conspiracy to commit access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1029(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b)(2). The Court now sentences Defendant and provides a complete
statement of reasons pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) of those factors set forth by Congress in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant is hereby sentenced to 24 months
of incarceration, to be followed by one year of supervised release with both standard conditions
and special conditions, restitution in the amount of $178,800.00 as set forth in the Order of

Restitution, forfeiture in the amount of $178,800.00 as set forth in the Order of Forfeiture, and a
$100.00 mandatory special assessment.

BACKGROUND

The instant offense was uncovered through a joint investigation by the United States Postal
Inspection Service and the Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General into fraudulent
unemployment benefits claims submitted to the New York State Department of Labor
(“NYSDOL”). Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 6, ECF No. 185.

In March 2020, the President of the United States signed into law various acts for the
purpose of providing financial assistance to individuals affected by the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic. Id. J§ 8-12. Included among these were the Families First Coronavirus Response Act,
which provided flexibility for state unemployment insurance (“UI”) agencies and administrative
funding to respond to COVID-19; and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(“CARES” Act), which expanded the ability of states to provide UI for workers affected by

COVID-19. Id. J 9-10. The CARES Act also created new UI programs, including the Pandemic
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Unemployment Assistance program and the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
program. Jd. §10. As the pandemic raged on, the President continued to authorize additional
funding to alleviate Americans’ pandemic-related financial hardship. See id. J¥ 13-14.

The NYSDOL operates New York’s unemployment system and distributes UI benefits. Jd.
4/7. It does so primarily through the New York State Unemployment Insurance Fund (“NYSUIF”).
Id. During the period covering the instant offense, the two primary methods for filing for NYSUIF
benefits were (1) online through the NYSDOL website and (2) by telephone through a NYSDOL
call center. Jd. 9 15. Individuals obtained their NYSUIF benefits in a number of ways. Id. ¥ 16.
Some claimants were issued KeyBank National Association (“KeyBank”) debit cards to which
NYSUIF benefits were credited. Jd. Other claimants acquired reloadable cards issued by different
banks and, after inputting their reloadable cards’ information to the NYSDOL online portal, had
those cards funded with NYSUIF benefits. Jd Other claimants had NYSDOL deposit their
NYSUIF benefits directly into personal bank accounts. Jd.

Between June 2020 and April 2021, Defendant and his co-conspirators submitted and
caused to be submitted approximately 250 fraudulent UI claims to NYSDOL using the personal
identifying information (“PII”) of real individuals (“the victims”). Jd. f§ 18-19. Defendant and
his co-conspirators obtained the victims’ PII by, inter alia, using Bitcoin to purchase it from
individuals via Telegram, an encrypted messaging application. Jd. § 20; see also Government
Sentencing Memorandum (“Gov’t Mem.”) at 6, ECF No. 232. Defendant himself shared a third-
party’s PII with another co-conspirator in one Telegram chat and asked that co-conspirator if he
could purchase further third-party PII. PSR 21.

Once Defendant and his co-conspirators purchased their victims’ PII using cryptocurrency

funds and submitted the fraudulent claims, they obtained NYSUIF benefits on KeyBank debit
cards. Jd. | 22 (explaining three of Defendant’s co-defendants had the NYSUIF benefits deposited
directly into co-conspirators’ bank accounts). Defendant also shared a KeyBank debit card with
at least one of his co-conspirators. Jd. 24. Defendant and his co-conspirators went to banks to
withdraw cash using those KeyBank debit cards; indeed, the PSR details four instances where
Defendant, accompanied by co-conspirators, attempted to withdraw money from KeyBank debit
cards at various banks. Jd. at 23. During the timeframe of the instant offense, Defendant and his
co-defendants took and posted pictures of themselves with and fanning out large quantities of cash,
in designer clothes and accessories, and with luxury cars. Id. | 25; see also Gov’t Mem. at 3.

Altogether, Defendant and his co-conspirators received more than $1,750,000.00 as a result
of their fraudulent scheme. Jd. J 19. However, if NYSDOL had not detected their scheme before
issuing additional payments on pending claims, this figure would have been more than
$8,900,000.00. Jd. Defendant himself submitted and caused to be submitted fraudulent claims in
the names of at least 23 victims, for which Defendant and/or his co-conspirators yielded
approximately $178,800.00. Id. §31.!

On May 14, 2021, the Government filed a then-sealed Complaint alleging between June
2020 and April 2021, Defendant and others fraudulently filed federal and state unemployment
insurance claims using the PII of third-party victims, and fraudulently received UI benefits funded

by COVID-19 pandemic assistance programs. Compl., ECF No. 1.

