District Court Docket and Record — Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas

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Full text

APPEAL,STAYED,TYPE−D
U.S. District Court
District of Columbia (Washington, DC)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:21−cv−00100−EGS
HUISHA−HUISHA et al v. GAYNOR et al
Assigned to: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
 Case: 1:20−cv−02245−EGS−GMH
Cause: 05:0701 Judicial Review of Agency Decision
Date Filed: 01/12/2021
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other
Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant
Plaintiff
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA
and her minor child
represented by Tamara Goodlette
REFUGEE AND IMMIGRANT CENTER
FOR EDUCATION & LEGAL
SERVICES
802 Kentucky Avenue
San Antonio, TX 78201
210−960−3206
Email: tami.goodlette@raicestexas.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
915 15th Street NW
Ste 2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20005
202−601−4266
Fax: 202−457−0805
Email: artspitzer@gmail.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
ACLU IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS
PROJECT
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
646−905−8953
Email: cperez@aclu.org
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
Immigrants' Rights Project
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
415−343−0785
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Email: cwofsy@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
New York
125 Broad Street
Suite 18th Floor
New York
New York, NY 10004
646−905−8907
Email: dgalindo@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
CENTER FOR GENDER AND
REFUGEE STUDIES
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 565−4877
Fax: (415) 581−8824
Email: crookjamie@uchastings.edu
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT
1017 W. Hackberry Avenue
Alamo, TX 78516
512−731−2576
Email: kvargas@texascivilrightsproject.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
125 Broad St.
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
212−549−2616
Fax: 212−549−2654
Email: lgelernt@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
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New York, NY 10004
646−610−9943
Fax: 212−549−2654
Email: MCheung@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
415−343−0776
Email: irp_mr@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
Immigrants' Rights Project
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 549−2620
Fax: (212) 549−2654
Email: ojadwat@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
915 15th Street, NW
2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 457−0800
Fax: (202) 457−0805
Email: smichelman@acludc.org
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
415−343−0783
Fax: 415−395−0950
Email: skang@aclu.org
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
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I.M.C.H.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
4
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Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO
and her minor daughter
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
5
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Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
B.A.M.M.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
6
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Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA
and her minor children
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
7
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Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
H.N.D.S.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
8
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Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
E.R.P.D.S.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
9
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LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
10
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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
M.E.S.D.S.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
11
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PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
H.T.D.S.D.S.
on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
12
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PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
ALL PLAINTIFFS
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arthur B. Spitzer
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
13
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(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Michelman
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
MARTHA LILIANA
TADAY−ACOSTA
and her minor children
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
14
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Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
D.J.Z.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
15
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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
J.A.Z.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
16
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(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
JULIEN THOMAS
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
17
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Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
FIDETTE BOUTE
and their minor children
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
18
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(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
D.J.T.−B.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
19
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Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
T.J.T.−B.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
20
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LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
21
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 21 of 176

ROMILUS VALCOURT
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
22
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 22 of 176

Plaintiff
BEDAPHECA ALCANTE
and their minor child
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
23
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PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
B.V.−A.
represented by Tamara Goodlette
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celso Perez
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 04/05/2021
Cody H. Wofsy
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Antonio Galindo
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karla Vargas
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ming Cheung
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Morgan Russell
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Omar C. Jadwat
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
24
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 24 of 176

Stephen Bonggyun Kang
(See above for address)
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
PETER T. GAYNOR
ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, in his official capacity
TERMINATED: 01/28/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
555 Fourth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 252−2533
Fax: (202) 252−2599
Email: sean.tepe@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
MARK A. MORGAN
SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING
THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP), in
his official capacity
TERMINATED: 01/28/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
WILLIAM A. FERRARA
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, CBP OFFICE OF
FIELD OPERATIONS, in his official
capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
RODNEY S. SCOTT
CHIEF OF U.S. BORDER PATROL, in
his official capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
JONATHAN FAHEY
SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING
THE DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, in his official capacity
TERMINATED: 01/28/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
25
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ALEX M. AZAR, II
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, in his official
capacity
TERMINATED: 01/28/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
ROBERT R. REDFIELD
DR.,DIRECTOR OF THE CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, in his official capacity
TERMINATED: 01/28/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
DAVID PEKOSKE
ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, in his official capacity
TERMINATED: 02/10/2021
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
TROY MILLER
SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING
THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP), in
his official capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
TAE D. JOHNSON
Senior Official Performing the Duties of
the Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, in his official
capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
NORRIS COCHRAN
Acting Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in his official capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY
Dr., Director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, in her official
capacity
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
ALEJANDRO J. MAYORKAS
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
26
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 26 of 176

