Amicus Brief — Immigration Reform Law Institute — Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas

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No. 21-5200 
Oral Argument Not Scheduled 
                                                                                                                  
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
                                                                                                                  
 
Nancy Gimena Huisha-Huisha, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs - Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
Alejandro N. Mayorkas, et al., 
 
Defendants - Appellants. 
                                                                                                                  
 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ENTERED BY THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
No. 21-cv-00100 
                                                                                                                  
 
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 
25 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 335 
Washington, DC 20001 
Telephone: (202) 232-5590 
 
John M. Miano  
Counsel of Record 
Matt A. Crapo 
On the Brief 
 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
The Immigration Reform Law Institute is a non-profit corporation with no 
shareholders. 
FED. R. APP. P. 29 STATEMENT 
In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2), all parties have consented to 
the filing of this brief. This brief is filed in accordance with Circuit Rule 29(d) as 
the only non-government entity amicus brief filed in support of Defendants–
Appellants.  
Further, no counsel for a party in this case authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund 
the preparation of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or 
its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
FED. R. APP. P. 29 STATEMENT 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................................................................... 1 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 2 
 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 3 
 
I. 
Based on an Absurd Statutory Reading, the District Court Eviscerated 
a Vital Sovereign Power .................................................................................. 3 
 
II. 
Subsequent Immigration Provisions did not Repeal the Public Health  
Statute by Implication ..................................................................................... 7 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 14 
 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
 
 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
 
Page(s) 
CASES 
 
Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,  
818 F.3d 101 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................ 1 
 
Branch v. Smith,  
538 U.S. 254 (2003) ........................................................................................... 11 
 
Caminetti v. United States,  
242 U.S. 470 (1917) ............................................................................................. 6 
 
Defs. of Wildlife v. United States EPA, 
420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 9, 10 
 
Defs. of Wildlife v. United States EPA, 
450 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 10 
 
Fiallo v. Bell,  
430 U.S. 787 (1977) ............................................................................................. 3 
 
Galvan v. Press,  
347 U.S. 522 (1954) ............................................................................................. 3 
 
Hunter v. FERC,  
711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................. 9 
 
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,  
456 U.S. 461 (1982) ........................................................................................... 11 
 
Landon v. Plasencia,  
459 U.S. 21 (1982) ............................................................................................... 3 
 
Matter of Silva-Trevino,  
26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016) ........................................................................ 1  
 
Matter of C-T-L-,  
25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (B.I.A. 2010) ........................................................................ 1 
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Morton v. Mancari,  
417 U.S. 535 (1974) ............................................................................................. 9 
 
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
551 U.S. 644 (2007) ....................................................................................... 9, 10 
 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,  
142 U.S. 651 (1892) ............................................................................................. 3 
 
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440 (1989) ............................................................................................. 7 
 
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 
566 U.S. 639 (2012) ........................................................................................... 12 
 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,  
467 U.S. 986 (1984) ............................................................................................. 9 
 
Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,  
942 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 1 
 
Trump v. Hawaii,  
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ..................................................................................... 1, 3 
 
United States v. Borden Co.,  
308 U.S. 188 (1939) ............................................................................................. 9 
 
United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 
14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 7 
 
United States v. Texas,  
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) ......................................................................................... 1 
 
United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 
425 U.S. 164 (1976) ............................................................................................. 9 
 
Washington All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,  
74 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C.2014) ........................................................................ 1 
 
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STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
 
7 U.S.C. § 7712 ..................................................................................................... 5, 8 
 
7 U.S.C. § 8303 ..................................................................................................... 5, 8 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1158 ................................................................................................... 4, 12 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) ....................................................................................... 7 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 ................................................................................................... 4, 12 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1232 ................................................................................................... 4, 12 
 
42 C.F.R. § 71.40 ................................................................................................. 4, 12 
 
