TIGTA Semiannual Report to Congress — April 1 to September 30, 2024

Record facts

Full text

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2024 — SEPTEMBER 30, 2024
C
E
L
E
B
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
O
U
R
 
T
W
E
N
T
Y
-
F
I
F
T
H
 
A
N
N
I
V
E
R
S
A
R
Y
C
E
L
E
B
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
O
U
R
 
T
W
E
N
T
Y
-
F
I
F
T
H
 
A
N
N
I
V
E
R
S
A
R
Y

C
E
L
E
B
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
O
U
R
 
T
W
E
N
T
Y
-
F
I
F
T
H
 
A
N
N
I
V
E
R
S
A
R
Y
C
E
L
E
B
R
A
T
I
N
G
 
O
U
R
 
T
W
E
N
T
Y
-
F
I
F
T
H
 
A
N
N
I
V
E
R
S
A
R
Y
Our Vision
Maintain a highly skilled, proactive, and diverse Inspector General 
organization dedicated to working in a collaborative environment with 
key stakeholders to foster and promote fair tax administration.
Our Mission
Provide quality professional audit, investigative, and inspection and 
evaluation services that promote integrity, economy, and efficiency in 
the administration of the nation’s tax system.
Our Core Values
Integrity – Maintain the highest professional standards of integrity,
personal responsibility, independence, objectivity, and operational 
excellence in pursuit of TIGTA’s mission.
Organizational Innovation – Model innovative practices in 
organizational structure, operational programs and processes, audit, 
investigative, and inspection and evaluation methodologies, and the 
application of advanced information technology.
Communication – Achieve effective organizational approaches and 
solutions by encouraging open, honest, and respectful communication 
among TIGTA’s executives, employees, offices, and functions, as well as 
between TIGTA and its external stakeholders.
Value Employees – Respect the dignity, contributions, and work-life 
balance of our employees, and recognize diversity as fundamental to 
the strength of our organization.
Commitment to Collaboration – Establish and maintain collaborative 
and professional relationships with other government and 
non-government stakeholders.
Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA)

 
 
 
 
April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
│  3 
 
            Acting Inspector General’s Message to Congress 
  
January 2024 marked the 25th anniversary of the Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). As one of three Inspectors 
General serving the U.S. Department of the Treasury, we are 
responsible for providing oversight of the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and protecting the integrity of the nation’s tax system. Congress 
established TIGTA as part of the sweeping reforms enacted in the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98). The RRA 98 
transferred all functions of the former IRS Inspection Service to TIGTA.1  
 
Our accomplishments over the past 25 years are a testament to the 
positive changes resulting from the RRA 98 and subsequent revisions 
to the Internal Revenue Code. Partnering with the IRS and providing 
effective oversight has helped the agency understand and overcome its management 
challenges while delivering significant return on investment to the nation’s taxpayers.  
 
Highlights from our work over the past 25 years include: 
 
• An average annual return of $102 for each dollar invested in TIGTA.2 
• Issuing 3,280 reports with monetary benefits totaling more than $382.7 billion. 
• Referring 31,798 cases of IRS employee misconduct for action, and 5,368 cases for 
criminal prosecution. 
 
In this Semiannual Report to Congress, I am also pleased to summarize our accomplishments 
from April 1, 2024, through Sept. 30, 2024. We continue our regular IRS oversight roles and 
responsibilities, in addition to monitoring the IRS’s use of supplemental Inflation Reduction 
Act (IRA) funds. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, we identified “Managing IRA Transformation 
Efforts” as 1 of 9 IRS management challenges. During this reporting period, we issued 16  
IRA-related reports to assist the IRS and keep stakeholders informed.  
 
Our quarterly snapshot reports, for example, share cumulative and quarterly assessments 
about the IRS and its use of IRA funding. Visit our IRA dashboard on TIGTA.gov to obtain 
regular updates on the IRS’s progress using supplemental IRA funding. We also issued an  
IRA-related report examining the IRS’s Lifting Up Communities initiative. The initiative was 
developed to rebuild underserved communities by creating jobs for people living in these 
communities. Other IRA-related reports examined IRS efforts to comply with a Treasury 
Directive not to increase the audit rate for taxpayers with incomes below $400,000, and two 
reports reviewed the IRS’s Direct File Pilot program.  
 
Additional highlights from our Office of Audit include reporting on noncompliant biofuel tax 
credit claims, the need for the IRS to improve virtual tax compliance enforcement surrounding 
the trillion-dollar virtual currency industry, and ways the IRS can address questionable claims 
 
1 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
2 Dollar amount does not include supplemental funding. 

 
 
 
 
 
4 │ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
associated with the Employee Retention Credit. We also assessed the IRS’s handling of 
taxpayers who took early retirement distributions but did not pay additional tax, claim an 
exception, or report the income. 
 
Our Office of Inspections and Evaluations provides expedited oversight that quickly assesses 
emerging issues impacting IRS operations. In one of our evaluations that assessed the IRS’s 
Taxpayer Advocate Service, we called all 76 local Taxpayer Advocate Service telephone lines 
in the United States and Puerto Rico using phone numbers listed on IRS websites. We found 
telephone lines that were not in service, voicemail boxes that were full, and inconsistent 
recorded messaging and callback time frames.  
 
Cases highlighted from our Office of Investigations include an IRS employee indicted for filing 
a false tax return, an IRS contract employee sentenced to 17 months imprisonment for 
threatening to bomb an IRS Lockbox facility, 2 People’s Republic of China citizens pleading 
guilty in an IRS bribery scheme, and a postal worker indicted in the theft of more than  
$4 million in Treasury checks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this reporting period, our Office of Audit issued 50 reports; Office of Inspections and 
Evaluations issued 10 reports; and Office of Investigations completed 1,032 investigations. 
TIGTA’s combined audit and investigative efforts during this reporting period resulted in the 
recovery, protection, and identification of monetary benefits totaling more than $6.1 billion. 
 
As we celebrate our 25th anniversary, we look forward to continuing our work providing quality 
audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services to help the IRS achieve its goals. 
We also remain committed to working with Congress, the Administration, and all our 
stakeholders to improve federal tax administration. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
     
 
       Heather M. Hill 
       Acting Inspector General 
Highlights This Reporting Period 
50 
Audits  
Investigations 
Inspections and Evaluations  
10 
1,032 
in Monetary Benefits 
$6.1 Billion 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 5
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
TIGTA’s Profile ........................................................................................................................................     6 
 
 
 
Statutory Mandate .......................................................................................................................     6 
 
Organizational Structure .............................................................................................................     7 
 
Authorities ....................................................................................................................................     7 
 
Inflation Reduction Act Oversight Activities ..........................................................................................     8 
 
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Tax Administration .....................................    16 
 
 
Assess Emerging Issues Impacting America’s Tax System .................................................................    22 
 
Protect the Integrity of Tax Administration ...........................................................................................    24 
 
 
Investigations Statistical Reports .........................................................................................................    32 
 
 
Reports With Unimplemented Corrective Actions ................................................................................    37 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix I – Other Required Reporting ................................................................................................    47 
 
Appendix II – TIGTA’s Statutory Reviews ..............................................................................................    48 
 
 
Appendix III – Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued ............................................................................    54 
 
Appendix IV – Inspector General Peer Review Activity ........................................................................    58 
 
Appendix V – Data Tables Provided by the Internal Revenue Service ................................................    59 
 
 
 
Internal Revenue Service Memorandum ...................................................................................    59 
 
Report of Employee Misconduct by Disposition Groups ...........................................................    60
 
Report of Employee Misconduct National Summary .................................................................    61 
 Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. Section 1203 Inquiries Recorded in ALERTS .....................    62 
 
Appendix VI – Section 1203 Standards ...............................................................................................    63 
 
Glossary ..................................................................................................................................................    64 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
6│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
TIGTA’s Profile 
 
TIGTA provides audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services that promote 
economy, efficiency, and integrity in the administration of the Internal Revenue laws.  
We provide independent oversight of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the IRS Oversight 
Board, and the IRS Office of Chief Counsel. We are placed organizationally within the 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department or Treasury). While TIGTA reports to the 
Treasury Secretary and to Congress, we function independently from all other offices and 
bureaus within the Treasury Department. 
 
 
TIGTA oversees all aspects of the IRS’s administration of the federal tax system.  
We protect the public’s confidence in the tax system by identifying and recommending 
strategies for addressing the IRS’s management challenges and by implementing Treasury 
Department priorities. 
 
Our organizational structure (see following page) consists of the Office of the Inspector 
General and six functional offices: the Office of Audit; the Office of Inspections and 
Evaluations; the Office of Investigations; the Office of Mission Support; the Office of 
Information Technology; and the Office of Chief Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory Mandate 
  
Prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in IRS programs and operations. 
 
 
Protect against IRS employee misconduct and external attempts to corrupt or 
threaten IRS employees. 
 
Provide policy direction and conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and 
investigations related to IRS programs and operations. 
 
 
Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations related to IRS programs 
and operations, and make recommendations concerning the impact of such 
legislation or regulations. 
 
Promote economy and efficiency in the administration of tax laws. 
 
 
Inform the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress of problems and deficiencies 
identified and of the progress made in resolving them. 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 7
 
 
 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
 
 
Authorities 
 
TIGTA has all authorities granted under the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Inspector 
General Act).3 In addition to standard authorities granted to Inspectors General, TIGTA is 
authorized to access tax returns and return information in the performance of our tax 
administration responsibilities. We also report potential criminal violations directly to the 
U.S. Department of Justice when we deem appropriate.  
 
TIGTA and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner or IRS Commissioner) have 
established policies and procedures delineating responsibilities to investigate potential 
criminal offenses under the Internal Revenue laws. In addition, the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98) amended the Inspector General Act to give TIGTA statutory 
authority to carry firearms, execute search and arrest warrants, serve subpoenas and 
summonses, and make arrests pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 7608(b)(2).4 
 
 
 
 
 
3 5 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.  
4 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26, 31, 38,          
and 49 U.S.C.). 
 

 
 
 
 
8│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Inflation Reduction Act Oversight Activities 
 
Through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), the IRS received approximately  
$80 billion in supplemental funding to improve the administration of our nation’s tax  
system and services to taxpayers.5 By the end of March 2024, Congress had reduced  
the IRS’s funding from the IRA to $57.8 billion.6 TIGTA also received supplemental funding 
from the IRA. The $403 million in funding that we received will help us provide oversight of 
the IRS and support our operations.  
 
The IRA provided the IRS with funding to transform all aspects of its operations over the next 
decade. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, we identified “Managing IRA Transformation Efforts” as  
1 of 9 IRS management challenges. Following are highlights from our IRA-related reviews 
this reporting period. We plan to share ongoing quarterly and cumulative reporting on the 
IRS’s use of IRA funding to implement its Strategic Operating Plan (SOP).7 Visit TIGTA.gov for 
additional information on our IRA oversight activities. 
 
Quarterly Snapshot:  The IRS’s Inflation Reduction Act Spending Through June 30, 2024 
(Report Number 2024-IE-R020) 
 
     Figure 1: Cumulative IRA Expenditures by Funding Activity Through June 30, 20248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Pub. L. No. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818. 
6 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 460 (rescinding $20.2 billion); Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5, 137 Stat. 10 (rescinding $1.4 billion). 
7 Publication 3744, Internal Revenue Service Inflation Reduction Act Strategic Operating Plan (Rev. 4-2023). 
8 Percentages of IRA funds expended may not calculate correctly due to rounding. Additionally, the Enforcement allocation 
amount is after the $21.6 billion in rescissions. 
Source: TIGTA-created graphic based on information provided by the Office of the 
Chief Financial Officer.

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 9
 
 
 
 
In this report, we presented our most recent cumulative and quarterly snapshot of how the 
IRS has expended IRA funds. As of June 30, 2024, the IRS had expended approximately 
$6.9 billion (11.9 percent) of its $57.8 billion in IRA funds (see Figure 1). Of the $6.9 billion, 
approximately $1.2 billion occurred in the third quarter of FY 2024 (April through  
June 2024).  
 
In addition, the IRS expended approximately $11.6 million in FY 2023 for the direct e-file tax 
return system. The IRS also indicated that $2 billion of the $6.9 billion in expended IRA 
funds were used to supplement the IRS’s annual appropriation because the amount the IRS 
received was insufficient to cover normal operating expenses. 
 
The report provided information only. We made no recommendations. 
 
Actions Need to Be Taken to Ensure the Success of the Lifting Communities Up Initiative 
in Expanding Services and Assistance to Taxpayers in Underserved Populations             
(Report Number 2024-IE-R012) 
 
The Taxpayer First Act requires the IRS to develop a comprehensive taxpayer experience 
strategy.9 As part of the development of its strategy, the IRS identified several initiatives to 
expand services and assistance to taxpayers in underserved populations. One initiative is 
called Lifting Communities Up (LCU), which was developed to rebuild underserved 
communities by creating jobs for people in these communities. In FY 2022, the IRS selected 
the Mississippi Delta for its pilot LCU initiative.  
 
Our evaluation of the LCU pilot initiative found that the IRS had not taken key steps to 
ensure the continuation of the LCU initiative. As of December 2023, the IRS Commissioner 
had not approved the Request for Organizational Change to formally establish the LCU 
Program Office. In addition, the IRS had not finalized the LCU’s governing and operational 
policies and procedures or developed key performance measurements to assess the 
success of the initiative in the Mississippi Delta.  
 
We made two recommendations that include establishing the LCU Program Office and 
developing a strategy to conduct in-person recruiting activities at educational institutions 
and job fairs as part of the Mississippi Delta hiring strategies. The IRS agreed with the 
recommendations. 
 
Opportunities Exist to Improve Taxpayer Service to Underserved, Underrepresented, and 
Rural Communities (Report Number 2024-IE-R014)  
 
In April 2023, the IRS issued its SOP, which outlined how the IRS plans to use its 
supplemental IRA funding to better serve taxpayers, tax professionals, and the broader tax 
system. The SOP notes that the IRS plans to make interactions easier and more convenient 
for taxpayers.  
 
 
9 Pub. L. No. 116-25, 133 Stat. 981 (2019).  

 
 
 
 
10│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
 Table 1: Definition of Underserved Taxpayers From Various IRS Business Units 
Source: Response from IRS business units. 
We found that the IRS has made improvements to increase the accessibility and availability 
of customer service in underserved, underrepresented, and rural communities; however, 
additional efforts are needed to improve the geographic outreach efforts in these 
communities. While the IRS uses various models to identify the underserved, 
underrepresented, and rural population, there is no clear definition for these populations.  
 