SECURITY, in his official capacity
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
XAVIER BECERRA
represented by Sean Michael Tepe
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amicus
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF
represented by Noah A. Levine
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
& DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwhich Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 230−8800
Fax: (212) 230−8888
Email: noah.levine@wilmerhale.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Volchok
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
& DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 663−6103
Fax: (202) 663−6363
Email: daniel.volchok@wilmerhale.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
& DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 400E
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 663−6000
Fax: (202) 663−6363
Email: paul.wolfson@wilmerhale.com
TERMINATED: 08/16/2021
Amicus
DEBORAH ANKER
represented by Noah A. Levine
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
27
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Daniel S. Volchok
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 08/16/2021
Amicus
JAMES C. HATHTAWAY
represented by Noah A. Levine
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Volchok
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 08/16/2021
Amicus
GERALD L. NEUMAN
represented by Noah A. Levine
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Volchok
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul R.Q. Wolfson
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 08/16/2021
Amicus
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROJECT
represented by Kathryn S. Austin
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROJECT
One Battery Park Plaza
4th Floor
New York, NY 10004
516−296−0688
Email: kaustin@refugeerights.org
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Geroline A Castillo
28
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INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE PROJECT
One Battery Park Plaza
4th Floor
New York, NY 10004
516−824−4256
Email: gcastillo@refugeerights.org
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amicus
HISTORIANS
represented by Raymond P. Tolentino
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP
350 Fifth Avenue
Suite 7110
New York, NY 10118
212−763−0883
Fax: 212−564−0883
Email: rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Date Filed
#
Page Docket Text
01/12/2021
1 
COMPLAINT against ALEX M. AZAR, II, JONATHAN FAHEY, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, PETER T. GAYNOR, MARK A. MORGAN, ROBERT R.
REDFIELD, RODNEY S. SCOTT ( Filing fee $ 402 receipt number
ADCDC−8066168) filed by B.A.M.M., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., I.M.C.H.,
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, E.R.P.D.S., M.E.S.D.S., NANCY
GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO.
(Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Notice of Related Cases, # 3
Summons for all Defendants)(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
2 
NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
Case related to Case No. 20cv2245. (adh, ) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
Case Assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. (adh, ) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
3 
SUMMONS (9) Issued Electronically as to ALEX M. AZAR, II, JONATHAN
FAHEY, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, PETER T. GAYNOR, MARK A.
MORGAN, ROBERT R. REDFIELD, RODNEY S. SCOTT, U.S. Attorney
and U.S. Attorney General (Attachment: # 1 Notice and Consent)(adh, )
(Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
4 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This document is SEALED
and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of
Huisha−Huisha, # 2 Declaration of Pereira−De Souza, # 3 Declaration of
Macancela Bermejo, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
29
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01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
5 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA
(Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay of
Removal, # 2 Declaration of Andrea Meza, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez,
Celso) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
MINUTE ORDER. The Court, sua sponte, schedules a Status Conference for
January 12, 2021 at 6:00 PM via Teleconference. The parties shall contact Mr.
Mark Coates, the Courtroom Deputy Clerk, for the dial−in information. In view
of Plaintiffs' 5 Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal, plaintiffs are HEREBY
DIRECTED to contact forthwith the United States Attorneys Office for the
District of Columbia and/or the Department of Justice as appropriate to identify
government counsel. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/12/2021.
(lcegs2) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 1/12/2021 at 6:00 PM in
Telephonic/VTC before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. (mac) (Entered:
01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan: Status
Conference held via VTC on 1/12/2021. The Court Will Grant Motion Over
Objection. Plaintiffs Not Involuntarily Moved Pending Further Order Of The
Court. The Court Will Issue An Order. Parties Will Confer In Regard To
Briefing Schedule. (Court Reporter LISA BANKINS.) (mac) (Entered:
01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting, over objection, Plaintiffs' 5 Emergency MOTION
to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by Plaintiffs in their
motion, the representations made by the Government, and for the reasons
stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, Plaintiffs shall
not be involuntarily removed from the United States pending further order of
the Court. Parties shall file a Joint Proposed Scheduling Order by no later than
January 15, 2021. In the forthcoming briefing, in addition to other arguments,
parties shall address whether this case is related to Civil Action Number
20−2245, P.J.E.S. v. Wolf Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/12/2021.
(lcegs2) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
6 
NOTICE of Appearance by Sean Michael Tepe on behalf of All Defendants
(Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
7 
NOTICE of Appearance by Scott Michelman on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Michelman, Scott) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/12/2021
8 
NOTICE of Appearance by Arthur B. Spitzer on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 01/12/2021)
01/13/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 1/15/2021 (mac) (Entered:
01/13/2021)
01/13/2021
SEALED MINUTE ORDER granting 4 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
1/13/21. (mac) (Entered: 01/13/2021)
30
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01/13/2021
9 
SEALED Declarations filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf)
(Entered: 01/13/2021)
01/14/2021
10 
NOTICE of Appearance by Jamie L. Crook on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Crook,
Jamie) (Main Document 10 replaced on 1/14/2021) (zjf). (Entered: 01/14/2021)
01/15/2021
11 
PROPOSED BRIEFING SCHEDULE Joint Proposed Briefing Schedule by
ALEX M. AZAR, II, JONATHAN FAHEY, WILLIAM A. FERRARA,
PETER T. GAYNOR, MARK A. MORGAN, ROBERT R. REDFIELD,
RODNEY S. SCOTT. (Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 01/15/2021)
01/15/2021
MINUTE ORDER. In view of Parties' 11 PROPOSED BRIEFING
SCHEDULE concerning the specific issue of whether this case is related to
Civil Action Number 20−2245, P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, the parties SHALL adhere to
the following briefing schedule: Defendants shall file a brief with supporting
points and authorities of no more than 10 pages in length by no later than
January 19, 2021, and Plaintiffs shall file a brief with supporting points and
authorities of no more than 10 pages in length by no later than January 21,
2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/15/2021. (lcegs2) (Entered:
01/15/2021)
01/19/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants Brief due 1/19/2021. Plaintiffs Brief due
1/21/2021. (mac) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
12 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
13 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This document is SEALED
and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed
Order, # 2 Declaration of Taday−Acosta, # 3 Declaration of Thomas)(Perez,
Celso) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 12
emergency order to stay removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion and for the reasons stated on the record at the January
12, 2021 Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the removal of
Martha Liliana Taday−Acosta (SID 369−635−597) and her minor children
D.J.Z. (SID 369−635−599) and J.A.Z. (SID 369−635−605); and of Julien
Thomas (SID 369−648−244), Fidette Boute (SID 369−648−252), and their
minor children D.J.T.−B. (SID 369− 648−250) and T.J.T.−B. (SID
369−648−247), is STAYED pending further order of the Court. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint status report with a
recommendation for further proceedings by no later than January 21, 2021 at
12:00 PM. This Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no
later than January 19, 2021 at 8:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
31
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1/19/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 13 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
1/19/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
14 
RESPONSE re 2 Notice of Related Case filed by ALEX M. AZAR, II,
JONATHAN FAHEY, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, PETER T. GAYNOR,
MARK A. MORGAN, ROBERT R. REDFIELD, RODNEY S. SCOTT. (Tepe,
Sean) (Entered: 01/19/2021)
01/19/2021
17 
SEALED DECLARATIONS filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is
SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 01/21/2021)
01/20/2021
15 
REPLY re 2 Notice of Related Cases filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S.,
H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H.,
M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE
SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) Modified on 1/20/2021 to correct docket link (zjf).
(Entered: 01/20/2021)
01/21/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due no later than 12:00PM on
1/21/2021 (mac) (Entered: 01/21/2021)
01/21/2021
16 
Joint STATUS REPORT by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA
MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso)
(Entered: 01/21/2021)
01/21/2021
MINUTE ORDER. In view of 16 joint status report, Plaintiffs shall file their
amended complaint by no later than January 28, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan on 1/21/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/21/2021)
01/22/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Amended Complaint due by 1/28/2021. (mac)
(Entered: 01/22/2021)
01/25/2021
18 
STANDING ORDER: The parties are directed to read the attached Standing
Order Governing Civil Cases Before Judge Emmet G. Sullivan in its entirety
upon receipt. The parties are hereby ORDERED to comply with the directives
in the attached Standing Order. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
1/25/21. (Attachment: # 1 Exhibit 1) (mac) (Entered: 01/25/2021)
01/26/2021
19 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Karla M.
Vargas, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8127067. Fee Status: Fee
Paid. by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
01/26/2021)
01/26/2021
20 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
01/26/2021)
01/26/2021
21 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
32
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HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This document is SEALED
and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed
Order, # 2 Declaration of Valcourt)(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 01/26/2021)
01/27/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 20
emergency motion to stay removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion and for the reasons stated on the record at the January
12, 2021 Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the removal of
Romilus Valcourt (SID 369−705−271), Bedapheca Alcante, (SID
369−705−293), and their minor child B.V.−A. (SID 369−705−304), is
STAYED pending further order of the Court. This Order is subject to
reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than January 27, 2021 at 5:00
PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/27/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
01/27/2021)
01/27/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 21 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
1/27/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/27/2021)
01/27/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Minute Order Reconsideration For Good Cause Shown
due no later than 5:00PM on 1/27/2021. (mac) (Entered: 01/27/2021)
01/27/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 19 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Karla
M. Vargas is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should
register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant
to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 1/27/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/27/2021)
01/27/2021
24 
SEALED DOCUMENT (Declaration) filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S.,
H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H.,
M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE
SOUZA. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized
persons.)(znmw) (Entered: 01/29/2021)
01/28/2021
22 
AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants filed by B.A.M.M.,
H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., I.M.C.H., JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA,
E.R.P.D.S., M.E.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, VALERIA
MACANCELA BERMEJO. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. Redline Amended
Complaint)(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 01/28/2021)
01/28/2021
23 
MOTION to Certify Class by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA
MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Attachments:
# 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Certify Class, # 2 Declaration of
Stephen B. Kang with Exhibits A and B, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez,
Celso) (Entered: 01/28/2021)
01/29/2021
25 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
01/29/2021)
01/29/2021
26 
33
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 33 of 176

SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This document is SEALED
and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed
Order, # 2 Declaration of Casy, # 3 Declaration of De Oliveira, # 4 Declaration
of Zami, # 5 Declaration of Lataro)(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 01/29/2021)
01/29/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 25
emergency motion to stay removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion and for the reasons stated on the record at the January
12, 2021 Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the removal of Kaio
Joseph Lataro (SID 369−651−122), Carine Nathielle Pereira Brocanelli (SID
369−651−127, and their minor child M.L.B.L. (SID 369−651− 134); Jude
Mary Zami (SID 369−696−796), Santhianie Aris (SID 369−696−835), and
their minor child C.E.J.Z.A. (SID 369−696−868); Gracia Junior Casy (SID
369−706−088), Farah Casy Bescien (SID 369−706−084), and their minor child
T.C. (SID 369−706−096); and Jessica Fernandes de Oliveira (SID
369−676−509) and her minor child J.F.L. (SID 369−676−502) is STAYED
pending further order of the Court. This Order is subject to reconsideration for
good cause shown by no later than January 29, 2021 at 6:00 PM. Signed by
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/29/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/29/2021)
01/29/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 26 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
1/29/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 01/29/2021)
01/29/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 6:00PM on
1/29/2021. (mac) (Entered: 01/29/2021)
01/29/2021
27 
SEALED Declarations of Casy, De Oliveira, Zami and Lataro filed by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized
persons.)(zjf) (Main Document 27 replaced on 1/31/2021) (zjf). (Entered:
01/31/2021)
01/31/2021
28 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
01/31/2021)
01/31/2021
29 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This document is SEALED
and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed
Order, # 2 Declaration of Fils Aime, # 3 Declaration of Ladouceur, # 4
Declaration of Louis, # 5 Declaration of Myrtil, # 6 Declaration of Sabino, # 7
Declaration of Santos De Paula)(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 01/31/2021)
01/31/2021
MINUTE ORDER. In view of 28 Emergency Motion to Stay Removal, the
government is directed to file a response by no later than February 1, 2021 at
8:00 AM. Plaintiffs shall file a reply by no later than February 1, 2021 at 12:00
PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 1/31/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
34
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 34 of 176

