Court filing
MEMORANDUM in Support by PacMar Technologies LLC as to Martin Kao re… — PPP Attempt Conspiracy Legal Filings (Dkt. 198)
No. 1:21-cr-00061-LEK · Doc. 198 · Docket on CourtListener
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KOBAYASHI SUGITA & GODA, LLP
DAVID M. LOUIE 2162
JESSE W. SCHIEL 7995
First Hawaiian Center
999 Bishop Street, Suite 2600
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Telephone: (808) 535-5700
Facsimile: (808) 535-5799
E-mail: dml@ksglaw.com; jws@ksglaw.com
Attorneys for Movant
PACMAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC f/k/a
MARTIN DEFENSE GROUP, LLC f/k/a
NAVATEK LLC
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR. NO. 21-00061 LEK
Plaintiff, MOVANT PACMAR
TECHNOLOGIES LLC'S
vs. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION
MARTIN KAO, FOR RESTITUTION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. § 3663A AND § 3664, FILED
Defendant. ON MARCH 10, 2026; CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................2
A. PacMar’s Attorneys’ Fees Are Categorically Recoverable Under the
MVRA ...................................................................................................2
1. The Ninth Circuit Adopts a Broad View of Recoverable
Investigation Costs ......................................................................2
2. Lagos Preserves PacMar’s Fees — It Does Not Limit Them.....4
3. Both Investigations Were Criminal Grand Jury Proceedings .....5
4. The Court Has Already Determined PacMar Is Entitled to
Restitution ...................................................................................5
B. The Applicable Legal Standard Requires Reasonable Approximation,
Not Line-by-Line Precision...................................................................6
1. Preponderance of the Evidence Means Reasonable
Approximation ............................................................................6
2. PacMar’s Submission Is Not a “Back-of-the-Envelope”
Approximation ............................................................................7
3. The MVRA’s Mandatory Framework Makes Denial a Last
Resort ..........................................................................................8
C. PacMar’s Submission Satisfies the Applicable Standard .....................9
1. The Ninth Circuit Has Endorsed Exactly This Type of Affidavit
.....................................................................................................9
2. Sworn Declarations from the Billing Attorney, Combined with
Invoices, Are Sufficient ............................................................10
3. Percentage-Based Allocation Is an Accepted Methodology ....11
4. Block Billing Reduces an Award; It Does Not Eliminate One 13
5. PacMar Has Already Implemented the “Reasonable Solution”
Courts Require ..........................................................................14
D. Denial With Prejudice Is Inappropriate and Inconsistent With the
MVRA’s Mandatory Framework ........................................................15
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III. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................16
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Dolan v. United States,
560 U.S. 605 (2010)........................................................................................8, 16
In re Sealed Case,
702 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................ 7
Lagos v. United States,
584 U.S. 577 (2018)......................................................................................2, 4, 5
United States v. Afriyie,
27 F.4th 161 (2d Cir. 2022) ............................................................................5, 14
United States v. Amato,
540 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2008) .........................................................................10, 15
United States v. Anderson,
741 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 8
United States v. Avenatti,
No. (S1) 19 Cr. 373 (PGG), 2022 WL 452385 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
2022), aff’d, 81 F.4th 171 (2d Cir. 2023) .....................................................13, 14
United States v. Battista,
575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009) ............................................................................... 13
United States v. Cardozo,
68 F.4th 725 (1st Cir. 2023)............................................................................ 7, 11
United States v. Dadyan,
76 F.4th 955 (9th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................. 6
United States v. Donaghy,
570 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ................................................................11
United States v. Eyraud,
809 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................3, 4
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United States v. Ferdman,
779 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2015) ..................................................................7, 9, 15
United States v. Fogel,
494 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Conn. 2007).................................................................12
United States v. Gordon,
393 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 3, 4
United States v. Gupta,
925 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ................................................................ 12
United States v. Gushlak,
728 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2013) ................................................................................. 6
United States v. Holmes,
673 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2023) ................................................................ 8
United States v. Kennedy,
643 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 6
United States v. Manlapaz,
825 F. App’x 109 (4th Cir. 2020) ......................................................................... 7
United States v. Savoie,
985 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1993)................................................................................. 7
United States v. Waknine,
543 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................3, 6, 9, 10
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 3663A ..................................................................................................... 1
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) ......................................................................................8, 15
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4)....................................................................................2, 3, 4
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B) ................................................................................9, 15
18 U.S.C. § 3664 ........................................................................................................ 1
18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) ................................................................................................... 6
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MOVANT PACMAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC’S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR
RESTITUTION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3663A AND § 3664, FILED ON
MARCH 10, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Court’s Electronic Order of April 30, 2026 [Dkt. 197] (the
“EO”), PACMAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC f/k/a MARTIN DEFENSE GROUP,
LLC f/k/a NAVATEK LLC (“PacMar”) respectfully submits this Supplemental
Memorandum in support of its Renewed Motion for Restitution [Dkt. 190]
(“Renewed Motion”).
