After Action Review Recommendations — Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic (December 4, 2024)

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AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: 
Recommendations 
 
 
December 4, 2024 

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The Origins of the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including but Not Limited to the 
Federal Government’s Funding of Gain-of-Function Research 
 
Recommendations Regarding Investigating the Origins of COVID-19 
 
1. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue its investigation into the origins of 
COVID-19.  
a. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue to pursue the origins of 
COVID-19, to include intelligence collection regarding activities at the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology and Wuhan Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
specifically regarding activities conducted immediately preceding the COVID-19 
pandemic.  
 
b. The U.S. Intelligence Community should continue to pursue the origins of 
COVID-19, to include intelligence collection regarding the knowledge and 
actions of the government of the People’s Republic of China, including but not 
limited to local and provincial governments. 
 
2. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence should declassify, to the extent 
allowable by law, information related to COVID-19’s origins. The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence must abide by S. 619, the COVID-19 Origin Act of 
2023, and declassify “any and all information related to the potential links between the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19)…” 
 
3. The Federal Government should do a holistic review of the origins of COVID-19. 
The White House should conduct a thorough and comprehensive internal review of all 
documents and information in the custody and control of the following agencies 
regarding the origins of COVID-19, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc, and funding of gain-of-
function research: 
 
a. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to include the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 
 
b. U.S. Department of State, to include the U.S. Agency for International 
Development; 
 
c. U.S. Department of Homeland Security;  
 
d. U.S. Department of Justice, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
 
e. U.S. Department of Defense, to include the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; 
 
f. U.S. Department of Energy, to include the network of National Laboratories; and 
the 

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g.  U.S. Intelligence Community, to include the Central Intelligence Agency.  
 
Recommendations Regarding Gain-of-Function Research 
 
1. The Federal Government must take steps to pause and subsequently regulate high-
risk pathogen research to increase safety and decrease the risk of an accident. 
Evaluate pausing all high-risk pathogen research until new regulations and biosafety and 
biosecurity measures can be designed and implemented.  
 
a. Provide further scrutiny to high-risk pathogen research that involves recombinant 
or chimeric research, regardless of pathogen host, to include government review 
and oversight.  
 
b. Evaluate increasing laboratory and fieldwork biosafety and security standards for 
all life sciences research. 
 
c. Evaluate whether the United States needs a single, unified regulatory scheme 
governing gain-of-function and dual use research, regardless of funding source. 
 
d. Evaluate removing final approval authority for high-risk pathogen research 
proposals from the funding agency and instead empower an independent oversight 
entity to review, approve, and oversee such experiments. 
 
e. Impose increased transparency requirements for high-risk pathogen research so 
that federal and federally funded entities can no longer withhold critical 
information from Congress and the public. 
 
2. Using artificial intelligence or machine learning should be encouraged as a 
substitute for traditional high-risk pathogen research. The Federal Government must 
encourage the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning in high-risk virology 
research and restrict the use of live viral research to only necessary uses to reduce the 
likelihood of a laboratory or research related accident or infection.  
 
Recommendations Regarding EcoHealth Alliance, Inc 
 
1. The Federal Government must ensure that no more U.S. taxpayer dollars go to 
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc or Dr. Peter Daszak and that they are held accountable. As 
of December 4, 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has 
preliminarily suspended and proposed for debarment both EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., as an 
institution, and Dr. Peter Daszak, as an individual. The U.S, Department of Health and 
Human Services must formally debar both EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and Dr. Peter Daszak 
for the maximum time allowable.  
 
2. The Department of Justice must evaluate if Dr. Peter Daszak violated any federal laws, 
including but limited to violations of:  

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a. 18 U.S.C. 1001;  
 
b. 18 U.S.C. 1621; and  
 
c. 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733.  
 
Recommendations Regarding the Federal Government. 
 
