Government opposition to motion for bill of particulars

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A Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars in United States v. Timmy G. Robinson, Jr., Criminal Action No. 0:26-CR-33-DLB-EBA, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland, filed August 10, 2026 as Doc #: 27. The government argues that the motion (DE 25) should be denied because the Indictment sets forth the elements of the offenses charged and the discovery already produced gives further detail. It states that on June 4, 2026 the defendant was charged with wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and with transacting in proceeds of a specified unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The response is signed /s/ Paul McCaffrey, Assistant United States Attorney.

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 Case: 0:26-cr-00033-DLB-EBA          Doc #: 27 Filed: 08/10/26     Page: 1 of 10 - Page
                                          ID#: 93



                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                         EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
                              NORTHERN DIVISION
                                   ASHLAND

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 0:26-CR-33-DLB-EBA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                                                  PLAINTIFF


V.                 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
                      MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS


TIMMY G. ROBINSON, JR.                                                  DEFENDANT

                                        *******

          The Defendant’s Motion for Bill of Particulars, DE 25, should be denied. The

Indictment undisputedly sets forth the elements of the offenses charged, and sufficiently

informs the Defendant of those charges to enable him to prepare for trial. The

Indictment’s detail, particularly when viewed alongside the substantial discovery

produced to the Defendant already, dictates denial of the Motion.

     I.      RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          On June 4, 2026, the Defendant was charged with one count of wire fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and two counts of transacting in proceeds of a specified

unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. [DE 1: Indictment.] In addition to

background information and language accurately conveying the statutory elements of the

wire fraud offense, the Indictment includes thirteen detailed paragraphs specifying the

manner and means of the alleged crime, including precise dates, transaction amounts,
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bank accounts, and allegations regarding the Defendant’s false statements and

concealments of material facts. [Id. at ¶¶ 7-19.] The Indictment further specifies the

execution of the alleged wire fraud scheme, including the date and nature of the interstate

wire transmission allegedly caused by the Defendant that forms the basis of Count 1. [Id.

at ¶ 20.] While the Indictment does not identify the names of the relevant parties to the

transactions described in Count 1, 1 it is clear from the Motion that the Defendant is fully

aware of those details as well. [See DE 25: Motion for Bill of Particulars, at 1-3.]

        The money laundering charges in Counts 2 and 3 are similarly detailed, specifying

not only the statutory elements of the § 1957 charges, but also the specifics of each

alleged transaction. Those Counts incorporate by reference the preceding allegations of

the Indictment, making clear the nature of the specified unlawful activity giving rise to

the money laundering. [DE 1: Indictment at ¶ 21.] The two transactions are identified by

precise date and dollar amount, and the Indictment further describes the nature of the

transactions: Count 2 is described as a $325,000 “[w]ire payment to ARC Account x0157

at Truist Bank” on November 17, 2025. [Id. at ¶ 22.] Count 3 is described as a $997,500

“[w]ire payment to Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.” on November 22, 2025. [Id.]

        On June 26, 2026 and July 17, 2026, the United States produced discovery to the

Defendant that comprises approximately 10,627 pages and provides significant detail

regarding the charged offenses. An affidavit in support of a search warrant, which also

details the scheme, was produced on August 7, 2026. The Defendant described this


1
 The entity described as Buyer 2, and arguably the entity described as Buyer 1, are properly
considered victims of the offense.
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discovery as “extensive and voluminous.” [DE 23: Motion to Continue.] However, it

was not a “document dump,” but rather highly organized and accompanied by a detailed

discovery index that described each set of records. See June 26, 2026 Discovery Receipt

and July 17, 2026 Discovery Receipt, attached hereto as sealed Exhibits 1 and 2. 2

           On July 29, 2026, the Defendant filed his Motion for a Bill of Particulars seeking

seven categories of information regarding the charges, including, among other things, the

identification of witnesses, the government’s theories as to which representations were

false, and the government’s theories regarding the victims’ knowledge of the scheme.

[DE 25: Motion.] Six of the seven requested categories relate to the wire fraud charge.

[Id.]

     II.      LEGAL STANDARD

           “The purpose of a bill of particulars is to give a defendant key factual information

not contained in the indictment, so as to enable him or her to prepare a defense and avoid

surprise at trial.” United States v. Page, 575 F. App’x 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2014). It is “a

tool to minimize surprise,” see United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 1375 (6th Cir.