01/31/2021)
02/01/2021
30 
RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order, Response to January 31,
2021 Minute Order filed by ALEX M. AZAR, II, JONATHAN FAHEY,
WILLIAM A. FERRARA, PETER T. GAYNOR, TROY MILLER, MARK A.
MORGAN, DAVID PEKOSKE, ROBERT R. REDFIELD, RODNEY S.
SCOTT. (Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Government Response due no later than 8:00AM on
2/1/2021. Plaintiffs Reply due no later than 12:00PM on2/1/2021. (mac)
(Entered: 02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
31 
REPLY to opposition to motion re 28 Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal
filed by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting, over objection, 28 Emergency Motion to Stay
Removal. Although the government notes in its 30 Response that, on January
31, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C.
Circuit") stayed the class−wide preliminary injunction in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, No.
20−cv−2245 (D.D.C.), see Order, P.J.E.S. v. Pekoske, No. 20−5357 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 29, 2021), the government does not, and cannot, argue that the D.C.
Circuit's order requires denial of 28 Emergency Motion to Stay Removal
because the D.C. Circuit's order is not published and was issued without
opinion or reasoning. Accordingly, in view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs, and for the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021
Status Conference, it is hereby ORDERED that the removals of the following
six families are STAYED pending further order of this Court: Evens Fils Aime
(SID 369−703−977), Shnaidere Altenord (SID 369−703−992), and their minor
child A.F.A.A. (SID 369−704−002); Rijkaard Ladouceur (SID 369−690−928),
Miralia Fleurima (SID 369−690−930), and their minor children N.F. (SID
369−690−940) and B.R.L.F. (SID 369−690−944); Frenzy Joseph Louis (SID
369−627−368), Rose Maria Bien−Aime (SID 369−627−371), and their minor
child H.G.L. (SID 369−627−374); Djimytoo Myrtil (SID 369−705−242),
Lunda Odilus (SID 369−705−228), and their minor child M.Y.M.O. (SID
369−705−252); Eric Lenes Sabino (SID 369−694−161), Elisandra de Lima
Borges (SID 369−694−170), and their minor children K.C.S.B. (SID
369−694−176) and K.V.S.B. (SID 369−694−183); Josimar Santos de Paula
(SID 369−695−923), and his minor child K.V.S.D.P. (SID 369− 695−934).
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/1/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 29 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/1/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
32 
SEALED Declarations of Fils Aime, Ladouceur, Louis, Myrtil, Sabino &
Santos De Paula filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and
only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/01/2021)
02/01/2021
33 
RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order on Motion to Stay,,,,,,
filed by ALEX M. AZAR, II, JONATHAN FAHEY, WILLIAM A.
35
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 35 of 176

FERRARA, PETER T. GAYNOR, TROY MILLER, MARK A. MORGAN,
DAVID PEKOSKE, ROBERT R. REDFIELD, RODNEY S. SCOTT. (Tepe,
Sean) (Entered: 02/01/2021)
02/02/2021
34 
Joint MOTION for Scheduling Order by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S.,
H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
35 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Stephen B.
Kang, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155498. Fee Status: Fee
Paid. by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
36 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Ming Cheung,
Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155543. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by
B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
37 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Cody Wofsy,
Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155680. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by
B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
38 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Lee Gelernt,
Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155714. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by
B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
39 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Morgan
Russell, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155725. Fee Status: Fee
Paid. by B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
40 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Daniel Galindo,
Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8155744. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by
B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/02/2021
41 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Omar Jadwat,
Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8156091. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by
B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
36
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 36 of 176

HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Perez, Celso) (Entered:
02/02/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 34 joint motion for scheduling order. The parties
shall abide by the following briefing schedule: Plaintiffs shall file their motion
for classwide preliminary injunction by no later than February 5, 2021;
Defendants shall file their combined opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and motion for classwide preliminary injunction by no later than
February 17, 2021; and Plaintiffs shall file their combined reply in support of
both motions by no later than February 23, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan on 2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 35 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice.
Stephen B. Kang is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel
should register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance
pursuant to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan on 2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 36 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Ming
Cheung is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should register
for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant to LCvR
83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 37 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Cody
Wofsy is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should register
for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant to LCvR
83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 38 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Lee
Gelernt is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should register
for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant to LCvR
83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 39 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice.
Morgan Russell is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should
register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant
to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 40 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Daniel
Galindo is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should
register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant
to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
02/03/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 41 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Omar
Jadwat is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should register
for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant to LCvR
83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/3/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/03/2021)
37
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 37 of 176

02/04/2021
42 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by ALL PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M.,
E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA,
I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE
PEREIRA−DE SOUZA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook,
Jamie) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
43 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA
MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA (This
document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments:
# 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration of Jonny Dieudonne)(Crook,
Jamie) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Motion For Classwide Preliminary Injunction
due by 2/5/2021. Defendants Combined Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For
Class Certification And Motion For Classwide Preliminary Injunction due by
2/17/2021. Plaintiffs Combined Reply In Support Of Both Motions due by
2/23/2021.(mac) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 42
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removals of Jonny Dieudonne (SID 369−745−541),
Nathalie Decilian (SID 369−745−608), and their minor child N.J.D.D. (SID
369−745−546) are STAYED pending further order of this Court. This Order is
subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than February 4,
2021 at 12:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/4/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 43 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/4/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Reconsideration, If Any, due no later than 12:00PM on
2/4/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
44 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL
PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A., FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z.,
E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA,
I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO,
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA
TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS, ROMILUS VALCOURT.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered:
02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
45 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A.,
FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA,
T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS,
ROMILUS VALCOURT (This document is SEALED and only available to
38
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 38 of 176

authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Diana Quilli−Marca)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
46 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL
PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A., FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z.,
E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA,
I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO,
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA
TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS, ROMILUS VALCOURT.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered:
02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
47 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A.,
FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA,
T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS,
ROMILUS VALCOURT (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Jean Louissaint Fleury, # 3 Declaration of Thechelet Dieudonne,
# 4 Declaration of Pouchon Bien−Aime, # 5 Declaration of Elyse
Louima)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 44
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removals of Diana Quilli−Marca (SID
369−752−319) and her minor child N.S.Q. (SID 369−752−531) are STAYED
pending further order of this Court. This Order is subject to reconsideration for
good cause shown by no later than February 4, 2021 at 10:00 PM. Signed by
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/4/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 45 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/4/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 46
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removals of the following families are STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Thechelet Dieudonne (SID 369−745−511),
Juna Delphin (SID 369−745−516), and their minor child T.D. (SID
369−745−519); Pouchon Bien−Aime, (SID 369−780−070), Annediana Desir,
(SID 369−780−063), and their minor child P.R.B.A.D. (SID 369−780−078);
Jean Louissaint Fleury, (SID 369−780−176), Barbara Fleury Previl, (SID
369−780−197), and their minor children D.L.F. (SID 369−780−189) and M.L.
(SID 369−780−181); Elyse Louima (SID 369−739−119), Filande Adolphe
(SID 369−739−126), and their minor child E.L.A. (SID 369−739−133). This
Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than
February 4, 2021 at 10:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
39
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 39 of 176

2/4/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 47 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/4/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
48 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL
PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A., FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z.,
E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA,
I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO,
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA
TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS, ROMILUS VALCOURT.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered:
02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
49 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A.,
FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S.,
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S.,
VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA,
T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS,
ROMILUS VALCOURT (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Fabiana Ferreira Da Costa)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered:
02/04/2021)
02/04/2021
64 
SEALED Declaration of DIANA QUILLI−MARCA filed by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized
persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/04/2021
65 
SEALED Declaration of JONNY DIEUDONNE filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS.
(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf)
(Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/04/2021
66 
SEALED Declarations of Jean Louissaint Fleury, Thechelet Dieudonne,
Pouchon Bien−Aime and Elyse Louima filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This
document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered:
02/09/2021)
02/05/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 10:00PM
on 2/4/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 48
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removals of the following families are STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Fabiana Ferreira Da Costa (SID
369−729−448), and her minor children M.A.L.F.C. (SID 369−729−454),
K.R.F.D.C. (SID 369−729−457), and A.D.M.F.D.C. (SID 369−729−466). This
Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than
February 5, 2021 at 12:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/5/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
40
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 40 of 176