1 The PSR and Government’s Memorandum both discuss Defendant’s conduct related to other fraudulent schemes
not covered by the instant offense. Defendant was in a group chat with co-conspirators in which one co-conspirator
asked how long “Womply,” a Paycheck Protection Program loan provider, took to approve claims and where he
could obtain bank statements of third parties. See PSR (37; Gov’t Mem. at 2 n.2. In response, another co-
conspirator responded with the approval time and stated he had forged the required bank statements. Jd. Ina
separate group chat, Defendant sent a co-conspirator PII for third-party victims in Georgia, California, and North
Carolina and the co-conspirator sent a link to a website for Ohio unemployment claims. PSR { 38; Gov’t Mem. at 2
n.2.
On August 5, 2021, a grand jury returned a 13-count Indictment charging Defendant with:
one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2),
1029(a}(5), and (b)(2); one count of access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(5)
and(c)(1)(A)(ii); and one count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1028A(a)(1), (b), (c)(4), and (c)(5). ECF No. 70.

On January 24, 2023, Defendant pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment, charging
conspiracy to commit access device fraud. As part of his plea agreement, Defendant agreed not to
file an appeal or otherwise challenge his sentence if the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of
71 months or below. ECF No. 150 { 4.

Legal Standard

18 U.S.C. § 3553 outlines the procedures for imposing sentence in a criminal case. The
“starting point and the initial benchmark” in evaluating a criminal sentence is the Guidelines
sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). If and when a district court
chooses to impose a sentence outside of the Sentencing Guidelines range, the court “shall state in
open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and . . . the specific reason for
the imposition of a sentence different from that described” in the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c)(2). The court must also “state[] with specificity” its reasons for so departing “in a
statement of reasons form.” Id.

“The sentencing court’s written statement of reasons shall be a simple, fact-specific
statement explaining why the guidelines range did not account for a specific factor or factors
under § 3553(a).” United States v. Davis, 08-CR-0332, 2010 WL 1221709, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 29, 2010) (Weinstein, J.). Section 3553(a) provides a set of seven factors for the Court to
consider in determining what sentence to impose on a criminal defendant. The Court addresses
each in turn.

A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and the History and
Characteristics of Defendant

1. Family and Personal Background

The first § 3553(a) factor requires the Court to evaluate “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

Defendant was born on July 25, 2001 in Brooklyn, New York to Everton Stewart and
Denise Kerr. PSR § 70. When Defendant was young, his parents ended their relationship. Jd.
Defendant’s mother is aware of the instant offense and remains supportive. Jd. Defendant’s father
was deported when Defendant was a child, after which Defendant reported only occasional contact
with him. Jd. § 72. Defendant has three maternal half-siblings, the eldest of whom is aware of
Defendant’s instant conviction and remains supportive. Jd. J 71. Defendant reported he has
approximately ten paternal half-siblings, none of whom he is close with. Id.

Defendant was primarily raised by his mother in a below-average income, three-family
home in East Flatbush, Brooklyn. Jd. 72. Defendant reported favorably on his childhood, which
was free from abuse. Jd. For much of his childhood, Defendant played football, which held a
significant place in his life. Id. However, Defendant quit football after one of his coaches “ruined”
the game for him with criticism and negativity and, apparently, would not approve of Defendant’s
transfer to another school where Defendant could play football. /d.; Defense Counsel’s Sentencing
Memorandum (“Def. Mem.”) at 5, ECF No. 231. Defense counsel explains that this coach
“favored players who were recruited by him . . . and whose fathers were active and helpful.” Def.

Mem. at 5. Defendant met neither of those criteria. /d.
Defendant has never been married. Jd. { 74. At the time of the PSR’s writing, Defendant
had no children, id., but Defendant’s girlfriend has since given birth to Defendant’s child, Def.
Mem. at 1.

2. Educational and Employment History

Defendant graduated from East Brooklyn Community High School in 2021. PSR § 80.
Prior to attending East Brooklyn Community High School, defense counsel reports Defendant
attended Franklin High School so that he could play football, and had the experiences described
above. Def. Mem. at 5.

From March 2022 through July 2023, Defendant worked as a stocker and warehouse
worker at an Amazon location in Maryland. See PSR § 83; Def. Mem. at 7. In December 2023,
Defendant reportedly began working on a temporary basis for Amazon in Maryland, but has
since been terminated. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 216, 218; Second Defense Counsel Supplemental
Sentencing Submission (“Second Def. Supp. Mem.”) at 2 n.1, ECF No. 240. Defendant’s only
other job was a Summer Youth Employment job as a childcare worker with the City of New

York. PSR { 84.