When we asked the IRS for the criteria used to identify these populations, the response we 
received varied by business unit. Table 1 shows the inconsistency in how various IRS  
business units define an underserved taxpayer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without a clear definition of what constitutes these populations, the IRS is unable to 
measure its progress in increasing accessibility and availability to these segments of  
taxpayers. This includes the IRS’s inability to identify additional locations where there are 
segments of underserved taxpayers for which the IRS currently does not provide adequate 
face-to-face customer service. Our evaluation also identified that there is no comprehensive 
communication strategy to inform underserved taxpayers of the availability of these options. 
 
We made five recommendations. The IRS agreed with all five recommendations. 
 
The IRS Has Made Limited Progress Developing the Methodology to Comply With the 
Treasury Directive to Not Increase the Audit Rate for Taxpayers With Incomes Below 
$400,000 Due to Planning and Implementation Challenges (Report Number 2024-308-043) 
 
The $24 billion of IRA funds allocated to IRS enforcement activities is intended in part to 
increase examinations of high-income taxpayers. In August 2022, the Secretary of the 
Treasury issued a Treasury Directive to the IRS Commissioner directing the IRS not to use  

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 11
 
 
 
 
any additional resources to increase audits on small business or households earning below 
$400,000 per year. In the directive, the Treasury Secretary stated that “enforcement 
resources will focus on high-end noncompliance.”  
 
Although the IRS and Treasury chose Tax Year (TY) 2018 for the base year, as of May 2024, 
the IRS had yet to calculate the audit coverage for TY 2018 because it had not finalized its 
methodology for the audit coverage calculation. While the IRS routinely calculates audit 
coverage rates, the IRS and Treasury have been exploring a range of options to develop a 
different methodology for purposes of determining compliance with the directive.  
 
Table 2 shows that examinations of taxpayers reporting total positive income (TPI) under 
$400,000 accounted for 95 percent of total examinations in FYs 2019 to 2021 and  
93 percent and 91 percent in FYs 2022 and 2023, respectively. Increasing the audit 
coverage rate for taxpayers reporting TPI greater than $400,000 will require a significant 
shift in the IRS’s examination resources. 
 
 
 
Examinations Started 
FY 2019 
FY 2020 
FY 2021 
FY 2022 
FY 2023 
Total Number of Records 
574,951 
466,921 
519,167 
446,100 
400,446 
Percentage of Examinations of TPI 
Less Than or Equal to $400,000 
95% 
95% 
95% 
93% 
91% 
Percentage of Examinations of TPI 
Greater Than $400,000 
5% 
5% 
5% 
7% 
9% 
 
 
 
We made four recommendations. The IRS agreed with two recommendations, disagreed 
with one, and partially agreed with one. 
 
Interim Results of the 2024 Filing Season (Report Number 2024-408-024) 
 
Our report presented interim results evaluating whether the IRS was timely and  
accurately processing TY 2023 individual paper and electronically filed (e-filed) tax  
returns. The results were presented as of several dates between Jan. 29, 2024, and  
March 30, 2024, depending on when the information was available. 
 
While e-file volumes decreased by 1.5 percent, the number of returns filed through the IRS 
Free File Program increased by 14 percent when compared to the same period during the 
2023 Filing Season. The IRS also continued to increase the number of fraudulent tax returns 
detected and stopped from entering the tax processing system, i.e., rejecting e-filed tax 
returns and preventing paper tax returns from posting. As of Feb. 24, 2024, the IRS  
reported that it identified 32,616 tax returns with approximately $272.7 million claimed in  
fraudulent refunds and prevented the issuance of $262.7 million (96.3 percent) of those 
refunds (see Table 3). 
 
Table 2: Examinations of Taxpayers Reporting TPI Under and Over $400,000 
Source: TIGTA analysis of Audit Information Management System and Return Transaction 
File data. 

 
 
 
 
12│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Table 3: Fraudulent Tax Returns and Refunds Identified and                                                    
Stopped in Processing Years 2022, 2023, and 2024 
 
Processing 
Year 
 
Fraudulent 
Refund 
Returns 
Identified 
 
Fraudulent 
Refund 
Returns 
Stopped 
 
Amount of Fraudulent 
Refunds Identified 
 
 
Amount of Fraudulent 
Refunds Stopped 
 
2022 
76,814 
74,711 
$817,400,771 
$807,903,066 
2023 
31,079 
30,730 
$310,724,203 
$303,718,702 
2024 
32,616 
30,867 
$272,738,111 
$262,682,364 
 
Source: IRS fraudulent tax return statistics for Processing Years 2022 (as of Feb. 26, 2022);                                
2023 (as of Feb. 25, 2023); and 2024 (as of Feb. 24, 2024). 
 
We reported on several IRS customer service initiatives, such as the increase in visits to 
IRS.gov, and the launch of a public-facing dashboard that lists current processing statuses 
for general correspondence and key tax forms. The IRS also planned to assist about                      
2 million taxpayers at its Taxpayer Assistance Centers in FY 2024, which was a 22 percent 
increase from the number of taxpayers the IRS assisted during FY 2023. 
 
This report provided interim information only. No recommendations were made. 
 
Inflation Reduction Act: Implementation of the Elective Payment and Transfer                             
of Credit Provision (Report Number 2024--408-066) 
 
The IRA created new Internal Revenue Code sections allowing applicable entities to treat the 
unused portion of certain nonrefundable clean energy tax credits as an elective payment 
that generates a refund and allows eligible taxpayers to elect to transfer, i.e., sell, certain 
clean energy tax credit(s) to an unrelated third-party buyer in exchange for cash. IRS 
regulations require taxpayers that intend to make an election for an elective payment or a 
transfer of credit to register each property or facility used to earn the credit after the 
property or facility is placed into service.   
 
The IRS developed the Pre-Filing Registration tool within the Energy Credits Online portal for 
taxpayers to register their properties and facilities. As of May 21, 2024, we identified more 
than 1,700 entities entered information into the Pre-Filing Registration tool, accounting for 
about 62,500 properties or facilities. During that same time frame, the IRS reported that 
130 tax returns had been filed reporting elective payments and/or transfers of credits 
totaling almost $381 million. 
 
Our review found that the IRS established access controls for the portal and a process to 
evaluate the properties being registered. The portal is accessible through IRS.gov where an 
individual user authenticates themselves and creates an account. The IRS also developed a  
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 13
 
 
 
 
new process to evaluate the entities and properties prior to issuing registration numbers to 
help prevent duplication, improper payments, or excessive payments.  
 
We made one recommendation. The IRS agreed with the recommendation. 
 
Communication Breakdowns, Hiring Volume Surges, and Aging System Integration 
Challenges Delayed Some IRS Hiring Efforts (Report Number 2024-108-069) 
 
Over the last decade, the IRS has faced a decline in staffing levels, which has affected its 
ability to fulfill its mission. IRA funds have allowed the IRS to expand its hiring efforts. In 
addition, the IRS was granted multiple Direct Hire Authorities (DHA) to expedite hiring and fill 
job vacancies when a critical hiring need or a severe shortage of candidates exists.  
 
From Oct. 1, 2021, to Sept. 30, 2023, the IRS processed nearly 53,000 new hires.  
In FY 2022 there were almost 22,000 new hires and approximately 31,000 new hires in  
FY 2023. Although the IRS used multiple DHAs to expedite its hiring process to fill vacant 
positions, almost 19,000 of FYs 2022 and 2023 new hires exceeded the Office of Personnel 
Management’s (OPM) target of 80 calendar days to hire.  
 
We reviewed a statistically valid stratified random sample of 106 of the new hires who 
exceeded OPM’s target of 80 calendar days to hire. We found that delays in the hiring 
process were the result of workload constraints and miscommunication, security checks 
exceeding their targeted completion time, and limitations in the IRS’s hiring management 
system.  
 
We made four recommendations to the IRS. Our recommendations included designing a 
corrective action plan focused on improving training, communication, and coordination 
throughout the hiring process; developing comprehensive, up-to-date reference materials; 
and taking steps to improve information accuracy and reduce data input errors in the IRS’s 
hiring management system. The IRS agreed with all of our recommendations. 
 
Progress of Information Technology Modernization Efforts (Report Number 2024-2S8-055) 
 
Modernizing the IRS’s information technology and business systems is essential for helping 
the IRS maintain the integrity of the nation’s tax system, collect trillions of dollars, and keep 
up with economic and population growth.  
 
The SOP outlines how the IRS will deploy IRA funding to better serve taxpayers, tax 
professionals, and the broader tax ecosystem. The SOP is structured to achieve 5 core  
transformation objectives that will be accomplished through the completion of 42 initiatives 
and 39 projects.   
 
We reviewed the progress of the IRS’s modernization efforts and the reported FY 2023 
milestone statuses for Objective 4 of the core objectives. Our review covered the period of 
November 2023 through July 2024, and we issued a memorandum to document actions the 
IRS has taken.  
 

 
 
 
 
14│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
We noted that the IRS is making progress in its modernization efforts while adhering to its 
strategic goals. Specifically, the Information Technology organization is making significant 
technical advancements in the areas of artificial intelligence, automation, cloud capabilities, 
data access, data quality, and data standards. We also noted the IRS is undergoing multiple 
new processes that, once fully operational, will pave the way for a new technology era across 
the enterprise.   
 
The Direct File Pilot Deployed Successfully; However, Security and Testing Improvements 
Are Needed (Report Number 2024-200-050) 
 
The IRA required the IRS to establish a task force to design and report to Congress on an 
IRS-run free, direct electronic filing tax return system. The IRS launched the Direct File Pilot 
program on Feb. 1, 2024, and implemented the pilot in phases throughout the 2024 Filing 
Season. The pilot was implemented to a limited scope of taxpayers with certain types of 
income, credits, deductions, and who reside in 1 of 12 participating states. The IRS 
Transformation and Strategy Office, with support from the Office of Information Technology, 
led the team to design and deploy the pilot.  
 
The IRS issued the Authorization to Operate for the Direct File Pilot with eight moderate and 
low risks identified during security control assessments. We found that during systems 
development, the Direct File Pilot team did not appropriately complete two of its required 
artifacts, e.g., the Configuration Management Plan and the About Page. Once the 
Authorization to Operate was issued, the Direct File Pilot team completed its first required 
monthly Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Continuous Monitoring 
Summary Report. However, we noted that the report was issued without the security 
assessment for the cloud platform upon which the Direct File Pilot resides.   
 
We also found that the Direct File Pilot team issued Memorandums of Understanding to 
participating states without relevant security or technical details for managing the exchange  
of taxpayer data. Initially, the team developed high-level requirements in their test plan and 
test schedule; however, the repositories used for source code and issue tracking lacked 
traceability and reporting capabilities. None of the tests in the issue tracker were able to be 
traced back to the test plan. In addition, the Direct File Pilot contained sufficient 
documentation on bug, also called defect, remediation for only 12 (46 percent) of the  
26 testing issues reviewed.  
 
We made six recommendations. The IRS agreed with all of our recommendations. 
 
Inflation Reduction Act: Interim Results of the Direct File Pilot (Report Number 2024-408-031) 
 
The IRA provided the IRS with $15 million to establish a task force to design an IRS-run, 
free, direct electronic filing system and prepare a report for Congress by May 16, 2023.  
This report provided interim information related to Phase A of the Direct File Pilot.  
 
Our review of the eligibility checker and tax returns filed through Direct File during Phase A 
identified opportunities for the IRS to update the eligibility checker to clarify eligibility  

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 15
 
 
 
 
requirements and potentially reduce taxpayer confusion and burden. For example, we 
identified inconsistent text between the Spanish and English translations for the Direct File 
eligibility checker.  
 
The IRS met three of seven firm criteria established for exiting Phase A of the pilot, but two 
of the seven criteria were not met. For the remaining two criteria, TIGTA has been unable to 
determine whether these criteria were met before exiting Phase A. 
 
We made three recommendations to the IRS. The IRS agreed with two recommendations 
and partially agreed with the third recommendation. Although management agreed with the 
importance of quantitative metrics to assist in evaluating the Direct File pilot, management 
did not establish numerical benchmarks as we recommended. 
 
The Individual Tax Processing Engine Project Is Progressing, but Risks Remain  
(Report Number 2024-208-052) 
 
The Customer Account Data Engine 2 program is one of the most complex modernization 
programs in the federal government and involves major changes to core IRS tax processing 
systems. The program plans to reengineer the IRS’s Individual Master File from an old 
programming language into a modern language and provide state-of-the-art individual 
taxpayer account processing.  
 
The IRS established the Individual Tax Processing Engine (ITPE) project to update two 
programs that perform the core Individual Master File business functions of posting, 
settlement, and analysis, and are the most complex individual tax processing programs.  
For the ITPE project to be successful, the outputs of the project must match the outputs of 
the legacy system it will replace. To ensure that the outputs match, the IRS used high-
volume functional testing. This testing combined functional and high-volume testing to 
evaluate code quality and collect performance metrics.  
 
We assessed whether the IRS effectively managed the testing and defect remediation 
process for the ITPE project and whether a delay in implementing the project would affect 
the schedule of any IRA projects or milestones. We found that the ITPE project met its 
performance goal of processing the code within three hours for Filing Season 2023. 
However, the IRS stopped reporting a risk to stakeholders about a defect that could affect 
the ITPE project delivery. 
 
We made two recommendations. The IRS agreed with both recommendations.   
 

 
 
 
 
16│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Promote the Economy, Efficiency, and 
Effectiveness of Tax Administration 
 
TIGTA’s Office of Audit strives to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of tax 
administration. We provide recommendations to improve IRS systems and operations and to 
ensure the fair and equitable treatment of taxpayers. Our comprehensive and independent 
performance audits of the IRS’s programs and operations primarily address statutorily 
mandated reviews and high-risk challenges the IRS faces. 
 
The IRS’s implementation of audit recommendations results in: 
• Cost savings; 
• Increased or protected revenue; 
• Protection of taxpayers’ rights and entitlements; and 
• More efficient use of resources. 
 
Each year, TIGTA identifies and addresses the IRS’s major management and performance 
challenges. The Office of Audit places audit emphasis on statutory coverage required by the 
RRA 98 and other laws, as well as areas of concern to Congress, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the IRS Commissioner, and other key stakeholders.  
 
The following summaries highlight significant audits completed during this 6-month 
reporting period.  
 
Additional Actions Need to Be Taken to Identify and Address Noncompliant Biofuel Tax 
Credit Claims (Report Number 2024-300-021) 
 
The use of biodiesel instead of conventional diesel fuel is believed to reduce particulate 
matter and hydrocarbon emissions. Since Congress enacted legislation creating biofuel tax 
credits in Calendar Year 2004, the IRS has been susceptible to significant fraudulent 
schemes that have resulted in the payment of erroneous refunds.  
 
