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What This Document Is

This is the State Applicants' (led by Ohio) reply brief, filed January 3, 2022, in support of their emergency stay application and alternative petition for certiorari before judgment against the OSHA vaccine-or-testing ETS, filed alongside but distinct from the Business Associations' reply (21A244_065).

Factual Summary

The States renew their request for an administrative stay, noting OSHA gave states with approved State Plans until November 20, 2021 to respond to the ETS, extended for at least one state (Iowa) to January 7, 2022 — the date of oral argument — creating pressure to rule before that deadline. The brief's central arguments: COVID-19 is not an "occupational danger" of the kind OSHA may regulate under the OSH Act, citing CDC COVID Data Tracker figures and a September 2021 MMWR report on case/hospitalization/death rates by vaccination status; COVID-19 does not meet the statute's "grave danger" threshold; the ETS fails the Act's "necessity" requirement given the government's own delay in acting; the standard is not a genuinely "temporary" response to an "emergency"; and the major-questions doctrine, federalism canon, and constitutional-avoidance canon all favor the States' narrower reading of OSHA's authority (citing Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, West Virginia v. EPA). The brief expressly states the States "share OSHA's 'strong interest in combatting the spread' of a virus that has prematurely ended over three-quarters of a million American lives," framing its challenge as statutory/constitutional-authority-based rather than disputing the pandemic's severity.

Key Facts

  • Filed January 3, 2022 by Ohio and co-plaintiff State Applicants, led by Ohio Solicitor General Benjamin M. Flowers.
  • Central arguments: COVID-19 is not an "occupational danger" OSHA may regulate; the ETS fails the OSH Act's "necessity" and "temporary" requirements; the major-questions doctrine requires clear congressional authorization the Act does not provide.
  • Explicitly shares OSHA's stated interest in combating COVID-19's severity (citing the same three-quarters-of-a-million-deaths figure), distinguishing its posture from science-disputing amici elsewhere in this docket.
  • Cites CDC COVID Data Tracker and MMWR vaccination-status case data as sourcing for its risk-characterization arguments.

Source Caveats

  • Use the linked source file for exact quotations, page references, signatures, attachments, and any redacted or sealed material.

Full text

                           Nos. 21A244, 21A247

             In the Supreme Court of the United States
                ___________________________________
          NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, ET AL.
                                          Applicants
                                  v.

         OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
                                             Respondents
         _______________________________________________________
                                OHIO, ET AL.
                                                   Applicants
                                      v.

             DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
                      HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.
                                             Respondents
         _______________________________________________________
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                        FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
          _____________________________________________________
    STATE APPLICANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY
   APPLICATION FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE STAY AND STAY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND ALTERNATIVE PETITION FOR WRIT
              OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
       _______________________________________________________
       MAY MAILMAN                         DAVE YOST
       MATHURA SRIDHARAN                   Attorney General of Ohio
       JOHN ROCKENBACH
       Deputy Solicitors General           BENJAMIN M. FLOWERS*
       30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor         * Counsel of Record
       Columbus, OH 43215                  Solicitor General
                                           30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor
                                           Columbus, OH 43215
                                           (614) 466-8980
                                           bflowers@OhioAGO.gov

                         Counsel for the State of Ohio
                (Additional counsel listed after signature block)
                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                           Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... ii

REPLY ............................................................................................................................ 1

     I.         The States renew their request for an administrative stay......................... 1

     II.        The Court should stay the Vaccine Mandate pending disposition of the
                petitions for review ........................................................................................ 2

           A.        The States and other applicants will prevail on the merits ................... 2

                1.       COVID-19 is not an occupational danger that OSHA may
                         regulate................................................................................................ 4

                2.       COVID-19 does not present the type of “grave” danger that the
                         statute requires ................................................................................... 7

                3.       The Vaccine Mandate does not satisfy the Emergency Provision’s
                         necessity requirement ....................................................................... 13

                4.       The challenged standard is not a “temporary” response to an
                         “emergency” ....................................................................................... 18

                5.       The major-questions doctrine, the federalism canon, and the
                         constitutional-doubt canon require the States’ reading .................. 19

           B.        The remaining factors support the entry of a stay ............................... 26

     III.       In the alternative, the Court could grant certiorari before judgment ....... 29

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 30




                                                                 i
                                       TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases                                                                                                         Page(s)

Abbott v. Perez,
  138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) ............................................................................................ 27

Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
   141 S. Ct. 2320 (2021) ............................................................................................ 28

Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
   141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ............................................................................ 1, 21, 22, 28

Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA,
   727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................ 12, 15

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA,
  17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 14, 20

Clark v. Martinez,
   543 U.S. 371 (2005) ................................................................................................ 22

Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,
  139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ............................................................................................ 10

Descamps v. United States,
   570 U.S. 254 (2013) ............................................................................................ 8, 26

Downes v. Bidwell,
  182 U.S. 244 (1901) .................................................................................................. 1

Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor,
   486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) ................................................................................ 14, 15

Forging Indus. Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor,
   773 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) .................................................................. 6

Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt,
  923 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................ 25

Gundy v. United States,
  139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ............................................................................................ 24

Hill v. Colorado,
   530 U.S. 703 (2000) ................................................................................................ 16



                                                           ii
Marbury v. Madison,
  1 Cranch 137 (1803) ............................................................................................... 30

Maryland v. King,
  567 U.S. 1301 (2012) .............................................................................................. 27

Munaf v. Geren,
  553 U.S. 674 (2008) ................................................................................................ 30

NFIB v. Sebelius,
  567 U.S. 519 (2012) .......................................................................................... 23, 24

Nken v. Holder,
  556 U.S. 418 (2009) ............................................................................................ 2, 28

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
  141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) .............................................................................................. 1, 2

SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
  318 U.S. 80 (1943) ............................................................................................ 13, 15

Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
   496 U.S. 617 (1990) ................................................................................................ 20

Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. Dep’t of Labor,
  537 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1976) .................................................................................. 27

West Virginia v. EPA,
  577 U.S. 1126 (2016) .......................................................................................... 2, 30

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
  555 U.S. 7 (2008) .................................................................................................... 30

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
   343 U.S. 579 (1952) .................................................................................................. 1

Statutes

5 U.S.C. §551 ................................................................................................................ 25

29 U.S.C. §652 ............................................................................................ 13, 17, 25, 26

29 U.S.C. §655 .......................................................................................................passim

29 U.S.C. §667 ................................................................................................................ 1

29 U.S.C. §669 .............................................................................................................. 20

                                                              iii
Fla. Stat. §381.00317 ................................................................................................... 26

Idaho Code Ann. §39-9003........................................................................................... 26

Ind. Code §22-8-1.1-16.2 .............................................................................................. 26

Mont. Code Ann. §49-2-312 ......................................................................................... 26

Tenn. Code Ann. §14-2-102 ......................................................................................... 26

W. Va. Code §16-3-4b ................................................................................................... 26

Other Authorities

86 Fed. Reg. 61402-01 (Nov. 5, 2021) ...................................................................passim

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, No. 21-60845 (5th Cir.), Mtn. for Stay
  by Texas, et al. ........................................................................................................ 27

CDC, CDC Updates and Shortens Recommended Isolation and
  Quarantine Period for General Population (Dec. 27, 2021) ............................ 10, 11

CDC, COVID Data Tracker ..................................................................................... 9, 10

CDC, Preventing Homicide in the Workplace, National Institute for
  Occupational Safety and Health (June 6, 2014)...................................................... 5

Heather M. Scobie, et al., Monitoring Incidence of COVID–19 Cases,
  Hospitalizations, and Deaths, by Vaccination Status—13 U.S.
  Jurisdictions, April 4–July 17, 2021, MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly
  Rep 2021 (September 17, 2021) ............................................................................... 9

In re: MCP No. 165, No. 21-7000 (6th Cir.), Mtn. for Stay by Florida, et
   al.............................................................................................................................. 27

OSHA, Statement on the Status of the OSHA COVID-19 Healthcare
  ETS (Dec. 27, 2021) .......................................................................................... 11, 28

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law §35 (2012) ................................................................. 18




                                                                 iv
                                       REPLY

      Cicero famously observed that, in times of war, the laws fall silent. Perhaps

that was true of the Roman system. It is not true of ours. In “our system,” the gov-

ernment may not “act unlawfully” even in extraordinary times. Alabama Ass’n of

Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (per curiam).