1. The Federal Government must continue to prioritize grant oversight and 
compliance efforts. Evaluate the resources allocated to grant oversight and compliance 
to ensure adequate government-wide grant enforcement and proper investigations of 
grant compliance. 
 
a. Ensure that the annual grant reporting process is timely, transparent, and 
streamlined, to include a public repository of all annual reports filed pursuant to 
taxpayer funded grants.  
 
b. Evaluate policies to ensure federal funded research can be replicated successfully 
and reward researchers whose research is routinely successfully replicated.  
 
c. Include excessive or unanticipated pathogen growth conditions as a term of award 
in all high-risk pathogen grants, these terms must include how the grantee should 
measure growth, when the grantee should measure growth, and how and when 
that growth is to be reported to the funding agency. Any experiments that exhibit 
excessive or unanticipated growth must be reported to Congress within 48 hours 
of the funding agency receiving the report from the grantee.  
 
d. Update applicable U.S. biosafety and security standards to include a biosafety 
level for research with bat-borne coronaviruses.  
 
e. Include applicable U.S. biosafety and biosecurity standards as a term of award in 
all high-risk pathogen grants, especially those with a foreign component or 
collaborator.  
 
f. Evaluate new terms of award, regulations, or grant conditions to ensure the safety 
and humane treatment of laboratory animals in domestic and foreign labs.  
 
g. Require grantees in all high-risk pathogen grants produce all metadata, underlying 
data, laboratory notebooks, or other information pertinent to the federal funded 
activity within 48 hours at the funding agencies request. 
 
2. Restructure the U.S. National Institutes of Health to provide for great accountability 
and transparency. Consider whether the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases should be divided into at least two institutes, one focusing on 
infectious disease and one focusing on allergies. 

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a. Evaluate whether leadership of the institutes and centers of the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health should be subject to term or years of service limits. 
 
3. Increase accountability, security, and transparency in the federal grant peer review 
process. Consider granting the Director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health or the 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the funding Institute, 
authority to immediately suspend, pending investigation, a grant determined to be a threat 
to national security.  
 
a. Incorporate a national security or Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
review into the grant making process for grants that involve, in any way, countries 
of particular concern or special watch list countries.   
 
b. Provide transparency and accountability to the grant process by assigning one 
funding agency official to be accountable for approving federal funding for grants 
and making those decisions, and the peer review process more transparent to 
Congress and the public.  
 
c. Allow federal funded research peer review process to be more open to include 
more researchers and scientists to ensure research is being thoroughly and 
impartially reviewed.  
 
 
 
 
 

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The Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Transparency of the Use of Taxpayer Funds 
and Relief Programs to Address the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including Any 
Reports of Waste, Fraud, or Abuse 
 
1. Federal Agencies Cannot Rely on “Self-Certification” and Must Implement Modern 
Digital Identification Programs: Whether for regular, recurring government benefits or 
for the extraordinary benefits that were disbursed during the pandemic, federal agencies 
must verify eligibility of applicants through either commercially available or 
government-developed identification verification applications. Federal agencies should 
implement proper cross-matching of applicant data with available databases immediately 
to be effective in the scenario of future emergency relief funds. Update legacy systems 
within federal agencies to give them the ability to perform cross-matching for such a 
large volume of claims. 
 
2. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Effective Control Measured Should be 
Implemented:  Require OMB to provide detailed guidance for federal agencies to 
develop internal control plans that can be put to immediate use for future emergency 
funding and require agencies to report such plans to OMB and Congress. These internal 
control plans should be standardized across all agencies and include procedures for 
verifying eligibility, monitoring fund usage, and detecting fraud.  
 
3. SBA Should Implement a Fraud-Risk Program: When SBA is engaged in contingency 
operations to disburse funds as it was during the pandemic, it needs to assign trained staff 
to focus on fraud risk management and oversee improper payments and fraud. This 
includes leveraging analytics programs to identify patterns of fraud or abuse across 
applications.  
 
4. SBA Must Instruct Lenders on How to Combat Fraud and Require Internal 
Controls: During the disbursement of various pandemic relief funds and loans, SBA 
assumed lenders had prior internal control measures in place for mitigating waste, fraud, 
and abuse in loans. While some lenders may have some controls, not all did. SBA should 
develop uniform guidance and minimum levels of internal controls in order for lenders to 
be eligible to administer relief loans.  
 