We found that the IRS is not using all available compliance tools to encourage more tax 
compliance of biofuel tax claims. Of the 124 taxpayers we sampled, 42 claimed biofuel tax 
credits totaling about $30.3 million. Our analysis found that the 42 taxpayers did not 
provide an approved registration number or a Certificate of Biodiesel; therefore, these 
claims would not be allowable. 
 
Under current law, the IRS could only address these claims after the returns are filed and 
examined, and the agency issues notices of deficiency to the taxpayers as appropriate.  
The IRS does not have the legal authority to deny biofuel tax credits or otherwise enforce  
registration requirements on taxpayers that are not eligible to receive the credits at the time 
a tax return is filed. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 17
 
 
 
 
We also found that IRS compliance efforts primarily focused on biofuel tax credit claims 
made on Form 8849, Schedule 3, Certain Fuel Mixtures and the Alternative Fuel Credit; and 
Form 720, Schedule C, Claims. We noted that more effective efforts could be undertaken to 
evaluate claims made on Form 4136, Credit for Federal Tax Paid on Fuels. 
 
We made four recommendations. The IRS agreed with three recommendations and partially 
agreed with one. 
 
The IRS Has Reduced Its Overall Space Footprint; However, a Significant Amount of 
Unneeded Office Space Still Remains (Report Number 2024-100-027) 
 
For FY 2024, the IRS indicated it would spend approximately $600 million on real estate 
costs. This includes 516 office buildings totaling approximately 22.3 million square feet. 
Since FY 2018, the IRS has reduced its overall space footprint by approximately 2 million 
rentable square feet, from 24.3 million to 22.3 million, which represents a reduction of 
approximately 8 percent (see Figure 2).10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the IRS has made progress reducing its unneeded office space, additional efforts 
to address long-term space planning are important to increasing efficient space allocation 
and realizing associated cost savings. In FY 2023, more than one-half of IRS buildings had a 
workstation occupancy rate of 50 percent or less. In addition, the IRS has not implemented 
workstation sharing/hoteling for approximately 61 percent of its employees on frequent 
 
10 This figure does not include space that is designated as joint space. The General Services Administration defines joint 
space as any space used by all tenants in a building such as food service, fitness, and childcare centers. 
Figure 2: Changes in the IRS’s Real Estate Portfolio for FYs 2018 Through 2023 
Source: The IRS Facilities Management and Security Services, Graphic 
Database Interface system, Facilities Consolidated Data Plus Reports for  
FYs 2018 through 2023. Numbers in this figure are rounded. 
Fiscal Year 

 
 
 
 
18│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
telework. We found that the IRS has enhanced its internal controls over occupancy 
information accuracy since our last review, but documentation could be improved.  
 
We made three recommendations. The IRS agreed with the recommendations and said the 
agency has developed corrective actions to address each one. 
 
Virtual Currency Tax Compliance Enforcement Can Be Improved 
(Report Number 2024-300-030) 
 
In the last 15 years, virtual currency has grown into a trillion-dollar industry. The anonymity 
of virtual currency complicates the IRS’s enforcement efforts. The IRS does not always have 
a clear window into taxpayers’ transactions, and trading platforms do not generally provide 
information reporting documents to the agency.  
 
Without information reporting documents, the IRS 
has been unable to use some of its enforcement tools 
to match reported virtual currency-related income to 
taxpayers’ tax returns to ensure that taxpayers are 
accurately reporting income generated from virtual 
currencies. When there is income information 
reporting from third parties, tax compliance exceeds 
90 percent; however, when there is no third-party 
income information tax compliance is 55 percent.11 
 
We found that IRS Criminal Investigation has taken advantage of analytics tools to address 
virtual currency noncompliance. During FYs 2018 to 2023, there were 390 Criminal 
Investigation cases involving virtual currency or digital assets. Of those cases, 224 were 
recommended for prosecution.  
 
The IRS’s civil examination enforcement efforts focused on digital assets are mostly indirect 
and negligible. The IRS established “Operation Hidden Treasure,” describing it as a 
partnership between the criminal and civil functions to identify taxpayers who omit digital 
assets from their tax returns. However, its primary purpose has been limited to the 
acquisition of tools and training, rather than pursuing taxpayers. 
 
We made three recommendations. The IRS agreed with all three recommendations. 
 
Actions Have Been Taken to Improve Security Controls for the Planned Expanded Use of 
Login.gov; However, Additional Security Improvements Are Needed  
(Report Number 2024-200-032) 
 
In December 2022, the IRS deployed Login.gov as one of its credential service  
providers (CSP) to offer authentication services. The CSPs are independent and trusted  
 
11 IRS, Publication 1415, Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2014-2016, p. 3                        
(Rev. 10-2022). 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 19
 
 
 
 
third parties that issue user authenticators and provide electronic credentials for accessing 
an information system or application. The IRS leverages Login.gov as a CSP for its Secure 
Access Digital Identity system.  
 
We audited the effectiveness and security of the IRS’s Login.gov deployment. We found that 
the IRS timely completed the initial analysis of Login.gov’s Federal Risk and Authorization 
Management Program (FedRAMP) security package, which includes the Plans of Action and 
Milestones, the Digital Identity Acceptance Statement, and the Information System 
Contingency Plan. However, we noted that additional security controls need improvement.  
 
We also found that continuous monitoring security reviews need improvement. Continuous 
monitoring security reviews were not completed timely and/or the results were not sent 
consistently to the Authorizing Official. This resulted in the IRS not knowing that the 
Personally Identifiable Information for 57,417 IRS user authentications may have been sent 
to unauthorized locations outside of the United States.  
 
We made six recommendations. The IRS agreed with all six recommendations. 
 
The Information Collected by Online Providers and Shared With Third Parties Is Not 
Clearly Disclosed to Taxpayers and Is Unknown to the IRS (Report Number 2024-400-062) 
 
The IRS partners with tax professionals and other entities that assist taxpayers in meeting 
their tax obligations. Before accepting these individuals, the IRS conducts suitability checks, 
e.g., background and tax compliance checks, to ensure that reputable individuals are 
participating in the Authorized e-file Provider (i.e., online providers), Acceptance Agent, and 
Enrolled Agent Programs. Allowing unsuitable individuals into these programs increases the 
risk to taxpayers.  
 
Our review of four tax software companies found that providers requested taxpayer consent 
for the disclosure and use of tax return information, used the required format, and met 
requirements for electronic signatures. However, consent statements did not clearly  
identify the intended purpose of the disclosure and specific recipient(s) of the tax return 
information. 
 
We also found that the guidance for obtaining taxpayer consent to use or disclose taxpayer 
information did not specifically address the use of pixels, i.e., third-party code used to track 
information on a website. Additionally, we noted that the IRS did not have awareness of the 
full scope of information that an online provider routinely collects, beyond what  
is filed with the IRS or shared with third parties.   
 
We made three recommendations. The IRS agreed with all three recommendations and 
plans to discuss the revenue procedure with Treasury; identify the most appropriate 
communication mechanism to raise awareness about data-sharing practices; and explore 
and identify potential solutions to ensure that Authorized e-file Providers comply with 
taxpayer consent statement requirements.  
 
 

 
 
 
 
20│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Former Contractor Employees Retained Access to IRS Facilities, Systems,  
and Equipment (Report Number 2024-100-063) 
 
The IRS uses HRConnect, the Treasury Department’s human resource and personnel 
system, to manage and track onboarding and separation data associated with contractor 
employees. Our review of 18,454 contractor employees listed as active on HRConnect as of  
April 2023 identified 1,821 (10 percent) former contractor employees who should have 
been listed as separated because they were no longer assigned to an ongoing contract.  
 
As of October 2023, 63 of the 1,821 former contractor employees had not returned their 
assigned identification media allowing access to an IRS facility, of which 13 had active IRS 
network access. In addition, 17 of the 1,821 former contractor employees had not returned 
their assigned IRS computer hardware.  
 
When the IRS does not properly separate contractor employees and retrieve the issued 
security items and identification media, it increases the risk of unauthorized entry to IRS 
facilities and workspaces, potentially endangering IRS employees. By not recovering security 
items and computers, the IRS increases the risk of former contractor employees improperly 
accessing its systems and sensitive taxpayer information. Unrecovered computers also 
represent a financial loss to the IRS.  
 
We also noted that the IRS did not always document contractor separation actions as 
required. From Oct. 1, 2021, through Jan. 31, 2023, the IRS had 10,628 contractor 
employees who separated from the agency. In 12 of 20 contractor employee separations 
reviewed, the Contracting Officer’s Representative either did not complete, or partially 
documented completing, the required contractor separation actions. 
 
We made two recommendations. The IRS agreed with both of recommendations. 
 
Management Took Actions to Address Erroneous Employee Retention Credit Claims; 
However, Some Questionable Claims Still Need to Be Addressed                                                       
(Report Number 2024-400-068)  
 
This report was a continuation of our review of the Employee Retention Credit (ERC). The 
ERC was intended to provide businesses with relief from the adverse financial effects of the 
pandemic. On Sept. 14, 2023, the IRS placed a moratorium on processing new ERC claims 
due to a surge in the volume of suspicious claims from unscrupulous actors.   
 
We found that the IRS increased awareness about ERC eligibility requirements by issuing 
numerous press releases and electronic news articles to tax professionals and other 
subscribers. The IRS also updated identity theft filters and reported that it identified more 
than 155,000 tax returns claiming potentially erroneous ERC, preventing $487 million in 
refunds from being issued during Processing Years 2021 through 2023. However, we noted 
that the IRS does not apply updated filters to tax returns that were previously screened 
using old criteria. We identified 997 returns reporting $19.6 million in potentially erroneous 
ERC that the IRS did not identify.   
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 21
 
 
 
 
We also found that through June 29, 2023, the IRS made decisions to double the threshold 
and change the referral criteria to include only returns that met specific return scenarios. 
The IRS said these changes were to deal with the influx of ERC claims and to expedite the 
processing. However, the IRS’s decisions resulted in 184,923 returns claiming $41.8 billion 
in ERC from being considered for possible prerefund examination. 
 
After the moratorium was announced, the IRS implemented several initiatives that assessed 
or prevented erroneous ERC amounts. These initiatives prevented $1.6 billion in ERC and 
allowed the IRS to assess $573 million in ERC as of April 13, 2024. However, we identified 
an additional 923 entities that claimed ERC of $105 million that should have received a 
disallowance letter but were not initially identified by the IRS. 
 
We made four recommendations. The IRS agreed with three recommendations and partially 
agreed with one. 
 
Millions of Taxpayers Took Early Retirement Distributions but Some Did Not Pay the 
Additional Tax, Claim an Exception, or Report the Income (Report Number 2024-100-065) 
 
Many individuals use retirement plans to save for their retirement. However, the law 
imposes a 10 percent additional tax on certain early retirement distributions. We assessed 
whether the IRS is effectively ensuring that taxpayers comply with Form 5329, Additional 
Taxes on Qualified Plans (Including IRAs) and Other Tax-Favored Accounts, filing and 
payment requirements when they receive an early distribution from a retirement account.   
 
Our analysis of TY 2021 tax return information identified approximately 2.8 million taxpayers 
who received early distributions of approximately $12.9 billion but did not pay the additional 
10 percent tax and did not file Forms 5329. These taxpayers could be subject to  
approximately $1.29 billion in additional taxes and/or approximately $322 million in  
Form 5329 failure to file penalties.  
 
We found that taxpayers for whom third parties reported early distributions should have 
reported and paid the additional 10 percent tax, filed a Form 5329 claiming an exception, or 
both if only a portion of the early distribution was excepted. Our analysis applied the  
Form 5329 failure to file penalty on the 10 percent additional tax owed because the law 
applies the penalty to the amount owed on the return due date. However, IRS management 
was uncertain if it was appropriate to apply the penalty to this amount because taxpayers 
who belatedly file Forms 5329 are claiming exceptions to the tax and the subsequent 
amount owed is potentially zero, rendering the penalty amount to zero. 
 
We also found that approximately 2.3 million of the 2.8 million taxpayers did not properly 
report $11.4 billion in early distributions as taxable income, including 880 taxpayers with 
distribution amounts over $200,000.   
 
TIGTA made five recommendations. The IRS agreed or partially agreed with three 
recommendations and disagreed with two recommendations.  
 

 
 
 
 
22│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Assess Emerging Issues Impacting  
America’s Tax System 
 
TIGTA’s Office of Inspections and Evaluations provides focused and expedited oversight to 
quickly assess emerging issues impacting tax administration and IRS operations.  
 
Inspections are intended to: 
 
• Provide factual and analytical information;  
• Monitor compliance; 
• Measure performance; 
• Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and operations; 
• Share best practices; and 
• Inquire into allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. 
 
Evaluations are intended to: 
 
• Provide in-depth reviews of specific management issues, policies, or programs; 
• Address governmentwide or multiagency issues; and 
• Develop recommendations to streamline operations, enhance data quality, and 
minimize inefficient and ineffective procedures. 
 
The following summaries highlight significant evaluations completed during this 6-month 
reporting period. 
 
The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Fully Complying With the 90- and 120-Day 
Requirements of the “No TikTok on Government Devices” Implementation Guidance 
(Report Number 2024-IE-R016) 
 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, enacted the No TikTok on Government Devices 
Act in December 2022.12 In this report, we assessed the IRS’s actions to timely address the 
90- and 120-day requirements in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) M-23-13, 
“No TikTok on Government Devices” Implementation Guidance.  
 
We found that the IRS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) was not in compliance 
with OMB and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) guidance because contracting officers 
did not always include the required clause in solicitations, contracts, and contract 
modifications to extend the period of performance. Specifically, our review of contract 
actions signed between June 2 and Aug. 16, 2023, found that contracting officers omitted 
the FAR clause in 68 of 163 contracts or solicitations and in 50 of 53 contract 
modifications. The FAR clause states that contractors are prohibited from using TikTok or a 
 
12 Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022). 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 23
 
 
 
 
subsidiary of TikTok’s parent company during the performance of a contract. In addition, we 
identified social media and recruiting contracts, which were not identified by the OCPO, that 
could potentially involve the use of TikTok.  
 
We made five recommendations. The IRS agreed with four of the five recommendations and 
disagreed with one. 
 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Local Taxpayer Advocate Service Telephone 
Lines Are Properly Monitored (Report Number 2024-IE-R018) 
 
The Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is an independent IRS organization with a mission to 
help taxpayers resolve problems and recommend changes to IRS processes and procedures. 
Our report evaluated the readiness of local TAS telephone lines and the consistency of 
information posted online.  
 
We found that local TAS telephone lines were not consistent in providing taxpayers the 
ability to speak with a TAS representative. We called all 76 local TAS telephone lines in the 
United States, including offices in the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, using telephone 
numbers listed on the TAS and 
IRS websites. The calls found 
some telephone lines were not       
in service, voicemail boxes were 
full, and there were inconsistent 
recorded scripted messaging         
and callback time frames.  
 
