Federal Defendants Reply ISO Motion to Dismiss Cross Claims — Ocean City v. Interior (D. Md.)

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U.S. District Court, District of Maryland · No. 1:24-cv-03111-SAG · Doc. 129 · 2025-12-19 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
(Baltimore Division) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF OCEAN 
) 
CITY, MARYLAND, et al., 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
) 
  v. 
 
 
 
 
)  
Case No.: 1:24-cv-03111-SAG 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
 
) 
 
INTERIOR, et al.,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Federal Defendants, 
 
 
) 
  and 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
US WIND, INC. 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Defendant-Intervenor.  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS  
DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR’S CROSS CLAIMS 
 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
US Wind’s cross claims against Federal Defendants should be dismissed.  As this Court 
recently held in denying US Wind’s motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 127) (“Mem. 
Op.”), Federal Defendants have not taken any action with respect to the prior COP approval or US 
Wind’s lease.  Thus, US Wind has not challenged a final agency action and the cross claims are 
unripe.  And because no present, legal conflict exists between US Wind and Federal Defendants, 
US Wind’s claims seeking declaratory judgment are not justiciable.  US Wind has therefore failed 
to show that this Court has jurisdiction over any of its cross claims, so this Court should dismiss 
them all. 
US Wind’s OCSLA and procedural due process claims should also be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim. US Wind does not dispute that it failed to comply with OCSLA’s sixty-day notice 
provision and has not otherwise shown that any exception to OCSLA’s notice requirement applies. 
Nor has US Wind shown the deprivation of any protected property interest that could give rise to 
a due process claim.  
The Court should therefore dismiss US Wind’s cross claims for lack of jurisdiction and 
failure to state a claim.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over US Wind’s cross claims. 
 
The Court should dismiss US Wind’s cross claims for a lack of jurisdiction. US Wind’s 
APA, OCSLA, and due process claims all challenge the same alleged action: the government’s 
alleged decision to revoke the COP. But US Wind failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the 
government has in fact made a final decision on the COP that is ripe for review. And US Wind 
cannot show a present legal conflict with Federal Defendants, as required for jurisdiction over its 
declaratory judgment claims.  
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A. US Wind identified no action by Federal Defendants constituting final agency  
action ripe for review.  
US Wind’s APA, OCSLA, and due process claims, Counts I–V, should be dismissed with-
out prejudice. As the Court has already found, BOEM’s threshold determination that the COP ap-
proval must be reevaluated is just that: a decision to reevaluate.  It is not a final agency action 
regarding the COP.  That decision is yet to be made and is therefore not ripe for review. See Mem. 
Op. 5–11. US Wind has not met the tests for either ripeness or final agency action because (1) the 
decision to reevaluate does not mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process 
with respect to the COP, which depends on future uncertainties; and (2) US Wind has not shown 
any legal consequences from the reevaluation process.1 US Wind’s effort to cobble together a final 
agency action for various agency statements or internal directives is not supported in law or fact.    
1. US Wind fails to allege any action that is the consummation of BOEM’s 
decision making, and future uncertainties remain. 
US Wind’s allegations fail to satisfy the first prong of both the ripeness and final agency 
action tests. The only decision BOEM has made is to reevaluate the COP approval. The Suess 
Declaration is not, and does not purport to be, BOEM’s final word on the COP. Instead, the Suess 
Declaration noted that the analysis of the COP approval was flawed, so BOEM intends to reeval-
uate the COP approval and apply the correct legal standard. Suess Decl. ¶ 16, Dkt. No. 81-1. That 
decision to reevaluate is a “threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted” and is not a 
final agency action ripe for review. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980). When 
the reevaluation is complete, BOEM may approve the COP, disapprove, or approve with condi-
tions. Suess Decl. ¶ 16. Until that happens, the agency may still “change course,” meaning there 
 