The EO directs PacMar to address the concerns raised at the April 30, 2025
hearing when the Court denied PacMar’s prior request without prejudice. Those
concerns centered on whether PacMar’s documentation was sufficiently specific to
allow the Court to determine an appropriate restitution amount. Defendant Martin
Kao’s (“Defendant Kao” or “Kao”) position — then and now — is that PacMar
cannot provide that specificity and that its Renewed Motion should therefore be
denied with prejudice.
Kao is wrong on both the law and the record. The Renewed Motion already
provides what the law requires: a sworn declaration from Preston Burton, the lead
Buckley LLP partner who directed all of the work, offering a professional estimate
grounded in firsthand knowledge of both investigations (the “Burton
Declaration”), supported by highlighted invoices and two independent
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methodologies producing corroborating figures. Under the Ninth Circuit’s and every
other circuit’s interpretation of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”),
this submission is sufficient for several reasons.
First, PacMar’s attorneys’ fees are categorically recoverable under the MVRA
— the Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad view of recoverable investigation costs,
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Lagos v. United States expressly preserves,
rather than limits, recovery for fees incurred in response to government grand jury
subpoenas.
Second, the applicable legal standard does not require line-by-line precision;
it requires reasonable approximation supported by sound methodology.
Third, PacMar’s submission — the Burton Declaration combined with
highlighted invoices and two corroborating calculations — is precisely the evidence
that the Ninth Circuit and other courts have found sufficient to support a restitution
award.
II. ARGUMENT
A. PacMar’s Attorneys’ Fees Are Categorically Recoverable Under
the MVRA
1. The Ninth Circuit Adopts a Broad View of Recoverable
Investigation Costs
Section 3663A(b)(4) of the MVRA requires restitution for “other expenses
incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution or attendance at
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proceedings related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit has
“adopted a ‘broad view of the restitution authorization [for investigation costs],’
holding that ‘investigation costs — including attorneys’ fees — incurred by private
parties as a direct and foreseeable result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct may
be recoverable.’” United States v. Eyraud, 809 F.3d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To qualify, fees must be “reasonably
necessary” to aid in the investigation or prosecution. United States v. Waknine, 543
F.3d 546, 559 (9th Cir. 2008). Congress’s intent was that courts “engage in an
expedient and reasonable restitution process, with uncertainties resolved with a view
toward achieving fairness to the victim.” United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044,
1048 (9th Cir. 2004).
In Gordon, the Ninth Circuit specifically affirmed restitution for over $1
million in investigation costs where those “costs were incurred in response to five
grand jury subpoenas and a number of government requests requiring [the victim] to
analyze vast amounts of documentation and electronic information.” Id. at 1057.
This is precisely PacMar’s situation: Buckley was engaged specifically to respond
to grand jury subpoenas from the USAO for the District of Hawaii and the USAO
for the District of Columbia, and the highlighted invoice entries in Exhibit C to the
Renewed Motion reflect work related to document collection, review, production,
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and privilege screening in connection with those subpoenas. Declaration of Preston
Burton in support of the Renewed Motion (“Burton Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 8.