Only two telephone lines were 
answered by a TAS representative. 
Voicemail prompts indicated that 
callbacks would be received within 
time frames ranging from one 
business day to four weeks. 
 
In addition, we found several discrepancies between what was listed on the TAS website and 
the IRS website when comparing contact information for telephone numbers, fax lines, and 
local addresses. We also identified voicemail messaging that had significant differences in 
the information being communicated. 
 
During our evaluation, we issued an email alert to TAS management about our findings.  
TAS management partially agreed with our recommendations and took corrective actions  
to make changes to voicemail messages, made updates to the IRS and TAS websites, and 
provided more consistent information to taxpayers. Due to the actions taken, we did not 
make additional recommendations. 
  
 
 
Figure 7: Caller Experience for Local TAS Telephone Lines 
Source: TIGTA evaluator experience when calling local TAS 
telephone lines. 

 
 
 
 
24│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Protect the Integrity of Tax Administration 
 
TIGTA is statutorily mandated to protect the integrity of federal tax administration.  
We accomplish this mission through the investigative work conducted by the Office of 
Investigations (OI). Through its investigative programs, OI protects the integrity of the IRS 
and its ability to collect revenue owed to the federal government by investigating violations 
of criminal and civil law that adversely impact federal tax administration, as well as 
administrative misconduct by IRS employees. 
 
The Performance Model 
 
TIGTA’s OI accomplishes its mission through the hard work of employees, whose efforts are 
guided by a performance model that focuses on three primary areas of investigative 
responsibility: 
IRS employee misconduct undermines the IRS’s ability to deliver taxpayer services, to 
enforce tax laws effectively, and to collect taxes owed to the federal government. External 
threats against the IRS impede its ability to carry out its role as the nation’s revenue 
collector fairly, efficiently, and safely. Individuals who attempt to corrupt or otherwise 
interfere with the IRS through various schemes and frauds adversely impact the IRS’s ability 
to collect revenue. 
 
TIGTA investigates allegations of violations in these areas, and refers the findings to the  
U.S. Department of Justice or to state authorities for prosecution. We also refer allegations 
of violations involving IRS employee misconduct to IRS management.  
 
In each of the following performance areas, we highlight example cases from the current 
reporting period.13 For additional details about the highlighted cases, visit the TIGTA 
Investigative Activities web page or click on the hyperlink in the case titles.  
 
 
 
13 Facts in the summarized case narratives come from court documents of the jurisdictions named. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 25
 
 
 
 
Performance Area: Employee Integrity 
 
For our country’s tax system to operate successfully, 
taxpayers must have confidence in the fair and impartial 
administration of federal tax laws and regulations. IRS 
employee misconduct can erode the public’s trust and 
impede the IRS’s ability to effectively enforce tax laws. 
Employee misconduct can take many forms, such as: the 
misuse of IRS resources or authority; theft; fraud; extortion; 
taxpayer abuse; unauthorized access to, and disclosure of, 
tax returns and return information; and identity theft. 
 
During this reporting period, employee integrity investigations 
accounted for 41 percent of OI’s work. OI conducted 530 employee misconduct 
investigations that were referred to the IRS for action. The IRS took action, up to and 
including termination, on 478 investigations and closed 52 without action.14 
 
As part of our employee integrity focus, we also conduct proactive investigative initiatives to 
detect misconduct in the administration of IRS programs. During this reporting period, we 
initiated five proactive projects to detect systemic weaknesses or potential IRS program 
vulnerabilities. Our most successful integrity project involves the detection of IRS employees 
who abuse their access to taxpayer information to commit identity theft and other crimes. 
 
The following cases represent OI’s efforts to address employee misconduct during this 
reporting period. 
 
Addressing Employee Misconduct 
 
IRS Employee Indicted for Filing False Tax Returns 
 
On April 16, 2024, in the District of Massachusetts, IRS employee Amy Ndeye Thioub was 
indicted on three counts of filing a false tax return and three counts of filing a false tax 
return by an employee of the United States.   
 
According to the charging documents, Thioub has been employed by the IRS since 2006. 
Thioub has extensive and specialized knowledge and training in accounting techniques, 
practices, and investigative audit techniques. She is also responsible for examining and 
resolving various tax issues of individuals and business organizations that may include 
extensive national and/or international subsidiaries.  
 
The indictment alleges Thioub fraudulently claimed thousands of dollars in false business 
expenses for at least TYs 2017, 2018, and 2019. Specifically, Thioub is alleged to  
 
14 These data may pertain to investigations referred administratively in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate 
to the total number of misconduct investigations that were referred to the IRS for action during this reporting period. 
of OI’s work was employee
integrity investigations.
41%

 
 
 
 
26│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
have filed a Schedule C claiming a net loss from a business. The net loss was carried over to 
her IRS Form 1040s and used to reduce Thioub’s adjusted gross income and ultimate tax 
liability. The Schedule C forms reported net business losses of $42,805 in 2017; $20,324 
in 2018; and $27,063 in 2019. 
 
IRS Employee Sentenced for Mail Fraud Conspiracy 
 
On June 27, 2024, Contessa M. Qualls was sentenced to 3 years’ probation, 80 hours of 
community service, and ordered to pay a $100 court assessment. Qualls pleaded guilty to 
mail fraud conspiracy for her role in mailing drugs to the Toledo Correctional Institute (TCI).   
 
In October 2021, Qualls, an IRS employee in Covington, Kentucky, obtained controlled 
substances from the internet and other sources for the purpose of mailing them to an 
inmate of TCI. On at least two occasions, Qualls used IRS mailings, sent from the IRS office 
in Covington, Kentucky, to mail documents soaked in a controlled substance known as “K2” 
or “spice,” to an inmate at TCI. Qualls mailed documents for the purpose of sale and 
distribution in TCI by the inmate. Using the IRS mailings, Qualls intended to deceive TCI 
officials by conveying the false impression that the mailings constituted official documents 
from a U.S. government agency, thus introducing the contraband into TCI without additional 
scrutiny or interception. Qualls intended the controlled substances to be sold and 
distributed in TCI. 
 
 
Performance Area: Employee and Infrastructure Security 
 
Threats and assaults directed at IRS employees, facilities, and 
infrastructure impede the effective and safe administration of the 
federal tax system and the IRS’s ability to collect tax revenue.  
OI receives referrals of all reports of threats, assaults, and forcible 
interference against IRS employees while performing their official 
duties. We also pursue, investigate, and mitigate emerging threats to 
the IRS’s ability to conduct federal tax administration in cyberspace.  
 
Contact with the IRS can be stressful and emotional for taxpayers. While the majority of 
taxpayer contacts are routine, some may become confrontational and even violent. TIGTA’s 
special agents are statutorily mandated to provide physical security, known as “armed 
escorts,” to IRS employees who have face-to-face contact with taxpayers who may pose a 
danger to the employee, and to ensure that IRS employees have a secure environment in 
which to perform their critical tax administration functions. During this 6-month reporting 
period, OI provided 12 armed escorts for IRS employees. 
 
OI undertakes investigative initiatives to identify individuals who could commit violence 
against, or otherwise pose a threat to, IRS employees, facilities, or infrastructure. OI also 
provides intelligence to IRS officials to assist them in making proactive operational decisions 
about potential violence or other activities that could pose a threat to IRS systems, 
operations, and employees.  

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 27
 
 
 
 
Investigative information sharing between OI and the IRS’s 
Office of Employee Protection to identify “potentially 
dangerous” taxpayers is one example of our commitment to 
protecting IRS employees. Taxpayers who meet certain IRS 
criteria receive a designation as potentially dangerous. Five 
years after this designation has been made, we conduct a 
follow-up assessment of the taxpayer so that the IRS can 
determine if the taxpayer still presents a potential danger to 
IRS employees.  
 
During this reporting period, employee and infrastructure 
security investigations accounted for 24 percent of OI’s work.  
 
The following case represents OI’s efforts to ensure the safety of IRS employees during the 
reporting period. 
 
Louisville Man Sentenced for Threatening to Bomb IRS Lockbox Facility 
 
On April 4, 2024, in the Western District of Kentucky, Cameron Hyatt was sentenced to  
17 months imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $11,201 in 
restitution. Hyatt pleaded guilty to one count of false information and hoaxes and three 
counts of assaulting, resisting, or impeding three TIGTA special agents.   
 
On April 13, 2023, Hyatt, a contract employee at an IRS Lockbox, a government facility for 
processing federal tax returns and tax remittances, sent a text message to his contracting 
agency that stated, “I am going home and killing myself, blowing my brains out.” The next 
day a shift supervisor called Hyatt and advised him that he could not return to work until he 
was cleared by human resources. Hyatt called the shift supervisor multiple times and cursed 
at them. On April 17, 2023, a human resources representative advised Hyatt that his 
employment was terminated. Hyatt told the human resources representative not to call him 
again and stated he was going to kill himself. When told he was no longer permitted on any 
client site, including the IRS Lockbox, Hyatt stated, “That’s okay because I’m going to bomb 
your place…” When interviewed by a TIGTA special agent, Hyatt stated he sent the text 
messages “because he wanted to...scare them for ruining my job, my livelihood.” 
On April 20, 2023, Hyatt was arrested by TIGTA agents. During his arrest, Hyatt kicked and 
spit at a TIGTA special agent, kicked a second TIGTA special agent, and kicked and 
threatened to kill a third TIGTA special agent.  
 
 
 
 
 
of OI’s work was 
investigations of 
threats/assaults.
24%

 
 
 
 
28│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Performance Area: External Attempts to Corrupt Tax Administration 
 
We also investigate external attempts to corrupt or impede tax administration. Individuals 
may attempt to corrupt or impede tax administration in many ways. They may impersonate 
IRS employees or misuse IRS seals and symbols; use fraudulent IRS documentation to 
perpetrate criminal activity; offer bribes to IRS 
employees to influence their tax cases; commit fraud 
in contracts the IRS awards to contractors; or commit 
cybercrimes through the misuse of IRS portals.  
In addition, we investigate corruption and criminal 
activity involving the theft of U.S. Treasury checks, 
which can include Social Security benefits, COVID-19 
stimulus checks, and tax refunds.  
 
During this reporting period, investigations into 
attempts to corrupt or impede tax administration 
accounted for 35 percent of OI’s work.  
 
The following cases represent OI’s efforts to  
address external attempts to corrupt or impede  
tax administration during this reporting period. 
 
Unregistered Agents’ Bribery Scheme 
 
People’s Republic of China Agents Plead Guilty in IRS Bribery Scheme 
 
In July 2024, in the Southern District of New York, John Chen, a U.S. citizen; and Lin Feng, a 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizen; pleaded guilty to acting as unregistered agents of a 
foreign government and bribing a public official. The charges were in connection with a plot 
to target U.S.-based practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in the PRC. 
 
According to a U.S. Department of Justice press release, from January 2023 to May 2023, 
Chen and Feng engaged in a scheme directed by the PRC government to manipulate the 
IRS’s Whistleblower Program in an effort to strip the tax-exempt status of an entity run and 
maintained by Falun Gong practitioners. After Chen filed a defective whistleblower complaint 
with the IRS, Chen and Feng paid $5,000 in cash bribes, and promised to pay substantially 
more, to a purported IRS agent who was an undercover officer, in exchange for assistance in 
advancing the whistleblower complaint. During a meeting in Newburgh, New York, Chen 
gave the undercover officer a $1,000 cash bribe as an initial, partial bribe payment. Chen 
further offered to pay the undercover officer a total of $50,000 for opening an audit on the 
entity run by Falun Gong practitioners, as well as 60 percent of any whistleblower award 
from the IRS if Chen’s whistleblower complaint was successful. Furthermore, Feng paid the 
undercover officer a $4,000 cash bribe at John F. Kennedy International Airport as an 
additional partial bribe payment in furtherance of the scheme.  
 
of OI’s work was investigating
attempts to corrupt or impede
tax administration.
35%

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 29
 
 
 
 
CARES Act Fraud 
 
New Hampshire Man Sentenced for CARES Act Fraud 
 
On May 29, 2024, in the District of New Hampshire, David Dodge was sentenced to  
34 months imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $219,323 in 
restitution. Dodge pleaded guilty to bank fraud for his role involving Paycheck Protection 
Program (“PPP”) fraud. 
 
Beginning in March 2020, Dodge used the identity of a minor child to apply for an Employer 
Identification Number (EIN) from the IRS. Dodge used that EIN in some of the fraudulent 
applications. According to a Department of Justice press release dated Feb. 21, 2024, 
Dodge claimed to own or control multiple businesses in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, 
but in reality, these companies had no operations and served no business purpose. Dodge 
used fake supporting documents, including fraudulent tax documents and a doctored 
limited liability company certificate, to submit 30 fraudulent applications for PPP loans  
from private lenders; Economic Injury Disaster Loans from the U. S. Small Business 
Administration; and pandemic relief grants from the New Hampshire Governor’s Office for 
Emergency Relief and Recovery, and the Massachusetts Growth Capital Corporation.  
 
Lenders detected most of the fraudulent applications; however, Dodge was able to obtain 
$219,323 out of the approximately $2.5 million he sought. Dodge used some of the 
fraudulently obtained funds to purchase jewelry. 
 
Idaho Man Indicted for Bank Fraud 
 
On May 14, 2024, in the District of Idaho, Luis Vasquez was indicted for bank fraud related 
to a fraudulent PPP loan application. The indictment alleges that beginning in January 2021, 
Vasquez obtained an EIN from the IRS for Luis J Vasquez Enterprises.  
 
Vasquez subsequently submitted false and fraudulent documents to the Idaho Central 
Credit Union, including a U.S. Small Business Administration Form 2483 PPP loan 
application, for a PPP loan on behalf of Luis J Vasquez Enterprises in the amount of 
$51,614. The PPP application falsely claimed that Luis J Vasquez Enterprises had 11 
employees; had average monthly payroll expenses of $13,783; was in operation on  
February 15, 2020; and had employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes. 
 
Based upon the false statements in the PPP application and supporting documentation, the 
credit union funded the loan by disbursing $51,614 in April 2021. Vasquez used the PPP 
loan funds for non-qualifying, non-business-related purposes, including, among others, 
payments to himself and other individuals who did not work for the business entity, and 
payment of personal expenses in violation of the terms of the PPP loan agreement. 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
30│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Fighting Cybercrime 
 
Jamaican National Sentenced in Business Email Compromise Scheme 
 
On May 22, 2024, in the District of Maryland, Jamelia Thompson was sentenced to  
37 months imprisonment, 2 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $546,000 in 
restitution after pleading guilty to bank fraud conspiracy for her role in a business email 
compromise scheme. 
 