42 U.S.C. § 264 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5 
 
42 U.S.C. § 265 ..................................................................................... 4, 5, 8, 11, 13 
 
Hawaii Omnibus Act, 
Pub. L. 86-624, 74 Stat. 419 (1960) ................................................................... 13 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 .......................................................................... 4 
 
National Consumer Health Information and Health Promotion Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-317, 90 Stat. 695 ........................................................................ 13 
 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 .................................................................... 13 
 
Public Health Service Act, 
Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) .................................................... 4, 8, 12 
 
 
 
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MISCELLANEOUS 
 
85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020) ........................................................................ 4 
 
85 Fed. Reg. 56,424 (Sept. 11, 2020) ........................................................................ 4 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.) ............................................................................ 6 
 
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 91 .................................................................. 6 
 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Immigration Reform Law Institute (“IRLI”) is a not for profit 501(c)(3) 
public interest law firm dedicated to litigating immigration-related cases on behalf 
of, and in the interests of, United States citizens, and also to assisting courts in 
understanding and accurately applying federal immigration law.  For more than 
twenty years the Board of Immigration Appeals has solicited supplementary 
briefing, drafted by IRLI staff, from the Federation for American Immigration 
Reform, of which IRLI is a supporting organization. IRLI has litigated or filed 
amicus curiae briefs in a wide variety of cases, including Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. 
Ct. 2392 (2018); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Arizona Dream 
Act Coal. v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 101 (9th Cir. 2016); Washington All. of Tech. 
Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 74 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D.D.C.2014); Save 
Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 942 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Matter 
of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016); and Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 341 (B.I.A. 2010). IRLI has also represented a wide variety of plaintiffs in 
immigration matters, ranging from American workers who have been displaced by 
foreign workers to foreign workers who have not been paid by their employers. 
Consequently, IRLI is dedicated to assisting the courts in maintaining a rational 
immigration system for the benefit of its clients. 
 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
IRLI respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the judgment of the 
district court and vacate the preliminary injunction. The district court’s ruling is 
based upon an absurd interpretation of the Public Health Service Act. Specifically, 
the district court’s determination that the public health authority to prohibit the 
introduction of persons does not include the authority to expel persons who violate 
such a prohibition leads to the absurd result that, in the Public Health Service Act, 
Congress granted an illusory power. Because absurd interpretations are to be 
eschewed, this Court should reverse the district court’s misreading of the statute 
and uphold the government’s inherent sovereign authority to control the nation’s 
borders. 
The district court also improperly imposed immigration-related constraints 
upon public health officials acting under separate and more specific public health 
authority. Congress enacted the Public Health Service Act for the purpose of 
protecting the public health. Subsequently, Congress enacted immigration 
provisions that constrain the Department of Homeland Security’s authority to 
remove certain aliens from the United States. The district court erred in concluding 
that these generally-applicable immigration provisions implicitly repealed or 
otherwise constrain public health officials’ authority to prohibit the introduction of 
certain aliens. Repeals by implication are disfavored, and the narrow conditions for 
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them are not met here. Rather, the more specific of the two statutes—the Public 
Health Services Act—should govern.  
For these reasons, and those put forward by Defendents-Appellees, this 
Court should reverse the district court’s judgment and vacate the preliminary 
injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Based on an Absurd Statutory Reading, the District Court Eviscerated 
a Vital Sovereign Power 
 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “the admission and exclusion 
of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the 
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977)); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[T]he power to 
admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.”). Thus, the power “to forbid 
the entrance of foreigners … or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe” is an inherent sovereign prerogative 
entrusted exclusively in Congress. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 
659 (1892); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies 
pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted 
exclusively to Congress . . . .”).  