5. Require Sole Proprietors and Contractors to Provide Employer Identification 
Numbers (EINs): EINs must be provided when applying for future emergency relief 
programs, such as EIDL loans.  Do not allow applicants to self-certify the number of 
employees at their company to receive additional relief funds based off a falsified SSN or 
EIN.  
 
6. Federal Agencies Must Integrate Frad-Risk Assessments Before Disbursing Funds 
to Applicants: Federal agencies should not disburse funds to applicants without proper 
implementations of fraud risk assessments outlined by the Select Subcommittee, and the 
agency’s IGs. Fraud risk assessments should involve identifying, analyzing, and 
mitigating potential vulnerabilities in the program's funding process.  
 

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7. Establish Agreements with Other Agencies to Securely Share Data and Streamline 
Eligibility Verification: For example, make the U.S. Department of Treasury’s do-not-
pay list available to all agency’s OIGs to verify identities and the eligibility of individuals 
and organizations seeking emergency relief funding prior to issuing payments.  
 
8. Amend the Social Security Act to Allow full Death Data to be Shared Between the 
Social Security Administration and Treasury. Authorize the SSA to share the Full 
Death Master File (DMF) with the Treasury and other federal agencies for program 
integrity purposes. Sharing complete death records ensures that federal agencies can 
quickly identify and stop payments made to deceased beneficiaries. Ensure timely 
updates to federal databases, reducing overpayments and the risk of fraud. Minimize 
financial losses due to improper payments, which cost taxpayers billions. 
 
 

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The Implementation or Effectiveness of Any Federal Law or Regulation 
Applied, Enacted, or Under Consideration to Address the Coronavirus 
Pandemic and Prepare for Future Pandemics 
 
1. Expand and Improve the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response: Created 
after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Office Pandemic Preparedness and Response (OPPR) is a 
good start, but only focusses on two of five biodefense strategy objectives. The current National 
Biodefense Strategy has five objectives. Those are: (1) enable risk awareness to inform decision 
making, (2) ensure capabilities to prevent incidents, (3) ensure preparedness to reduce impacts, 
(4) rapidly respond to limit impacts, and (5) facilitate recovery. The OPPR is currently only 
responsible for (3) preparedness and (4) response. The OPPR should be renamed the Office of 
Biodefense Surveillance, Prevention and Response because “pandemic” is too limited a focus in 
a world of biodefense threats. The Office should be responsible for ‘biological hazards’ as 
naturally occurring or bioengineered and ‘biological incidents’ as natural or accidental 
occurrences, a crime involving a biothreat, and an act of biological terrorism or warfare.  More 
important, the Office should be expanded to cover all of the National Biodefense Strategy 
objectives. As the leading public health officer, the Surgeon General should be consulted and 
briefed regularly on the Office’s activities. Finally, the Office should be removed from the 
Executive Office of the President to emphasize the apolitical nature of the office and its 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 

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Notional organizational chart for the Office of Biodefense Surveillance, Prevention, and Response 
This office will inform biodefense strategy and policy, assign biodefense roles and responsibilities across 
the interagency, direct biodefense activities, and advise on biodefense budgetary matters. 
 
Recommendations Regarding The WHO 
 
2. Reform the WHO as a Condition of Continued U.S. Support: The WHO stood by 
while China lied about the severity of the novel COVID-19 virus and obstructed 
investigations within China. Honesty is a non-negotiable, especially in a once in a 
lifetime global pandemic, and within any public health intuition. If the WHO cannot be 
reformed to better manage its membership the U.S. should commence withdrawing 
support. 
 
3. Support Taiwan’s Inclusion into the WHO to Replace China’s Membership: The 
next Administration should endorse Taiwan’s membership as a consequence for the 
manner in which China misled the international community regarding COVID-19. The 
United States and other like-minded developed countries must hold China to account, and 
excluding China from international bodies, such as the WHO, should be considered as 
means to bring China into compliance with shared international norms and practices 
between responsible nations.   
 