MINUTE ORDER granting 49 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/5/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 12:00PM
on 2/5/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
50 
NOTICE of Appearance by Paul R.Q. Wolfson on behalf of T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Deborah Anker, James C. Hathaway, Gerald L. Neuman (Wolfson,
Paul) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
51 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Noah A.
Levine, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8169810. Fee Status: Fee
Paid. by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Deborah Anker, James C. Hathaway, Gerald
L. Neuman. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Noah A. Levine, # 2 Text of
Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
52 
Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File a Brief for Scholars of Refugee and
Immigration Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Classwide Preliminary Injunction by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Deborah Anker,
James C. Hathaway, Gerald L. Neuman. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amicus
Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Wolfson, Paul) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
53 
NOTICE of Appearance by Lee Gelernt on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Gelernt,
Lee) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
54 
MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed
Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Austin, Kathryn) (Entered:
02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
55 
NOTICE of Appearance by Raymond P. Tolentino on behalf of Historians
(Tolentino, Raymond) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
56 
Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Historians.
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amicus Brief, # 2 Text of Proposed
Order)(Tolentino, Raymond) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
57 
MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, ALL
PLAINTIFFS, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A., FIDETTE BOUTE, D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z.,
E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA HUISHA−HUISHA,
I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA BERMEJO,
JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, T.J.T.−B., MARTHA LILIANA
TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS, ROMILUS VALCOURT.
(Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, # 2 Text
of Proposed Order, # 3 Index of Exhibits, # 4 Declaration of Ming Cheung, # 5
Exhibit A−I, # 6 Declaration of Public Health Experts, # 7 Exhibit A−D, # 8
Declaration of Javier Hidalgo, # 9 Declaration of Allison Herre, # 10
Declaration of Linda Corchado, # 11 Declaration of Lisa Frydman, # 12
Declaration of Taylor Levy)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
58 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal of Apollon Family by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook, Jamie)
(Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
59 
41
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 41 of 176

SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Gesnel Apollon)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/05/2021)
02/05/2021
67 
SEALED Declaration of Fabiana Ferreira Da Costa filed by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized
persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/06/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 58
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removal of the following family is STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Gesnel Apollon (SID 369−778−765),
Elourdes Bergel (SID#369−778−770), and their minor child, J.A.,
SID#369−778−776. This Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause
shown by no later than February 6, 2021 at 8:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan on 2/6/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/06/2021)
02/06/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 59 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/6/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/06/2021)
02/06/2021
63 
SEALED Declaration of Gesnel Apollon re 58 Emergency MOTION to Stay
Removal of Apollon Family filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is
SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/08/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 8:00PM on
2/6/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/08/2021)
02/08/2021
60 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal of Desenclos/Emile, Jean, Lalune, and
Thomas Families by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed
Order)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/08/2021)
02/08/2021
61 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Clema Thomas, # 3 Declaration of David Jean, # 4 Declaration
of Danie Lalune, # 5 Declaration of Ketlene Emile)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered:
02/08/2021)
02/09/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 60
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removal of the following families are STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Ketlene Emile (SID#369−736−280),
Michel Riverson Cliff Salis Desenclos (SID#369− 736−194), and their minor
child A.D.E. (SID#369−736−308); David Jean (SID# 369−789−160), Edwidge
Civil (SID#369−789−185), and their minor child A.J. (SID#369−789−192);
Danie Lalune (SID# 369−782−922), Wesley Lalune (SID# 369−782−907), and
their two minor children D.L. (SID# 369−782−935) and C.M.L. (SID#
369−782−949); Clema Thomas (SID#369−781−406), Lyesse Sylen
(SID#369−783−314), and their minor children A.G.T.S. (SID#369−781−423)
42
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 42 of 176

and A.G.D. (SID#369−783−326). This Order is subject to reconsideration for
good cause shown by no later than February 9, 2021 at 12:00 PM. Signed by
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/9/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/09/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 61 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/9/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/09/2021
62 
MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Tamara F.
Goodlette, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−8180349. Fee Status: Fee
Paid. by BEDAPHECA ALCANTE, B.A.M.M., B.V.−A., FIDETTE BOUTE,
D.J.T.−B., D.J.Z., E.R.P.D.S., H.N.D.S., H.T.D.S.D.S., NANCY GIMENA
HUISHA−HUISHA, I.M.C.H., J.A.Z., M.E.S.D.S., VALERIA MACANCELA
BERMEJO, JOSAINE PEREIRA−DE SOUZA, T.J.T.−B., MARTHA
LILIANA TADAY−ACOSTA, JULIEN THOMAS, ROMILUS VALCOURT.
(Perez, Celso) (Entered: 02/09/2021)
02/09/2021
70 
SEALED Declaration of Clema Thomas,David Jean, Danie Lalune, Ketlene
Emile filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only
available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 12:00PM
on 2/9/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
68 
NOTICE of Appearance by Stephen Bonggyun Kang on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Kang, Stephen) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
69 
NOTICE of Appearance by Cody H. Wofsy on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Wofsy,
Cody) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
71 
NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel Antonio Galindo on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Galindo, Daniel) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
72 
NOTICE of Appearance by Ming Cheung on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Cheung,
Ming) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
73 
NOTICE of Appearance by Morgan Russell on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Russell, Morgan) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/10/2021
74 
NOTICE of Appearance by Omar C. Jadwat on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Jadwat,
Omar) (Entered: 02/10/2021)
02/11/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 51 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Noah
A. Levine is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should
register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant
to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 2/11/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 62 motion for leave to appear pro hac vice. Tamara
F. Goodlette is hereby admitted pro hac vice in this action. Counsel should
register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant
to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 2/11/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 52 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File a Brief
for Scholars of Refugee and Immigration Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
43
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 43 of 176

