Complaint — Terkel v. CDC

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas · No. 6:20-cv-00564-JCB · Doc. 1 · 2020-10-22 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
TYLER DIVISION 
 
LAUREN 
TERKEL; 
PINEYWOODS 
ARCADIA HOME TEAM, LTD; LUFKIN 
CREEKSIDE 
APARTMENTS, 
LTD; 
LUFKIN CREEKSIDE APARTMENTS II, 
LTD; LAKERIDGE APARTMENTS, LTD; 
WEATHERFORD 
MEADOW 
VISTA 
APARTMENTS, LP; and MACDONALD 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC; 
 
  
Plaintiffs, 
 
  
 v. 
 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND 
PREVENTION; 
ROBERT 
R. 
REDFIELD, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention; NINA WITKOFSKY, in 
her official capacity as Acting Chief of 
Staff for the Centers for Disease Control 
and 
Prevention; 
UNITED 
STATES 
DEPARTMENT 
OF 
HEALTH 
AND 
HUMAN SERVICES; and ALEX AZAR, in 
his official capacity as Secretary of the 
Department 
of 
Health 
and 
Human 
Services; 
 
  
Defendants. 
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CIVIL ACTION NO. ____________ 
JUDGE _______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 
Plaintiffs 
Lauren 
Terkel, 
Pineywoods 
Arcadia 
Home 
Team, 
Ltd. 
(“Pineywoods”), Lufkin Creekside Apartments, Ltd. (“Creekside”), Lufkin Creekside 
Apartments II, Ltd. (“Creekside II”), Lakeridge Apartments, Ltd. (“Lakeridge”), 
Weatherford Meadow Vista Apartments, LP (“Weatherford”), and MacDonald 
Property Management, LLC (“MacDonald”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) seek relief 
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from this Court against Defendants Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the 
“CDC”), Robert R. Redfield (in his official capacity as Director of the CDC), Nina 
Witkofsky (in her official capacity as Acting Chief of Staff for the CDC), United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and Alex Azar (in his official 
capacity as Secretary of HHS) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Plaintiffs are 
challenging the constitutionality of Defendants’ emergency agency order imposing a 
temporary moratorium on residential evictions (the “Eviction Moratorium Order”),1 
and in support would show the Court as follows: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
When Plaintiffs expended substantial financial resources in order to build and 
maintain residential rental properties, they did so with the reasonable expectation 
that they would be legally permitted to realize the benefit of their bargain by 
collecting monthly rent from their tenants. Plaintiffs also expected to have legal 
recourse if those tenants breached the terms of their lease by failing to pay their rent. 
Specifically, by following the standard procedures laid out by Texas state law for 
evicting a tenant, Plaintiffs would be able to replace tenants that failed to pay their 
rent with others that would fulfill their obligations in exchange for occupying the 
property. Plaintiffs’ tenants have now breached their rental agreements by failing to 
pay the agreed upon rent, and under normal circumstances would be immediately 
subject to eviction proceedings under state law. 
                                                          
1  
Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of 
COVID-19, 
85 
Fed. 
Reg. 
55292 
(Sept. 
4, 
2020), 
available 
at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-04/pdf/2020-19654.pdf. 
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However, following the CDC’s emergency issuance of a nationwide Eviction 
Moratorium Order, Plaintiffs have been denied the benefit of their bargain by a 
federal agency on the pretext that exercising their well-established property rights 
will contribute to the spread of COVID-19. This occurred despite the structural 
limitations inherent in our constitutional design, whereby the executive branch of the 
United States government may only act either pursuant to its own inherent executive 
power or to enforcement of a law duly enacted by Congress. Indeed, neither fount of 
power is sufficient to support the CDC’s unprecedented order here. 