Recommendations Regarding The Supply Chain and Strategic National Stockpile 
 
4. A U.S. Pandemic Quick Response Team and Supporting Infrastructure Needs to be 
in Place Before the Next Pandemic: This is crucial for rapid containment, effective 
response, and mitigation of societal and economic impacts. This would be part of a larger 
national pandemic response infrastructure that includes enhanced disease surveillance, 
dispersed supply stockpiles, rapid development of medical countermeasures, and securing 
public trust through effective communication   

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5. States Need to Acquire and Maintain Their Own Strategic Stockpiles: Stockpiles 
should be designed to address pandemics, natural disasters, chemical/biological threats, 
and other emergencies. State stockpiles should supplement the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS), reducing reliance on federal resources. Ensure stockpiles are 
appropriately sized for state populations and potential risks. 
 
6. Better Management of National Stockpile: More and multiple diverse sites – even with 
the states acquiring their own products.  Use digital inventory systems to track stock 
levels, expiration dates, and maintenance schedules. Set up alerts for replenishment needs 
and approaching expiration dates. Ensure systems can communicate with federal and 
regional databases for seamless coordination. Regularly rotate stock to prevent 
expiration, especially for perishable items like medications. Partner with manufacturers 
or distributors to maintain "just-in-time" replenishment capabilities. 
 
7. U.S. Must Move Toward a 100 Percent Domestic Production of Vital medical 
Supplies and Pharmaceuticals: Provide tax credits, grants, and low-interest loans to 
companies investing in domestic production. Offer guaranteed government procurement 
contracts to incentivize U.S.-based production. Partner with private companies to develop 
next-generation medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Fund educational initiatives and 
apprenticeships in pharmaceutical manufacturing, biomedical engineering, and related 
fields. Maintain a strategic reserve of critical materials to buffer against supply 
disruptions. 
 
8. U.S. Must Develop a Manufacturing Ready Reserve (MRR): This would be a 
forward-thinking strategy to ensure the U.S. can rapidly produce critical medical 
supplies, pharmaceuticals, and other essential goods during emergencies. The MRR 
would act as a "standby force" of manufacturing capacity, ready to be activated when 
needed. Focus areas would include: Medical Supplies: PPE, ventilators, syringes, and 
diagnostic tools. Pharmaceuticals: Vaccines, antiviral drugs, antibiotics, and essential 
medications. Critical Technologies: Items like microchips and other essential components 
used in healthcare devices.  
 
Recommendations Regarding Public Health Mitigation Measures 
 
9. Ensure Proposed Policies, Such as Social Distancing, are Considered Wholistically.  
The economic, mental, and social impacts of these policies must be weighed with the 
public health considerations. 
 
10. The CDC and Administration must Conduct Gold Standard Scientific Studies 
before Suggesting Wide-Spread use of Masks: The government should be more 
transparent with their understandings.  Let people know if what they are discussing is a 
hypothesis. Show if trials eventually prove something to be false  
 
11. Public Health Lockdowns Must Be Designed to Protect the Most Vulnerable While 
Preserving the Status Quo For As Much of the Population as Possible: A robust 

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discussion of the costs and benefits is critical. We must not ever again attach “zero value” 
to the collateral damage that may be caused by interventions such as lockdowns. 
 
12. The Collateral Damage of COVID-19 Lockdowns Should be Robustly Studied: 
These studies may help inform cost-benefit analysis during a future pandemic or provide 
guidance toward what present problems need to be addressed. 
 
Recommendations Regarding Surveillance and Testing 
 
13. Support Wastewater Surveillance Efforts. During COVID-19, efforts to surveil 
wastewater proved to be an effective early-warning tool. The federal government should 
consider bolstering these efforts to prepare for a future pandemic. 
 