1 In its opposition, US Wind contends that it is Federal Defendants’ burden to prove it is entitled 
to prevail as a matter of law. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 9, 16, Dkt. No. 122 (“Opp’n”). That con-
tention is wrong. In the Fourth Circuit, both ripeness and final agency action are jurisdictional, and 
“[t]he burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss is on the plaintiff, the 
party asserting jurisdiction.” Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).  
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has been no consummation of BOEM’s decisionmaking process. See Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. 
v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that a memorialized intention to 
reopen review was not a “final agency action” under the APA, in part because it “leaves room for 
[the agency] to change course”). No matter what decision the agency ultimately makes, the agency 
should be provided with the opportunity to state its reasons and bases for that action. Granting 
immediate judicial review would deny BOEM “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes.” Stand-
ard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242.  
As the Court has already explained in denying US Wind’s preliminary injunction motion, 
the cases emphasized by US Wind do not persuade otherwise. The claims in those cases were found 
to be ripe because they involved “fixed” agency actions with immediate legal consequences. In 
Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, the agency’s denial of a statutory preference was a final deter-
mination requiring no further action. 564 F.2d 1119, 1123 (4th Cir. 1977). Similarly, in Clarke v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the withdrawal of a no-action letter was not subject to 
any further agency review and it immediately forced the plaintiffs to change their conduct to avoid 
liability. 74 F.4th 627, 638–39 (5th Cir. 2023). In contrast, BOEM has not revoked or taken any 
other action with respect to the COP, and the Suess Declaration explicitly contemplates further 
agency action. Because the COP approval remains in force, US Wind’s decision to halt develop-
ment is a voluntary business choice rather than the result of a compelled decision.2 
 
2 In the motion to dismiss, Federal Defendants cited Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought, 149 
F.4th 762, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2025) for support that the agency actions were not final and unripe. On 
December 17, 2025, the D.C. Circuit granted en banc review and vacated the panel’s judgment 
that vacated the lower court’s preliminary injunction. “As a consequence, the panel’s decision has 
‘no precedential value.’” United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 953 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The 
other cases cited in the motion amply support the same propositions. See, e.g., Mayor & City 
Council of Baltimore v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 775 F. Supp. 3d 921, 945 (D. Md. 2025). 
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“Accordingly, US Wind’s claims are not ripe because they depend upon ‘contingent future 
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Mem. Op. 8 (citing 
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). 
2. US Wind has not identified any action from which “legal consequences will 
flow” or that could support a conclusion that US Wind faces a legally  
cognizable hardship. 
US Wind also cannot demonstrate “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind” necessary to 
meet the second prong of both the ripeness and final agency action tests. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n 
v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). There has been no change in US Wind’s legal position 
during the reevaluation, as both the COP approval and lease are still in effect and US Wind main-
tains all rights under those approvals during the reevaluation. And US Wind cannot allege BOEM 
has denied them anything from which legal consequences could flow, as they have not recently 
taken any steps to move the development forward. See Mem. Op. 4 (noting “US Wind represented 
that it is not currently awaiting any federal approval or response to any filing related to the pro-
ject”). During the reevaluation, US Wind is “free to conduct its business as it sees fit,”  Nat’l Park 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810 (2003), and is in no risk of facing any civil or 
criminal liability if it keeps moving forward with post-COP plans necessary for construction.  
The hardships US Wind has raised relate to business decisions. Opp’n 15, 23–24. But “any 
business uncertainty associated with awaiting a final decision from an agency is … insufficient to 
turn a threshold agency decision into a final agency action ripe for review.” U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of 
Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 413 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Standard Oil, 449 
U.S. at 242). Requiring US Wind to wait until a final decision is made or until the agency denies 
it a discrete service does not amount to hardship. Indeed, there is “nothing unusual” about having 
to face risks to investments while waiting for a decision that has some legal consequence. Mem. 
Op. at 10; see also Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243 (issuance of an administrative complaint “had no 
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legal force or practical effect upon [plaintiff’s] daily business other than the disruptions that ac-
company any major litigation.”).3   
Contrary to US Wind’s contentions, Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), does not support the 
company’s hardship claims. See Opp’n 15. In Pac. Gas & Elec., the Supreme Court found that a 
challenge to a California law that put a moratorium on new nuclear power plant construction was 
ripe because the preemption challenge to that provision required no “further development.” 461 
U.S. at 201. It found, however, that a challenge to a second provision that required case-by-case 
storage determinations before new construction could be approved was unripe. Id. at 203. Because 
the Energy Commission had not yet made those determinations, the Court could not know how the 
decision would affect the plaintiffs and judicial consideration had to “await further developments.” 
Id. This case resembles the latter provision that the Court found unripe. The reevaluation of the 
COP is project specific and yet to be completed, so the Court “cannot know” how BOEM will 
decide. Id. If BOEM once again approves the COP, US Wind’s challenge would be unnecessary 
and moot; and if it disapproves the COP or approves with modifications that US Wind finds un-
palatable, US Wind can challenge that decision at that time (assuming other jurisprudential re-
quirements are met). “In these circumstances, a court should not stretch to reach an early, and 
perhaps premature, decision” as to US Wind’s claims. See id.  
“Accordingly, US Wind has failed to demonstrate that the purported decision to revoke the 
COP has subjected it to any legal consequences or legally cognizable hardship.” Mem. Op. 10.  
 