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In enacting the public health provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-65, Congress 
sought to protect the public health by authorizing the executive branch to prohibit 
the introduction of people or property from countries where the Director of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has determined there exists a 
dangerous communicable disease. These provisions were enacted in the Public 
Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, §§ 361-62, 58 Stat. 682, 704 (1944).  
Congress has also established a comprehensive and uniform immigration 
system governing who may enter and remain in the United States by enacting the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 
163. That act governs the removal of aliens who are already present in the United 
States and includes provisions aimed at protecting aliens from persecution abroad 
and combatting the trafficking of children. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231-1232. 
To combat the current global pandemic, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265, promulgated an interim final rule 
that permitted the Director of the Centers for Disease Control to prohibit the 
introduction of certain persons into the United States. See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 
(Mar. 24, 2020); see also 85 Fed. Reg. 56,424 (Sept. 11, 2020) (promulgating final 
rule); 42 C.F.R. § 71.40. Previous regulations had not addressed the introduction of 
people into the United States. 85 Fed. Reg. at 16,560.  
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Federal statutes recognize that blocking the admission of disease from 
abroad is a key means of slowing the spread of an epidemic within the United 
States. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 7712, 8302, 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-65. The Homeland 
Security Council noted in 2005 that “[t]he most effective way to protect the 
American population is to contain an outbreak beyond the borders of the U.S.” 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, Nov. 2005 (available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457407). A study on internal border controls and 
the spread of influenza found that, absent other control measures, “stopping at least 
99% of travel would be required to significantly increase time available for vaccine 
production and distribution.” James G. Wood, et al., “Effects of Internal Border 
Control on Spread of Pandemic Influenza,” EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Vol. 
13, No. 7 (July 2007) 1038-1045 (available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/ 
13/7/06-0740_article). 
Despite the vital nature of this authority to protect public health, the district 
court held that the power to prohibit the introduction of all aliens from a given 
country during a health emergency does not encompass the power to expel such 
aliens who have crossed the border. Joint Appendix at 110 (reasoning that “[e]ven 
accepting … that the phrase, ‘prohibit … the introduction of,’ means ‘to intercept 
or prevent,’ the ‘process’ of introduction … this phrase also does not encompass 
expulsion from the United States” and “‘[e]xpelling persons … is entirely different 
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from interrupting, intercepting, or halting the process of introduction”). This is an 
absurd holding. Congress did not authorize the executive to undertake the physical 
task of preventing or impeding the geographical entry of persons into the United 
States. Rather, it gave the executive the authority to prohibit their introduction or 
entry. The leading definition of prohibit is “[to] forbid by law.” Prohibit, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed.). 
If the statute did not give the executive the authority to expel aliens who had 
violated its prohibition by surreptitiously crossing the border, the executive would 
have no way to exercise its authority to prohibit introduction at a land border at all, 
and Congress’s grant of that authority would have been only an empty gesture. It is 
absurd to conclude that Congress granted such an illusory power, particularly with 
respect to an authority intended to protect public health. 
Absurd interpretations of statutes are, of course, to be avoided. “If there arise 
out of [acts of parliament] collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly 
contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral 
consequences, void.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 91. And mindfulness 
of absurd consequences is—and always has been—an essential element of reading 
a text, notwithstanding the plainest statutory language. “[T]he language being 
plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the 
sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 
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U.S. 470, 490 (1917). Reading statutes to avoid absurd consequences 
“demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume 
would not act an in absurd way.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, “[w]e are authorized to deviate 
from the literal language of a statute only if the plain language would lead to 
absurd results, or if such an interpretation would defeat the intent of Congress.” 
United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, even if 
the language of the statute plainly had the meaning the district court gave it, the 
absurd consequence that Congress granted the executive a merely nominal and 
illusory power to prohibit the introduction of aliens at a land border (in order to 
protect public health no less) should be rejected. 
For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s interpretation is not only 
absurd, but dangerous, gravely undermining both national security and the public 
health of the nation. 
II. 
Subsequent Immigration Provisions did not Repeal the Public Health  
Statute by Implication 
 