14. Public-Private Partnerships to Develop Testing Must be Put in Place Now to 
Prepare for Future Pandemics:  Having agreements, contracts, etc. and infrastructure in 
place with industry and academia for testing.  Government development of its own kits 
did not work. Incorporate lessons learned for failures in developing tests.  Office of 
Pandemic Preparedness Readiness and Response should have the lead. 
 
15. Clear and Concise Communications: The FDA's evolving guidance on testing types, 
usage, and interpretation of results led to some confusion. For instance, there were 
changing recommendations about the use of PCR vs. antigen tests, which affected public 
understanding and trust in testing. As the understanding of the virus evolved, updating 
guidelines and communicating changes promptly would have kept testing strategies 
aligned with the latest scientific knowledge. 
 
16. Streamline Testing Processes (from Production to Delivering Results):  
a. Reducing Bottlenecks: The testing process often faced delays due to bottlenecks 
in sample collection, processing, and reporting. Improving logistics and 
increasing the speed of processing and reporting could have accelerated response 
times.  
b. Decentralization: Enhancing the ability for more decentralized or local testing, 
including at pharmacies and clinics, might have alleviated pressure on centralized 
testing facilities and made testing more accessible. 
c. Prioritize development of at-home testing for future pandemics, especially if 
symptoms could be asymptomatic and human-to-human transmission is the means 
of spreading the virus.  
 
17. When There is Any Doubt about a New Virus of Concern Emerging in a Foreign 
Country, Travel Restrictions Should be Immediately Enacted:  It is far easier to undo 
the restrictions that may have been unneeded than it is to take a “wait and see” approach 
once the unknown virus of concerned has entered our borders and thoroughly spread. 
 

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18. Continue to Build upon and Augment International Partnerships. The CDC and 
USAID have established effective programs in less capable nations to conduct overseas 
surveillance to provide early detection of diseases of concern.  
 
19. Exercise Closing the Borders and Ports of Entry: The Department of Homeland 
Security, in consultation with the CDC and Office of Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response, should develop an operational plan (or, if they exist, refine existing plans) to 
close the borders and all ports of entry within 24 hours’ notice and routinely exercise the 
plan in order to prepare for the next pandemic. 
 
General Recommendations 
 
20. The Constitution Should Never be Put on Hold in Times of Crisis: Free speech is of 
vital importance and the federal government should never seek to suppress content it 
disagrees with on social media, or elsewhere. The government should never be the arbiter 
of truth, especially not when it has a conflict of interest. 
 
21. Doctors Frequently and Responsibly Prescribe Off-Label Treatments and Should 
Never be Demonized for Doing so in Exercising Their Sound Medical Judgment: 
Doctors were repudiated for prescribing off-label treatment. This was shameful and 
should not be repeated. Off-label medications are a critical tool for physicians, both in 
times of normalcy and during a pandemic. Stigmatizing this commonplace practice is 
counterproductive. For federal health agencies to regain trust, they must avoid 
patronizing the American people. The American people want to be educated, not 
indoctrinated. In the face of a novel virus for which there is little or no available 
treatments, federal policy should seek to support doctors’ efforts to repurpose drugs 
which are already known to be very safe.  
 
22. Federal Health Agencies Must Trust the American People with the Whole Truth – 
Speaking in “Generalities” and Using Rules of Thumb is Not Good Enough: Full 
transparency is necessary for ensuring trust. Federal health agencies must avoid 
unnecessarily inflating or exaggerating the power of vaccines or other interventions. 
 
 

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The Development of Vaccines and Treatments, and the Development and 
Implementation of Vaccination Policies for Federal Employees and Members 
of the Armed Forces 
 
1. Operation Warp Speed Should Serve as a Blueprint to be Used to Quickly Develop 
Vaccines and Therapeutics. The federal government should evaluate whether certain 
aspects of Operation Warp Speed can be integrated permanently to more rapidly develop 
vaccines and therapeutics for diseases which currently afflict the American people. If this 
evaluation necessitates legislation, Congress should pass legislation which facilitates 
these goals. 
 