1993), but not a discovery device through which the defendant “learn[s] the

government’s evidence and theories.” United States v. Musick, 291 F. App’x 706, 724

(6th Cir. 2008). “Put another way, a bill of particulars ‘is meant to apprise the defendant

of the essential facts of a crime and should be required only where the charges of an

indictment are so general that they do not advise a defendant of the specific facts of


2
 The discovery indices reference witness names and banking information for accounts of the
Defendant and/or his businesses, and therefore should be sealed.
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which he is accused.’” United States v. Daugherty, 2017 WL 839472, at *1 (E.D. Ky.

Feb. 28, 2017) (quoting United States v. Kerik¸615 F. Supp. 2d 256, 277 (S.D.N.Y.

2009)). “Defendants are not entitled to a bill of particulars if the indictment sets forth the

elements of the offense charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of the charges to

enable him to prepare for trial.” United States v. Taylor, 2022 WL 4227509, at *1 (E.D.

Ky. Sept. 13, 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

       Beyond its potential misuse as an advanced discovery tool, a bill of particulars, if

improvidently granted, unfairly handicaps the government at trial. “When a bill of

particulars has been furnished, the government is strictly limited to the particulars which

it has specified, i.e., the bill limits the scope of the government’s proof at trial.” United

States v. Haskins, 345 F.3d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1965). The Sixth Circuit therefore cautions

that courts “should balance the defendant’s need for the information against the effect of

narrowing the Government’s scope of proof.” United States v. Martin, 822 F.2d 1089

(Table), 1987 WL 38036, at *2 (6th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Reid, 2008 WL

11414538, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2008) (“The preclusive effects on proof resulting

from issuance of a bill of particulars must inform the Court’s discretion.”).

       The discovery produced by the government also factors into the Court’s analysis.

Where the United States has provided significant discovery, the need for a bill of

particulars is reduced or eliminated, as the factual information necessary to prepare a

defense is already found within those records. See Daugherty, 2017 WL 839472, at *3

(“[T]he Sixth Circuit has never recognized even extraordinarily dense or voluminous

discovery as a justification to order a bill of particulars. To the contrary, the Circuit has

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cited and approved a case’s ‘significant discovery’ as ‘providing the defendant with

information about the details of the charges against him,’ obviating any need for a bill of

particulars.”) (citing Musick, 291 F. App’x at 724); see also United States v. Chew, 2025

WL 1036549, at *2 (N.D. Oh. Apr. 8, 2025) (“A motion for a bill of particulars is less

compelling where a defendant has been provided with full access to discovery.”) (citing

United States v. Page, 575 F. App’x 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2014)).

     III.   A BILL OF PARTICULARS IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE

        This is not the rare case where a bill of particulars is warranted. The Indictment

contains sufficient information about the charged offenses to enable the Defendant to

prepare for trial, and the discovery provided to the Defendant supplies further detail on

each alleged crime.

        Beginning with the wire fraud scheme, the Defendant does not claim (nor could he

credibly) that the Indictment omits any element of the charged offense. Further, his

Motion reveals that he understands the gravamen of the charge: “Mr. Robinson caused

Angelica Capital Trust to purchase Employee Retention Credit receivables that had

previously been assigned to Clear Cove Opportunities Fund I LLC, and [ ] Angelica did

so in reliance on [false] representations that the receivables were free and clear of any

prior claim.” [DE 25: Motion at 1.]

        Beyond those basics, the time frame of the alleged wire fraud scheme is explicit in

the Indictment. 3 [DE 1: Indictment at ¶ 6.] The manner and means section of the


3
 This is one of several instances in which the Defendant pretends to need information that is
plainly evident on the face of the Indictment itself. See DE 25: Motion, at 4 (demanding, as a
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Indictment further specifies precise dates on which key transactions, events, and alleged

false representations were made, offering a detailed chronology of the alleged crime.

See, e.g., DE 1: Indictment at ¶ 14 (“On or about October 27, 2025, ROBINSON falsely

represented to Broker 1 that the Q1 ERC and Q2 ERC were available to purchase from

ARC. ROBINSON concealed the prior transactions of the same ERCs with Buyer 1.”).

It provides dollar amounts of the transactions, identifies at least one of the bank accounts

involved, describes relevant contractual provisions, and summarizes some of the

Defendant’s statements and actions in furtherance of the scheme. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 16

(“In the sale agreement, ROBINSON falsely represented that no portion of the Q1 ERC

had been previously sold, transferred, or subject to any lien or encumbrance. On or about

November 12, 2025, ROBINSON electronically signed the sale agreement and caused it

to be transmitted via interstate wire communication to Broker 1.”). The transmission of

the sale agreements containing the Defendant’s false representations is clearly identified

as the operative interstate wire in Count 1. Id. at ¶ 20. This level of detail is more than

sufficient under this Court’s precedent. See Taylor, 2022 WL 4227509, at *3 (“The

Indictment signals the dates of the alleged criminal activity, the nature of the alleged

criminal activities that constitute the charged ‘schemes,’ and the elements of each offense

charged. Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to a bill of particulars because the

Indictment is constitutionally sufficient to enable adequate trial preparation.”).

