Reply to response to motion

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Defendant's reply in support of the Motion for a Bill of Particulars in United States of America v. Timmy G. Robinson, Jr., Criminal Action No. 0:26-CR-00033-DLB-EBA, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, Doc. 31 filed August 24, 2026. The reply argues that the Government's Response takes two contradictory positions, that Count 1 does not allege a representation made to Buyer 2, and that Counts 2 and 3 do not identify the criminally derived property. It also argues that 10,627 pages of discovery do not supply what the Indictment omits and that the Response did not address the request for the loss amount. It asks the court to require a bill of particulars filed within a time certain and sufficiently in advance of trial. The signature block is /s/ Michael B. Fox, counsel for Defendant.

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 Case: 0:26-cr-00033-DLB-EBA             Doc #: 31 Filed: 08/24/26           Page: 1 of 10 - Page
                                             ID#: 129



                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
                                 NORTHERN DIVISION
                                      ASHLAND

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 0:26-CR-00033-DLB-EBA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                                                                 PLAINTIFF


V.                     DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS
                       MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS


TIMMY G. ROBINSON, JR.                                                                 DEFENDANT

                                        * * * * * * *

       Comes now the Defendant, Timmy G. Robinson, Jr., by and through counsel, and for his

Reply in Support of his Motion for A Bill of Particulars (DE 25), states as follows:

                                 I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

       The Government’s Response advances two contradictory positions that cannot each be

correct. Specifically, it argues that the Indictment already supplies every fact requested, while at

the same time arguing that furnishing a bill of particulars would “unfairly handicap” the

Government at trial by confining its proof to the particulars stated. (DE 27 at 4.) If the requested

facts are already alleged, a bill of particulars would restate what the grand jury charged and

would limit nothing. The Government’s objection is valid only if it intends to introduce facts at

trial that the Indictment does not allege. That is the very type of surprise Rule 7(f) exists to

prevent.

       Defendant does not seek the Government’s evidence, its witness list, or its trial theories.

He simply seeks the identification of facts that the Response itself tacitly acknowledges are not




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stated in the Indictment, and facts that Defendant submits to this Court are omitted from the

Indictment.

                                           II. ARGUMENT

        A.      THE RESPONSE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT MATERIAL FACTS ARE
                NOT ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT.
        The Response asserts that every fact sought as to the money laundering counts is “alleged

in the Indictment already.” (DE 27 at 8.) However, the accompanying footnote states otherwise.

There, the Government explains that the wires charged in Counts 2 and 3 originated from the

ARC account at Community Trust Bank ending in *7593, “as is implicit in the Indictment and

obvious from the provided discovery,” and adds that “[t]he Indictment identifies recipient

institutions or accounts.” (DE 27 at 8 n.4 (emphasis added)). A fact that is implicit, and that must

be confirmed against discovery, is, by definition, a fact the Indictment does not state. The

disjunctive phrase “institutions or accounts” concedes that Count 3 identifies a payee law firm

and nothing more. (DE 1 at ¶ 22). Importantly, neither a financial institution nor an account is

stated for that transaction.

        Additionally, the Response hedges elsewhere in other regards. In footnote 1, the

Government states that Buyer 2, “and arguably” Buyer 1, are “properly considered victims of the

offense.” (DE 27 at 2 n.1). Whether Buyer 1 is a victim of the charged scheme or a party to a

separate commercial dispute is not a matter of proof detail. It defines the scope of the scheme,

and the Government has declined to commit to a position.

        A bill of particulars is the ordinary remedy for this specific issue. The purpose of a bill of

particulars is to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge with sufficient precision to

enable him to prepare for trial and to avoid surprise. Such a bill is appropriate “when the

indictment itself is too vague and indefinite for such purposes.” United States v. Birmley, 529



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F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir.

1965)). The Sixth Circuit’s holdings have cemented those purposes, describing a bill of

particulars as a tool “to minimize surprise and assist defendant in obtaining the information

needed to prepare a defense.” United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 1375 (6th Cir. 1993);

accord United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). The Government relies on

both Haskins and Salisbury, cases that provide similar support for the relief Defendant seeks in

the present motion.

       B.     COUNT 1 OF THE INDICTMENT DOES NOT ALLEGE THAT ANY
              REPRESENTATION WAS MADE TO BUYER 2.
       Each misrepresentation alleged in the underlying Indictment describes communications

directed to Broker 1. Specifically, Paragraph 14 alleges a false representation to Broker 1;

Paragraph 15 alleges continued false representations during a due diligence process conducted by

Broker 1; and Paragraphs 16 and 17 allege that the executed sale agreements containing the false

representations were transmitted by interstate wire to Broker 1. (DE 1 at ¶¶ 14-17). The

Indictment does not allege a single communication from Defendant to Buyer 2 or to any

identified agent of Buyer 2.

       The Government nonetheless identifies Buyer 2 as a victim of the charged offenses. (DE

27 at 2 n.1). The link between the party to whom the representations were made and the party

allegedly defrauded is not a detail of proof. It is the necessary connective basis of the wire fraud

theory, and the Indictment leaves it unstated. Defendant is entitled to know whether the

Government contends that Broker 1 acted as Buyer 2’s agent, such that representations to Broker

1 are attributable to Buyer 2, or whether it contends instead that some communication not

described in the Indictment reached Buyer 2 directly.