3. Prior Convictions

Defendant has no prior convictions. PSR {ff 63-64. Defendant has been arrested twice
while on bond for the instant offense, including one arrest where Defendant was with three other
individuals in a car wherein the arresting officers discovered two firearms. See PSR { 5, 67-68;
see also Gov’t Mem. at 6-7 (noting these firearms were loaded). Defense counsel represents that
both of these cases were dismissed against Defendant because of his “limited conduct.” Def. Mem.

at 7.
4. Medical and Mental Health

Defendant reported no history of mental or emotional health problems, nor any chronic or
serious physical health problems. PSR {| 77-78.
5. Substance Abuse
Defendant reported prior to his arrest for the instant offense, he used marijuana daily. Id.
4179. However, he reported he using marijuana due to his bond conditions, and does not believe

he needs substance abuse treatment. Jd.

6. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
The Court’s previous statements make clear the nature and circumstances surrounding the
instant offense. See supra at Section I.

B. The Need for the Sentence Imposed

The second § 3553(a) factor instructs the Court to consider “the need for the sentence
imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

Both defense counsel and the Government recognize the seriousness of the instant offense,
and the Court agrees with these assessments. See Def. Mem. at 11; Gov’t Mem. at 6. As the
Government put it:

The defendant and his co-conspirators took advantage of a global
pandemic—a time of tremendous suffering—to profit through an
elaborate criminal scheme. The defendant and his co-conspirators

used cryptocurrency to unlawfully purchase the PII of real victims
on encrypted applications like Telegram, and then used that
information to fraudulently apply for unemployment benefits from
NYSDOL. In total, the defendant and his co-conspirators submitted
fraudulent claims in the names of approximately 250 real victims,
for which they received in excess of $1,750,000.
Gov’t Mem. at 6. The Court will consider this and the other § 3553(a)(2) factors further in

connection with the parties’ sentencing recommendations infra.

: OF The Kinds of Sentences Available

The third § 3553(a) factor requires the Court to detail “the kinds of sentences available”
for Defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3). Defendant pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment,
charging him with conspiracy to commit access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1029(a){2), (a)(5), and (b)(2).

Defendant faces a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of seven and one-half years
and no minimum term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(b)(2) and 1029(c)(1)(A)(ii). Defendant
also faces a statutory maximum term of supervised release of three years and no minimum term of
supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). If a condition of release is violated, Defendant may be
sentenced to a maximum of two years of imprisonment without credit for pre-release imprisonment
or time previously served on post-release supervision. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Defendant is also
eligible for not less than one nor more than five years of probation, and, barring extraordinary
circumstances, one of the following must be imposed as a condition of probation: fine, restitution,
or community service. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561(c)(1) and 3563(a)(2). Defendant faces a maximum
statutory fine of $250,000.00. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b). However, Probation notes Defendant appears
unable to pay a fine based on his financial profile and the priority of restitution. PSR § 89.

The Court is also required to impose a mandatory special assessment of $100.00 per count.
18 U.S.C. § 3013. The Court imposes that special assessment of $100.00 now. Restitution in the

full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the Court is mandatory in this case pursuant

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to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664. Defendant is subject to the terms of the Order of Restitution,
obligating him to pay $178,800.00 in restitution. ECF No. 252. In addition, Defendant is subject
to the terms of the Order of Forfeiture, which the Court entered on February 26, 2024. ECF No.
230.

D. The Kind of Sentences and the Sentencing Range Established for
Defendant’s Offenses

The fourth § 3553(a) factor requires the Court to discuss “the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).

Probation asserts the applicable guideline for conspiracy to commit access device fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b)(2), is U.S.S.G. §2B1.1, which provides a
base offense level of six. PSR 950. Defendant is responsible for a total actual loss amount of
more than $1.5 million, resulting in a 16-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(6)(1)().
First PSR Addendum at 1, ECF No. 246; PSR { 51.

Two levels are added pursuant to U.S.S.G §2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the offense involved
more than 10 victims. PSR 452. A further two levels are added pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i) because the offense involved the unauthorized transfer or use of
identification unlawfully to produce or obtain means of identification. PSR 453. Two more
levels are added under U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(12) because the offense involved conduct described
in 18 U.S.C. § 1040, which is fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits.
PSR { 54.