3 Because BOEM has not taken any action on US Wind’s lease or the prior COP approval, US 
Wind also lacks the causation necessary for Article III standing for its cross claims. BOEM’s re-
evaluation does not create any “palpable and imminent” injury-in-fact for US Wind, see South 
Carolina v. United States, 912 F.3d 720, 726 (4th Cir. 2019). And the possibility that a future 
decision may harm US Wind’s interest is not sufficient for Article III purposes. The Court could 
therefore also dismiss US Wind’s APA, OCSLA, and due process claims for lack of standing. 
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3. US Wind cannot create a final agency action through a collection of  
decisions. 
As shown in Federal Defendant’s motion and above, there is no ripe or final decision that 
could give rise to US Wind’s cross claims. Faced with this conclusion, US Wind changed course. 
In each brief filed in response to the various motions related to the cross claims, US Wind has 
expanded its challenge to now include the effects of the Presidential Memorandum, Temporary 
Withdrawal of All Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review 
of the Federal Government’s Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects (“Presidential 
Wind Memo”), 90 Fed. Reg. 8363, 8363 (Jan. 20, 2025); the May 2025 M‑Opinion 37086 (“Zerzan 
Opinion”); and Federal Defendants’ motion to remand and vacate (Dkt. No. 81) supported by the 
Suess Declaration (Dkt. No. 81-1). That collection of government directions and interpretations 
cannot form a single action that is final and ripe.   
First, none of those documents are alleged in the cross claims to be the purported agency 
action that US Wind challenges. See generally Am. Answer, Dkt. No. 77. The cross claims do not 
mention or cite the Presidential Wind Memo or the Zerzan Opinion, and it was impossible to cite 
the motion for remand or the Suess Declaration because US Wind filed its cross claims nine days 
before the government filed its motion. Thus, the cross claims would suffer from a pleading failure.  
And US Wind “may not introduce new allegations or new facts in an opposition to a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.” Hooker v. Disbrow, No. 1:16-CV-1588-GBL-JFA, 2017 WL 1377696, at *4 
(E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2017).   
Second, US Wind’s attempt to create a final agency action that is ripe by combining the 
effects of policy decisions, statutory interpretations, and legal briefs should be rejected. The agency 
conduct challenged must be “specific,” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990), 
and “discrete,” City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 913 F.3d 423, 431 (4th Cir. 2019). The 
challenged conduct thus cannot be, as US Wind asserts in its opposition, a “series of actions” taken 
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over several “weeks.” Opp’n 4. US Wind’s attempt show that a single final decision has been made 
by pointing to “many individual actions” therefore fails. See Nat’l Wildlife, 497 U.S. at 893.  
Looking at each of the alleged decisions individually confirms what this Court has previ-
ously held—the agency action challenged is unripe and not final. Starting with the Presidential 
Wind Memo, US Wind argues in its opposition that the government decision is final because sec-
tion 2(a) of the Presidential Wind Memo would not allow BOEM to approve the COP. Opp’n  
18–19. But section 2(a) of the Presidential Wind Memo did not direct anything with respect to US 
Wind’s COP and does not even mention the project. In any event, Interior’s purported decision to 
implement section 2(a) of the Presidential Wind Memo has now been vacated and therefore cannot 
support US Wind’s theory. New York v. Trump, No. 25-CV-11221-PBS, 2025 WL 3514301, at *18 
(D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2025). 
Turning next to the Zerzan Opinion, US Wind argues in its opposition that the Zerzan Opin-
ion “changed the legal standard.” Opp’n 22-23. But that M-Opinion does not dictate any one out-
come for the individual approvals that are under review and it has not affected the legal rights or 
obligations for US Wind. Nor, as explained above, has the M-Opinion’s interpretation been applied 
to US Wind’s COP. See Suess Decl. ¶ 16.  