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       This principle is not a novel one, as definitions of offenses that include generic terms are

not enough for the charging instrument to speak in those same generic terms, because it “must

descend to particulars.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The charge must “sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared

to meet.” Id. at 763-764 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court’s concern in

Russell was that a charge pleaded in generic terms leaves the defendant to “go to trial with the

chief issue undefined” and gives the prosecution a free hand to fill the gaps by surmise. Id. at

766. Defendant does not seek draconian relief from the Court, such as dismissal of the

Indictment. He simply asks that the Government state which representation it contends was false

and to whom it contends it was made, which is the lesser remedy Rule 7(f) supplies.

       The Sixth Circuit has applied this requirement to fraud charges, asking whether a

charging instrument conveys “some substantial indication of the nature or character” of the

scheme alleged. United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1986). In Azad, the

indictment supplied that indication in part by describing how the scheme operated upon the

victims it identified. Id. In this case, the Indictment describes conduct directed at Broker 1 and

separately identifies Buyer 2 as the victim. However, it does not sufficiently allege the

connection between the two.

       Here, Defendant primarily seeks answers to two questions. First, does the Government

rely on any false representation other than those described in Paragraphs 14 through 17 of the

Indictment? Second, does the Government contend that any of those representations reached

Buyer 2? The Government can answer in a manner that does not reveal any of its evidence. The

cases cited in the Government’s Response involved far broader demands. (DE 27 at 6-7). In

those cases, the defendants sought for the Government to catalog every false statement it




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attributed to them and explain why each statement was false. Defendant’s requests are limited in

scope and are not nearly as far-reaching. He does not ask the Government to explain why any

statement was false, to identify its witnesses, or to preview its proof. Defendant simply asks

whether the Government’s theory rests on the representations already described at Paragraphs 14

through 17 of the Indictment, and whether it contends any of them reached Buyer 2.

       In United States v. McQuarrie, 817 F. App’x 63 (6th Cir. 2020), three defendants charged

with wire and mail fraud moved for a bill of particulars after the second superseding indictment

was returned. The district court granted the motion in part, but required the Government to

identify the specific dates of the transactions underlying the fraud counts. Id. at 78. The

Government complied, ultimately filing a second amended bill of particulars that added the

mailing dates for the two documents at the center of those counts. Id. at 80. Nothing in

McQuarrie suggests that furnishing those particulars burdened the prosecution in any way. The

Government stated, transaction by transaction, what it already knew from law enforcement’s

investigation.

       On appeal, the Sixth Circuit’s treatment of the bill in McQuarrie is equally instructive. In

reviewing a claim that the proof at trial varied from the charges, the court measured the

Government’s evidence against the bill of particulars it had furnished, describing it as the

document by which the Government “was strictly limited.” Id. at 79-80 (the Government is

“strictly limited by a bill of particulars to the particulars ‘which it has specified’” (quoting

Haskins, 345 F.2d at 114)). Thus, the bill did the work that Rule 7(f) contemplates by fixing the

scope of the Government’s proof in advance, such that the Defendant can properly prepare a

defense and is not ambushed at trial with undisclosed facts.

       C.        AS TO COUNTS 2 AND 3, THE INDICTMENT DOES NOT IDENTIFY
                 THE CRIMINALLY DERIVED PROPERTY.



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       The chronology of the underlying Indictment demonstrates why the omission identified

herein matters. Paragraph 19 of the Indictment alleges that ARC did not receive the Q1 ERC and

Q2 ERC funds from the IRS until December 2, 2025. (DE 1 at ¶ 19). The transactions charged in

Counts 2 and 3 allegedly occurred on November 17 and November 22, 2025, approximately two

weeks earlier. (DE 1 at ¶ 22). Therefore, the ERC funds themselves cannot reasonably be the

criminally derived property involved in either of the charged transactions.

       On the face of the Indictment, the only remaining transaction is the initial purchase

payment of $4,739,843.18 wired by Buyer 2 on November 12, 2025 into the Community Trust

Bank account ending in *7593. (DE 1 at ¶ 18). This account, which Defendant understands from

the produced discovery, also received the July 22, 2025 payment of $2,721,761 from Buyer 1,

and ARC paid “other operational costs and debt obligations” from its funds. (DE 1 at ¶¶ 10, 19).

18 U.S.C. § 1957 requires that the property involved in the charged transaction be criminally

derived property of a value greater than $10,000 that was derived from specified unlawful

activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). When the Government bases charges on outgoing wires from a

commingled operating account, a defendant’s request for particularity as to which property it

means is not a request for evidence or a theory of prosecution. It simply asks the Government to

identify facts supporting an element of the offense. Defendant cannot trace the funds transferred

on November 17 and November 22, or properly build a defense around that tracing, until the

Government clarifies which deposits supplied the criminally derived property.