Beginning in April 2016, Thompson and her coconspirators used the IRS’s Modernized 
Internet Employer Identification Number system to create various EINs in furtherance of a 
scheme to defraud. Many of these EINs were obtained from the IRS using stolen Personally 
Identifiable Information. These EINs, in conjunction with fraudulently obtained state 
business certificates, allowed the coconspirators to open bank accounts at various financial 
institutions for the purpose of depositing stolen and/or altered checks or for receiving 
fraudulently obtained wire transfers.  
 
Thompson and her coconspirators obtained legitimate checks written on the accounts of 
payor business victims and made payable to payee business victims. Thompson and her 
coconspirators would alter the names of the payee on some of the checks and deposit the 
checks into bank accounts they had opened and controlled. Thompson and her 
coconspirators conducted over $4 million in fraudulent bank transactions. 
 
Impersonation Scams and Schemes 
 
Man Sentenced to Seven Months in IRS Impersonation Scheme 
 
On June 20, 2024, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Himanshu Amin was sentenced to 
7 months imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Amin was additionally ordered to 
pay $58,811 in restitution—$1,972 individually plus $56,839 jointly and severally with 
another defendant.  
 
From January 2016 to September 2016, a group of conspirators in India made phone calls 
to U.S. residents and falsely claimed the victim’s owed money. The callers often pretended 
they worked for the IRS. The coconspirator callers told the victims how much money they 
purportedly owed, typically alleging the debt was for delinquent taxes. The callers frequently 
threatened the fraud victims with arrest if they failed to immediately pay the alleged debt.  
 
Amin was an account holder who received proceeds of the fraud scheme via deposits from 
runners. Amin had access to multiple bank accounts as well as his personal bank accounts 
to receive and move fraud proceeds that were deposited by coconspirators. He received 
multiple cash deposits across numerous states and quickly moved the fraudulent proceeds 
from their accounts to another bank account. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 31
 
 
 
 
The coconspirator callers caused approximately 100 victim taxpayers to pay at least 
$799,151 to coconspirator runners who made deposits that were deposited into the bank 
accounts of the account holders. 
 
California Man Pleads Guilty in Refund Fraud Case 
On June 17, 2024, in the Eastern District of California, Miguel Martinez pleaded guilty to 
one count of conspiracy to submit false claims. From November 2019 through June 2023, 
Miguel Martinez and his coconspirators used stolen identities to create fake businesses. 
They then reported phony wage and withholding information for those businesses to the 
IRS. Martinez and his coconspirators subsequently used other individuals’ stolen 
identities to file individual federal income tax returns with the IRS that falsely reported 
wages and withholdings for those individuals from the fake businesses. 
 
Martinez and his coconspirators solicited and received advice from an IRS employee 
regarding how to avoid IRS fraud detection systems. The IRS employee’s advice included 
information about the IRS’s monetary thresholds, so the tax returns Martinez and his 
coconspirators filed were less likely to be deemed suspicious or flagged by the IRS for 
suspected fraud.  
 
Martinez and his coconspirators filed thousands of fraudulent individual federal income 
tax returns, claiming over $9.5 million in refunds and receiving $2.3 million in refunds 
from the IRS. When arrested, Martinez had over $750,000 in fraudulent tax refund 
checks, identification cards for more than 200 people, and multiple firearms and 
ammunition. 
 
Theft of U.S. Treasury Checks 
 
Postal Worker Charged With Stealing More Than $4 Million in U.S. Treasury Checks  
 
On July 8, 2024, in the Eastern District of New York, Kevaughn Wellington was indicted on 
one count of conspiracy to steal government funds, one count of theft of government funds, 
one count of possession of stolen mail, and one count of theft of mail by a U.S. Postal 
Service employee.  
 
According to a U.S. Department of Justice press release and court documents, between  
June 2021 and August 2023, Wellington and a coconspirator engaged in a scheme to steal 
and sell Treasury checks intended for, among other things, individuals entitled to Social 
Security benefits, COVID-19 stimulus checks, and tax refunds. Wellington stole parcels 
containing Treasury checks from New York’s John F. Kennedy (JFK) Mail Facility where he 
was employed at the time as a postal worker.  
 
Together with others, Wellington sold the stolen Treasury checks for a cut of the profit. As 
part of the scheme, Wellington and a coconspirator stole over 125 Treasury checks valued 
at more than $4 million.  

 
 
 
 
32│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Investigations Statistical Reports 
Significant Investigative Achievements (April 1, 2024, Through September 30, 2024) 
 
Complaints/Allegations Received by TIGTA 
Complaints Against IRS Employees 
1,267 
Complaints Against Non-Employees 
2,067 
Total Complaints/Allegations 
3,334 
 
Investigations Initiated 
513 
In Process Within TIGTA15 
497 
Referred to IRS for Action 
753 
Referred to IRS for Information Only 
132 
Referred to a Non-IRS Entity16 
0 
Closed With No Referral 
631 
Closed Associated With Prior Investigation 
668 
Closed With All Actions Completed 
140 
Total Complaints/Allegations 
3,334 
Investigations Opened and Closed 
Total Investigations Opened 
904 
Total Investigations Closed 
1,032 
 Financial Accomplishments 
Embezzlement/Theft Funds Recovered 
$428,367 
Contract Fraud and Overpayments Recovered 
$0 
Court-Ordered Fines, Penalties, and Restitution 
$79,799,497 
Out-of-Court Settlements 
$0 
Potentially Compromised by Bribery 
$0 
Tax Liability of Taxpayers Who Threaten and/or Assault IRS Employees 
$555,922 
IRS Assets and Resources Protected Against Malicious Loss 
$0 
Total Financial Accomplishments 
$80,783,787 
 
15 Complaints for which final determination had not been made at the end of the reporting period. 
16 A non-IRS entity includes other law enforcement entities or federal agencies. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 33
 
 
 
 
 
17 Criminal referrals include both federal and state dispositions. 
18 Final criminal dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations referred criminally in 
prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations referred criminally in the previous Status of 
Closed Criminal Investigations table. This table does not include investigations whose existence is protected from 
disclosure by I.R.C. § 6103.  
19 Generally, in a deferred prosecution, the defendant accepts responsibility for their actions and complies with certain 
conditions imposed by the court. Upon the defendant’s completion of the conditions, the court dismisses the case. If the 
defendant fails to fully comply, the court reinstates prosecution of the charge. 
20 Final administrative dispositions during the reporting period. These data may pertain to investigations referred 
administratively in prior reporting periods and do not necessarily relate to the investigations closed in the Investigations 
Opened and Closed table.  
21 Administrative actions taken by the IRS against non-IRS employees, e.g., contractors. 
 
 
Status of Closed Criminal Investigations 
Criminal Referral 
Employee 
Non-Employee 
Total 
       Referred – Accepted for Prosecution 
4 
122 
126 
       Referred – Declined for Prosecution 
191 
218 
409 
       Referred – Pending Prosecutorial Decision 
10 
78 
88 
Total Criminal Referrals17 
205 
418 
623 
No Referral 
194 
132 
326 
Criminal Dispositions18 
Criminal Disposition 
Employee 
Non-Employee 
Total 
Guilty (convicted) 
0 
6 
6 
Guilty (plea)  
4 
95 
99 
Nolo Contendere (no contest) 
0 
0 
0 
Pretrial Diversion 
0 
2 
2 
Deferred Prosecution19 
1 
0 
1 
Not Guilty 
0 
6 
6 
Dismissed  
0 
4 
4 
Total Criminal Dispositions 
5 
113 
118 
Administrative Dispositions on Closed Investigations20 
Removed/Terminated 
33 
Suspended/Reduction in Grade 
21 
Resigned/Retired/Separated Prior to Adjudication  
63 
Oral or Written Reprimand/Admonishment  
69 
Clearance Letter/Closed, No Action Taken 
47 
Alternative Discipline/Letter With Cautionary Statement/Other 
43 
Non-Employee Actions21 
147 
Total Administrative Dispositions 
423 

 
 
 
 
34│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Summary of Investigative Reports and Criminal Referrals 
Criminal Referral Breakdown 
Number of Investigative Reports Issued 
 
Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution 
517 
Referred to State/Local Prosecuting Authorities 
27 
Number of Indictments and Criminal Informations 
 
Indictments 
100 
Criminal Informations 
16 
 Source: TIGTA OI’s Criminal Results Management System.  
 
Summary of Activity Relating to Complaints of Human Trafficking 
 
Activity Relating to Complaints of Human Trafficking 
Number of Suspected Violations Reported 
0 
Number of Investigations 
0 
Status of Investigations 
N/A 
Outcome of Investigations 
N/A 
Source: TIGTA OI’s Criminal Results Management System. 
 
Interference 
 
During the reporting period, there were no attempts by the IRS to interfere with the 
independence of TIGTA. Additionally, the IRS did not resist, object to oversight activities, or 
significantly delay access to information.  
 
Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation 
 
During the reporting period, there were no investigations of whistleblower retaliation.  
 
No-Knock Warrants 
 
During the reporting period, TIGTA did not have any “no-knock” warrants for entries: 
 
• Pursuant to judicial authorization; 
• Pursuant to exigent circumstances; and  
• In which a law enforcement officer or other person was injured during a  
no-knock entry. 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 35
 
 
 
 
Suspension and Debarment 
 
The following table represents the number of cases TIGTA has referred to Treasury’s Office 
of Procurement Executive, who is the Department’s Suspension and Debarment Official. 
Cases are referred for potential suspension or debarment action, including any subsequent 
action taken by the Treasury Department, between April 1, 2024, and Sept. 30, 2024.  
 
Summary of Suspension and Debarment Referrals 
 
 
 
Closed
 Investigations Involving IRS Senior Government Employees22 
 
Detailed Description of the 
Facts and Circumstances of 
the Investigation 
Disposition 
Criminal 
Status 
Date 
Referred 
If Declined, 
Date of 
Declination 
A senior government employee 
allegedly allowed harassment to 
an IRS employee. 
Closed Without         
Action Letter 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly used illegal drugs and 
made threatening statements to   
a taxpayer. 
Oral / Written 
Counseling 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly deleted IRS emails and 
obstructed a criminal 
investigation. 
Admonished / 
Reprimanded 
Declined 
11/18/2022 
11/18/2022 
A senior government employee 
allegedly participated in 
unapproved outside employment. 
Admonished / 
Reprimanded 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly participated in matters 
resulting in a conflict of interest. 
Admonished / 
Reprimanded 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
22 When TIGTA refers an IRS employee investigation to the IRS, the investigation remains open until all actions are 
completed, including any penalty imposed upon the employee by the IRS. TIGTA closes an employee investigation after 
receiving notice from the IRS of the administrative action taken in response to that investigation. For this report, a “senior 
government employee” refers to an officer or employee in the Executive Branch who occupies a position classified at or 
above GS-15 of the General Schedule. 5 U.S.C. § 405(a)(6). 
 
 
 
Referred 
Pending 
Suspended 
Debarred 
Declined 
Office of Investigations 
2 
15 
0 
0 
0 

 
 
 
 
36│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Detailed Description of the 
Facts and Circumstances of 
the Investigation 
Disposition 
Criminal 
Status 
Date 
Referred 
If Declined, 
Date of 
Declination 
A senior government employee 
allegedly provided preferential 
treatment to certain employees. 
Oral / Written 
Counseling 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly provided preferential 
treatment to certain employees. 
Oral / Written 
Counseling 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly provided preferential 
treatment to a certain employee. 
Clearance Letter 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly abused the power of 
their position. 
Clearance Letter 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly provided preferential 
treatment to taxpayers. 
Clearance Letter 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
A senior government employee 
allegedly hired family members 
and obstructed the subsequent 
investigation. 
Suspension, 10 Days 
N/A 
12/18/2023 
12/18/2023 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 37
 
 
 
 
Reports With Unimplemented Corrective Actions 
 
The Inspector General Act requires that we identify any recommendations described in 
previous semiannual reports, including the potential cost savings of those recommendations 
for which corrective actions have not been completed. Following is a list of audit and evaluation 
reports with unimplemented corrective actions. The list is based on information from the 
Treasury Department’s Joint Audit Management Enterprise System (JAMES). Click the link in 
the report number to obtain more details about the recommendations. 
 
 
Revising Tax Debt Identification Programming and Correcting Procedural Errors                      
Could Improve the Tax Refund Offset Program 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2016-40-028; March 2016 
 
 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Tax Accounts on the Automated                                  
Non-Master File Are Accurately Processed 
Recommendation 1 
Recommendation 2—Potential Increased Revenue: $354,153 
Rep. No. 2017-40-037; May 2017 
 
 
Further Actions Are Needed to Reduce the Risk of Employment Tax Fraud to Businesses  
That Use the Services of Professional Employer Organizations 
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2017-40-085; September 2017 
 
 
Processes Need to Be Improved to Identify Incomplete and Fraudulent Applications                    
for Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers 
Recommendation 5 
Rep. No. 2018-40-010; January 2018 
 
 
Actions Are Needed to Reduce the Risk of Fraudulent Use of Employer Identification 
Numbers and to Improve the Effectiveness of the Application Process 
Recommendations 3 and 9 
Rep. No. 2018-40-013; February 2018 
 
 
 
 
Active Directory Oversight Needs Improvement and Criminal Investigation                              
Computer Rooms Lack Minimum Security Controls  
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2018-20-034; June 2018 
 
 

 
 
 
 
38│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
 
 
 
Improvements Are Needed in the Withholding Compliance Program 
Recommendation 5 
Rep. No. 2018-30-072; September 2018 
 
 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Alimony Reporting Discrepancies                            
on Income Tax Returns 
Recommendations 2 and 3 
Rep. No. 2019-40-048; August 2019 
 
 
The Bring Your Own Device Program’s Security Controls Need Improvement 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2019-20-046; September 2019 
 
 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Further Reduce Undeliverable Mail 
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2019-40-074; September 2019 
 
 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Consistent Suitability Checks Are Performed               
for Participation in Internal Revenue Service Programs 
Recommendation 9 
Rep. No. 2020-40-005; November 2019 
 
 
The Internal Revenue Service Can Improve Taxpayer Compliance                                                           
for Virtual Currency Transactions 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2020-30-066; September 2020 
 
 
Security Controls Over Electronic Crimes Labs Need Improvement 
Recommendations 1 and 3 
Rep. No. 2021-20-003; December 2020 
 
 
Expansion of Self-Correction for Electronic Filers and Other Improvements Could Reduce 
Taxpayer Burden and Costs Associated With Tax Return Error Resolution 
Recommendation 6 
Rep. No. 2021-40-008; December 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 39
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controls Over the Internal Revenue Service Contractor Tax Check Process                                       
Need to Be Improved 
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2021-10-039; June 2021 
 