Last, US Wind in its opposition points to the motion to remand and the Suess Declaration 
as evidence that a final decision is made. Opp’n 18. But as the Court already found, the Suess 
Declaration merely “states an intent to reexamine the COP.” Mem. Op. 7. And while the Suess 
Declaration “suggests that the analysis underlying the COP approval was flawed, it expresses no 
view of the ultimate legality of the COP.” Id. (emphasis added). As part of the reevaluation, BOEM 
will reconsider the COP under OCSLA 8(p)(4). Suess Decl. ¶¶ 12–16. But that review is still on-
going, and no decision has been made as to whether the COP should have been approved, disap-
proved, or approved with modification. See id. ¶ 16.  
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After disposing of these materials, all that is left is the decision to reevaluate the COP 
approval. As shown above, and as this Court already found, that decision is not justiciable. US 
Wind argues, however, that BOEM’s decision to review the COP approval is foreclosed by statute. 
Opp’n 13–14. That contention is wrong. The statutes, regulations, and lease provisions US Wind 
cites apply only to a lease “suspension” and “cancellation,” not a reevaluation. Opp’n 14 (citing 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a)(1), (2); 30 C.F.R. § 585.422; Dkt. No. 92-6 § 8). BOEM has not suspended 
or cancelled the lease, nor has BOEM issued a stop work order while it conducts its review. Those 
provisions therefore do not apply. And nothing in the statutes or regulations limit the agency’s 
well-established and implicit statutory authority to reconsider its own decisions. See FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); The Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 
340 (4th Cir. 2007). OCSLA, in fact, provides the Secretary authority for continued oversight after 
COP approval. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4) (stating in the present tense that “[t]he Secretary shall 
ensure that any activity under this subsection is carried out in a manner that provides for” the listed 
factors). 
In sum, the Court should once again find that US Wind’s cross claims are not based on any 
final agency actions and are not ripe for review. The cross claims should be dismissed. 
B. US Wind’s declaratory judgment claims should be dismissed because no adverse 
legal interest exists between US Wind and Federal Defendants. 
 US Wind’s arguments regarding the viability of its declaratory judgment claims (Counts 
IV–X) similarly fail to address the jurisdictional deficiencies of these claims. As the Court has 
recently held, US Wind “has identified no action from which legal consequences will flow or that 
could support a conclusion that US Wind faces a legally cognizable hardship.” Mem. Op. 8. Thus, 
BOEM’s intention to reconsider the COP approval cannot function as the legal adverse interest 
necessary to establish jurisdiction over US Wind’s declaratory judgment claims. See Aetna Life 
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Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–241 (1937) (“The controversy must be definite and concrete, 
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”). 
And in any event, the Court should decline jurisdiction. Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 
237 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, federal courts have discretion in de-
ciding whether to hear a declaratory action.”). The Court has now entered a scheduling order for 
cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ OCSLA, NEPA, ESA, MMPA, and NHPA 
claims. US Wind can address any arguments on the legality of the prior COP approval in its cross 
motion on those claims, and the Court can adjudicate the questions contemplated in Counts VI–X 
through the normal course. See Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l Corp. (USA), 627 F. Supp. 2d 494, 505 
(D.N.J. 2009) (declining jurisdiction over duplicative claims where “a finding in favor of Plain-
tiffs” would mean “an actual judgment, rather than a mere declaration, would be entered” and thus 
“the Court need not issue a separate declaratory judgment on the merits of the action”). The Court 
should therefore dismiss US Wind’s declaratory judgment claims. 
II. 
US Wind fails to state viable OCSLA and due process claims.  
 