Some of this Court’s most significant rulings respect that principle. See, e.g., Youngs-

town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). “Things never go well” when

the courts fail to do so. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63,

71 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

      The States share OSHA’s “‘strong interest in combatting the spread’ of a virus

that has prematurely ended over three-quarters of a million American lives.” App.B-

8 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc) (quoting Real-

tors, 141 S. Ct. at 2490). But federal agencies cannot bend the law to pursue whatever

means they think will most effectively bring about a worthy end. No doubt, courts

must leave policymaking to policymakers. It is, however, emphatically the province

of the judiciary to make clear that the law is “not to be obeyed or disobeyed as the

circumstances of a particular crisis … may suggest.” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.

244, 384 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court should stay the Vaccine Mandate

to make that clear.

I.    The States renew their request for an administrative stay

      Many of the State applicants have adopted State Plans under 29 U.S.C. §667.

See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed.

Reg. 61402-01, 61506 (Nov. 5, 2021). The Vaccine Mandate requires these States to


                                           1
“notify Federal OSHA” regarding how and whether they will update their plans in

response to the Vaccine Mandate. Id. OSHA initially gave the States until November

20, 2021, to make a decision. That deadline passed while the Fifth Circuit’s stay was

in place. After the Sixth Circuit dissolved that stay, at least one applicant State

(Iowa) received notice from OSHA that the agency was extending the deadline only

until January 7—the day the Court will hear argument in these cases. To spare the

States from having to respond to OSHA (or face the consequences of failing to do so)

before this Court can rule, the States respectfully renew their request for an imme-

diate administrative stay.

II.   The Court should stay the Vaccine Mandate pending disposition of the
      petitions for review

      All four of the factors governing the question whether to enter a stay, see Nken

v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), favor awarding one here. OSHA insists that the

injunction-pending-appeal standard should govern. That is wrong. This Court has

previously “stayed” illegal agency actions “pending disposition of … petitions for re-

view.” West Virginia v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1126 (2016) (emphasis added). Regardless, the

standards differ only in that applicants seeking an injunction must “clearly estab-

lish[] their entitlement to relief.” Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 66. The

various applicants easily clear even that higher hurdle.

      A.     The States and other applicants will prevail on the merits

      OSHA may bypass the notice-and-comment process, and issue an “emergency

temporary standard,” if the Secretary of Labor determines: “(A) that employees are

exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic



                                          2
or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is

necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 U.S.C. §655(c)(1). This stat-

ute—the “Emergency Provision”—gave OSHA no authority to issue the Vaccine Man-

date. First, COVID-19 is not (for most employees) an occupational danger that OSHA

may regulate. Second, even according to OSHA’s own reasoning, COVID-19 does not

present a “grave” danger for many employees subject to the Mandate. Third, the

Vaccine Mandate does not satisfy the Emergency Provision’s necessity requirement.

Fourth, the challenged standard is not a “temporary” response to an “emergency.”

Finally, three interpretive principles—the major-questions doctrine, the federalism

canon, and the constitutional-doubt canon—resolve any doubts in the States’ favor.

      OSHA agrees that it can regulate only “work-related dangers.” Response in

Opposition (“Resp.”) at 45 (quoting States’ Stay Application at 9). But it defines that

concept to include every hazard one might encounter at work, including dangers fairly

characterized as “hazard[s] of life”—hazards that arise out of typical human interac-

tion and human existence generally. App.B-37–38 (Bush, J., dissenting from the de-

nial of initial hearing en banc). OSHA then defines “necessary,” Resp.44 (quotation

omitted), to mean “useful,” defines “grave danger” to encompass every risk that is

capable of causing death and that the Secretary chooses to regulate, Resp.23–30, and

insists that emergency temporary standards may require permanent abatement

measures, Resp.54. The result? A nearly limitless delegation of authority to require

any precaution that OSHA thinks will help protect employees from any hazard capa-

ble of causing death or serious injury—without notice-and-comment or any other




                                          3
rigorous standard-setting process. That is not what the Emergency Provision means.

If it were, the law would be unconstitutional.

             1.    COVID-19 is not an occupational danger that OSHA may
                   regulate

      a. The “Occupational Safety and Health Act gives the Secretary power to ad-

dress only occupational health and safety risks.” App.B-6 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting

from the denial of initial hearing en banc); accord App.A-49 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

It does not extend to other risks. The Emergency Provision—part of that Act—con-

tains precisely the same limitation. It applies when “employees are exposed to grave

danger,” and empowers OSHA to issue standards “necessary to protect employees

from” such dangers. §655(c) (emphasis added). Every ordinary English speaker

would understand this employee-centric language as empowering OSHA to regulate

“workplace hazards with workplace solutions.” App.A-51 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

The language would not be understood as empowering OSHA to regulate endemic

diseases, violent crime, ambient air quality, or any other dangers that cannot fairly

be characterized as work-related.

      b. OSHA concedes that it may regulate only “work-related dangers.” Resp.45

(quotation omitted). (Given that concession, OSHA’s attempt to characterize the ar-

gument as “non-textual,” Resp.44, is hard to understand.) So the question becomes:

What makes a danger “work-related” in the relevant sense?

      The States have an answer: a work-related danger is a danger “that arise[s]

directly out of the workplace.” App.B-15 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of

initial hearing en banc). That generally excludes risks that arise out of routine



                                          4
human interaction as opposed to work or the workplace—risks like COVID-19 and

violent crime. And it generally excludes other risks that we face by virtue of living

on Earth in the present day—risks like exposure to community-wide air pollution.

The qualifier “generally” is necessary because, for some employees at some work-

places, work might create a risk from these dangers distinct from the risk inherent

in interacting with people or existing on the planet. For example, a researcher who

works with SARS-CoV-2 could plausibly describe COVID-19 as a workplace-related

danger—a danger arising directly out of the workplace. A lawyer or chef or carpenter

could not.

      If common risks of life were workplace risks for all employees simply because

they might also present themselves at work, what would be the limiting principle?

Homicide is a danger one might confront anywhere, including at work. See CDC,

Preventing Homicide in the Workplace, National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health (June 6, 2014), https://perma.cc/G3R3-JPZQ.      May OSHA mandate that all

employers take steps to decrease the risk of violence? Could it force all employers to

hire armed guards? Could it issue “workplace” regulations preempting state laws

(and overriding company policies) that forbid or permit carrying a gun at work?

OSHA refuses to engage with the inquiry. Resp.47–48.

      When the scope of OSHA’s workplace-related authority is properly defined, the

Vaccine Mandate is blatantly illegal. The Mandate acknowledges that the risk of

contracting COVID-19 is inherent in human interaction. To quote the rule itself,

COVID-19 is a workplace risk because the virus is transmitted through routine




                                          5
human interaction and “workplaces … are areas where multiple people come into

contact with one another, often for extended periods of time.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61411.

Thus, the danger arises not from work, but from routine human interaction. And so

it is not work-related.

      Instead of addressing the States’ argument or offering a limiting principle,

OSHA knocks down straw men. It accuses the States of arguing that “OSHA is pow-

erless to address” COVID-19 because it “is not uniquely a workplace danger” or more

likely to occur there. Resp.45. As just explained, that is not the States’ argument—

nor was it an argument that Chief Judge Sutton (joined by seven of his colleagues) or

Judge Larsen raised in their opinions below. OSHA may certainly regulate hazards

(like the risk of fire or the risk of bacterial infection or the danger from nonfunctioning

toilets, Resp.48) that occur both at work and outside of work. See Forging Indus.

Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc). But it may

regulate those risks only insofar as they “arise directly out of the workplace.” App.B-

15 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc); see also Forg-

ing, 773 F.2d at 1443–44. That means OSHA has no power to regulate risks that are

more fairly characterized as “hazard[s] of life.” App.B-37–38 (Bush, J., dissenting

from the denial of initial hearing en banc). OSHA never responds to that argument.

      Finally, OSHA dedicates substantial effort to arguing that SARS-CoV-2 is an

“agent” or “substance,” and that COVID-19 is a “hazard.” Resp.17–23. Again, the

States are not disputing this. See States’ Stay Application at 12. They instead argue

that OSHA can regulate agents, substances, and hazards only insofar as they




                                            6
constitute a work-related threat. For the vast majority of workers subject to the Man-

date, neither SARS-CoV-2 nor COVID-19 qualify.

             2.     COVID-19 does not present the type of “grave” danger that
                    the statute requires

      a. Every danger is dangerous. So when the Emergency Provision speaks of

grave dangers, it must mean particularly serious dangers. States’ Stay Application

at 14–15. To qualify as “grave,” the danger in question must pose “a risk of ‘incurable,

permanent, or fatal consequences to workers.’” App.A-48 (Larsen, J., dissenting)

(quoting Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 (5th

Cir. 1974)). There must also be a sufficiently high likelihood that those consequences

will occur. To illustrate, consider that plane crashes threaten near-certain death.

But given the vanishingly low odds of crashing, passengers face little risk, let alone

a grave risk. A grave risk entails a potentially serious consequence and a serious

likelihood of the consequence’s occurring. Cf. App.A-48–49 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

      For at least two reasons, OSHA has not shown that the disease constitutes a

“grave” danger for many of the employees it covers. (Those so inclined can view this

as an argument regarding whether the Mandate is “necessary”—after all, it is unnec-

essary for the Mandate to cover individuals who are not in “grave danger.”) First,

OSHA’s own data show that COVID-19 poses no “grave” risk, even on OSHA’s inter-

pretation of that phrase, to significant numbers of American workers. Remember,

OSHA says that no vaccinated workers are in grave danger from COVID-19. See 86

Fed. Reg. at 61434. But research OSHA cited suggests that vaccinated and unvac-

cinated workers are unlikely to be admitted to an intensive care unit or die because



                                           7
of COVID-19, even if they contract it. States’ Stay Application at 15. Perhaps more

important, the government’s own data show that younger, unvaccinated people face

risks that are roughly identical to older, vaccinated workers. States’ Stay Application

at 15–16; App.A-49 (Larsen, J., dissenting). “So an unvaccinated 18-year-old bears

the same risk as a vaccinated 50-year-old. And yet,” according to OSHA, “the 18-

year-old is in grave danger, while the 50-year-old is not. One of these conclusions

must be wrong; either way is a problem for OSHA’s rule.” App.A-49 (Larsen, J., dis-

senting).

      Second, OSHA tried to gerrymander its way to a “grave danger” finding. The

agency supported its “grave danger” finding by noting that unvaccinated individuals

face a grave risk. But again, it conceded that vaccinated workers face no grave risk.

If the agency can declare a grave danger based exclusively on a particular at-risk

group, then the “grave danger” requirement will no longer do much work. After all,

even many overwhelmingly safe substances, like peanut butter and latex, present an

especially high risk to some subset of individuals. See States’ Stay Application at 16–

17.

      b. OSHA responds by not responding. It never addresses the gerrymandering

problem at all, forfeiting any right to do so. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.

254, 277 n.6 (2013). And its response to the first problem consists of obfuscation.

Over the course of several pages, it cites data showing that COVID-19 causes unac-

ceptably high hospitalization and death rates for “working age Americans (18-64

years old),” Resp.25 (emphasis added, quotation omitted), and that COVID-19 is far




                                          8
more dangerous to unvaccinated workers than to their vaccinated peers, Resp.38–40.

But the data fail to address the fact that the risk to young, unvaccinated employees

is roughly equivalent to the risk faced by older, vaccinated employees.

      Indeed, some of the very studies on which OSHA relies hammer home the

point. One study, cited in both OSHA’s response and the Vaccine Mandate, see 86

Fed. Reg. at 61418; Resp.39, found that a vaccinated person, 65 or older, was twice

as likely to die of COVID-19 relative to a not-fully-vaccinated individual in the 18-to-

49 age cohort. Heather M. Scobie, et al., Monitoring Incidence of COVID–19 Cases,

Hospitalizations, and Deaths, by Vaccination Status—13 U.S. Jurisdictions, April 4–

July 17, 2021, MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021, at 1287 Table (September 17,

2021), https://perma.cc/NEB9-BABU (comparing incidence rates of death of 0.4 and

0.5 per 100,000 in vaccinated persons, 65 and older, to 0.2 and 0.2 in not-fully-vac-

cinated 18-to-49-year-olds in the April 4–June 19, 2021 and June 20–July 17, 2021

time periods, respectively).

      The CDC’s own data reveal similar problems. Take the last week of October,

for instance, from which OSHA’s brief cherry-picks certain comparative metrics. Alt-

hough OSHA compares the death rate in unvaccinated 18-to-29-year-olds to the rate

among their vaccinated peers, it compares the death rate in the unvaccinated 30-to-

49 age bracket with that of vaccinated 50-to-64-year-olds. Resp.39–40. Those very

metrics, presented fairly, paint a different picture. Unvaccinated 18-to-29-year-olds

were about as likely to die from COVID-19 as vaccinated 50-to-64-year-olds and five

times less likely to die than vaccinated individuals between the ages of 65 and 79.




                                           9
CDC, COVID Data Tracker, go.usa.gov/xt3kf (for the week ending Oct. 30, 2021,

death rate per 100,000 by age group was 0.17 for unvaccinated 18-to-29-year-olds,

0.20 for vaccinated 50-to-64-year-olds, and 1.00 for vaccinated 65-to-79-year-olds).

That same week, unvaccinated 18-to-49-year-olds were about as likely (at just 1.3

times the likelihood) to be hospitalized as vaccinated persons 65 and older. CDC,

COVID Data Tracker, go.usa.gov/xt3km (for the week ending Oct. 30, 2021, hospital-

ization rate per 100,000 by age group was 17 for unvaccinated 18-to-49-year-olds, and

12.7 for the vaccinated 65-and-over age cohort).

      To be clear, the States are not gainsaying the dangerous and potentially fatal

nature of COVID-19. Their point is that a finding of “grave danger” for employees as

a whole is irreconcilable with OSHA’s own definition of “grave danger,” which ex-

cludes older, vaccinated individuals while including younger, unvaccinated individu-

als who face roughly equivalent risks. In other words, OSHA determined that equiv-

alent risks are both grave and not grave. This is a “problem” for OSHA under any

standard of review. App.A-49 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

      What is more, the government’s statements continue to be “incongruent with”

its actions. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019). For exam-

ple, the CDC is now advising that fully vaccinated employees who contract COVID-

19 can return to work after five days of isolation without regard to whether they are

still testing positive. See CDC, CDC Updates and Shortens Recommended Isolation

and Quarantine Period for General Population (Dec. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/C722-

PMTH. And on December 27, OSHA decided to withdraw the emergency temporary




                                         10
standard applicable to healthcare workers instead of completing a final rule in the

“timeframe … contemplated by the OSH Act.” OSHA, Statement on the Status of the

OSHA COVID-19 Healthcare ETS (Dec. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/F9V7-BQVG. If

all unvaccinated workers faced a grave risk demanding swift action, both decisions

would be unconscionable.