The authority to seal the borders in the event of a public health crisis is not a 
shared power. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for the exclusion of 
individual aliens on health- related grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) 
(specifying that any alien who is determined to have a communicable disease of 
public health significance is inadmissible). The Act does not, however, provide the 
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Department of Homeland Security with authority to close the border with countries 
in a pandemic health emergency. That power lies with the public health services 
that have the authority to prohibit the “introduction” of “persons.” Public Health 
Service Act., Pub. L. No. 78-410, § 362, 58 Stat. 682, 704 (1944) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 265).1 
Although the Department of Homeland Security’s authority to remove aliens 
is constrained by the provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act enacted to 
protect aliens from persecution abroad and to combat the trafficking of children, 
Congress has not imposed those same constraints on public health officials under 
the Public Health Service Act. Nevertheless, the district court ruled that the 
expulsion of Plaintiffs-Appellees pursuant to the Title 42 process, without any 
opportunity to apply for asylum or withholding of removal under Title 8 
immigration laws, is unlawful. Joint Appendix at 114. In essence, the district court 
held that the enactments in Title 8 governing the Department of Homeland 
Security took precedence over, or implicitly repealed, the earlier public health 
provisions enacted by Congress.  
                                                            
 
1  Likewise, the Secretary of Agriculture has the similar authority to ban the 
importation of plants (7 U.S.C. § 7712) and animals (7 U.S.C. § 8303). 
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“It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by 
implication are not favored.” United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 
164, 168 (1976). 
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional 
enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is 
the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional 
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. “When there are 
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if 
possible.”  
 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (quoting United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)). Furthermore, the courts treat allegations of partial 
repeal by implication in the same manner as allegations of total repeal by 
implication. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017 (1984); 
Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
Under this general rule of statutory construction, the provisions of Title 42 
have not been repealed by subsequent enactments in Title 8. Instructively, the 
Supreme Court declined to find a repeal by implication in Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). The Clean Water Act (1972) 
gave the Environmental Protection Agency authority to issue permits for the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. Defs. of Wildlife v. United States 
EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2005). The same Act permitted states to apply to 
the Environmental Protection Agency to administer the permit program within 
their borders. Id. Furthermore, the Clean Water Act mandated that the 
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Environmental Protection Agency approve such applications if nine conditions 
were met. Id. Subsequently, in 1973, Congress enacted the Endangered Species 
Act. Id. The Endangered Species Act required agencies to ensure that their actions 
would not adversely affect threatened species. Id. at 950-51. The plaintiff in Defs. 
of Wildlife challenged the transfer of a permit process to Arizona under the Clean 
Water Act on the grounds that the transfer did not conform to the requirements of 
the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 955. 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the permit process transfer, even though the nine 
requirements of the Clean Water Act had been satisfied. Defs. of Wildlife, 420 F.3d 
at 978. The Ninth Circuit held that the requirements of the Endangered Species Act 
also applied, effectively creating a tenth requirement for the application process. 
Id. at 975; Defs. of Wildlife v. United States EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 404 n.2 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he very definite, unqualified language of the after-enacted Endangered 
Species Act must still prevail.”) (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
The Supreme Court reversed. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 673. 
The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s grafting of a tenth requirement from the 
Endangered Species Act into the permit application process impermissibly created 
an implicit repeal of the mandate of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 663. 
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Similarly, here, the provisions of Title 42 cannot be wiped out implicitly by 
the later enactments of Title 8 when there has been no explicit repeal. There are 
two situations where courts find repeals by implication: 
(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the 
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of 
the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the 
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate 
similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention 
of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. 
 