 
**********Platform Management Needs Improvement23 
Recommendation 5 
Rep. No. 2021-20-063; September 2021 
 
 
Increased Availability of Tax Resources and Information for Limited English Proficient                
and Visually Impaired Taxpayers Has Enhanced Assistance, but Additional Improvements  
Are Needed 
Recommendations 4, 6, 7, and 8 
Rep. No. 2022-40-008; December 2021 
 
 
Administration of the Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2022-40-013; January 2022 
 
 
Plans to Close the Austin Tax Processing Center Should Be Halted Until Hiring Challenges 
and Substantial Backlogs at Remaining Centers Are Addressed 
Recommendation 6 
Rep. No. 2022-40-015; February 2022 
 
 
Centralized Partnership Audit Regime Rules Have Been Implemented; However, Initial               
No-Change Rates Are High and Measurable Goals Have Not Been Established 
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2022-30-020; March 2022 
 
 
Program and Organizational Changes Are Needed to Address the Continued Inadequate Tax 
Account Assistance Provided to Taxpayers 
Recommendations 11 and 18 
Rep. No. 2022-46-027; March 2022 
 
 
Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During the 2021 Filing Season 
Recommendation 1 
Recommendation 3 – Potential Funds Put to Better Use: $217,927,531 
Rep. No. 2022-46-032; May 2022 
 
 
23 Redaction due to subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released. 

 
 
 
 
40│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
 
Compliance Efforts Are Needed to Address Refund Claims Reported on Form 1139                        
That Are Based on the CARES Act Net Operating Loss Carryback Provisions 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2022-35-049; August 2022 
 
 
Cloud Services Were Implemented Without Key Security Controls, Placing Taxpayer                         
Data At Risk 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2022-20-052; September 2022 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2022 Statutory Review of Disclosure of Collection Activity With Respect                             
to Joint Returns 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2022-30-058; September 2022 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2022 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines                                                            
When Issuing Levies 
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2022-30-061; September 2022 
 
 
Physical Security Controls at the ********************24 
Recommendation 1, 5, and 6 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R001; October 2022 
 
 
More Should Be Done to Increase Use and Availability of the IRS’s Taxpayer  
Digital Communications Tools 
Recommendation 3 
Rep. No. 2023-30-003; November 2022 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2023 Biannual Independent Assessment of Private Collection Agency 
Performance 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2023-30-005; December 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunities Exist for the IRS to Develop a More Coordinated Approach  
 
24 Redaction due to subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 41
 
 
 
 
to Examination Workplan Development and Resource Allocation 
Recommendations 1, 2, and 4 
Rep. No. 2023-30-008; February 2023 
 
 
Actions Have Been Taken to Implement Taxpayer First Act Provisions Related to the IRS 
Independent Office of Appeals; However, Some Improvements Are Still Needed 
Recommendations 1 and 3 
Rep. No. 2023-15-010; February 2023 
 
 
The IRS Has Not Adequately Prioritized Federal Civilian Employee Nonfilers 
Recommendations 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11 
Rep. No. 2023-30-011; March 2023 
 
 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve and Secure the Income Verification  
Express Service Program 
Recommendations 7, 8, and 13 
Rep. No. 2023-45-014; March 2023 
 
 
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Completeness, Development, and Review  
of IRS Tax Gap Estimates 
Recommendation 6 
Rep. No. 2023-10-016; March 2023 
 
 
The IRS Eliminated Its Employee Suggestion Program Without Plans for a Replacement 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2023-30-020; March 2023 
 
 
Implementation of the Taxpayer First Act Provision Regarding the Management and 
Purchase of Information Technology Resources Needs Improvement 
Recommendation 6 
Rep. No. 2023-25-017; April 2023 
 
 
Actions Are Being Taken to Reduce Risks to Employees Whose Names Are Required  
to Be Included on Internal Revenue Service Correspondence  
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R004; May 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment of the Internal Revenue Service’s Active Shooter Readiness and Training   

 
 
 
 
42│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Recommendations 3 and 5 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R005; May 2023 
 
 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Reduce Accounts Management Function Inventories  
to Below Pre-Pandemic Levels 
Recommendations 6, 8, and 10 
Rep. No. 2023-46-026; May 2023 
 
 
Services to Underserved Communities Have Been Ongoing; However, an Agencywide 
Strategy Has Not Been Developed 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-15-027; May 2023 
 
 
Plans Were Made to Implement the Taxpayer Experience Strategy, but Progress  
Is Not Monitored 
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2023-15-028; May 2023 
 
 
Recurring Identification Is Needed to Ensure That Employers Full Pay  
the Deferred Social Security Tax 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2023-46-030; May 2023 
 
 
Opportunities Exist to Improve the Accuracy of Information in the Centralized  
Authorization File and Increase the Use of the Tax Pro Account System 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-40-033; May 2023 
 
 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve Data Collection and Analysis of Whistleblower 
Claims and Ensure Full Compliance With the Taxpayer First Act 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-35-031; June 2023 
 
 
Actions Have Been Taken to Improve the Privacy Program; However, Some Privacy Controls 
Have Not Been Fully Implemented and Assessed 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2023-20-034; June 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
American Rescue Plan Act: Review of the Reconciliation of the Child Tax Credit 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 43
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 1 – Potential Funds Put to Better Use: $9,957,194 
Rep. No. 2023-47-035; June 2023 
 
 
American Rescue Plan Act: Continued Review of Premium Tax Credit Provisions 
Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 
Rep. No. 2023-47-036; June 2023 
 
 
Actions Are Needed to Address Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Inconsistent Taxpayer 
Assistance Center Information Provided to Taxpayers 
Recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R006; July 2023 
 
 
Review of the IRS Independent Office of Appeals Collection Due Process Program 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-10-038; July 2023 
 
 
The Customer Callback System Benefits Taxpayers; However, Performance Measures  
Are Not Comprehensive and More Callers Could Qualify for Callback Offers 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-10-046; July 2023 
 
 
Sensitive Business and Individual Tax Account Information Stored on Microfilm  
Cannot Be Located  
Recommendations 3, 5, and 12 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R008; August 2023 
 
 
Expanded Use of Special Payment Incentives Could Help Improve Recruitment  
and Retention Efforts 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2023-10-043; August 2023 
 
 
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities That Remain Unremediated Could Put  
the IRS Network at Risk 
Recommendation 2 
Rep. No. 2023-20-048; August 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2023 Statutory Review of Restrictions on Directly Contacting 

 
 
 
 
44│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Represented Taxpayers 
Recommendations 3 and 5 
Rep. No. 2023-30-051; August 2023 
 
 
The IRS Needs to Leverage the Most Effective Training for Revenue Agents  
Examining High-Income Taxpayers 
Recommendations 3 and 4 
Rep. No. 2023-30-054; August 2023 
 
 
Review of the IRS’s Process to Perform Mandatory Annual Examinations  
of Presidential Returns for Tax Years 2000 Through 2021 
Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 5 
Rep. No. 2023-IE-R011; September 2023 
 
 
The Internal Revenue Service Has Experienced Challenges in Transitioning  
to Electronic Records 
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2023-10-050; September 2023 
 
 
Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Fuel Tax Credit Screening and Examination  
Processes; However, Improvements Are Still Needed 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2023-30-053; September 2023 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2023 Statutory Audit of Compliance With Legal Guidelines Restricting  
the Use of Records of Tax Enforcement Results 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2023-30-058; September 2023 
 
 
The Enterprise Physical Access Control System Implementation and Physical Security 
Controls Need Improvement 
Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 
Rep. No. 2023-20-062; September 2023 
 
 
Fiscal Year 2023 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines  
When Issuing Levies 
Recommendations 1, 4, 6, and 7 
Rep. No. 2023-30-066; September 2023 
 
 
 
 
The Innocent Spouse Program Needs Improved Guidance for Employees  

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 45
 
 
 
 
and Increased Communications With Taxpayers 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2024-300-001; October 2023 
 
 
Thousands of Tax Exempt and Government Entities Taxpayers May Not Have Received 
Satisfactory Responses to Their Questions 
Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 
Rep. No. 2024-100-003; October 2023 
 
 
The IRS Has Improved Audit Trail Collection; However, Not All Audit Trail Data  
Are Being Collected and User Account Controls Need Improvement 
Recommendations 1 and 3 
Rep. No. 2024-200-005; October 2023 
 
 
Actions Are Needed to Improve the Quality of Customer Service in Telephone Operations 
Recommendation 4 
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R001; November 2023 
 
 
The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Fully Complying With the No TikTok  
on Government Devices Implementation Guidance 
Recommendations 3 and 6 
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R003; December 2023 
 
 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure the Health and Safety of Employees at the C-site 
Recommendations 1, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 16 
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R006; December 2023 
 
 
Post-Pandemic Actions Have Contributed to Declines in Automated Collection System  
Level of Service and Collection Inventories 
Recommendations 2, 3, and 4 
Rep. No. 2024-300-008; December 2023 
 
 
Administration of the Individual Taxpayer Identification Number Program 
Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 8 
Recommendation 7 – Potential Funds Put to Better Use: $8,114,040 
Rep. No. 2024-400-012; December 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Progress Update on Tax Return Scanning Initiatives 

 
 
 
 
46│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2024-408-013; December 2023 
 
 
Interim Evaluation – Assessment of the IRS’s Comprehensive Facilities Security Review  
and Employee Safety and Security Measures 
Recommendations 1, 2, 9, 11, 12, and 13 
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R004; January 2024 
 
 
Assessment of Processes to Grant Access to Sensitive Systems and to Safeguard  
Federal Tax Information   
Recommendations 1 and 2 
Rep. No. 2024-IE-R008; February 2024 
 
 
The IRS Continues to Reduce Backlog Inventories in the Tax Processing Centers 
Recommendation 1 
Rep. No. 2024-406-020; March 2024 
 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 47
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
Other Required Reporting 
 
The Inspector General Act requires Inspectors General to address the following matters. 
 
Topic 
Results for the Reporting Period  
Ending September 30, 2024 
Interference/Access to Information  
There were no attempts to interfere with TIGTA’s 
independence, including:  
•   budget constraints;  
•   incidents of resistance or objection to 
oversight activities; and/or  
•   restricted or significantly delayed access to 
information.  
Disputed Recommendations 
There were no instances in which significant 
recommendations were disputed.  
Revised Management Decisions 
The IRS issued no significant revised 
management decisions. 
Management Decisions for Reports  
Issued in a Prior Reporting Period 
TIGTA received no management decisions during 
the current reporting period for reports issued in 
a prior reporting period. 
Reports Issued in the Prior Reporting Period 
With No Management Response  
There were no reports from a prior reporting 
period for which TIGTA failed to receive a 
management response within 60 days of 
issuance.  
Disclosure 
No reports were closed and not disclosed             
to the public. 
 
Review of Legislation and Regulations 
 
TIGTA’s Office of Chief Counsel reviewed 147 
proposed regulations and legislative requests 
during the reporting period. 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
48│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Appendix II 
TIGTA’s Statutory Reviews 
   The following table reflects our FY 2024 statutory reviews. 
 
Reference to 
Statutory Coverage 
Explanation of the Provision 
Comments/TIGTA Audit Status 
  
  Enforcement Statistics 
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A) 
 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s 
compliance with restrictions under  
RRA 98 § 1204 on the use of 
enforcement statistics to evaluate IRS 
employees. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-061; Sep 2024 
We found instances of noncompliance 
with RRA 98 § 1204 requirements. 
Specifically, we identified the following 
noncompliance: 7 violations in which a 
Record of Tax Enforcement Results  
was used to evaluate an employee  
§ 1204(a); 30 instances in which IRS 
management failed to either maintain 
the retention standard documentation  
or ensure that it was appropriately 
signed [§ 1204(b)]; and 28 managers 
who did not complete at least 1  
FY 2023 quarterly certification  
[§ 1204(c)]. We identified six self-
assessments containing high-risk terms 
and phrases, and Section 1204 and  
non-Section 1204 employees who are 
not consistently designated in the 
human resource system. Further, 34 
Section 1204 employees failed to 
complete the Section 1204 training in  
FY 2023. 
  
  Restrictions on Directly Contacting  
  Taxpayers 
 I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(ii) 
 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s           
compliance with restrictions under 
I.R.C. § 7521 on directly contacting 
taxpayers who have indicated they prefer 
their representatives be contacted. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-058; Sep 2024 
We analyzed the extent to which private 
collection agency (PCA) employees 
complied with the direct contact 
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 7521(b)(2)  
and (c) and the fair tax collection 
practices of I.R.C. § 6304(a)(2) during 
interactions with taxpayers or their 
representatives. We reviewed incoming 
and outgoing call logs from all three 
PCAs for July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023, 
and found that the IRS does not always 
submit timely power of attorney 
information to the PCAs. For the 74 
taxpayers reviewed, 3 taxpayers had 
power of attorney information on file  
with the IRS that did not correspond  
with information provided in the PCAs’ 
call logs. In addition, we found that  
confusion may arise when taxpayer 
accounts assigned to a PCA are 
suspended awaiting the submission         
and processing of Form 2848, Power of 
Attorney and Declaration of 
Representative. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 49
 
 
 
 
  
  Filing of a Notice of Lien 
  I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) 
 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s          
compliance with required procedures  
under I.R.C. § 6320(a) upon the filing of a 
notice of lien. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-037; Aug 2024 
Our systemic review of 103,460 Notice 
of Federal Tax Liens (NFTL) filed from   
July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023, in which 
a Collection Due Process (CDP) notice 
was required to be sent to the taxpayer, 
and a separate review of a statistical 
sample of 117 NFTLs from  the same 
population, identified a total of 272 
taxpayers that were potentially not  
timely mailed a CDP notice as required 
by I.R.C. § 6320(a). The sample 
identified 41 cases in which the  
taxpayer designated their authorized 
representative to receive notices; 
however, in 3 of the 41 cases, the IRS 
did not provide CDP notices  
to the taxpayers’ authorized 
representatives. We also identified 
thousands of levies that were issued 
during the period when taxpayers had 
the right to request a lien CDP hearing. 
We determined that the IRS did not take 
any of the required preemptive steps 
available to suspend collection activity 
on taxpayers impacted by the hurricane 
on Sept. 28, 2022. 
Extensions of the Statute of   
Limitations for Assessment of Tax 
  I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(C) 
    
  I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(B) 
Requires TIGTA to include information  
regarding extensions of the statute of 
limitations for assessment of tax under 
 I.R.C. § 6501 and the provision of notice 
to taxpayers regarding the right to refuse 
or limit the extension of particular issues 
or a particular period of time. 
Rep. No. 2024-100-018; Mar 2024 
We reviewed a judgmentally selected 
sample of 36 closed taxpayer audit files 
with assessment statute extensions  
and found that the IRS complied with 
I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(B). However, the IRS 
had difficulties providing most of the 
paper documents requested. The IRS  
is experiencing a backlog of inventory. 
We are currently evaluating the  
backlog and identified challenges the 
IRS is facing while attempting to 
eliminate the significant backlog. 
  