      In truth, OSHA’s actions have been inconsistent with the presence of a truly

grave danger from the outset. See App.B-27–28 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the

denial of initial hearing en banc). By the time OSHA acted, Americans had access to

vaccines for nearly a year, better therapeutics than ever before, and a great deal of

experience with the virus. Id. at B-22. OSHA responds by noting that “[d]angers can

evolve.” Resp.28. True enough, but the changed circumstances OSHA cites lessened

the danger. As it notes, vaccines became more “widely available.” Resp.29. And the

FDA “granted approval (rather than the earlier Emergency Use Authorization) to one

vaccine in August 2021.” Resp.29–30. Finally, testing became more readily available.

Resp.30. The fact that OSHA waited until after testing was widely available makes

its delay even harder to explain. If, as OSHA candidly acknowledges, the goal of the

Mandate is to encourage vaccination, see 86 Fed. Reg. at 61435–36, it would have

been even more effective at achieving its goal when testing was harder to secure.

      When OSHA eventually acted, it did so only with respect to employers with

100 or more employees. (Independent contractors that work with a business do not

count as its employees. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 61513.) Individuals who work for smaller

businesses are not covered by the Mandate. OSHA claims to have been “concerned




                                         11
about imposing administrative burdens on smaller companies.” App.B-27 (Sutton,

C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc). But consider “how that

argument would fare in another context.” Id. “If the Secretary suddenly realized

that exposure to a new chemical created a ‘grave’ danger of cancer, it is difficult to

imagine anyone would permit an emergency rule targeting the problem to apply only

to companies with over 100 employees in order to save the other companies money.”

Id. at B-27–28. Indeed, the Emergency Provision says that the Secretary “shall” issue

an emergency temporary standard whenever necessary to protect employees from a

grave danger. 29 U.S.C. §655(c).

      OSHA responds that other important laws, like Title VII, also “include exemp-

tions for small employers.” Resp.27. That is irrelevant. The arguments for exempt-

ing small businesses from prohibitions on workplace discrimination, whatever their

merits, have little purchase when it comes to laws, like the Emergency Provision,

aimed at protecting employees from long-lasting, incurable, or fatal injuries.

      OSHA suggests that the States and other applicants are exhibiting callousness

toward the far-too-many Americans who lost their lives or loved ones to COVID-19.

Resp.24–25. But it would seem far more callous for OSHA to refuse to take and to

delay in taking actions that it believes are within its power and capable of saving

thousands of lives. And if OSHA’s statements regarding grave risks are to be be-

lieved, it failed to act for an inexplicably long time. This “failure to act” is “evidence

that” there is no “true emergency.” Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 423

(5th Cir. 1984).




                                           12
             3.    The Vaccine Mandate does not satisfy the Emergency
                   Provision’s necessity requirement

      a. An emergency temporary standard is legal only if it is “necessary.” 29

U.S.C. §655(c)(1). “Sometimes, ‘necessary’ means simply ‘useful.’” App.A-44 (Larsen,

J., dissenting) (quoting Necessary, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)). “At other

times, though, ‘necessary’ means ‘indispensable.’” Id. (quoting American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 877 (1976)). In the Emergency Provision, the

word bears only this second sense. The standard governing non-emergency OSHA

regulations requires OSHA to show that its standards are “reasonably necessary or

appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. §652(8). Congress’s decision to drop “reasonably” and “ap-

propriate” from the Emergency Provision shows that emergency temporary standards

must be “necessary” in the “indispensable” sense. App.A-44 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

What is more, with the Emergency Provision, “Congress ‘narrowly circumscribed’”

OSHA’s “authority to issue emergency standards.” Id. (quoting Indus. Union Dep’t,

AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 651 (1980) (plurality)). In “this con-

text especially, ‘necessary’ must be read as a word of limitation, not enlargement.”

Id.

      The Vaccine Mandate is not “indispensable” to protecting workers. For one

thing, OSHA has a Chenery problem. It never found that the Mandate was “indis-

pensable,” and courts “cannot uphold a rule based on a finding the agency never

made.” App.A-45 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,

87 (1943)). Instead, OSHA concluded that the Vaccine Mandate would be effective at

mitigating the risk of COVID-19.      See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. at 61434–39.       But



                                         13
effectiveness does not entail necessity. And OSHA gave no consideration to many

obvious, more-narrowly-tailored approaches to the dangers of COVID-19. App.A-45–

48 (Larsen, J., dissenting); App.B-21 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of ini-

tial hearing en banc); BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 615 (5th Cir.

2021); see also States’ Stay Application at 20–22.

      b. To understand OSHA’s position on necessity, one must begin with its defi-

nition of “necessary”—or, more accurately, its failure to offer any clear definition.

While OSHA contests the States’ definition of “necessary,” it does not offer one of its

own. But it appears to embrace the definition of “necessary” under which it means

“useful” or “effective,” Resp.44; see App.A-44 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (quoting Neces-

sary, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)). That cannot be right, for all the reasons

addressed above.

      OSHA does not engage with those reasons. Instead, it contends that emer-

gency temporary standards need not be “finely calibrated to impose the minimum

requirements necessary to protect each and every employee” from grave danger.

Resp.36. But no one is demanding that extreme degree of tailoring. The States, much

like Judge Larsen and Chief Judge Sutton, maintain only that OSHA must “not over-

look … obvious distinctions” that might make a rule’s requirements “appropriate in

one category of cases” but “entirely unnecessary in another.” Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n,

Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1973). In other words, the agency

must consider alternative approaches and justify its decision not to pursue meaning-

fully narrower options. That is how courts have interpreted the word “necessary” for




                                          14
almost fifty years. Id. Courts have even invalidated past emergency temporary

standards on the ground that OSHA failed to pursue less-demanding alternatives for

protecting workers. See Asbestos Info., 727 F.2d at 426–27.

      OSHA protests that it would be “anomalous in the context of an emergency

temporary standard” to demand much precision at all, since “the whole point” of the

Emergency Provision “is to allow the agency to act swiftly.” Resp.37. That hardly

follows. Given that emergency temporary standards represent the “most dramatic

weapon” in OSHA’s arsenal, it makes perfect sense that the agency may promulgate

only those rules that are truly “‘necessary’ to achieve the projected benefits.” Asbestos

Info., 727 F.2d at 426. Again, “‘necessary’ must be read as a word of limitation, not

enlargement,” in this context. App.A-44 (Larsen, J., dissenting).

      OSHA’s remaining arguments collapse when “necessary” is properly defined.

Start with the Chenery issue. OSHA insists that there is no Chenery problem, quoting

passages from the Vaccine Mandate that describe the Mandate’s terms as “neces-

sary.” Resp.42–43. But look more closely, and none of these passages uses “neces-

sary” in the relevant sense. At least one of the quoted passages finds that “an ETS is

necessary.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61403 (quoted at Resp.42) (emphasis added). That is

inadequate. The Emergency Provision allows OSHA to issue an emergency tempo-

rary standard only if it finds “that such emergency standard”—in other words, the

actual standard it decides to issue—is necessary. 29 U.S.C. §655(c) (emphasis added);

accord App.A-45 n.4 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Nowhere did OSHA say that the Vaccine

Mandate itself was indispensable to combating the grave danger of COVID-19. It




                                           15
instead found: that it needed to do something to stop workers from being infected

with COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. at 61432 (quoted at Resp.43); that “encouraging vac-

cination” would be “the most efficient and effective method for addressing the grave

danger,” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61434 (quoted at Resp.43); that encouraging or mandating

vaccines was “necessary” in the sense of being the “single best method for protecting

an unvaccinated worker from the serious health consequences of a COVID-19 infec-

tion,” id. at 61435 (quoted misleadingly at Resp.43); and that a mask-and-test re-

quirement for unvaccinated workers was “essential” in that it would “further mitigate

the potential for unvaccinated workers to spread the virus at the workplace,” 86 Fed.