Three levels are removed pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 to account for Defendant’s timely
acceptance of responsibility for the offense. PSR ff 60-61. A further two levels are removed

because Defendant is a Zero-Point Offender under the 2023 Amendments to the Sentencing
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Guidelines. First PSR Addendum at 2. Altogether, Probation calculates Defendant’s total
adjusted offense level is 23. Jd.

Defense counsel and the Government largely agree with Probation’s calculations. See
Def. Mem. at 2; Gov’t Mem. at 4. However, defense counsel and the Government argue, and the
plea agreement reflects, Defendant should receive a further one-level reduction pursuant to
U.S.S.G. Policy Statement 5K2.0 because there was a global resolution to the case. Def. Mem.
at 2; Gov’t Mem. at 4. Altogether, the Government and defense counsel calculate Defendant’s
total adjusted offense level to be 22. Def. Mem. at 2; Gov’t Mem. at 4-5.

Defendant has no prior criminal convictions, which results in a total criminal history
score of zero. PSR {] 63-65. According to the sentencing table in U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A, a
criminal history score of zero establishes a criminal history category of I.

According to Probation’s calculations, which assume an offense level of 23, the
Guidelines imprisonment range is 46 to 57 months of imprisonment. First PSR Addendum at 2.
According to calculations by defense counsel and the Government, which assume an offense
level of 22, the Guidelines imprisonment range is 41 to 51 months of imprisonment. Def. Mem.
at 2; Gov’t Mem. at 5.

The parties’ sentencing recommendations vary. Probation recommends a below-
Guidelines sentence of 14 months of custody; restitution in the amount of $1,788,429.00; one
year of supervised release with special conditions; and a $100.00 special assessment. Revised
Probation Recommendation at 1, ECF No. 246-1. In recommending this below-Guidelines
sentence, Probation emphasizes the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Defendant was only
partially responsible for the total loss amount primarily driving the Guidelines range; (2)

Defendant’s young age at the time of the instant offense; and (3) a federal conviction would have

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considerable consequences on the otherwise law-abiding Defendant. Id. at 3. The PSR further
states Defendant’s rehabilitation following his arrest, including participating in the Special
Options Services (“SOS”) program, may be mitigating. PSR { 106. Probation posits these
circumstances warrant significant leniency. Revised Probation Recommendation at 3. Finally,
recommends Defendant be excused from the mandatory drug testing provisions during
supervised release. Id. at 2.

Defense counsel recommends a below-Guidelines sentence of time served and three years
of supervised release. Def. Mem. at 11. Defense counsel argues if Defendant’s Guidelines
calculations were predicated on the loss personally attributable to Defendant—who, according to
defense counsel, had the “second lowest number of claims” and third lowest dollar amount
obtained via those claims out of the co-conspirators—Defendant’s total adjusted offense level
would be 16. Jd. at 2-3. Regarding the adjustment for more than ten victims, defense counsel
argues “[w]hile the identities of more than ten persons were used” during the course of the
offense, Ҥ2B1.1 Application Note 1, Definitions, require the more than 10 victims suffer actual
loss to be considered,” and “[t]here is no evidence that any of the persons whose identities were
used suffered financial loss.” Jd. at 3. Defense counsel posits Defendant’s adjusted offense level
would be 20 without the two-level adjustment for more than ten victims. Def. Mem. at 3.
Moreover, if both variances defense counsel argues for were applied, Defendant’s total adjusted
offense level would be 14. Jd.

Defense counsel urges the Court to give Defendant a second chance, arguing Defendant
now finally understands the severity of his conduct and “additional incarceration is unnecessary
to achieve the sentencing goals including deterring Gianni Stewart from such conduct again.” Id.

at 3, 11; see also id. at 8-11. Defense counsel argues Defendant’s post-arrest rehabilitation,