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class−wide Preliminary Injunction. The [52−1] amicus
brief shall be deemed filed as of February 11, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan on 2/11/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 54 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae
Brief by INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT. The
[54−1] amicus brief shall be deemed filed as of February 11, 2021. Signed by
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/11/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 56 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Amicus
Curiae Brief by Historians. The [56−1] amicus brief shall be deemed filed as of
February 11, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/11/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
75 
NOTICE of Appearance by Noah A. Levine on behalf of T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF, DEBORAH ANKER, JAMES C. HATHTAWAY, GERALD
L. NEUMAN (Levine, Noah) (Entered: 02/11/2021)
02/11/2021
77 
AMICUS BRIEF by T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DEBORAH ANKER,
JAMES C. HATHTAWAY, GERALD L. NEUMAN. (znmw) (Entered:
02/18/2021)
02/11/2021
78 
AMICUS BRIEF by INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT. (znmw) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
02/11/2021
79 
AMICUS BRIEF by HISTORIANS. (znmw) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
02/17/2021
76 
Memorandum in opposition to re 23 MOTION to Certify Class , 57 MOTION
for Preliminary Injunction filed by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM A.
FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Attachments:
# 1 Exhibits A−E, # 2 Declaration of Troy Miller, # 3 Declaration of Russell
Hott)(Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 02/17/2021)
02/18/2021
80 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: #
1 Text of Proposed Order)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
02/18/2021
81 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Torres−Rojas)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
02/18/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 80
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removal of the following family is STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Paola Trinidad Torres−Rojas (SID
369−842−359) and her minor child M.J.Z.T. (SID 369− 842−362). This Order
is subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than February
18, 2021 at 7:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/18/2021.
(lcegs3) (Entered: 02/18/2021)
02/18/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 81 sealed motion for leave to file document under
seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/18/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
02/18/2021)
44
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 44 of 176

02/18/2021
88 
SEALED Declaration of Bebeto Pierrot filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This
document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered:
02/24/2021)
02/18/2021
89 
SEALED Declaration of Torres−Rojas filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This
document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered:
02/24/2021)
02/19/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 7:00PM on
2/18/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
82 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: #
1 Text of Proposed Order)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
83 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Francois)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 82
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removal of the following family is STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Fredenel Francois (SID 369−772−515),
Guyvlena Malvoisin, (SID 369−772−487), and their minor child, P.A.S.G.M.
(SID 369−772−547). This Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause
shown by no later than February 19, 2021 at 3:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet
G. Sullivan on 2/19/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 83 sealed motion for leave to file document under
seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/19/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 3:00PM on
2/19/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
84 
SEALED Declaration of Francois filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document
is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered:
02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
85 
Emergency MOTION to Stay Removal of the Pierrot Family by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Russell, Morgan)
(Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/19/2021
86 
SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL
filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS (This document is SEALED and only available to
authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2
Declaration of Bebeto Pierrot)(Russell, Morgan) (Entered: 02/19/2021)
02/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER treating as opposed and granting over objection 85
Emergency Motion to Stay Removal. In view of the arguments presented by
Plaintiffs in their motion, the Court's February 1, 2021 Minute Order, and for
the reasons stated on the record at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference, it is
hereby ORDERED that the removal of the following family is STAYED
pending further order of this Court: Bebeto Pierrot, SID 369−772−300, Nadine
45
USCA Case #21-5200      Document #1914698            Filed: 09/17/2021      Page 45 of 176