Reg. at 61439 (cited at Resp.33). One searches in vain for any rejection of obviously

more tailored options, such as focusing on those most at risk, focusing on industries

where the risk is heightened, and so on. It is hardly surprising that OSHA failed to

consider this. Since OSHA misunderstood “necessary” to mean “useful,” it would not

have considered whether the Mandate was indispensable.

      OSHA next contends the Vaccine Mandate actually is tailored, since it “does

not apply to employees who work exclusively at home, alone, or outdoors.” Resp.35

(emphasis added). These exemptions will cover very few employees. By OSHA’s own

estimates, only 9 percent of landscapers and 5 percent of highway-maintenance work-

ers would qualify. 86 Fed. Reg. at 61461. So when OSHA says it “tailored the” Vac-

cine Mandate, Resp.35, “tailoring must refer not to the standards of Versace, but to

those of Omar the tentmaker.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 749 (2000) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).




                                         16
      Regardless, these exemptions do nothing to address the most obvious of all

distinctions that the Vaccine Mandate ignores: the different risks faced by employees

of different ages, see above 7–13, and the different risks presented by different work

settings. See App.B-20–21 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing

en banc). The fact that “employees can be exposed to the virus in almost any work

setting,” Resp.41 (quoting 86 Fed. Reg. at 61411) (emphasis added), hardly suggests

that all industries and worksites pose comparable risks. Regarding its failure to draw

age-based distinctions, OSHA claims that it “adopted the Standard in significant part

to prevent employees from transmitting the virus to other employees—a risk pre-

sented by younger and older transmitters alike.” Resp.40. But that cannot support

the necessity finding, because OSHA concluded that those who are vaccinated face no

grave risk at all. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 61434. Thus, preventing young-to-old transmis-

sion is not “necessary” to abate a grave risk according to OSHA itself: everyone who

wants a vaccine can get one for free and avoid any grave risk.

      Finally, OSHA’s misunderstanding of “necessary” also leads it to misunder-

stand the States’ argument that the Mandate could not have been necessary to protect

workers since any workers who wanted a vaccine could obtain one for free. OSHA

responds that its standards “routinely require the use of protective controls even if

employees would prefer not to be subject to particular health or safety measures.”

Resp.52. But those standards are permanent standards, and permanent standards,

unlike emergency temporary standards, need not be “necessary”—they need only to

be “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. §652(8). Making employees take




                                         17
precautions they prefer not to take may be reasonably necessary or appropriate for

ensuring employee safety. It is not generally, however, “indispensable” to protecting

them.

              4.    The challenged standard is not a “temporary” response to
                    an “emergency”

        a. The Mandate does not qualify as a “temporary” standard, and it was not

issued in response to an “emergency” in the relevant sense. See App.B-21–23 (Sutton,

C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc); see also App.A-51 (Larsen,

J., dissenting). The lack of any emergency follows from the fact that nothing suddenly

happened on November 5, 2021, to necessitate the Vaccine Mandate. Indeed, because

OSHA concedes that vaccines eliminate any grave risk from COVID-19, and because

more people were vaccinated against COVID-19 in November 2021 than ever before,

“fewer people face[d] lethal risks from COVID-19.” App.B-22 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting

from the denial of initial hearing en banc). The measure is not “temporary” in any

relevant sense, either. Because a “vaccine may not be taken off when the workday

ends,” it is permanent in a way that true workplace regulations are not. App.A-51

(Larsen, J., dissenting); accord App.B-22 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of

initial hearing en banc).

        b. OSHA responds that there is no “freestanding statutory requirement that

the agency find the existence of an ‘emergency.’” Resp.54. And it says that, as long

as the emergency temporary standard is slated to lapse during the six-month period

provided for by 29 U.S.C. §655(c)(2), it is sufficiently “temporary.” Resp.54. But if a

statute’s “title” can be a “permissible indicator[] of meaning,” Scalia & Garner,



                                          18
Reading Law, §35, p.221 (2012), then surely the name of the action the statute au-

thorizes can be, too. Here, the statute authorizes OSHA to set “emergency temporary

standard[s].” §655(c). This suggests that the agency can act only in response to an

emergency. And it certainly suggests that the standard’s effects must be temporary.

After all, if OSHA could demand permanent abatement measures via a temporary

standard, then OSHA could evade the temporal limits that §655(c)(2) places on its

emergency power.

             5.     The major-questions doctrine, the federalism canon, and
                    the constitutional-doubt canon require the States’ reading

      As the States explained in their application, the major-questions doctrine, the

federalism canon, and the constitutional-doubt canon all require resolving any ambi-

guity in the States’ favor. See States’ Stay Application at 25–31. OSHA’s contrary

arguments are wrong, wrong, and wrong again.

                    a.    Major-questions doctrine

      OSHA does not deny, and never has denied, that the question whether to im-

pose the Vaccine Mandate presents a “major question.” It thus (wisely) abandons the

Sixth Circuit’s contrary determination below. See App.A-15–16 (majority op.). Ra-

ther than fighting on this front, OSHA maintains that the Emergency Provision un-

ambiguously empowered it to issue the Vaccine Mandate. See Resp.55. (The same

lack of ambiguity, it claims, prevents the Court from relying on the constitutional-

doubt canon. See Resp.73.) But the foregoing, if nothing else, shows that Congress

stopped well short of clearly empowering OSHA to issue the Vaccine Mandate. And

indeed, the vast majority of judges to have written or joined an opinion in these cases



                                          19
agree with the States’ interpretation. See App.A-39 (Larsen, J., dissenting); App.B-6

(Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc); App.B-33 (Bush,

J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc); BST, 17 F.4th 604.

      OSHA’s attempts at showing that Congress clearly empowered the agency to

mandate vaccinations all fall short. First, citing 29 U.S.C. §669(a)(5), OSHA claims

“Congress expressly contemplated that” OSHA could require immunization. Resp.56.

The cited statute does not, however, come close to suggesting that Congress “com-

pleted” OSHA might mandate vaccines for endemic illnesses. It gives another de-

partment—HHS—authority to take actions regarding occupational illnesses. It then

states:

      Nothing in this or any other provision of this chapter shall be deemed to
      authorize or require medical examination, immunization, or treatment for
      those who object thereto on religious grounds, except where such is
      necessary for the protection of the health or safety of others.

All this means is that, if some provision empowers the government to require vac-

cinations, it must respect religious objections when exercising that authority. The

question here is whether the Emergency Provision empowers OSHA to mandate

COVID-19 vaccinations. Section 669(a)(5) sheds no light on that question.

      March 2021 legislation appropriating money to OSHA so that it may “carry out

COVID-19 related worker protection activities” is equally irrelevant. Resp.56 (cita-

tion omitted). As an initial matter, this legislation did not amend 29 U.S.C. §655. At

most, it reflects Congress’s interpretation of OSHA’s authority. And Congress’s views

concerning the meaning of “a statute already enacted are entitled to no more weight

than the views of a judge concerning a statute not yet passed.”           Sullivan v.



                                          20
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In any event,

this legislation says nothing at all about whether OSHA has authority to mandate

COVID-19 vaccinations. Most important of all, the States are not denying that OSHA

could take some enforcement actions in response to COVID-19. Again, for some jobs,

COVID-19 likely is a work-related risk. Because the States’ position envisions a role

for OSHA in connection with COVID-19, it is consistent with Congress’s appropria-

tions.

         Finally, OSHA insists that this Court’s decision in Alabama Realtors has no

bearing on the present matter. Its argument appears to be that the statute in Ala-

bama Realtors had different words. That is true, but irrelevant. The Emergency

Provision fails to clearly authorize the Vaccine Mandate, just as the statute at issue

in Alabama Realtors failed to clearly authorize the eviction moratorium in that case.