 Levies 
   
  I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv) 
 
 Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s 
compliance with required procedures 
under I.R.C. § 6330 regarding levies. 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-056; Sep 2024 
We reviewed levies issued by Field 
Collection revenue officers for more  
than 48,000 taxpayers during the  
period July 1, 2022, through  
June 30, 2023. The IRS generally 
complied with legal and administrative 
requirements. However, we identified 
more than 1,900 instances of 
noncompliance that resulted in  
potential violations of taxpayers’ rights  
or taxpayers being burdened. 

 
 
 
 
50│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
  
 Collection Due Process 
 
  I.R.C. §§ 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s  
compliance with required procedures  
under I.R.C. §§ 6320 and 6330 
regarding taxpayers’ rights to appeal  
lien or levy actions. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-060; Sep 2024 
We reviewed 103 levy CDP hearing 
requests from the error populations 
identified in the FY 2023 statutory 
reviews of levies and liens. Prohibited 
levy action was taken in 93 cases  
during the CDP hearing. In 11 of the 
cases, the hearing was cancelled so no 
law and administrative review was 
required. While 2 cases had no case  
file, the remaining 80 cases included 
statements from the appeals officer 
attesting that all legal and  
administrative requirements had been 
met. However, appeals officers did not 
verify that the IRS successfully 
suspended collection actions on the 
subject tax modules during the CDP 
hearing period. In 17 of the 93 cases 
with a prohibited levy, the IRS received 
over $226,000 in levy payments. All  
the prohibited levy payments were 
refunded, or the taxpayer requested  
that the IRS apply the levy payment to 
another balance due. 
 Seizures 
    
   I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iv) 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the IRS’s  
compliance with required procedures under 
I.R.C. §§ 6330 through 6344 when 
conducting seizures. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-054; Sep 2024 
We reviewed 73 taxpayer cases in 
which the IRS conducted seizures 
during the period July 1, 2022, through 
June 30, 2023. We found that Field 
Collection employees generally 
adhered to procedures that help 
ensure compliance with I.R.C. §§ 6330 
through 6344. However, we identified 
three cases in which revenue officers 
conducted seizures without following 
proper procedures or obtaining proper 
approvals, potentially violating 
taxpayer rights. 
  Taxpayer Designations–Illegal Tax 
Protester Designation and Similar 
Designations 
 
 I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(v) 
 
An evaluation of the IRS’s compliance 
with restrictions under RRA 98 § 3707 
on designation of taxpayers. 
 
Memorandum to IRS; May 2024 
Our review determined that Illegal Tax 
Protester codes were not used on the 
Master File during the review period of 
July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023. 
Since our first review in FY 1999, when 
the IRS removed the Illegal Tax 
Protester code from the Master File, 
we have not identified any uses of the 
code or any other coding of a similar 
designation on the Master File. 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 51
 
 
 
 
   
  Disclosure of Collection Activity With 
Respect to Joint Returns 
   I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(B) 
  (TIGTA requirement) 
 I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8)  
 (IRS requirement) 
 
  Requires TIGTA to review and certify  
whether the IRS is complying with 
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(8), which requires the IRS 
to disclose information to an individual 
filing a joint return on collection activity 
involving the other individual filing the 
return. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-051; Sep 2024 
We reviewed 100 case files from the 
Wage and Investment Division to 
determine whether employees 
followed the joint return disclosure 
requirements on collection information 
requests. We determined that 
disclosure requirements were not 
followed in 14 (28 percent) of the          
50 Accounts Management cases  
and 6 (12 percent) of the 50 Field 
Assistance cases reviewed. In 16 
cases, taxpayers or their 
representatives did not receive 
information related to collection 
activities of the taxpayers’ joint 
liabilities to which they were entitled, 
and in four cases, taxpayers’ 
information was inappropriately 
disclosed.   
 Taxpayer Complaints 
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(2)(A) 
 
Requires TIGTA to include in each 
Semiannual Report to Congress the 
number of taxpayer complaints received; 
and the number of employee 
misconduct and taxpayer abuse 
allegations received by the IRS or TIGTA 
from taxpayers, IRS employees, and 
other sources. 
 
 
Statistical results on the number of 
taxpayer complaints received are 
shown on page 32. 
Administrative or Civil Actions With   
Respect to the Tax Collection 
Practices Act of 1996 
 
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(G) 
   
  I.R.C. § 6304 
RRA 98 § 3466 
 
Requires TIGTA to include information 
regarding any administrative or civil 
actions with respect to violation of the  
fair debt collection provision of 
 I.R.C. § 6304, including a summary of 
such actions and any resulting 
judgments or awards granted. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-300-059; Sep 2024 
Our review of Automated Labor  
and Employee Relations Tracking 
System (ALERTS) employee 
misconduct cases from July 1, 2022, 
through June 30, 2023, that were not 
coded as potential Fair Tax Collection 
Practices (FTCP) violations, found that 
23 of the 123 cases included taxpayer 
complaints of harassment, abuse, and 
unprofessionalism and should have 
been documented in ALERTS as 
potential FTCP violations. Our review of 
PCAs incident logs from July 1, 2022, 
through June 30, 2023, found 
inconsistencies among the PCAs 
reporting potential Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act § 805(b) third-party 
disclosure violations. We found 107 
Field Collection and 5 Campus 
Collection potential FTCP violations in 
the Embedded Quality Review System 
case narratives that were not reported 
in the ALERTS database.   
 

 
 
 
 
52│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
  
  Denials of Requests for Information 
  I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(F) 
I.R.C. § 7803(d)(3)(A) 
 
Requires TIGTA to include information 
regarding improper denial of requests 
for information from the IRS, based on a 
statistically valid sample of the total 
number of determinations made by the 
IRS to deny written requests to disclose 
information to taxpayers on the basis of 
I.R.C. § 6103 or 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-100-023; Apr 2024 
We reviewed a statistical sample of 99 
of the 516 fully or partially denied 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests and determined that the IRS 
correctly withheld information using 
FOIA exemption (b)(7) for 98 of the 99 
FOIA information requests we sampled. 
This was an improvement compared to 
our last report, in which we reported 
that the Disclosure Office did not 
follow FOIA redaction requirements for 
11 of the 83 requests reviewed. We 
reviewed all 10 I.R.C. § 6103(c) and 
(e) requests and did not identify any 
disclosure errors. 
Improper Payments Elimination and  
Recovery Act of 2010 
   31 U.S.C. § 3321 
Requires TIGTA to assess the IRS’s  
  compliance with improper payment  
requirements. 
 
Rep. No. 2024-400-026; May 2024 
For FY 2023, the IRS was largely 
compliant with reporting requirements 
contained in the Payment Integrity 
Information Act of 2019. However, the 
IRS still has not satisfied the Payment 
Integrity Act goal to reduce improper 
payment rates to less than 10 percent. 
Government Charge Card Abuse 
Prevention Act of 2012 
Pub. L. No. 112-194, 126 Stat. 1445 
(codified as amended at  
5 U.S.C. § 5701 note, 10 U.S.C.  
§ 2784, and 41 § U.S.C. 1909) 
 
Requires TIGTA to report on the IRS’s 
progress in implementing purchase and 
travel card audit recommendations. 
 Rep. No. 2024-100-016; Jan 2024 
Our review of the IRS’s purchase card 
program found that controls are 
generally effective, and the number of 
purchase card violations identified by  
the IRS Credit Card Services Branch 
were minimal. 
 
Rep. No. 2024-100-044; Jul 2024 
Our review of the IRS’s purchase card 
program found that controls are 
generally effective, and the number of 
purchase card violations identified by  
the Chief Financial Officer’s Credit Card 
Services Branch were minimal. 
 
Biannual Independent Assessment  
of Private Collection Agency 
Performance 
 
 
Independently evaluate the 
performance of private collection 
agencies. 
 
Report due Dec 2024. To be included 
in the Mar 2025 SAR. 
Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) Detailed Accounting 
Submission and Assertions 
National Drug Enforcement Policy  
21 U.S.C. § 1704(d) and the ONDCP 
Circular, Drug Control Accounting, 
dated May 1, 2007. 
Requires TIGTA to authenticate the IRS’s 
ONDCP detailed accounting submission 
and assertions. 
 
 
Rep. No. 2024-100-014; Dec 2023 
We are not aware of any material 
modifications that should be made to 
the assertions in the IRS’s FY 2023 
Budget Formulation Compliance 
Report and Detailed Accounting Report 
in order for them to be in accordance 
with the ONDCP Circular. 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 53
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Taxpayer Identification 
Number (ITIN) Program 
 
Assess that only individuals with a tax 
need are assigned an ITIN. 
   Rep. No. 2024-400-012; Dec 2023 
Included in the Mar 2024 SAR. 
Adequacy and Security of the 
Technology of the IRS 
 
 I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(D) 
 
Requires TIGTA to evaluate the 
adequacy and security of the IRS’s  
technology. 
 
  Information Technology Reviews: 
  Rep. No. 2024-408-004; Oct 2023 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-009; Jan 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-015; Feb 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-IE-R008; Feb 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-406-020; Mar 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-025; Jun 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-408-031; Jun 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-038; Aug 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-2S8-055; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-208-052; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-400-062; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-408-066; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-049; Sep 2024 
  Security Reviews: 
   
  Rep. No. 2024-200-005; Oct 2023 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-032; Jul 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-039; Jul 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-20S-034; Aug 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-046; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-042; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-047; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-048; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-100-063; Sep 2024 
  Rep. No. 2024-200-050; Sep 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
54│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Appendix III 
Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued  
    April 1, 2024, Through September 30, 202425 
 
 
 Report Title 
                    Report Number/Link26 
                                                      April 2024 
Fiscal Year 2024 Mandatory Review of Compliance With the Freedom of Information Act 
2024-100-023 
Criminal Investigation Had Success With Ghost Employers, While Civil Enforcement Efforts  
Can Be Improved 
2024-300-019 
Additional Actions Need to Be Taken to Identify and Address Noncompliant Biofuel  
Tax Credit Claims 
2024-300-021 
Interim Results of the 2024 Filing Season 
2024-408-024 
Quarterly Snapshot: The IRS's Inflation Reduction Act Spending Through December 31, 2023 
2024-IE-R011 
                                                      May 2024 
Taxpayer Assistance Centers Generally Provided Quality Service, but Additional Actions Are 
Needed to Reduce Taxpayer Burden 
2024-100-022 
Assessment of Fiscal Year 2023 Compliance With Improper Payment Reporting Requirements 
2024-400-026 
Actions Need to Be Taken to Ensure the Success of the Lifting Communities Up Initiative in 
Expanding Services and Assistance to Taxpayers in Underserved Populations 
2024-IE-R012 
                                                      June 2024 
The IRS Has Reduced Its Overall Space Footprint; However, a Significant Amount of Unneeded 
Office Space Still Remains 
2024-100-027 
Some Corrective Actions to Address Reported Information Technology Weaknesses Were Not 
Adequately Documented and Effectively Implemented 
2024-200-025 
The IRS Ceased Compliance With the $10 Million Taxpayer Treasury Directive in Favor of an 
Overall Focus on High-Income Taxpayer Noncompliance 
2024-300-028 
Inflation Reduction Act: Interim Results of the Direct File Pilot 
2024-408-031 
A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed to Address the Significant Backlog of Adjustment Source 
Documentation Inventory 
2024-IE-R013 
Opportunities Exist to Improve Taxpayer Service to Underserved, Underrepresented, and Rural 
Communities 
2024-IE-R014 
 
25 Unless otherwise noted, IRS management decisions were made by the end of the reporting period for all audit products 
listed in this appendix. 
26 Dollar values for any recommendations with Questioned Costs and/or Funds Put to Better Use are available in the 
Outcome Measure Appendix of the report linked, if applicable. 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 55
 
 
 
 
Quarterly Snapshot: The IRS’s Inflation Reduction Act Spending Through March 31, 2024 
2024-IE-R015 
                                                       July 2024 
Improvements Are Needed to Effectively Provide Oversight and Management of the 
Interagency Agreement With the National Archives and Records Administration 
2024-300-029 
Virtual Currency Tax Compliance Enforcement Can Be Improved 
2024-300-030 
Actions Have Been Taken to Improve Security Controls for the Planned Expanded Use of 
Login.gov; However, Additional Security Improvements Are Needed 
2024-200-032 
Review of the Internal Revenue Service’s Purchase Card Violations Report 
2024-100-044 
Ninety-Five Percent of IRS and Contractor Employees Were Tax Compliant; However, There 
Were Some Tax Delinquencies or Prior Conduct/Performance Issues 
2024-100-033 
Fiscal Year 2024 IRS Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation 
2024-200-039 
The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Fully Complying With the 90- and 120-Day Requirements 
of the No TikTok on Government Devices Implementation Guidance 
2024-IE-R016 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Local Taxpayer Advocate Service Telephone Lines 
Are Properly Monitored 
2024-IE-R018 
                                                       August 2024 
The IRS Does Not Have Specific Plans to Replace and Decommission Legacy Systems 
2024-200-038 
Access to and Safeguarding Federal Tax Information, Investigating Unauthorized Access, and 
Ongoing Audits on the Security of Taxpayer Data 
2024-20S-034 
Improvements to the Tax-Exempt Compliance Unit Could Reduce Mistakes and Unproductive 
Examination Referrals 
2024-100-040 
Review of the Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit Implementation Identified 
Weaknesses in the Pre-Rulemaking Process 
2024-308-035 
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Review of Compliance With Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing 
Collection Due Process Procedures 
2024-300-037 
Efforts to Oversee State Agency Access to Federal Tax Information Were Generally Successful; 
However, Some Improvements Are Needed 
2024-100-041 
The IRS Faces Challenges to Address Tax Avoidance Strategies of Large Multinational 
Corporations 
2024-400-045 
The IRS Has Made Limited Progress Developing the Methodology to Comply With the Treasury 
Directive to Not Increase the Audit Rate for Taxpayers With Incomes Below $400,000 Due to 
Planning and Implementation Challenges 
2024-308-043 
Employee Safety and Physical Security Review of the ********Taxpayer Assistance 
Center and Tax Compliance Office27 
2024-IE-R017 
 
 
 
27 Redaction due to subject matter that might create a risk of circumvention of the law if publicly released. 

 
 
 
 