The power to suspend the terms of a rental agreement between private parties, 
interfere with state legal proceedings, or prevent private property owners from 
removing unlawfully present persons from their property has never been considered 
inherent in “[t]he executive Power” referenced in Article II of the United States 
Constitution. Thus, the Eviction Moratorium Order’s validity must necessarily be 
predicated on the CDC enforcing one of the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 
8. However, even if Congress itself had passed a law attempting to impose a 
nationwide moratorium on the eviction of residential tenants, such measures would 
reach far beyond the legitimate scope of federal power. Such a moratorium could not 
be supported under the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, or any other 
enumerated power. And if Congress itself lacks the constitutional power to intrude 
upon the States’ traditional police power, Defendants’ attempt to impose such 
measures must also fail. 
 
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Because Defendants have clearly transgressed well established constitutional 
constraints, Plaintiffs file this suit seeking a declaration that the Eviction 
Moratorium Order is unconstitutional because it both exceeds the limited powers of 
the federal government and violates the Administrative Procedure Act. For the same 
reasons, Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against the Order’s enforcement. 
PARTIES 
1. 
Plaintiff Lauren Terkel is individual that owns one 4-unit rental 
property in Tyler, Texas. 
2. 
Plaintiff Pineywoods is a Texas limited partnership that owns a 26-unit 
apartment complex in Center, Texas. PAHT, Inc. is the general partner of the 
partnership. 
3. 
Plaintiff Creekside is a Texas limited partnership that owns a 72-unit 
apartment complex in Lufkin, Texas. First MT Development is the general partner 
of the partnership. 
4. 
Plaintiff Creekside II is a Texas limited partnership that owns a 60-unit 
apartment complex in Lufkin, Texas. PED-Creekside, LLC is the general partner of 
the partnership. 
5. 
Plaintiff Lakeridge is a Texas limited partnership that owns a 112-unit 
apartment complex in Texarkana, Texas. Shannock Two, LLC, is the general partner 
of the limited partnership. 
6. 
Plaintiff Weatherford is a Texas limited partnership that owns an 80-
unit apartment complex in Weatherford, Texas. Weatherford Meadow Vista GP, LLC 
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is its general partner. 
7. 
Plaintiff MacDonald is a Texas limited liability company that manages 
rental properties across the state of Texas. 
8. 
Defendant CDC is an agency of the United States located within HHS. 
9. 
Defendant Robert R. Redfield is the Director of the CDC and, pursuant 
to 42 CFR 70.2, is charged with determining whether measures taken by a State’s 
health authorities are insufficient to prevent the interstate spread of communicable 
diseases. He is sued in his official capacity. 
10. 
Defendant Nina Witkofsky is the Acting Chief of Staff for the CDC and 
is responsible for the challenged agency action taken pursuant to the Eviction 
Moratorium Order. She is sued in her official capacity. 
11. 
Defendant HHS is an agency of the United States. 
12. 
Defendant Alex Azar is the agency head of HHS and is sued in his official 
capacity. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
13. 
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(federal question jurisdiction) because this action arises under the United States 
Constitution; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) because this suit constitutes a civil action against 
an executive department of the United States; and 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706 (providing 
for judicial review of agency action) because this matter involves questions arising 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
14. 
This Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 2201 and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202. 
15. 
Venue is proper within this judicial district and division pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 703 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or 
omissions asserted by Plaintiffs arose within this judicial district. Venue is proper in 
the Tyler Division of the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(1). 
FACTS 
A. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order 
16. 
On September 1, 2020, Defendant Acting Chief of Staff Witkofsky issued 
the Eviction Moratorium Order. The Order became effective on September 4, 2020, 
upon its publication in the Federal Register, and remains in effect until December 31, 
2020, “unless extended.” 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020). 
17. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order prohibits any “landlord, owner of a 
residential property, or other person with a legal right to pursue eviction or 
possessory action” from evicting “any covered person from any residential property in 
any jurisdiction to which this Order applies during the effective period of the Order.” 
Id. 
18. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order defines “evict” or “eviction” as “any 
action by a landlord, owner of a residential property, or other person with a legal right 
to pursue eviction or a possessory action, to remove or cause the removal of a covered 
person from a residential property.” Id. 
19. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order defines a “covered person” as “any 
tenant, lessee, or resident of a residential property who provides . . . a declaration 
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under penalty of perjury” that the individual meets the five qualifications listed 
within the Order. Those qualifications are as follows: 
(1) The individual has used best efforts to obtain all available 
government assistance for rent or housing; 
(2) The individual either (i) expects to earn no more than $99,000 
in annual income for Calendar Year 2020 (or no more than 
$198,000 if filing a joint tax return), (ii) was not required to report 
any income in 2019 to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, or (iii) 
received an Economic Impact Payment (stimulus check) pursuant 
to Section 2201 of the CARES Act; 
(3) the individual is unable to pay the full rent or make a full 
housing payment due to substantial loss of household income, loss 
of compensable hours of work or wages, a lay-off, or extraordinary 
out-of-pocket medical expenses; 
(4) the individual is using best efforts to make timely partial 
payments that are as close to the full payment as the individual's 
circumstances 
may 
permit, 
taking 
into 
account 
other 
nondiscretionary expenses; and 
(5) eviction would likely render the individual homeless—or force 
the individual to move into and live in close quarters in a new 
congregate or shared living setting—because the individual has 
no other available housing options. 
Id. 
20. 
The stated objective of the Eviction Moratorium Order is “mitigating the 
further spread of COVID-19 from one U.S. State or U.S. territory into any other U.S. 
State or U.S. territory.” Id.  
21. 
In particular, the Order claims that because some individuals who are 
evicted from their homes may move to another state, “mass evictions would likely 
increase the interstate spread of COVID-19.” Id. 
22. 
However, the order provides no findings linking the interstate spread of 
COVID-19 to evictions. 
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23. 
Moreover, the Order’s prohibition on evictions is not limited to 
individuals who have been infected or have been exposed to COVID-19. 
24. 
And there is no current prohibition on individuals who have been 
infected or have been exposed to COVID-19 moving between states. 
25. 
An individual that violates the Eviction Moratorium Order “may be 
subject to a fine of no more than $100,000 if the violation does not result in a death 
or one year in jail, or both, or a fine of no more than $250,000 if the violation results 
in a death or one year in jail, or both, or as otherwise provided by law.” 85 Fed. Reg. 
55292 (Sept. 4, 2020). 
26. 
An organization that violates the Eviction Moratorium Order “may be 
subject to a fine of no more than $200,000 per event if the violation does not result in 
a death or $500,000 per event if the violation results in a death or as otherwise 
provided by law.” 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020). 
B. 
Plaintiffs’ Standing 
27. 
Plaintiff Lauren Terkel owns a 4-unit rental property located at (the 
“Tyler Property”). 
28. 
One tenant is two months’ delinquent on rent to Ms. Terkel, with a past 
due amount being approximately $1,700. 
29. 
Ms. Terkel’s monthly expenses for upkeep of the Tyler Property are 
approximately $1,190. 
30. 
Ms. Terkel has maintained the Tyler Property in compliance with all 
legal obligations as landlord and the tenant that owes past due rent possess no other 
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defense for nonpayment. 
31. 
Under Texas law, Ms. Terkel would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
against the tenant that owes past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
execution of writ of possession. 
32. 
Plaintiff Pineywoods owns a 26-unit multi-family property located at 
673 Arcadia Rd., Center, Texas 75935 (the “Pineywoods Property”). 
33. 
Pineywoods has a mortgage on the Pineywoods Property and makes 
monthly payments of approximately $3,745 for the mortgage principal and interest. 
34. 
One tenant is delinquent on rent to Pineywoods at least one month, with 
the past due amount owed being approximately $616. 
35. 
Pineywoods has maintained the Pineywoods Property in compliance 
with all legal obligations as landlord and the tenant that owes past due rent possess 
no other defense for nonpayment. 