And as Judge Larsen noted below, it is “hard to think of a” more on-point precedent

than Alabama Realtors. App.A-54 (Larsen, J., dissenting). The Court there “empha-

sized that the CDC’s moratorium covered ‘80% of the country, including between 6

and 17 million tenants,’ all to ‘combat[ ] the spread of COVID-19.’” Id. (quoting Real-

tors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489–90). In issuing the moratorium, the agency claimed “a power

of ‘vast economic and political significance.’” Id. (quoting Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489–

90). Here, “OSHA’s rule covers two-thirds of the private sector, including 84 million

workers (26 million unvaccinated), also to combat COVID-19.” Id. “If it is not clear

on its face that OSHA’s vaccinate-or-test mandate covering most of the country is

significant, then Alabama Association of Realtors tells us it is.” Id.




                                           21
                              b. Federalism canon

      Congress must “enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly

alter the balance between federal and state power.” Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (quo-

tation omitted). The rule applies here because the OSH Act, if indeed it empowered

OSHA to regulate the private medical decisions of every working American, would

empower OSHA to regulate public health—a matter traditionally reserved to the

States. App.B-14 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from the denial of initial hearing en banc).

Because the Emergency Provision contains no “exceedingly clear language” effecting

this transfer of authority, it cannot be read to permit the Vaccine Mandate.

      OSHA responds, again, by attacking an argument the States did not make. It

seems to think the States’ federalism-canon argument is a Tenth Amendment argu-

ment. Resp.69–70. It is not: the federalism canon is a clear-statement rule, not a

constitutional prohibition on federal intrusion into matters traditionally left to the

States.

                    c.    Constitutional-doubt canon

      Statutes should be construed so as to avoid placing their constitutionality in

doubt. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005). OSHA’s interpretation of the

Emergency Provision does not simply create doubt—it undoubtedly causes the stat-

ute to violate both the Commerce Clause and the nondelegation doctrine. See States’

Stay Application at 28–31. Thus, the Court should either reject this reading or else

hold that the States are likely to prevail on the ground that the Vaccine Mandate was

issued pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.




                                          22
      Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to

regulate inactivity—even economic inactivity. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,

557–58 (2012) (op. of Roberts, C.J.). The Vaccine Mandate regulates non-economic

inactivity. It does so by making life difficult for the unvaccinated. Those who refuse

a vaccine must wear masks while working and can be forced to secure and self-finance

weekly testing that may be administered only with the supervision of authorized per-

sons. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 61530–32, 61551–53. The Mandate thus penalizes the

unvaccinated for refusing to engage in the government’s preferred activity (vaccina-

tion). It therefore exceeds the power conferred by the Commerce Clause. NFIB, 567

U.S. at 557–58 (op. of Roberts, C.J.).

      OSHA responds that Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce al-

lows it to regulate working conditions and employer–employee relationships.

Resp.65–69. That is true, but Congress cannot use its power to regulate working

conditions to circumvent the limits on its powers. For example, Congress cannot,

under the Commerce Clause, require individuals to buy health insurance. NFIB, 567

U.S. at 557–58 (op. of Roberts, C.J.). Could it evade that limit on its authority by

requiring employers to fire anyone who declines to purchase health insurance?

Health insurance surely supports the productivity and safety of the workforce. So

could Congress justify this hypothetical law as nothing more than a regulation of “the

working conditions of employees who produce goods or furnish services to entities

whose activities unquestionably affect interstate commerce”? Resp.69. Could it re-

quire the termination or suspension of employees who refuse to exercise and who are




                                         23
thus more at risk of workplace injuries? It is hard to see a limiting principle for

OSHA’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

      OSHA also insists that the Vaccine Mandate is actually no mandate at all,

since employees can mask and submit to weekly testing instead of getting a vaccine

(if their employer allows that option). Resp.68. As an initial matter, this let-them-

eat-cake argument betrays tremendous ignorance of the conditions in much of the

country. Even during times when tests are not in short supply, weekly tests (espe-

cially self-financed tests) are not a practical option for many rural and lower-income

workers. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Standard Process Inc. at 6–10; Br. of Amici Curiae

Local Unions 1249 and 97 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers at

8–9. In any event, the option to pursue testing is irrelevant. Those who declined

health insurance in NFIB had the option to pay a fine. 567 U.S. at 557–58, 562–63

(op. of Roberts, C.J.). Putting them to the choice of paying that fine or buying health

insurance did not make the Individual Mandate in NFIB any less a regulation of

inactivity. Similarly, the mask-and-test option does not make the Vaccine Mandate

any less a regulation of inactivity.

      Nondelegation doctrine. The Emergency Provision, if it means what the

States say it means, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine as that doctrine ex-

ists today. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019). The same cannot

be said of OSHA’s interpretation. On OSHA’s understanding: OSHA can issue an

emergency temporary standard in response to any grave danger that an employee

may face at work, regardless of whether the risk has a direct relationship to work;




                                          24
the agency can require any solution that is “useful” for addressing the danger, even

if the solution is permanent, even if the solution will affect employees outside of work,

and even if there are obviously narrower solutions the agency could pursue; and the

Secretary has sole discretion to characterize as “grave” every danger that is capable

of causing death or serious injury. Put all that together, and one gets an almost-

limitless delegation of authority. It would seem that OSHA could, on this interpre-

tation, regulate nearly every potentially fatal risk that people might encounter at

work, as long as the regulation will (in the Secretary’s judgment) prove effective in

limiting the risk.

                                           *

      Before turning to the equities, the States pause to refute OSHA’s tepid sugges-

tion that the States may not be “person[s]” entitled to challenge an emergency tem-

porary standard under 29 U.S.C. §655(f). Resp.81 n.14. “Any person” may petition

for review of an emergency temporary standard. §655(f). “Person” means “one or

more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal rep-

resentatives, or any organized group of persons.” §652(4). That broad definition en-

compasses States. Indeed, it is materially identical to the APA’s definition of “per-

son”—“an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private or-

ganization other than an agency,” 5 U.S.C. §551(2)—which everyone agrees includes

the States. Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The

neighboring definition for “employer” removes any doubt. The OSH Act defines “em-

ployer” as “a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees,




                                           25
but does not include … any State or political subdivision of a State.” §652(5) (empha-

sis added). There would be no need to exclude government entities from the definition

of “employer” if, as OSHA claims, governments were not “persons.” In any event, as

even OSHA concedes, the presence of so many private applicants means the Court

plainly has jurisdiction to enter a stay. Resp.81 n.14.

       B.    The remaining factors support the entry of a stay

       Irreparable harm. The Vaccine Mandate will irreparably harm the States

by imposing unrecoverable compliance costs on States with OSHA Plans of their own,

by preempting state vaccination policies, and by invading state prerogatives. See

States’ Stay Application at 31–32. OSHA does not dispute the compliance-cost injury,

forfeiting its right to do so. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 277 n.6. It mischaracterizes

the other injuries as invoking “abstract notions of sovereignty.” Resp.81. But the

States’ interests are quite concrete. The Vaccine Mandate expressly preempts state

laws inconsistent with its terms. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 61437. There are quite a few

such laws. See, e.g., AZ Executive Order 2021-18 (Aug. 16, 2021) (cited by 86 Fed.

Reg. at 61510 n.86); Fla. Stat. §381.00317; Mont. Code Ann. §49-2-312; Idaho Code

Ann. §39-9003; Tenn. Code Ann. §14-2-102; W. Va. Code §16-3-4b; see also Ind. Code

§22-8-1.1-16.2(b) (requiring the State to wait 60 days before updating its State OSHA

Plan to implement new federal rules). The Mandate also overrides policies in States

that have, in the main, let employers decide for themselves what works best for their

businesses and employees. So the States are not appealing to abstract notions of

sovereignty—they are suing to prevent their own already-in-force policies from being

nullified.   Interference with the constitutional operation of state law always


                                          26
constitutes an irreparable injury. Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Rob-

erts, C.J., in chambers); accord Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). (The

possibility that individual employers might obtain variances, Resp.34, does not affect

the existence of the harms faced by the States. Indeed, the option to seek a variance

does not bear on the irreparable-harm inquiry even for private employers. See Taylor

Diving & Salvage Co. v. Dep’t of Labor, 537 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1976).)