56│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
                                                       September 2024 
The Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Has Been Implemented; However, Actions Are Needed            
to Improve the Program 
2024-200-046 
Review of the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax Implementation Identified Weaknesses            
in the Pre-Rulemaking Process 
2024-308-036 
Compliance Data Warehouse Security Needs Improvement 
2024-200-042 
Improvements Are Needed in the Cloud Security Assessment, Approval, and Monitoring 
Processes 
2024-200-047 
Progress of Information Technology Modernization Efforts 
2024-2S8-055 
The Individual Tax Processing Engine Project Is Progressing, but Risks Remain 
2024-208-052 
Actions Need to Be Taken to Improve the Data Loss Prevention Solution and Reduce                    
the Risk of Data Exfiltration 
2024-200-048 
Fiscal Year 2024 Mandatory Review of Disclosure of Collection Activity With Respect               
to Joint Returns 
2024-300-051 
The Information Collected by Online Providers and Shared With Third Parties Is Not Clearly 
Disclosed to Taxpayers and Is Unknown to the IRS 
2024-400-062 
Former Contractor Employees Retained Access to IRS Facilities, Systems, and Equipment 
2024-100-063 
Customer Satisfaction Survey Results Are Not Used Effectively to Improve Taxpayer Services 
2024-100-053 
Inflation Reduction Act: Implementation of the Elective Payment and Transfer                                
of Credit Provision 
2024-408-066 
Review of the IRS Independent Office of Appeals Collection Due Process Program 
2024-300-060 
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Issuing Levies 
2024-300-056 
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Review of Potential Fair Tax Collection Practices Violations 
2024-300-059 
The Direct File Pilot Deployed Successfully; However, Security and Testing Improvements            
Are Needed 
2024-200-050 
The IRS Is Not Meeting Key Federal Requirements in Its Transition to Internet Protocol           
Version 6 
2024-200-049 
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Audit of Compliance With Legal Guidelines Restricting the Use of 
Records of Tax Enforcement Results 
2024-300-061 
Fiscal Year 2024 Mandatory Review of Compliance With Legal Guidelines When Conducting 
Seizures of Taxpayers’ Property 
2024-300-054 
Fiscal Year 2024 Statutory Review of Restrictions on Directly Contacting  
Represented Taxpayers 
2024-300-058 
Communication Breakdowns, Hiring Volume Surges, and Aging System Integration Challenges 
Delayed Some IRS Hiring Efforts 
2024-108-069 
Security Vulnerability Management and Configuration Compliance of a General Support 
System and Major Application Need Improvement 
2024-200-057 
Management Took Actions to Address Erroneous Employee Retention Credit Claims;  
However, Some Questionable Claims Still Need to Be Addressed 
2024-400-068 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 57
 
 
 
 
Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Oversight of and Increase Participation  
in the Free File Program 
2024-400-067 
The IRS Could Collect Over a Billion Dollars in Taxes From Unreported Wagering Income 
2024-300-064 
Millions of Taxpayers Took Early Retirement Distributions but Some Did Not Pay                         
the Additional Tax, Claim an Exception, or Report the Income 
2024-100-065 
Additional Actions Are Needed to Clearly Inform Taxpayers in Federally Declared Disaster 
Areas of Balance Due Payment Postponement Time Frames 
2024-IE-R019 
Quarterly Snapshot: The IRS’s Inflation Reduction Act Spending Through June 30, 2024 
2024-IE-R020 

 
 
 
 
58│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Appendix IV 
Inspector General Peer Review Activity 
 
This appendix implements § 989C of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.28 
 
For the period April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024: 
 
Peer Reviews Conducted of TIGTA by Another Office of Inspector General 
 
• The Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General completed a peer 
review of our Office of Audit. The review was completed Sept. 18, 2024, with a rating 
of pass. 
 
• The Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General completed a peer review  
of our Office of Investigations (OI) on May 11, 2024. The review found that OI is in 
compliance with quality standards established by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency and other applicable guidelines and statutes.  
 
Outstanding Recommendations From Peer Reviews of TIGTA 
 
• There are no outstanding recommendations from the two peer reviews of TIGTA.  
 
Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA 
 
• TIGTA did not conduct a peer review during this reporting period.  
 
Outstanding Recommendations From Peer Reviews Conducted by TIGTA 
 
• There are no outstanding recommendations from peer reviews conducted by TIGTA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Codified at 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(14)-(16). 
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 59
 
 
 
 
Appendix V 
Data Tables Provided by the Internal Revenue Service 
 
The memorandum copied below is the IRS’s transmittal to TIGTA. The IRS provided the  
tables that follow the memorandum. They consist of IRS employee misconduct reports from 
the IRS Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System (ALERTS) for the period 
April 1, 2024, through Sept. 30, 2024. Also, data concerning substantiated RRA 98 § 1203 
allegations for the same period are included. See Appendix VI for § 1203 Standards.  
IRS management conducted inquiries into the cases reflected in these tables. 
 
Internal Revenue Service Memorandum                                                         
 
 
 
The Following Tables Are Provided by the IRS:  

 
 
 
 
60│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Report of Employee Misconduct by Disposition Groups 
Period Covering April 1, 2024, Through September 30, 2024 
 
 
Source: Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System (ALERTS) (extract date: Oct. 1, 2024). 
Columns containing numbers of three or less and protected by I.R.C. § 6103 are annotated with a zero and 
are not reflected in the column and row totals. Columns containing no data are annotated with ND. 
Disposition 
Administrative 
Case 
Employee 
Character 
Investigation 
Employee Tax 
Compliance 
Case 
TIGTA Report 
of 
Investigation 
Totals 
 
ALTERNATIVE DISCIPLINE:  
IN LIEU OF REPRIMAND 
0 
ND 
6 
0 
6 
 
ALTERNATIVE DISCIPLINE:  
IN LIEU OF SUSPENSION 
8 
ND 
12 
5 
25 
ADMONISHMENT 
95 
5 
298 
18 
416 
 
CASE SUSPENDED PENDING EMPLOYEE 
RETURN TO DUTY 
ND 
ND 
0 
0 
0 
CLEARANCE LETTER 
38 
ND 
21 
16 
75 
CLOSED - SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
 
CLOSED WITHOUT ACTION  
CAUTIONARY LETTER 
188 
116 
358 
42 
704 
CLOSED WITHOUT ACTION LETTER 
90 
44 
55 
31 
220 
FORWARDED TO TIGTA 
89 
ND 
ND 
ND 
89 
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 
0 
ND 
ND 
0 
0 
ORAL COUNSELING 
37 
ND 
6 
ND 
43 
PROBATION/SEPARATION 
359 
16 
0 
16 
391 
PROSECUTION PENDING FOR TIGTA’S 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (ROI) 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
 
REMOVAL AT U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT DIRECTION 
ND 
11 
ND 
ND 
11 
REMOVAL (PROBATION PERIOD 
COMPLETE) 
44 
0 
0 
21 
65 
REPRIMAND 
87 
5 
78 
32 
202 
 
RESIGNATION, RETIREMENT, ETC.  
(REASON NOTED ON SF50) 
20 
0 
8 
11 
39 
 
RESIGNATION, RETIREMENT, ETC.  
(REASON NOT NOTED ON SF50) 
104 
16 
30 
26 
176 
SEPARATION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
SUSPENSION, 14 DAYS OR LESS 
39 
ND 
42 
21 
102 
SUSPENSION, MORE THAN 14 DAYS 
5 
ND 
6 
11 
22 
 
TERMINATION FOR ABANDONMENT              
OF POSITION 
13 
ND 
ND 
ND 
13 
WRITTEN COUNSELING 
161 
66 
396 
32 
655 
TOTAL 
1,377 
279 
1,316 
282 
3,254 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 61
 
 
 
 
Report of Employee Misconduct National Summary 
Period Covering April 1, 2024, Through September 30, 2024 
 
Source: ALERTS (extract date: Oct. 1, 2024). Columns containing numbers of three or less and protected by 
I.R.C. § 6103 are annotated with a zero and are not reflected in the column and row totals. Columns 
containing no data are annotated with ND. 
 
Administrative Case - Any matter involving an employee in which management conducted an inquiry into 
alleged misconduct.  
 
Background Investigations - Any matter involving a National Background Investigation Center investigation into 
an employee’s background that is referred to management for appropriate action. 
 
Employee Tax Compliance Case - Any conduct matter identified by the Employee Tax Compliance program 
and becomes a matter of official interest. 
 
TIGTA Investigation - Any matter involving an employee in which TIGTA investigated alleged misconduct 
and referred a Report of Investigation to the IRS for appropriate action. 
 
 
 
Inventory      
Case Type 
 
Open 
Inventory 
 
 
Conduct 
Cases 
Received 
Cases Closed 
 
Ending 
Inventory 
Conduct 
Issues 
Cases 
Merged 
With Other 
Cases 
Non-
Conduct 
Issues 
Administrative 
Case 
652 
1,968 
1,663 
100 
12 
845 
Employee 
Character 
Investigation 
200 
325 
347 
20 
ND 
158 
Employee Tax 
Compliance 
Case 
1,598 
1,394 
1,399 
69 
ND 
1,524 
TIGTA Report of 
Investigation 
446 
404 
380 
14 
ND 
456 
Total 
2,896 
4,091 
3,789 
203 
12 
2,983 

 
 
 
 
62│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Summary of Substantiated I.R.C. Section 1203  
Inquiries Recorded in ALERTS  
Period Covering April 1, 2024, Through September 30, 2024 
 
Source: ALERTS (extract date: Oct. 1, 2024). Columns containing numbers of three or less and protected  
by I.R.C. § 6103 are annotated with a zero and are not reflected in the column and row totals. Columns 
containing no data are annotated with ND. 
 
Cases reported as “Removals” and “Penalty Mitigated” do not reflect the results of any  
third-party appeal.  
 
 
§ 1203 Violation 
Removals 
Resigned/
Retired 
Probation 
Separation 
Removed 
on Other 
Grounds 
Penalty 
Mitigated 
In 
Personnel 
Process 
Total 
1203(b)(3): CIVIL 
RIGHTS/CONSTRUCTIVE 
VIOLATION 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
0 
0 
1203(b)(8): WILLFUL 
UNTIMELY RETURN 
0 
ND 
ND 
0 
6 
67 
73 
1203(b)(9): WILLFUL 
UNDERSTATED TAX 
0 
ND 
0 
ND 
ND 
26 
26 
Total 
0 
ND 
0 
0 
6 
93 
99 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 63
 
 
 
 
Appendix VI 
Section 1203 Standards 
 
In general, the IRS Commissioner shall terminate any IRS employee if there is a final 
administrative or judicial determination that, in the performance of official duties, such 
employee committed any misconduct violations outlined below. Such termination shall be a 
removal for cause on charges of misconduct. 
Misconduct violations include: 
• Willfully failing to obtain the required approval signatures on documents authorizing the 
seizure of a taxpayer’s home, personal belongings, or business assets; 
• Providing a false statement under oath with respect to a material matter involving a 
taxpayer or taxpayer representative; 
• Violating, with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other employee of the IRS, 
any right under the Constitution of the United States, or any civil right established under 
Title VI or VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; Age Discrimination Act of 1975; Section 
501 or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; or Title I of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act of 1990;  
• Falsifying or destroying documents to conceal mistakes made by any employee with 
respect to a matter involving a taxpayer or taxpayer representative; 
• Committing assault or battery on a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or another employee 
of the IRS, but only if there is a criminal conviction or a final judgment by a court in a civil 
case with respect to the assault or battery;   
• Violating the I.R.C., the Treasury Department regulations, or policies of the IRS (including 
the IRM) for the purpose of retaliating against or harassing a taxpayer, taxpayer 
representative, or other employee of the IRS; 
• Willfully misusing provisions of I.R.C. § 6103 for the purpose of concealing information 
from a congressional inquiry; 
• Willfully failing to file any return of tax required under the I.R.C. on or before the date 
prescribed therefore (including any extensions), unless such failure is due to reasonable 
cause and not to willful neglect; 
• Willfully understating federal tax liability, unless such understatement is due to reasonable 
cause and not to willful neglect; and 
• Threatening to audit a taxpayer for the purpose of extracting personal gain or benefit. 
 
The IRS Commissioner may mitigate the penalty of removal for the misconduct violations 
outlined above. The exercise of this authority shall be at the sole discretion of the Commissioner 
and may not be delegated to any other officer. The Commissioner may establish a procedure 
that will be used to decide whether an individual should be referred to the Commissioner for 
determination. Any mitigation determination by the Commissioner in these matters may not be 
appealed in any administrative or judicial proceeding. 

 
 
 
 
64│ April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024 
 
Glossary  
 
ALERTS 
Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System 
CARE 
Customer Assistance, Relationships and Education 
CARES Act 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
CDP 
Collection Due Process  
C.F.R. 
Code of Federal Regulations  
CSP 
credential service providers 
EIN 
Employer Identification Number 
ERC 
Employee Retention Credit  
FAR 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FedRamp 
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
FOIA 
Freedom of Information Act 
FTCP 
Fair Tax Collection Practices 
FY 
Fiscal Year 
IRA 
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 
I.R.C. 
Internal Revenue Code 
IRS  
Internal Revenue Service  
ITIN 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number 
ITPE 
Individual Rax Processing Engine 
JAMES 
Joint Audit Management Enterprise System 
LCU 
Lifting Up Communities (IRS initiative) 
NFTL 
Notice of Federal Tax Liens  
 
 

April 1, 2024 – September 30, 2024│ 65
 
 
 
 
OCPO 
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (IRS) 
OI 
Office of Investigations 
OMB 
Office of Management and Budget 
ONDCP  
Office of National Drug Control Policy  
PCA 
private collection agency 
PPP 
Paycheck Protection Program 
PRC 
People’s Republic of China 
RRA 
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
SOP 
Strategic Operating Plan (IRS) 
TAS 
Taxpayer Advocate Service 
TCI 
Toledo Correctional Institute  
TPI 
Total Positive Income 
TY 
Tax Year 
TIGTA 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
U.S.C. 
United States Code 


TO REPORT WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE:
    CALL OUR TOLL-FREE HOTLINE
1-800-366-4484
BY WEB:
www.tigta.gov
BY FAX:
202-927-7002
OR WRITE:
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
P.O. Box 23291
Washington, DC 20026
Information you provide is confidential. You may remain anonymous.

Department of the Treasury
Office of the Inspector General for Tax Administration
901 D Street, SW, Suite 600
 Washington, DC 20024
This report and complete copies of TIGTA audit reports
are available online at: www.tigta.gov

File and source

File

REPORT_TIGTA_Semiannual-Report-to-Congress_sep2024.pdf

Size

1,996,213 bytes

SHA-256

9a3b4030bd008694766bd6059a4fff79fe3512b14c34c71c0e6bbab1e1a260fb

Our copy

REPORT_TIGTA_Semiannual-Report-to-Congress_sep2024.pdf

Original

www.tigta.gov