Eyraud extended Gordon, holding that fees incurred during the victim’s
“initial criminal investigation alongside the FBI” and “during the grand jury
proceedings” are covered under § 3663A(b)(4). 809 F.3d at 468. Together, Gordon
and Eyraud confirm that attorneys’ fees incurred by a victim to assist a government
criminal investigation are recoverable where reasonably necessary and directly tied
to the investigation or prosecution.
2. Lagos Preserves PacMar’s Fees — It Does Not Limit Them
Lagos v. United States holds that Section 3663A(b)(4)’s reference to
“investigation” is limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings —
meaning fees incurred in a victim’s purely private, self-initiated internal
investigation do not qualify. 584 U.S. 577, 581–82 (2018). The Supreme Court
expressly preserved recovery for fees incurred “testify[ing] before a grand jury” and
attending criminal proceedings. Id. at 582.
PacMar did not retain Buckley to conduct a private investigation. See Burton
Decl. ¶ 2. PacMar retained Buckley because it was served with compulsory grand
jury subpoenas — by the USAO for the District of Hawaii, and by the USAO for the
District of Columbia. See id. ¶ 5. The government came to PacMar; PacMar did not
seek out the government. See id. Buckley’s work responding to those subpoenas is
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the paradigm case Lagos preserved. Lagos thus supports PacMar’s claim; it does not
limit it.
3. Both Investigations Were Criminal Grand Jury Proceedings
In United States v. Afriyie, the Second Circuit drew a line between recoverable
work (USAO criminal investigation) and non-recoverable work (parallel SEC civil
investigation). 27 F.4th 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2022).
That line does not cut against PacMar. Both the Hawaii and D.C.
investigations were criminal grand jury proceedings — both resulted in federal
criminal charges and guilty pleas by Defendant Kao. The allocation question here is
one of apportionment between two covered investigations, not between a covered
and an uncovered one. Because every dollar at issue was incurred in connection with
one or both government criminal investigations, the threshold coverage requirement
under Afriyie is satisfied for all claimed amounts.
4. The Court Has Already Determined PacMar Is Entitled to
Restitution
At the April 30, 2025 hearing, the Court confirmed unequivocally that “I do
think [PacMar is] legally entitled to certain restitution.” See Exhibit B to the
Renewed Motion at 23:21–24. Kao has not challenged PacMar’s victim status or its
entitlement to some amount of restitution. See Kao’s MIO to the Renewed Motion
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[Dkt. 195] (“Kao’s MIO”) at 3–4. The threshold question is resolved. What remains
is the quantum.
B. The Applicable Legal Standard Requires Reasonable
Approximation, Not Line-by-Line Precision
1. Preponderance of the Evidence Means Reasonable
Approximation
Any dispute as to the proper amount of restitution “shall be resolved by the
court by the preponderance of the evidence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). Federal courts are
unanimous that preponderance under the MVRA does not mean exact proof. It
means reasonable approximation supported by sound methodology.
The Ninth Circuit has squarely held that the MVRA requires only “some
reasonable certainty” about the amount of a victim’s damages; “mathematical
precision” is not a “requirement.” United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261
(9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). The government must provide evidence sufficient
for the court to estimate “the full amount of the victim’s losses with some reasonable
certainty.” Id. The district court “is entitled to draw reasonable inferences when
arriving at its restitution calculation.” United States v. Dadyan, 76 F.4th 955, 961
(9th Cir. 2023). Evidence used must possess “sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.” Waknine, 543 F.3d at 557.