2. The Government should not Promise Approval of a Drug or Treatment Before its 
Approval. The White House should not promise a particular regulatory action, such as a 
booster recommendation, prior to the regulatory agency making its decision.  
 
3. Greater Congressional Oversight of FDA Decisions. Congress should consider 
legislation which requires the FDA Commissioner and CDC Director to notify 
Committees of jurisdiction prior to overruling its advisory committees such as VRBPAC 
and ACIP. 
4. Naturally Acquired Immunity Should not be so Quickly Discarded in the Future 
until there is Ample Scientific Data to Support or Refute the Value of Natural 
Immunity to a New Virus. Official public health guidelines should acknowledge that 
individuals who have recovered from an infection may possess natural immunity, which 
can provide protection against reinfection. Public health authorities should adopt a 
nuanced perspective, recognizing that while natural immunity exists, it may vary in 
strength, duration, and effectiveness across different individuals. Decisions regarding 
natural immunity should be grounded in robust, peer-reviewed scientific research, not 
assumptions or generalizations. 
 
5. Vaccine Mandates—Particularly at the Federal Level—Should be Avoided, 
Especially for Vaccines which do Not Prevent the Spread of a Virus. Vaccine policy 
should leave room for individual choice and tailored medical advice from individual’s 
doctors. One’s vaccination status should not preclude them from earning a wage or 
pursuing a happy and fulling life. 
 
6. Consider Whether Vaccines which are not Eligible for VICP Compensation should 
be Eligible for a Vaccine Mandate. Some vaccines, particularly those approved for 
emergency use (e.g., COVID-19 vaccines during the pandemic), may not be eligible for 
VICP compensation. Mandating such vaccines raises concerns about their safety, as they 
have not undergone the same long-term testing as vaccines covered by VICP. Vaccines 
not covered by VICP may still be safe and effective, but their long-term safety profile 
might not be fully known at the time of mandate. Continuous monitoring and post-market 
surveillance are necessary to ensure that any adverse effects are identified early and 

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addressed. Mandating vaccines that do not offer VICP protection could lead to legal 
challenges, particularly if individuals feel they are being forced to take a vaccine without 
adequate recourse in the event of harm. This could also damage public trust in 
vaccination programs. If vaccines are not eligible for VICP compensation, it may be 
appropriate for Congress to explore alternative mechanisms to provide compensation or 
remedy for individuals who suffer serious adverse reactions to mandated vaccines. 
 
7. DOD Should have Considered Testing Servicemembers’ Antibody Levels for a More 
Targeted Approach to Vaccination Policy, Rather than Mandating it for All Troops.  
The DOD or other entities may consider taking blood samples to test for antibody levels 
for more tailored vaccine policy. The DOD has a long history of requiring certain 
vaccines, however COVID-19 vaccines were very new and controversial, and the 
unintended consequences must be considered when weighing new mandates 
 
8. The System used by Federal Health Agencies for Vaccine Safety Surveillance Must 
be Reformed. The federal government should consider establishing a personnel reserve 
consisting of appropriate public and private sector experts, which could be activated 
during a public health emergency to evaluate reports of adverse events and seek to 
establish causality. Rather than maintaining a “separate back-end system” The FDA and 
CDC should evaluate the feasibility of publicly publishing all updates and corrections to 
VAERS reports.  
 
9. The Federal Government Should Robustly Investigate Reports of Neurological 
Issues Associated with COVID-19 vaccines. The federal government should consider 
establishing dedicated programs to study these conditions. The federal government must 
take neurological issues associated with COVID-19 vaccines seriously, given the 
potential concerns and the need to maintain public trust in the vaccination process. 
Investigating reports of adverse events, especially neurological side effects, should be 
done in a transparent, rigorous, and scientific manner. This is essential not only to ensure 
public safety but also to demonstrate the government’s commitment to thorough 
monitoring and accountability. 
 