       Ultimately, what the Defendant wants is an accounting of “which of the numerous


category of particulars, “[t]he date on which the government contends the scheme to defraud
began and the date on which it contends the scheme ended or was completed.”).
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communications and representations exchanged among these parties the government

contends constituted the fraudulent conduct,” and thus demands “[t]he specific

representation or representations that the government contends were false, including the

exact language of each representation, the document or communication in which each

representation appears, the person who made the representation, and the date each

representation was made or transmitted.” [DE 25: Motion at 3.] This is an improper

demand for the government’s evidence and theories, and not grounds for a bill of

particulars. See Taylor, 2022 WL 4227509, at *3 (rejecting request for bill of particulars

specifying “any fraudulent statements attributable to [Defendant]” and “the factual basis

for the government’s assertion that any such statement or representation is false or

fraudulent”); see also United States v. Sterritt, 678 F. Supp. 3d 317, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2023)

(holding that a “request for information regarding ‘when, to whom, or how [the

defendant] made any representations to investors’ is exactly the type of ‘wheres, whens,

and with whoms’ information that Courts have repeatedly rejected as ‘beyond the scope

of a bill of particulars.’”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Maricle, 2009 WL

4168974, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2009) (rejecting demands for the “whens, wheres, and

hows” of the alleged offenses, as “such requests far exceed the purposes of a bill of

particulars.”). Ample precedent supports denial of this improper request.

       The Defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars on the money laundering charges

is similarly flawed. He asks for the specific monetary transactions that the government

contends violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957, including transaction dates, transaction amounts, the

financial institutions involved, and the specified unlawful activity from which the

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government contends the property involved in the transaction was derived. [DE 25:

Motion at 4.] As noted above, all of these facts are alleged in the Indictment already. 4

[DE 1: Indictment at ¶¶ 21-22.] The Motion does not even make an argument as to why a

bill of particulars is needed for the money laundering charges, and it is clearly

unwarranted here.

        Moreover, all of the factual information sought for both the wire fraud and money

laundering charges – absent the government’s interpretations of and theories regarding

such information – is already contained in the extensive discovery disclosed to the

Defendant. The Defendant can review that material, assisted by the detailed discovery

indices provided by the United States, see Exhibits 1 and 2, and adequately prepare a

defense. Even assuming the Indictment is vague in some material aspect (and it clearly is

not), this eliminates the need for a bill of particulars. See United States v. Page, 575 F.

App’x 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding bill of particulars was unwarranted where the

defendant “received ample discovery from which he could have discerned the possible

identities of his co-conspirators.”); Daugherty, 2017 WL 839472, at *3; see also United

States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 772 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Schwartz, 2026 WL

1831492, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2026) (citing, in wire fraud case, “ample authority” for

rule that “ample discovery obviates the need for a bill of particulars.”).

        A bill of particulars is appropriate only where it is necessary to notify the


4
 Paragraph 18 of the Indictment alleges that the fraud proceeds were wired into an ARC bank
account at Community Trust Bank ending in *7593. The wire transactions at issue in Counts 2
and 3 originated from the same account, as is implicit in the Indictment and obvious from the
provided discovery. The Indictment identifies recipient institutions or accounts.
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defendant of the charges against him and adequately prepare a defense, and conversely

inappropriate where it is merely helpful as a discovery roadmap or preview of the

government’s prosecution theories. That is particularly so because of its limiting effect

on the government’s proof at trial. Where, as here, the Defendant is sufficiently informed

of the charges and has access to extensive discovery with which he can prepare a defense,

a bill of particulars is unwarranted. The United States respectfully submits that the

Motion should be denied.



                                   Respectfully submitted,

                                   JASON D. PARMAN
                                   FIRST ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

                                   By:    /s/ Paul McCaffrey
                                          Paul McCaffrey
                                          Assistant United States Attorney
                                          260 West Vine Street, Ste. 300
                                          Lexington, KY 40507
                                          (859) 685-4820
                                          Paul.McCaffrey@usdoj.gov




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                             CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that on August 10, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with

the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system which will send an electronic notice

to counsel of record.

                                                 s/ Paul McCaffrey
                                                 Assistant United States Attorney




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