This standard is consistent across the circuits. See United States v. Gushlak,
728 F.3d 184, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he MVRA requires only a reasonable
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approximation of losses supported by a sound methodology” and calculations need
not be “mathematically precise,” especially “in cases in which an exact dollar
amount is inherently incalculable.”); United States v. Cardozo, 68 F.4th 725, 734
(1st Cir. 2023) (emphasizing that the government’s burden is “not a heavy one: as
long as the court’s order reasonably responds to some reliable evidence, no more is
exigible.”); United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 617 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[S]o long as
the basis for reasonable approximation is at hand, difficulties in achieving exact
measurements will not preclude a trial court from ordering restitution.”); United
States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting courts “may resolve
restitution uncertainties with a view towards achieving fairness to the victim so long
as [the court] still makes a reasonable determination of appropriate restitution rooted
in a calculation of actual loss.”) (emphasis in original); In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d
59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (A restitution amount need not “be proven with exactitude”
and “determining the dollar amount of a victim’s losses . . . will inevitably involve
some degree of approximation, which is not fatal.”); United States v. Manlapaz, 825
F. App’x 109, 118 (4th Cir. 2020) (The MVRA “does not require absolute precision
so long as there is a basis for reasonable approximation.”).
2. PacMar’s Submission Is Not a “Back-of-the-Envelope”
Approximation
Kao may suggest that PacMar’s percentage-based methodology is the kind of
arbitrary “back-of-the-envelope” approach the Ninth Circuit cautioned against in
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United States v. Anderson, 741 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2013). Anderson is
inapposite. There, the court vacated a restitution order where losses were simply “not
quantifiable to any degree of certainty.” Id. at 954. Absent from that record were
what PacMar has provided here: actual billing records, a sworn declaration from the
lead billing attorney explaining the methodology, and two independent calculations
producing corroborating figures. Similarly, the district court in United States v.
Holmes denied a $500,000 request for legal fees where no “billing records or other
supporting documents” were submitted at all. 673 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1064 (N.D. Cal.
2023).
PacMar’s submission is the direct opposite of Holmes. The distinction
between what courts reject and what they approve is not precision versus
approximation; it is arbitrary guesswork versus reasonable estimation grounded in
evidence. PacMar’s submission is the latter.
3. The MVRA’s Mandatory Framework Makes Denial a Last
Resort
The MVRA commands that “the court shall order . . . that the defendant make
restitution to the victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). The Supreme Court in Dolan v.
United States confirmed that the MVRA “places primary weight upon, and
emphasizes the importance of, imposing restitution upon those convicted of certain
federal crimes,” and that procedural difficulties cannot defeat that mandate. 560 U.S.
605, 612 (2010).
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When documentation presents challenges, the Tenth Circuit in Ferdman
identified three tools available to the Court: (1) request additional evidence, (2) hold
an evidentiary hearing, or (3) only as a narrow last resort under § 3663A(c)(3)(B),
decline to order restitution where determining the amount would complicate or
prolong sentencing to a degree that outweighs the restitution interest. 779 F.3d at
1133. That complexity exception was designed for the exceptional case — not for
the routine challenge of apportioning fees between two concurrent criminal
investigations conducted by the same team on the same documents. Under Ferdman,
where PacMar has provided the Court with a sworn declaration, invoices, and two
corroborating calculations, denial with prejudice is simply not an available option.
C. PacMar’s Submission Satisfies the Applicable Standard
1. The Ninth Circuit Has Endorsed Exactly This Type of
Affidavit
The Ninth Circuit in Waknine vacated a restitution order because the victim
submitted only bare one-page summaries listing an attorney’s name and a total dollar
amount, with no description of time spent, activities performed, or credentials. 543
F.3d at 557. The court drew a narrow limit on that holding: “victim affidavits will
generally provide sufficient, reliable evidence to support a restitution order. In this
case, however, the affidavits were too summary and too conclusory to be sufficiently
reliable.” Id. The court added, explicitly: “A sufficiently detailed affidavit
doubtless would suffice in most cases.” Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
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The Burton Declaration is the “sufficiently detailed affidavit” Waknine
endorses. Burton was the lead partner who directed all of Buckley’s representation
of PacMar in both investigations. See Burton Decl. ¶ 2. He reviewed the invoices,
consulted with the two remaining team members who worked on both PacMar
matters, and reviewed correspondence with the government regarding document
productions. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. He identified that at least 90% of the total invoiced work
was related to one or both grand jury investigations, and that at least 25% of that
work was attributable to the USAO Hawaii investigation, yielding a figure of at least
$192,963.38. Id. ¶ 7. He provided a corroborating alternative calculation. Id. ¶¶ 8–
9. He attested under penalty of perjury that both figures likely understate the true
Hawaii amount. Id. ¶ 9. This is not the conclusory one-page summary Waknine
rejected. It is a detailed, sworn professional assessment from the person best
positioned to make it.