10. HRSA Should Work Rapidly to Establish an Injury Table for COVID-19 Vaccines 
and Other Covered Countermeasures: HRSA plays a crucial role in administering the 
VICP, which compensates individuals who suffer serious injuries from vaccines and other 
covered countermeasures. Given the introduction of COVID-19 vaccines and other 
emergency countermeasures (such as therapeutics and diagnostic tools), there is a 
pressing need for HRSA to rapidly establish an injury table specific to these vaccines and 
countermeasures to ensure timely support and transparency. 
 
11. Establish a Personnel Reserve Consisting of Appropriate Public and Private Sector 
Subject Matter Experts: The federal government should consider establishing a 
personnel reserve consisting of appropriate public and private sector experts, which could 

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be activated during a public health emergency to assist in the adjudication of 
compensation claims. This personnel reserve may also be established in conjunction with 
a personnel reserve analyzing overall reports of vaccine adverse events. 
 
12. Move COVID-19 Vaccines from CICP to VICP: Congress should also consider 
reforming these programs such that any future vaccine which is mass-distributed or 
mandated vaccine is covered under VICP rather than CICP. 
 
13. Emergency Use Authorization should Only Be Used for the Most Vulnerable 
Americans with the Greatest Risk: EUA process was created to allow for the rapid 
deployment of medical interventions—such as vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics—
during public health emergencies, including pandemics. However, there is a growing 
concern that EUA should only be applied to the most vulnerable Americans who face the 
greatest risk during a health crisis, rather than being broadly extended to all populations. 
 
14. Americans Need to Hear From Trusted Messengers: During the next pandemic or 
public health emergency, Americans need to hear more from trusted messengers such as 
doctors treating patients, who are also better equipped to provide advice that is tailored to 
a particular region or locality’s situation.  
 
15. During a Future Pandemic, the Government Should Craft Response Policies which 
Prioritize Maintaining Normalcy in the Healthcare System: During the COVID-19 
pandemic, far too many Americans were encouraged or forced to forgo medical treatment 
that was deemed to be “elective” or was deprioritized. The Select Subcommittee has 
heard personal stories of individuals who died from diseases other than COVID-19 
because crucial medical procedures were put on hold.  
 
16. In the Interest of Pandemic Preparedness and General Public Health Resiliency, 
Congress and the Executive Should Consider Enacting Legislation or Policies which 
Broadly Bolster the Health of the American People: Comorbidities were a critical 
determinant of an individual’s risk for COVID-19. 
 
 

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The Economic Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Associated 
Government Response on Individuals, Communities, Small Businesses, Health 
Care Providers, States, and Local Government Entities 
 
1. Faster Distribution of Aid: Delays in distributing unemployment benefits and stimulus 
checks caused financial strain. Implementing a more streamlined system for disbursing 
funds quickly, possibly using existing tax infrastructure or direct deposit systems, could 
have reduced delays. 
 
2. Targeted Support for Hard-Hit Sectors: Some sectors, like hospitality, retail, and small 
businesses, were disproportionately affected. More targeted aid and relief packages 
tailored specifically to the needs of these sectors could have preserved more jobs. 
 
3. Enhancing Digital Infrastructure: Many state unemployment systems were 
overwhelmed due to outdated technology. Federal investment in modernizing state 
unemployment systems before or early in the pandemic could have ensured more 
efficient processing of claims. 
 
4. Improved Communication and Guidance: Mixed messages and changing guidelines 
created confusion among businesses and workers. Clearer and more consistent 
communication from federal and state governments might have helped businesses and 
workers make better-informed decisions. 
 
5. Increased Federal Reserve Reporting on Risks of Prolonged Low Interests Rates: 
The Federal Reserve could have produced more detailed and frequent reports on financial 
stability, focusing on the risks associated with prolonged low interest rates and rising 
government debt. These reports should have included analyses of asset price bubbles and 
credit risk within the financial system. Furthermore, implementing robust monitoring 
systems to track risks across different sectors, including housing, corporate debt, and 
financial institutions, could have helped identify vulnerabilities early. The Federal 
Reserve should have conducted regular analyses of government debt sustainability, 
including assessing the potential impact of rising debt on future interest rates, inflation, 
and fiscal policy.  
 