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brought on at least in part by Defendant’s two and a half months of incarceration following this
Court revoking Defendant’s bail and Defendant becoming a father. Jd. at 1. Defense counsel
asserts “22 year old Gianni Stewart is no longer that” teenager who posts on social media
showing off cash obtained through fraud. See First Defense Counsel Supplemental Sentencing
Memorandum (“First Def. Supp. Mem.”) at 1, ECF No. 233. Defense counsel further cites
Supreme Court precedent recognizing “[o]ffenders on probation are . . . subject to several
standard conditions that substantially restrict their liberty,” Def. Mem. at 4 (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and maintains
Defendant’s “time already spent in jail, on home detention, and if I am sufficiently persuasive,
on supervision, is not a free ride for crimes committed by an 18 and 19 year old, now 22,” id. at
8. Ultimately, defense counsel argues “a sentence that incarcerates Mr. Stewart will not promote
respect for the law in our community but will be seen as overly harsh and unduly punitive
thereby diminishing the respect for the law and our system of justice.” Jd. at 10. Moreover, in
defense counsel’s second supplemental sentencing submission, defense counsel requests no
interest accrue on Defendant’s restitution “and that it is not to be collected or due until 90 days
after release from prison if your honor requires additional incarceration.” Second Def. Supp.
Mem. at 1. The Court denied that request during sentencing.

The Court has read and considered the letters written by Defendant and his supporters.
Exhibits to Def. Mem., ECF No. 231-1; Exhibits to First Supp. Def. Mem., ECF No. 233-1. The
letters from Defendant’s mother and girlfriend describe Defendant as a loving father, older
brother, son, and partner; Defendant’s aunt writes that Defendant is “well loved by all his family
members,” who were “very disappointed by his actions[]” and will “therefore . . . all come

together to ensure he makes better choices[;]” and Defendant’s former school counselor

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“believe[s] that he has grown and matured as a result of his troubles and . . . still believe[s] in
him.” Id The Court appreciates what Defendant and his advocates have said on his behalf.

The Government recommends a Guidelines sentence of 41 months to 51 months of
imprisonment. The Government emphasizes the seriousness of the instant offense combined
with Defendant’s “flaunt[ing of] his ill-gotten gains on social media” as warranting
incarceration. Gov’t Mem. at 6. The Government asserts a Guidelines sentence is necessary to
effectuate both specific and general deterrence, specifically invoking Defendant’s “repeated[]
flout[ing of] his conditions of supervised release,” the harms wrought by Defendant and his co-
conspirators in taking advantage of Government programs designed to help people during the
pandemic, and the difficulty in detecting and investigating these types of financial crimes. Jd. at
6-7. While the Government acknowledges Defendant’s young age at the time of the instant
offense, it ultimately concludes that “a balance of the Section 3553(a) factors nonetheless weighs
in favor of a Guidelines sentence.” Jd. at 7.

E. Pertinent Policy Statement(s) of the Sentencing Commission

The fifth § 3553(a) factor requires the Court to evaluate “any pertinent policy statement . .
. issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5).

The parties have pointed the Court to the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. §5K2.0
governing the global resolution reduction. See First PSR Addendum at 3; see also Gov’t Mem. at
4; Def. Mem. at 2. Defense counsel further points the Court to the United States Sentencing
Commission’s recent proposed amendments to the sentencing Guidelines, which would amend the
policy statement at §5H1.1 to specifically permit courts to downwardly depart “due to the
defendant’s youthfulness at the time of the offense or prior offenses.” Third Defense Counsel

Supplemental Sentencing Submission, ECF No. 242 (quoting U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Amendments

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to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) Proposed Amendment 2 (Apr. 17, 2024), available at
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendments/adopted-amendments-effective-november-1-2024)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The parties have not pointed the Court to any other pertinent
policy statements, and the Court has not found any on its own.

F. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities

The sixth § 3553(a) factor requires this Court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted

_ sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

_ The Court premises its sentence on the nature and characteristics of Defendant and of the
instant crime of conviction. It has carefully considered the purpose of the applicable Guidelines
provisions and has adequately ensured the sentence it now imposes will avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities.

G. The Need to Provide Restitution

Lastly, the seventh § 3553(a) factor requires this Court to touch upon “the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A and the Order of Restitution, Defendant is ordered to pay
restitution in the total amount of $178,800.00. See ECF No. 252.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court determines a sentence of 24 months of
incarceration to be followed by one year of supervised release with both the standard conditions
and special conditions, restitution in the amount of $178,800.00 as set forth in the Order of
Restitution, forfeiture in the amount of $178,800.00 as set forth in the Order of Forfeiture, and a

$100.00 mandatory special assessment is consistent with, and is sufficient but no greater than

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necessary to accomplish, the purposes of § 3553(a)(2). The Court does not impose a fine because
Defendant appears unable to pay. The Court excuses Defendant from the mandatory drug testing
provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d).

The Court expressly adopts the factual findings of the Presentence Investigation Report

and the addendum thereto, barring any errors contained therein, to the extent they are not

inconsistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED. _ PS

TION, WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: May 10, 2024
Brooklyn, New York

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