2. Sworn Declarations from the Billing Attorney, Combined
with Invoices, Are Sufficient
The Second Circuit in United States v. Amato upheld a restitution award of
attorneys’ fees and accounting costs where those amounts were well substantiated
in a memorandum supported by a sworn declaration by a member of the law firm as
well as invoices. 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008). The court also noted that the
MVRA makes “restitution a mandatory part of the sentences imposed for certain
categories of offenses” and thus “[i]t requires district courts to reimburse the victim”
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where the statute’s conditions are met. Id. This is exactly PacMar’s Renewed Motion
submission — the Burton Declaration (a sworn statement by the Buckley
engagement partner) supported by Exhibit C (the highlighted Buckley invoices).
The First Circuit in Cardozo went further, holding that billing statements
“prepared in the ordinary course of professional practice” need not even be sworn to
be reliable for restitution purposes: “We are aware of no authority that requires a
billing statement, prepared in the ordinary course of professional practice, to be
sworn before it can be deemed reliable.” 68 F.4th at 735. PacMar has done more
than Cardozo required — the Burton Declaration is sworn under penalty of perjury
and is supported by the underlying invoices.
3. Percentage-Based Allocation Is an Accepted Methodology
The leading case directly endorsing percentage-based allocation for MVRA
restitution is United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In
Donaghy, the NBA sought restitution for attorneys’ fees incurred assisting the
government in the referee-corruption investigation. The billing records covered
work that partly related to assisting the government and partly to other matters, and
each attorney “explained that only a portion of a billing entry was dedicated to
assisting the government, and . . . gave his or her best estimate as to how many hours
are recoverable.” Id. at 431. The court upheld a 25% allocation methodology, finding
the affidavits “while not extremely detailed” sufficient to establish a reasonable
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estimate by a preponderance, and noted that “uncertainties with respect to the
amount in question should be resolved in favor of the victim.” Id. at 423, 432. The
court also applied a 33% proportional multiplier to one attorney’s billing where
precise attribution was impossible. Id. at 435.
This is Burton’s Declaration in a nutshell: the engagement partner who
directed the work explained, on the basis of firsthand knowledge, what percentage
of the overlapping efforts was attributable to the Hawaii investigation.
United States v. Gupta, 925 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) reinforces this
approach. In Gupta, Judge Rakoff reviewed 542 pages of billing records for fees
incurred across multiple parallel matters, applied a percentage-based exclusion of
approximately 9–10% of entries he found non-necessary, and awarded
approximately 90% of the total requested. Id. at 584, 587–88. The key was that the
records identified the nature of the work with “sufficient particularity to assess what
was done, how it was done, and why it was done.” Id. at 587. The Burton Declaration
supplies precisely that particularity for PacMar’s highlighted entries.
Similarly, in United States v. Fogel, 494 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D. Conn. 2007), the
court awarded restitution for attorneys’ fees incurred by a victim insurer in a multi-
defendant fraud, even though the insurer could not allocate the fees by individual
defendant, because the victim documented total fees, demonstrated their connection
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to the criminal investigation as a whole, and allocated a proportionate share. PacMar
has done exactly the same.
Finally, United States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2009),
affirmed a methodology in which a district court “parsed out” compensable expenses
from total billing using a reasonable approach — it did not require every billing entry
to be independently verified or contemporaneously segregated into separate matter
files.
4. Block Billing Reduces an Award; It Does Not Eliminate One
Block billing warrants reduction in the MVRA context; it does not justify a
zero award. In United States v. Avenatti, the district court found that the victim’s
counsel’s block billing “significantly handicapped” its ability to separate
recoverable from non-recoverable work. United States v. Avenatti, No. (S1) 19 Cr.