6. The Federal Reserve Must Provide Clear Forward Guidance on How and When it 
Plans to Normalize Interest Rates and Unwind Unconventional Monetary Policies: 
Communicating a well-defined exit strategy would help manage expectations and reduce 
market uncertainty about future policy changes. Being transparent about the potential 
risks associated with low interest rates and high government debt would help market 
participants and policymakers understand the challenges and prepare for potential 
adjustments. This includes publishing detailed analyses of how current policies could 
impact future economic conditions. 
  
 

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The Societal Impact of Decisions to Close Schools, How the Decisions Were 
Made and Whether There is Evidence of Widespread Learning Loss or Other 
Negative Effects as a Result of These Decisions 
 
1. School Closures should be reviewed under the highest level of scrutiny: In the event 
of a declared national health emergency, School closures should be temporary measures 
and subject to the highest scrutiny.   
 
2. Comprehensive Analysis Impacts of School Closures: In the context of school 
closures, analyzing its effects should not be limited to public health considerations. 
Federal public health authorities should consider effects including but not limited to 
student academics, mental health, and physical health.   
 
3. Establishment of a Temporary Interagency Task Force: In the event of a declared 
national health emergency, the federal government should establish a temporary 
interagency task force that identifies and analyzes risks associated with the health 
emergency to coordinate and communicate targeted mitigation measures. The Secretary 
of Education should appoint a temporary officer to serve as a liaison to the public health 
agencies—specifically, HHS and CDC—to a continually review evolving science. While 
respecting federalism interests, the interagency task force should be communicating risk 
assessment and guidance to state and local stakeholders.   
 
4. Communicating and Consulting on Public Health Guidance: Public health 
authorities—specifically the CDC—should be encouraged to consult with stakeholders 
related to the practicality of health guidance. However, these agencies should be 
discouraged from sharing and accepting feedback from stakeholders that are not based on 
science and could harm the public trust of federal health agencies.   
 
5. Transparency in public health guidance. The CDC must be more transparent regarding 
published guidance, guideline, reference, or recommendation documents. This must 
include acknowledge any non-governmental groups the CDC consulted in the 
formulation of the documents.  
 
6. Addressing Pandemic-Era Learning Loss: The federal government should encourage 
states to establish programs to identify and assess pandemic-era learning loss and 
encourage targeted programs for addressing learning loss.  
 
7. Reducing Chronic Absenteeism: The federal government should collaborate with public 
and private stakeholders to identify, assess, and establish programs aiming to reduce the 
rate of chronic absenteeism that has occurred since the pandemic.    
 
8. Improving School Infrastructure: Encourage school districts to identify, construct, and 
maintain infrastructure, including but not limited to ventilation systems, that could further 
impact transmission in school environments. 
 

Page 18 of 18 
 
 
Cooperation By the Executive Branch and Others with Congress, the 
Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and Others in 
Connection with Oversight of the Preparedness for and Response to the 
Coronavirus Pandemic  
 
Recommendations Regarding the Federal Government 
 
1. The Executive Branch must comply with Congress. The Executive Branch’s standard 
operating posture must be to comply with authorized congressional oversight requests 
fully, transparently, and timely to the fullest extent allowed by law.  
 
3. The Federal Government must review employees’ record retention practices and 
ensure accountability for any violators. Conduct a federal government wide review of 
federal employees’ use of personal email for official, government business.  
 
a. Conduct a federal government wide review of federal employees’ deletion and 
destruction or potential deleting or destruction of official, government records.  
 
b. Conduct a federal government wide review of agencies compliance with the 
Freedom of Information Act to ensure it is consistent with the law and 
Congressional intent.  
 
c. The Department of Justice must evaluate if Dr. David Morens violated any federal 
laws, including but limited to violations of:  
 
I. 
18 U.S.C. 1001;  
 
II. 
18 U.S.C. 1621; and  
 
III. 
18 U.S.C. 2071.

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