       Finally, Count 2 of the Indictment ambiguously describes that transaction as a “[w]ire

payment to ARC Account x0157 at Truist Bank.” (DE 1 at ¶ 22). When read together with

footnote 4 of the Response, Count 2 charges a transfer from one ARC account to another ARC

account. Thus, the description does not disclose whether the Government contends the charged




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transaction is the outgoing wire from Community Trust Bank, the receipt of funds at Truist, or

both. A bill of particulars would allow Defendant to understand the allegation clearly.

       D.       THE VOLUME OF DISCOVERY DOES NOT SUPPLY WHAT THE
                INDICTMENT OMITS.
       Defendant does not dispute that the Government has produced substantial and

voluminous discovery in this matter. However, the Sixth Circuit authorities on which the

Response relies hold that discovery reduces or eliminates the need for a bill of particulars where

the discovery itself conveys the details of the charges. See United States v. Musick, 291 F. App’x

706, 724 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Page, 575 F. App’x 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2014) (bill of

particulars unwarranted where the defendant received ample discovery from which he could have

discerned the identities of his co-conspirators).

       The Government does not contend that its production identifies which deposits supplied

the criminally derived property for Counts 2 and 3, or that it discloses whether the Government

contends Broker 1 acted as Buyer 2’s agent. Instead, it states that the answer to one of these

questions is “implicit” in the Indictment and “obvious” from the records. (DE 27 at 8 n. 4). The

governing test is “whether providing such details is necessary to the preparation of the defense

and avoidance of prejudicial surprise.” Musick, 291 F. App’x at 724. To require a defendant to

infer the Government’s essential factual allegations from “10,627 pages” does not satisfy that

test. A discovery index that catalogs records by category and source only identifies where

documents are and where they were collected. It does not identify which facts the Government

will contend those documents establish, and it is that identification, not the documents, that Page

describes as the “key factual information not contained in the indictment.” See Page, 575 F.

App’x at 643.

       E.       THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT RESPOND TO THE REQUEST FOR
                THE LOSS AMOUNT, WHICH BEARS ON A JURY QUESTION.


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       In Defendant’s Motion, particular 7 requests the aggregate loss amount the Government

contends resulted from the scheme and the method used to calculate it. (DE 25 at 4). The

Response does not address that request and offers no argument or authority in opposition to it.

The Indictment invokes the alternative fine provision, exposing Defendant on Count 1 to a fine

of twice the gross gain or loss. (DE 1 at 8); see 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). In Southern Union Co. v.

United States, 567 U.S. 343, 360 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court applied Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the imposition of criminal fines, so any fact that increases the

maximum fine beyond what the jury’s verdict alone would authorize must be found by the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. The gross gain or loss figure is therefore a fact for the jury, not a

matter reserved for the presentence process. Defendant cannot prepare to contest at trial a figure

the Government refuses to state.

       F.      THE LIMITING EFFECT OF A BILL OF PARTICULARS FAVORS
               GRANTING THE MOTION.
       The Government cites Haskins, 345 F.2d at 114 in arguing that a bill of particulars, if

granted, would confine its proof at trial, and further cites that such would run afoul of the

balancing directed by United States v. Martin, 822 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1987) (table), 1987 WL

38036, at *2. (DE 27 at 4). The Sixth Circuit applied that limiting principle in McQuarrie. In

reviewing a variance challenge, the court measured the Government’s trial evidence against the

bill of particulars it had furnished, stating the bill is the document by which the Government

“was strictly limited.” McQuarrie, 817 F. App’x at 80.

       Here, the particulars requested would reasonably confine the Government only as to

matters the Response represents are already fixed, including the operative wire, the identity of

the allegedly false representations, and the source and character of the funds charged in Counts 2

and 3. If the Government’s position on each is truly what the Response states, the resulting



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limitation would cost nothing, as a bill would merely restate allegations already contained in the

Indictment. The concern espoused in Haskins arises only where the Government intends to prove

facts beyond those alleged. If the Government is unwilling to commit to the positions its

Response attributes to the Indictment, that unwillingness does not defeat the need for the

particulars, but instead confirms it.

       Finally, Defendant feels compelled to note separately that if the Government possesses

information indicating that any agent of Buyer 2 or Broker 1 knew of the prior transfer to Buyer

1 before the November 12, 2025 closing, such information is exculpatory and subject to

disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regardless of how the Court disposes of

the present Motion.

       WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Defendant’s

Motion for a Bill of Particulars, Defendant respectfully urges this Court to grant the relief

requested in his Motion, and that a bill of particulars be filed within a time certain and

sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the preparation of a defense.


                                                   Respectfully Submitted,

                                                   /s/ Michael B. Fox
                                                   Michael B. Fox
                                                   Fox Law Office
                                                   P.O. Box 1450
                                                   Olive Hill, KY 41164
                                                   (606) 286-5351
                                                   (606) 286-5352 (fax)
                                                   mike@foxlaw1.com
                                                   Counsel for Defendant




                                  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE




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       I hereby certify that on August 24, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the

clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to

all counsel of record.



                                                             /s/ Michael B. Fox
                                                             Counsel for Defendant




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