      OSHA next cites dicta from one of this Court’s cases for the proposition that a

“State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal

Government.” Resp.82 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S.

592, 610 n.16 (1982)). It is hard to see why. The just-discussed injuries on which the

States rely are injuries to the States themselves—they do not rest on a parens patriae

theory. Further, the States’ standing is not in doubt. In addition to the costs associ-

ated with State Plans and the sovereign injuries discussed above, the States will face

pocketbook harms when more of their citizens seek unemployment benefits after los-

ing their jobs because of the Vaccine Mandate, when tax revenues dip because of the

Mandate, when citizens who opt for the mask-and-test option seek testing provided

for by state programs, and when the increases in testing requests cause at least one

State’s group-health-insurance costs to rise. See, e.g., In re: MCP No. 165, No. 21-

7000 (6th Cir.), Mtn. for Stay by Florida, et al., Doc. 161 at 83, 91–93, 96–97, 107–09,

160, 162–63 (Declarations of Donald, Dorfman, Heckman, Lewandowski, Stokes,

Toomey); BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, No. 21-60845 (5th Cir.), Mtn. for Stay by

Texas, et al., Doc. 00516084105 (filed November 7, 2021) at 39, 50 (Exhibits 1 and 4).




                                          27
        Remaining factors. The remaining factors—harm to the opposing party and

the public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556

U.S. at 435. And here, they both support issuance of a stay.

        “It is hard to find harm to OSHA from delay, as it waited almost two years

since the pandemic began, and nearly a year after vaccines became publicly available,

to issue the mandate.” App.A-56 (Larsen, J., dissenting). A stay will not cause legally

cognizable harm to anyone else, either. While it is “indisputable that the public has

a strong interest in combating the spread of” COVID-19, “our system does not permit

agencies to act unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends.” Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at

2490.

        OSHA responds that the Vaccine Mandate will save many lives. Again, its own

actions make that claim hard to buy. If a stay would be so damaging, why did OSHA

wait eleven days to seek dissolution of the Fifth Circuit’s stay in the Sixth Circuit

instead of seeking immediate relief in this Court? And if it is so vital to have federally

imposed workplace protections for individuals who may encounter COVID-19 at

work, what could possibly explain OSHA’s withdrawal of the emergency temporary

standard applicable to healthcare workers? OSHA, Statement, https://perma.cc/F9V7

-BQVG. In any event, the beneficial effects of an unlawful policy do not factor into

the question whether to award a stay. Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2490. Upon determining

that a challenged policy is illegal, a court may conclude that the illegal action is best

abated through means other than a stay—through an impending expiration date, for

example. See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct.




                                           28
2320, 2321 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But courts may not, relying on the

equities, allow the government to keep acting illegally simply because they deem the

illegal actions prudent. “[O]nce judges go beyond the modest task of determining

whether statutes permit agency action, these broader considerations become exceed-

ingly complicated—and well beyond [their] ken.” App.B-31 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting

from the denial of initial hearing en banc).

       OSHA concludes its equities argument by asking the Court, if it enters a stay,

to stay “only the portion of the ETS concerning a vaccination requirement.” Resp.83.

That is, OSHA asks the Court to “leave in place during the pendency of litigation the

ETS’s requirement that employers implement a policy that requires unvaccinated

employees to mask and test.” Resp.83–84. This plea for tailored relief makes no

sense. Nearly all of the applicants’ various arguments apply with full force to a mask-

and-test mandate: COVID-19 is a non-occupational danger for most employees and

is thus a risk OSHA cannot regulate; the risk is not “grave” for many employees; a

one-size-fits-all policy is not “necessary”; the nondelegation problems remain; and the

narrower remedy still violates the Commerce Clause if (as is presumably the case)

employees would be allowed to take off their masks and cease testing in the event

they obtain a vaccine. Replacing one illegal rule with another is no relief at all.

III.   In the alternative, the Court could grant certiorari before judgment

       The States’ request for certiorari before judgment is largely moot if this Court

enters a stay. Any such order can make clear that the Vaccine Mandate is illegal and

unenforceable, giving the applicants all the relief they need. As such, there is little




                                          29
need to address OSHA’s argument that, because the Sixth Circuit has not entered

final judgment, the Court lacks jurisdiction to fully resolve this case on the merits

after awarding a writ of certiorari before judgment. Resp.85–86. But that argument

is wrong. Appellate jurisdiction, for constitutional purposes, entails review of a lower

court’s opinion. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175 (1803). Here, the Court’s

appellate jurisdiction unquestionably allows it to review the lower court’s stay-stage

decision. By granting certiorari to address that question, it would be free to award

permanent relief. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691–92 (2008); see also Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 31 (2008).

                                    CONCLUSION

      The Court should immediately enter an administrative stay of the Vaccine

Mandate. And it should stay the Vaccine Mandate’s enforcement “pending disposi-

tion of” the applicants’ “petitions for review.” West Virginia, 577 U.S. at 1126.




                                           30
January 2021                            Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL CAMERON                          DAVE YOST
Attorney General of Kentucky            Attorney General of Ohio

VICTOR B. MADDOX                        BENJAMIN M. FLOWERS*
CHRISTOPHER L. THACKER                  * Counsel of Record
ALEXANDER Y. MAGERA                       Solicitor General
JEREMY J. SYLVESTER                     MATHURA SRIDHARAN
LINDSEY R. KEISER                       MAY MAILMAN
Office of the Attorney General          JOHN ROCKENBACH
700 Capital Avenue, Suite 118             Deputy Solicitors General
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601               30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor
Phone: (502) 696-5300                   Columbus, OH 43215
Victor.Maddox@ky.gov                    Phone: (614) 466-8980
                                        bflowers@OhioAGO.gov
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky                                   Counsel for the State of Ohio




HERBERT H. SLATERY III                  JOHN M. O’CONNOR
Attorney General of Tennessee           Attorney General of Oklahoma

CLARK L. HILDABRAND                     MITHUN MANSINGHANI
BRANDON J. SMITH                         Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General          313 N.E. 21st St.
and Reporter                            Oklahoma City, OK
P.O. Box. 20207                         Phone: (405) 521-3921
Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207         Mithun.Mansinghani@oag.ok.gov
Phone: (615) 532-4081
clark.hildabrand@ag.tn.gov              Counsel for the State of Oklahoma

Counsel for the State of Tennessee




                                       31
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN                   PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of Idaho            Attorney General of West Virginia

BRIAN KANE                           LINDSAY S. SEE
 Chief Deputy Attorney General        Solicitor General
LESLIE M. HAYES                      MICHAEL WILLIAMS (admitted in Michi-
MEGAN A. LARRONDO                    gan; practicing under supervision of
 Deputy Attorneys General            West Virginia attorneys)
700 W. Jefferson Street, Ste. 210    Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720                       State Capitol Complex
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010              Bldg. 1, Room E-26
Phone: (208) 334-2400                Charleston, West Virginia 25305
brian.kane@ag.idaho.gov              Phone: (304) 558-2021
                                     Lindsay.S.See@wvago.gov
Counsel for the State of Idaho
                                     Counsel for the State of
                                     West Virginia



DEREK SCHMIDT                        LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of Kansas           Attorney General of Mississippi