36. 
Under Texas law, Pineywoods would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
against the tenant that owes past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
execution of writ of possession. 
37. 
Plaintiff Creekside owns a 72-unit multi-family property located at 1825 
Sayers St., Lufkin, Texas 75904 (the “Creekside Property”). 
38. 
Creekside has a mortgage on the Creekside Property and makes 
monthly payments of approximately $20,550 for the mortgage principal and interest. 
39. 
Six tenants are delinquent on rent to Creekside at least one month, with 
the total past due amount owed being approximately $6,671. 
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40. 
One of the tenants that is delinquent on rent to Creekside (“Creekside 
Tenant 1”) is six months behind and owes approximately $3,485 in back rent. 
41. 
Creekside Tenant 1 has declared to Creekside that the individual has 
used best efforts to obtain government assistance, is making less than $99,000 
individually or $198,000 jointly, is unable to pay rent, and would be rendered 
homeless by an eviction. 
42. 
Creekside filed for a writ of possession against Creekside Tenant 1 but 
received the tenant’s declaration on the same day. 
43. 
One of the tenants that is delinquent on rent to Creekside (“Creekside 
Tenant 2”) is two months behind and owes approximately $1,064 in back rent. 
44. 
Creekside Tenant 2 has declared to Creekside that the individual has 
used best efforts to obtain government assistance, is making less than $99,000 
individually or $198,000 jointly, is unable to pay rent, and would be rendered 
homeless by an eviction. 
45. 
Creekside issued Creekside Tenant 2 a 30-day notice to vacate prior to 
receiving the tenant’s declaration. 
46. 
Creekside has maintained the Creekside Property in compliance with 
all legal obligations as landlord and the tenants that owe past due rent possess no 
other defense for nonpayment. 
47. 
Under Texas law, Creekside would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
against the tenants that owe past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
execution of writs of possession. 
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48. 
Plaintiff Creekside II owns a 60-unit multi-family property located at 
1825 Sayers St., Lufkin, Texas 75904 (the “Creekside II Property”). 
49. 
Creekside II has a mortgage on the Creekside II Property and makes 
monthly payments of approximately $13,352 for the mortgage principal and interest. 
50. 
Six tenants are delinquent on rent to Creekside II at least one month, 
with the total past due amount owed being approximately $7,017. 
51. 
One of the tenants that is delinquent on rent to Creekside II (“Creekside 
II Tenant 1”) is five months behind and owes approximately $3,611 in back rent. 
52. 
Creekside II Tenant 1 has declared to Creekside II that the individual 
has used best efforts to obtain government assistance, is making less than $99,000 
individually or $198,000 jointly, is unable to pay rent, and would be rendered 
homeless by an eviction. 
53. 
Creekside II filed for a writ of possession against Creekside II Tenant 1 
but received the tenant’s declaration on the same day. 
54. 
One of the tenants that is delinquent on rent to Creekside II (“Creekside 
II Tenant 2”) is two months behind and owes approximately $1,132 in back rent. 
55. 
Creekside II has issued Creekside II Tenant 2 a 30-day notice to vacate. 
56. 
Creekside II has maintained the Creekside II Property in compliance 
with all legal obligations as landlord and the tenants that owe past due rent possess 
no other defense for nonpayment. 
57. 
Under Texas law, Creekside II would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
against the tenants that owe past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
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execution of writs of possession. 
58. 
Plaintiff Lakeridge owns a 112-unit multi-family property located at 
3708 S. Lake Dr., Texarkana, Texas 75501 (the “Lakeridge Property”). 
59. 
Lakeridge has a mortgage on the Lakeridge Property and makes 
monthly payments of approximately $34,944 for the mortgage principal and interest. 
60. 
Two tenants are delinquent on rent to Lakeridge at least one month, 
with the total past due amount owed being approximately $1,357. 
61. 
Lakeridge has issued both the tenants that are delinquent on their rent 
a 30-day notice to vacate. 