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (internal quotations 
omitted). Such a finding is rare. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing the Court had 
not found an implied repeal outside the antitrust context since 1917, or any implied 
repeal since 1975). 
The first circumstance for finding a repeal by implication is not present here. 
The executive’s powers to prohibit introduction under 42 U.S.C. § 265 are not 
boundless. That provision can only be invoked when four prerequisites are 
satisfied: the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention must 
determine (1) the existence of a communicable disease in a foreign country; (2) 
that there is serious danger of the introduction of the disease into the United States; 
(3) that the danger from the disease is increased by the introduction of persons or 
property from that country; and (4) that the suspension of the introduction of such 
persons or property is required in the interest of public health. See 42 U.S.C. § 265; 
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42 C.F.R. § 71.40(a). Accordingly, section 265 is not a provision of general 
application. 
Because section 265 is of limited application, it is not difficult to give effect 
to both it and the statutory provisions of Title 8. The provisions of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231, 1232) are of general 
application and normally apply. In contrast, section 265 only applies in limited 
circumstances and over limited periods of time. Thus, their interplay flows 
naturally from the generalia specialibus non derogant (general/specific) canon of 
statutory construction. “[W]here general and specific authorizations exist side-by-
side, the general/specific canon avoids rendering superfluous a specific provision 
that is swallowed by the general one.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012). The provisions of Title 42 can, and 
should, be given full effect. 
Neither is the second circumstance for finding repeal by implication present 
here. The public health provisions and immigration provisions at issue are in 
different titles of the U.S. Code (8: Aliens and Nationality; 42: The Public Health 
and Welfare). Section 265 of Title 42 was created in an act that consolidated the 
laws relating to the Public Health Service. Public Health Service Act, § 362, 58 
Stat. at 704. Clearly, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as amended 
does not cover the whole subject of public health. There is some overlap in subject 
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matter, but the Public Health Service Act is not a subset of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. In particular, Title 8 does not confer on the Department of 
Homeland Security the authority to suspend entries from a country on public health 
grounds. That power solely exists with the public health authorities. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 265. Therefore, neither circumstance for finding a repeal by implication exists 
here. 
Congress’s subsequent amendments to the immigration-related provisions of 
the Public Health Service Act also show a lack of implicit repeal. Section 362 of 
the Act, authorizing regulations to prevent the introduction of disease from foreign 
countries and allowing the apprehension of aliens coming from a foreign country, 
has been amended three times after the enactment of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. The Hawaii Omnibus Act (1960) removed references to 
the Territory of Hawaii. Pub. L. 86-624, § 29, 74 Stat. 419, 624. The National 
Consumer Health Information and Health Promotion Act of 1976 redefined state to 
include the District of Columbia. Pub. L. No. 94-317, § 301, 90 Stat. 695, 707. The 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 
modified the regulatory requirements governing the apprehension of aliens. Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, § 142, 116 Stat. 594, 626-27. These repeated amendments to the 
provision authorizing regulations to prohibit the introduction of aliens to prevent 
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the spread of communicable diseases shows that Congress has not intended § 362 
of the Public Health Service Act to be repealed. 
In sum, the district court’s reading of the public health authority to prohibit 
the introduction of certain persons into the United States is erroneous, leads to an 
absurd result, and endangers the public health. Nothing in the Public Health 
Service Act empowers the courts to second-guess the inherent authority to 
determine who may enter the country and on what terms. In light of the current 
pandemic conditions, the district court’s ruling endangers the public health and 
prevents public health officials from exercising their lawful authority. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court’s 
judgment and vacate the preliminary injunction. 
DATED: October 28, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/ John M. Miano                          
John M. Miano 
D.C. Bar No. 1003068 
Matt A. Crapo 
D.C. Bar No. 473355 
Immigration Reform Law Institute 
25 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 335 
Washington, DC 20001 
Telephone: (202) 232-5590 
 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The foregoing brief complies with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because it 
contains 3,161 words, as measured by Microsoft Word software. The brief also 
complies with the typeface and style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) & 
32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced, Roman-style 
typeface of 14 points or more. 
DATED: October 28, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/ John M. Miano 
John M. Miano 
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on October 28, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing motion 
and attached amicus brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF 
system.  Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be 
accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 
 
/s/ John M. Miano 
John M. Miano 
 
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1920011            Filed: 10/28/2021      Page 23 of 23

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