373 (PGG), 2022 WL 452385, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022), aff’d, 81 F.4th 171
(2d Cir. 2023). But the court did not deny the victim’s request outright. Instead, it
awarded approximately $259,800 for entries unambiguously traceable to
recoverable work, and the Second Circuit affirmed. See id.
PacMar’s situation is materially stronger than Avenatti’s for two reasons.
First, the allocation issue here is not recoverable versus non-recoverable work —
both the Hawaii and D.C. investigations were criminal grand jury proceedings, so
every dollar at issue was incurred in a government-compelled criminal proceeding.
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The only question is apportionment between two fully covered investigations.
Second, PacMar’s showing is stronger than the showing in Avenatti: in addition to
billing records, PacMar submitted a sworn declaration from the engagement partner
explaining, on the basis of firsthand professional knowledge, the basis for the
allocation estimate. That declaration bridges the gap that block billing creates.
5. PacMar Has Already Implemented the “Reasonable
Solution” Courts Require
When the Second Circuit in Afriyie confronted billing records containing
commingled entries for recoverable (USAO criminal) and non-recoverable (SEC
civil) work, it did not vacate the entire fee award. 27 F.4th 161. It remanded with
instructions to the district court to “devise a reasonable solution concerning these
commingled billing items.” Id. at 172. A sworn declaration from the engagement
partner allocating the commingled work on the basis of firsthand knowledge —
combined with a separate percentage methodology keyed to identified invoice
entries — is exactly such a reasonable solution.
PacMar has not asked this Court to accept bare billing records and extrapolate.
PacMar has provided the Burton Declaration explaining, entry-by-entry category by
entry-by-entry category, what the work consisted of and why a conservative
allocation of at least 25% to the Hawaii investigation is well-supported. This is the
methodology courts require.
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D. Denial With Prejudice Is Inappropriate and Inconsistent With the
MVRA’s Mandatory Framework
Kao requests that PacMar’s Renewed Motion be denied in its entirety with
prejudice. See Kao MIO at 8. That request is contrary to the MVRA’s mandatory
framework, the weight of authority, and the Court’s own prior findings.
The statute commands that “the court shall order . . . that the defendant make
restitution to the victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Second
Circuit in Amato was clear that the MVRA makes “restitution a mandatory part of
the sentences imposed for certain categories of offenses” and thus “[i]t requires
district courts to reimburse the victim” where the statute’s conditions are satisfied.
540 F.3d at 159. The Court has already determined, and Kao has not disputed, that
PacMar is a victim of Kao’s criminal offenses. The USPO confirmed PacMar’s
victim status. See Dkt. 177, Ex. 1 (USPO’s Victim Finding). The Court itself
stated unequivocally at the 2025 hearing: “I do think [PacMar is] legally
entitled to certain restitution.” See Exhibit B to the Renewed Motion at 23:21–24.
Under Ferdman’s three-tool framework, denial with prejudice is not the
Court’s first, second, or even third option when documentation presents challenges.
It is a narrow last resort reserved for cases of genuine complexity where the burden
of determination would be disproportionate. 779 F.3d at 1133; 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(c)(3)(B). Determining the proportion of grand jury subpoena-response fees
between two overlapping criminal investigations does not approach that threshold,
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particularly where PacMar has supplied a sworn declaration, highlighted invoices,
and two independent corroborating calculations.
Denying PacMar’s claim with prejudice because the billing records are not
amenable to line-by-line disaggregation would effectively nullify the MVRA’s
mandatory restitution requirement for any victim whose counsel represented it in
multiple concurrent government investigations — a result that is inconsistent with
the statute, Dolan, and the Court’s own conclusion that PacMar is legally entitled to
restitution.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, PacMar respectfully requests that this Court grant
its Renewed Motion for Restitution and order Defendant Kao to pay restitution to
PacMar in the amount of $192,963.38, or, alternatively, no less than $165,000.00.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 14, 2026.
/s/ Jesse W. Schiel
DAVID M. LOUIE
JESSE W. SCHIEL
Attorneys for Movant
PACMAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC
f/k/a MARTIN DEFENSE GROUP,
LLC f/k/a NAVATEK LLC
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