62. 
Lakeridge has maintained the Lakeridge Property in compliance with 
all legal obligations as landlord and the tenants that owe past due rent possess no 
other defense for nonpayment. 
63. 
Under Texas law, Lakeridge would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
against the tenants that owe past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
execution of writs of possession. 
64. 
Plaintiff Weatherford owns an 80-unit multi-family property located at 
525 Meadow Vista Circle, Weatherford, Texas 76087 (the “Weatherford Property”). 
65. 
Weatherford has a mortgage on the Weatherford Property and makes 
monthly payments of approximately $10,063 for the mortgage principal and interest. 
66. 
Weatherford has maintained the Weatherford Property in compliance 
with all legal obligations as landlord. 
67. 
Under Texas law, Weatherford would be entitled to pursue legal redress 
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against the tenant that owes past due rent, which could eventually result in the 
execution of writ of possession. 
68. 
Plaintiff MacDonald manages 41 rental properties across the state of 
Texas, many of which have tenants that are delinquent on their rent but have 
submitted declarations that appear to substantially conform to those described in the 
Eviction Moratorium Order. 
69. 
Plaintiff MacDonald’s income is primarily based upon receiving a 
percentage of the revenue from each property that it manages and the reduction in 
rent collected has thus resulted in reduced income. 
COUNT I 
THE EVICTION MORATORIUM ORDER EXCEEDS 
THE LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
70. 
Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
71. 
It is axiomatic that “[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
72. 
Any “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
U.S. Const. amend. X. 
73. 
There are seventeen specific powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution, along with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
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Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, sec.  8. 
74. 
The power to modify leasing agreements between landlords and tenants 
is neither explicitly nor implicitly among the federal government’s enumerated 
powers, see U.S. Const. art. I, sec.  8, nor is it inherent in “[t]he executive Power” 
referenced in Article II of the United States Constitution. 
75. 
The CDC has traditionally claimed authority to stem the spread of 
disease under the Commerce Clause.  
76. 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress authority “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, sec.  8, cl. 3. 
77. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority to “make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” 
78. 
But the Eviction Moratorium Order cannot be justified under the 
Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
79. 
The commerce power generally falls within three broad categories: 1) 
regulation of the channels of interstate commerce; 2) regulation of the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and 3) regulation of activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). 
80. 
The substantial effects test relies not merely on the Commerce Clause, 
but upon the Necessary and Proper Clause as well. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1, 33-42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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81. 
Regulating the eviction of tenants is not a regulation of a channel nor 
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 
82. 
Nor does the eviction of tenants from private property substantially 
effect interstate commerce.  
83. 
The CDC provides no evidence or findings supporting any claim that 
removing individuals who are unlawfully present from private property will have a 
substantial impact on the national economy. 
84. 
Nor is the Eviction Moratorium Order part of some broader economic 
regulatory scheme that would be undercut if the federal government were not 
permitted to stop evictions. 
85. 
There is currently no federal prohibition on those exposed to COVID-19 
moving across state lines. 
86. 
And there are no findings or evidence in the Eviction Moratorium Order 
that suggest a federal restriction on individuals exposed to COVID-19 moving across 
state lines would be undercut if the federal government could not prevent evictions 
from private property. 
87. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order is not even a regulation of economic 
activity.  
88. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order does not alter the commercial 
obligations of tenants, such as the payment of rent. 
89. 
Instead, the Eviction Moratorium Order punishes property owners for 
exercising their rights to remove unlawfully present persons from their property, or 
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for initiating legal proceedings to evict under state law.  
90. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order does not contain a “jurisdiction hook” 
that limits its operation to those traveling in interstate commerce, or to those who 
have been exposed to COVID-19. 
91. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order instead expands federal authority into 
areas of traditional state power by regulating private property rights, private 
contracts, and the right to invoke traditional state legal proceedings.  
92. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order therefore requires the exercise of a 
great and independent federal power not recognized under the Commerce Clause or 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
COUNT II 
THE EVICTION MORATORIUM ORDER VIOLATES 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT  
93. 
Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
94. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency action is invalid if 
it is contrary to any constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity. 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(B). 
95. 
An agency action that would extend an act of Congress beyond Congress’ 
enumerated powers is contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity and not in accordance with law. 
96. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order constitutes final agency action. 
97. 
The Eviction Moratorium Order violates 5 U.S.C. § 706 of the 
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Administrative Procedure Act because it neither implicates the exercise of any 
enumerated power nor is it necessary and proper to such an exercise. 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS 
98. 
Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
99. 
Plaintiffs allege that both on its face and as applied, the Eviction 
Moratorium Order violates their constitutional rights. 
100. 
If an injunction does not issue enjoining Defendants from enforcing the 
Eviction Moratorium Order, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed. 
101. 
Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law to prevent 
the Defendants from enforcing the Eviction Moratorium Order. 
102. 
If not enjoined by this Court, Defendants will continue to enforce the 
Eviction Moratorium Order in derogation of Plaintiffs’ rights. 
103. 
Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate. 
DECLARATORY RELIEF ALLEGATIONS 
104. 
Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as if 
set forth fully herein. 
105. 
An actual and substantial controversy exists between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants as to their legal rights and duties with respect to whether the Eviction 
Moratorium Order violates the United States Constitution. 
106. 
This case is presently justiciable because the Eviction Moratorium 
Order applies to Plaintiffs on its face and Plaintiffs have tenants who have invoked 
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the protection of the Eviction Moratorium Order. 
107. 
Declaratory relief is therefore appropriate to resolve this controversy. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, it is appropriate and 
proper that a declaratory judgment be issued by this Court, declaring 
unconstitutional the Eviction Moratorium Order. 
Furthermore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, it is 
appropriate and hereby requested that the Court issue preliminary and permanent 
injunctions prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the Eviction Moratorium Order. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants and that the 
Court: 
(1) 
declare that the Eviction Moratorium Order is unconstitutional on its 
face because it is unsupported by any power granted to any branch of the federal 
government by the United States Constitution; 
(2) 
declare that the Eviction Moratorium Order is invalid under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, because it is inconsistent with 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity and not in accordance with law; 
(3) 
issue a preliminary injunction against the Defendants, as well as all 
agents, administrators, employees, or other persons acting on behalf of the 
Defendants, from enforcing the Eviction Moratorium Order;  
(4) 
issue a permanent injunction against the Defendants, as well as all 
agents, administrators, employees, or other persons acting on behalf of the 
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Defendants, from enforcing the Eviction Moratorium Order; 
(5) 
award Plaintiffs their costs and expenses incurred in bringing this 
action, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412; and 
(6) 
grant such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just, 
and proper. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/s/Robert Henneke 
 
ROBERT HENNEKE 
Texas Bar No. 24046058 
rhenneke@texaspolicy.com 
CHANCE WELDON 
Texas Bar No. 24076767 
cweldon@texaspolicy.com 
RYAN D. WALTERS 
Texas Bar No. 24105085 
rwalters@texaspolicy.com 
TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION 
901 Congress Avenue 
Austin, TX 78701 
Telephone: (512) 472-2700 
Facsimile: 
(512) 472-2728 
 
KIMBERLY S. HERMANN 
(pro hac vice pending) 
Georgia Bar No. 646473 
khermann@southeasternlegal.org 
CELIA HOWARD O’LEARY 
(pro hac vice pending) 
coleary@southeasternlegal.org 
Georgia Bar No. 747472 
SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 
560 West Crossville Rd., Ste. 104 
Roswell, GA 30075 
Telephone: (770) 977-2131 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Case 6:20-cv-00564-JCB   Document 1   Filed 10/22/20   Page 19 of 19 PageID #:  19

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