US Wind fails to state a claim for relief under OCSLA or the due process clause. First, US 
Wind failed to provide the required notice under OCSLA and does not identify any immediate 
threat to its interests that would warrant its abandonment of the requirement. Second, US Wind 
cannot establish any deprivation sufficient to assert a due process claim, nor is there any “threat” 
constituting a deprivation.  
A. US Wind failed to comply with OCSLA’s 60-day notice requirement.  
US Wind claims that it need not comply with OCSLA’s mandatory notice requirement be-
cause Interior has made a decision with immediate effect on US Wind’s COP approval and lease 
rights. Opp’n 27. But US Wind fails to identify any immediate threat to its legal interests, let alone 
one that would have occurred within the 60-day window mandated by OCSLA. Id. As outlined 
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above, Interior has not taken any action that would affect US Wind’s COP approval or its interests 
under the lease. Supra 2–7; see also Mem. Op. 8 (holding that US Wind “identified no action from 
which ‘legal consequences will flow’ or that could support a conclusion that US Wind faces a 
legally cognizable hardship.”). US Wind’s collected cases, Opp’n 27, are all easily distinguished 
and involve immediate action that would take place within the 60-day notice window. US Wind’s 
COP approval remains intact and there are no immediate threats or actions that might “detrimen-
tally affect the plaintiffs’ legal interest” before the 60-day notice period is up. Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. FERC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64–65 (D.D.C. 2002).  
US Wind needed to comply with the mandatory notice period under OCSLA. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1349(a)(2); Duke Energy Field Services Assets, LLC v. FERC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 150, 154–56 
(D.D.C. 2001). By failing to do so, US Wind’s claim is now barred by statute, and Count IV should 
be dismissed.  
B. US Wind fails to state a viable due process claim because it shows no deprivation 
of any property right.   
US Wind’s due process claim should be dismissed because it fails to allege any deprivation 
of its property interests. US Wind’s Opposition argues that it suffers a threatened deprivation of 
property sufficient to satisfy a due process claim. Opp’n 28. But Interior’s reconsideration is not a 
“threat” to deprive US Wind of any rights granted under its COP approval or lease. And US Wind 
does not allege any concrete deprivation of its property rights.  
First, US Wind argues that the reconsideration amounts to a “threat” to its property inter-
ests, id., but this argument lacks merit and neither of US Wind’s cited cases provide any support. 
In Memphis, the company had terminated services multiple times for disputed nonpayment, and 
respondents claimed the threat of another termination constituted a due process claim. Memphis 
Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 5–6, 11 (1978). The Court held that “[b]ecause 
petitioners may terminate service only ‘for cause,’ respondents assert a legitimate claim of 
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entitlement within the protection of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 11–12. The company demon-
strated a history of terminating service without the required showing of cause, and the threat of 
another such violation was sufficient for respondents to assert a due process claim. Snider also 
involved repeated deprivations of due process procedures. Snider Intern. Corp. v. Town of Forest 
Heights, 906 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419 (D. Md. 2012). Accordingly, the Court found that plaintiffs who 
did not avail themselves of those procedures could still demonstrate an injury sufficient for stand-
ing purposes due to the threatened deprivation. Id. at 423–24. Both cases involved an explicit, 
repeated threat to deprive plaintiffs of their property interests and are easily distinguished.  
Interior, by contrast, intends to reconsider its decision to approve US Wind’s COP, and the 
agency has the inherent statutory authority to reconsider its own past decisions. See Fox Television 
Stations, 556 U.S. at 515; The Last Best Beef, 506 F.3d at 340. Interior’s new decision on US 
Wind’s COP may result in a disapproval, approval, or approval with conditions, but there is no 
explicit “threat” to deprive US Wind of any rights under the current COP approval or lease. “US 
Wind may continue to develop the project under the approved COP that remains in force. It simply 
has made a business decision not to do so in light of the political headwinds it perceives.” Mem. 
Op. 11. The mere possibility of harm to a property interest, at some future date, is not enough to 
allege a “threat” of deprivation.  
Second, as outlined in Federal Defendants’ opening brief, US Wind fails to identify any 
deprivation because Interior has not taken any action to withdraw, revoke, suspend, or otherwise 
impact US Wind’s COP approval or lease. Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 18 (Dkt. No. 105-1). To the 
extent that US Wind incorporates arguments raised elsewhere in its Opposition, Opp’n 28, conse-
quential injuries, such as reputational harm or market reactions, also cannot form the basis of a 
due process claim. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2010). By 
failing to allege a deprivation to its property rights, US Wind’s procedural due process claim fails.  
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, US Wind’s 
Opposition fails to establish that this Court has jurisdiction. US Wind’s cross claims remain a 
premature challenge to an incomplete agency reevaluation. Because there is no final agency action, 
US Wind cannot cure its lack of standing or the unripeness of its claims. And US Wind has offered 
no viable argument for its failure to provide notice under OCSLA or its inability to identify a 
deprivation of any protected property interest. The Court should grant the Motion and dismiss US 
Wind’s cross claims in their entirety. 
Dated: December 19, 2025 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAM R.F. GUSTAFSON 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
 
/s/ Samuel Vice 
 
 
SAMUEL VICE, Trial Attorney 
CA Bar No. 324687 
DEVON TICE, Trial Attorney 
CA Bar No. 357918 
Natural Resources Section 
P.O. Box 7611 
Washington, DC 20044-7611 
Tel: 202-514-4352 (Tice) 
Email: devon.tice@usdoj.gov 
Tel: 202-305-0434 (Vice) 
Email: samuel.vice@usdoj.gov 
 
BONNIE BALLARD 
Trial Attorney, Maryland Bar No. 
2211280027 
United States Department of Justice 
Environment & Natural Resources Division 
Wildlife & Marine Resources Section 
Ben Franklin Station 
P.O. Box 7611 
Washington, DC 20044-7611 
Tel: (202) 305-1513 
Fax: (202) 305-0275 
Email: bonnie.m.ballard@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for Federal Defendants 
 
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