JEFFREY A. CHANAY                    WHITNEY H. LIPSCOMB
  Chief Deputy Attorney General       Deputy Attorney General
SHANNON GRAMMEL                      SCOTT G. STEWART
  Deputy Solicitor General            Solicitor General
120 SW 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor        JUSTIN L. MATHENY
Topeka, Kansas 66612                  Deputy Solicitor General
Phone: (785) 296-2215                JOHN V. COGHLAN
jeff.chanay@ag.ks.gov                 Deputy Solicitor General
                                     Mississippi Attorney General’s Office
Counsel for the State of Kansas      P.O. Box 220
                                     Jackson, MS 39205
                                     Phone: (601) 359-3680
                                     scott.stewart@ago.ms.gov

                                     Counsel for the State of Mississippi




                                    32
STEVE MARSHALL                        ERIC S. SCHMITT
Attorney General of Alabama           Attorney General of Missouri

EDMUND G. LACOUR JR.                  D. JOHN SAUER
 Solicitor General                      Solicitor General
THOMAS A. WILSON                      Office of the Missouri
 Deputy Solicitor General             Attorney General
State of Alabama                      Supreme Court Building
Office of the Attorney General        P.O. Box 899
501 Washington Ave.                   Jefferson City, MO 65102
Montgomery, AL 36130                  Phone: (573) 751-3321
Phone: (334) 242-7300                 John.Sauer@ago.mo.gov
Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.gov
                                      Counsel for the State of Missouri
Counsel for the State of Alabama




TREG R. TAYLOR                        AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Alaska            Attorney General of Montana
                                      KRISTIN HANSEN
CHARLES E. BRASINGTON                 Lieutenant General
 Assistant Attorney General           DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST
State of Alaska                        Solicitor General
1031 West Fourth Avenue, Suite 200    CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN
Anchorage, AK 99501                    Assistant Solicitor General
Phone: (907) 269-6612                 Office of the Attorney General
charles.brasington@alaska.gov         215 North Sanders
                                      P.O. Box 201401
Counsel for the State of Alaska       Helena, MT 59620-1401
                                      Phone: (406) 444-2026
                                      David.Dewhirst@mt.gov

                                      Counsel for the State of Montana




                                     33
MARK BRNOVICH                        DOUGLAS J. PETERSON
Attorney General of Arizona          Attorney General of Nebraska

BRUNN W. ROYSDEN IIII                JAMES A. CAMPBELL
 SOLICITOR GENERAL                     Solicitor General
DREW C. ENSIGN                       Office of the Nebraska
 Deputy Solicitor General            Attorney General
Arizona Attorney General’s Office    2115 State Capitol
2005 N. Central Ave.                 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509
Phoenix, AZ 85004                    Phone: (402) 471-2682
Phone: (602) 542-3333                jim.campbell@nebraska.gov
Drew.ensign@azag.gov
                                     Counsel for the State of Nebraska
Counsel for the State of Arizona




LESLIE RUTLEDGE                      JOHN M. FORMELLA
Attorney General of Arkansas         Attorney General of New Hampshire

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI                   ANTHONY J. GALDIERI
 Solicitor General                    Solicitor General
VINCENT M. WAGNER                    New Hampshire Department of Justice
 Deputy Solicitor General            33 Capitol Street
Office of the Arkansas               Concord, NH 03301
Attorney General                     Phone: (603) 271-3658
323 Center Street, Suite 200         Anthony.J.Galdieri@doj.nh.gov
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Phone: (501) 682-8090                Counsel for the State of New Hampshire
Nicholas.bronni@arkansasag.gov

Counsel for the State of Arkansas




                                    34
ASHLEY MOODY                         WAYNE STENEHJEM
Attorney General of Florida          Attorney General of North Dakota

HENRY C. WHITAKER                    MATTHEW A. SAGSVEEN
 Solicitor General                    Solicitor General
DANIEL W. BELL                       Office of Attorney General
 Chief Deputy Solicitor General      500 North 9th Street
EVAN EZRAY                           Bismarck, ND 58501-4509
JASON H. HILBORN                     Phone: (701) 328-3640
 Deputy Solicitors General           masagsve@nd.gov
JAMES H. PERCIVAL
 Deputy Attorney General of          Counsel for the State of North Dakota
 Legal Policy
NATALIE P. CHRISTMAS
 Assistant Attorney General of
 Legal Policy
State of Florida
Office of the Attorney General
The Capitol, Pl-01
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Phone: (850) 414-3300
Henry.Whitaker@myfloridalegal.com

Counsel for the State of Florida



CHRISTOPHER M. CARR                  ALAN WILSON
Attorney General of Georgia          Attorney General of South Carolina

STEPHEN J. PETRANY                   ROBERT D. COOK
  Solicitor General                   Solicitor General
ROSS W. BERGETHON                    J. EMORY SMITH, JR.
DREW F. WALDBESER                     Deputy Solicitor General
  Deputy Solicitors General          THOMAS T. HYDRICK
State of Georgia                      Assistant Deputy Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General       Office of the Attorney General
40 Capitol Square, S.W.              Post Office Box 11549
Atlanta, Georgia, 30334              Columbia, South Carolina 29211
Phone: (404) 458-3378                Phone: (803) 734-3680
                                     thomashydrick@scag.gov
Counsel for the State of Georgia
                                     Counsel for the State of South Carolina




                                    35
THEODORE E. ROKITA                        JASON R. RAVNSBORG
Attorney General of Indiana               South Dakota Attorney General
THOMAS M. FISHER
 Solicitor General                        DAVID M. MCVEY
JULIA C. PAYNE                             Assistant Attorney General
MELINDA R. HOLMES                         1302 E. Highway 14, Suite 1
 Deputy Attorneys General                 Pierre, SD 57501-8501
Office of the Indiana Attorney General    Phone: (605) 773-3215
IGC South, Fifth Floor                    david.mcvey@state.sd.us
302 W. Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204                    Counsel for the State of South Dakota
Phone: (317) 232-6255
Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

Counsel for the State of Indiana




JEFFREY S. THOMPSON                       KEN PAXTON
Solicitor General of Iowa                 Attorney General of Texas

SAMUEL P. LANGHOLZ                        BRENT WEBSTER
  Assistant Solicitor General              First Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Iowa Attorney General       AARON F. REITZ
1305 E. Walnut Street                      Deputy Attorney General for
Des Moines, Iowa 50319                     Legal Strategy
Phone: (515) 281-5164                     JUDD E. STONE II
jeffrey.thompson@ag.iowa.gov               Solicitor General
                                          LANORA C. PETTIT
Counsel for the State of Iowa              Principal Deputy Solicitor General
                                          WILLIAM F. COLE
                                          RYAN S. BAASCH
                                           Assistant Solicitors General
                                          LEIF A. OLSON
                                           Special Counsel
                                          Office of the Attorney General
                                          P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
                                          Austin, Texas 78711-2548
                                          Phone: (512) 936-1700
                                          William.Cole@oag.texas.gov

                                          Counsel for the State of Texas



                                         36
JEFF LANDRY                           SEAN REYES
Attorney General of Louisiana         Attorney General

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL                  MELISSA A. HOLYOAK
 Solicitor General                     Solicitor General
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN                    Office of the Attorney General
 Deputy Solicitor General             350 N. State Street, Suite 230
JOSIAH KOLLMEYER                      P.O. Box 142320
 Assistant Solicitor General          Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2320
MORGAN BRUNGARD                       Phone: (385) 271-2484
 Assistant Solicitor General          melissaholyoak@agutah.gov
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third Street                  Counsel for the State of Utah
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
Phone: (225) 326-6766
emurrill@ag.louisiana.gov

Counsel for the State of Louisiana




                                      BRIDGET HILL
                                      Attorney General of Wyoming

                                      RYAN SCHELHAAS
                                        Chief Deputy Attorney General
                                      Wyoming Attorney General’s Office
                                      109 State Capitol
                                      Cheyenne, WY 82002
                                      Telephone: (307) 777-5786
                                      ryan.schelhaas@wyo.gov

                                      Counsel for the State of Wyoming




                                     37


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