Remilus, SID 369−772−363, and their minor child M.A.P., SID 369−868−214.
This Order is subject to reconsideration for good cause shown by no later than
February 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
2/22/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 02/22/2021)
02/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 86 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document
Under Seal. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/22/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 02/22/2021)
02/22/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motion For Reconsideration due no later than 3:00PM on
2/22/2021. (mac) (Entered: 02/22/2021)
02/22/2021
90 
SEALED DOCUMENT (Declaration of Bebeto Pierrot) filed by ALL
PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized
persons.)(znmw) (Entered: 02/26/2021)
02/23/2021
87 
Joint MOTION to Stay Joint Motion to Hold in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction Motions by NORRIS COCHRAN,
WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO N.
MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P.
WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 02/23/2021)
02/23/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 87 joint motion to hold in abeyance Plaintiffs'
motions for class certification and classwide preliminary injunction. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that either party may request termination of the
abeyance by filing a motion seeking such relief. It is FURTHER ORDERED
that Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions for class
certification and preliminary injunction by no later than March 23, 2021.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 2/23/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
02/23/2021)
02/24/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 3/23/2021. (mac) (Entered:
02/24/2021)
02/25/2021
91 
ENTERED IN ERROR AS A DUPLICATE DE# 90 ..SEALED Declaration of
Bebeto Pierrot filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (This document is SEALED and
only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) Modified on 2/26/2021 (zjf).
(Entered: 02/26/2021)
02/26/2021
92 
NOTICE of Appearance by Geroline A Castillo on behalf of
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Castillo, Geroline)
(Entered: 02/26/2021)
03/15/2021
93 
NOTICE of Appearance by Karla Vargas on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Vargas,
Karla) (Entered: 03/15/2021)
03/15/2021
94 
RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed.
ALEX M. AZAR, II served on 1/25/2021; JONATHAN FAHEY served on
1/19/2021; WILLIAM A. FERRARA served on 1/19/2021; PETER T.
GAYNOR served on 1/19/2021; MARK A. MORGAN served on 1/19/2021;
ROBERT R. REDFIELD served on 1/19/2021; RODNEY S. SCOTT served on
1/19/2021 (Cheung, Ming) (Entered: 03/15/2021)
03/15/2021
95 
RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed
on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States
46
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Attorney General 01/19/2021. (Cheung, Ming) (Entered: 03/15/2021)
03/15/2021
96 
RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed
as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney
on 1/21/2021. Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 3/22/2021.
(Cheung, Ming) (Entered: 03/15/2021)
03/16/2021
97 
Joint MOTION for Protective Order by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM A.
FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Attachments:
# 1 Proposed Stipulated Protective Order)(Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 03/16/2021)
03/16/2021
98 
Consent MOTION to Vacate Answer Deadline and Set Joint Status Report
Deadline by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D.
JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S.
SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 03/16/2021)
03/22/2021
99 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 3/22/2021 to correct docket event/text(zjf). (Entered: 03/22/2021)
03/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 97 joint motion for entry of a stipulated protective
order. The terms presented in [97−1] Stipulated Protective Order are hereby
incorporated by reference into this Order. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 3/22/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 03/22/2021)
03/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 98 consent motion to vacate answer deadline and
set joint status report deadline. It is hereby ORDERED that the March 22, 2021
deadline for Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended
Complaint is VACATED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file
a joint status report within fourteen days from the date of the Court's decisions
on Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Preliminary
Injunction. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 3/22/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 03/22/2021)
03/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 99 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction
until April 2, 2021. Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions by
no later than April 2, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 3/22/2021.
(lcegs3) (Entered: 03/22/2021)
03/23/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Reply due by 4/2/2021. (mac) (Entered:
03/23/2021)
04/01/2021
100 
Joint MOTION To Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 4/2/2021 (zjf). (Entered: 04/01/2021)
04/02/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 100 joint motion to continue holding in abeyance
Plaintiffs' motions for class certification and classwide preliminary injunction.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of
47
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their motions for class certification and preliminary injunction by no later than
April 12, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 4/2/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 04/02/2021)
04/03/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 4/12/2021. (mac) (Entered:
04/03/2021)
04/05/2021
101 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to ALL PLAINTIFFS.
Attorney Celso Perez terminated. (Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 04/05/2021)
04/11/2021
102 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
(Entered: 04/11/2021)
04/12/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 102 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction
until April 22, 2021. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file their
reply in support of their motions for class certification and preliminary
injunction by no later than April 22, 2021. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan
on 4/12/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 04/12/2021)
04/13/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 4/22/2021. (mac) (Entered:
04/13/2021)
04/22/2021
103 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 4/23/2021 to correct event/text (zjf). (Entered: 04/22/2021)
04/22/2021
104 
NOTICE of Appearance by Tamara Goodlette on behalf of All Plaintiffs
(Goodlette, Tamara) (Entered: 04/22/2021)
04/26/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 103 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction
until May 3, 2021. Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions for
class certification and preliminary injunction on May 3, 2021. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 4/26/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 04/26/2021)
04/26/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 5/3/2021. (mac) (Entered:
04/26/2021)
05/03/2021
105 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
(Entered: 05/03/2021)
05/04/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 105 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction.
Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions for class certification
48
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and preliminary injunction by no later than May 13, 2021. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 5/4/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 05/04/2021)
05/05/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 5/13/2021. (mac) (Entered:
05/05/2021)
05/13/2021
106 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 5/14/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 05/13/2021)
05/17/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 106 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction.
Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions for class certification
and preliminary injunction by no later than May 25, 2021. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 5/17/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 05/17/2021)
05/18/2021
ENTERED IN ERROR....Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of
Their Motions For Class Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by
5/2/2021. (mac) (Entered: 05/18/2021)
05/18/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 5/2/2021 (mac) (Entered:
05/18/2021)
05/25/2021
107 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 5/26/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 05/25/2021)
05/27/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 107 joint motion to continue to hold in abeyance
Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Classwide Permanent Injunction.
Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of their motions for class certification
and preliminary injunction by no later than June 8, 2021. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 5/27/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 05/27/2021)
05/27/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply In Support Of Their Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 6/8/2021. (mac) (Entered:
05/27/2021)
06/08/2021
108 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 6/9/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 06/08/2021)
06/09/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 108 Joint Motion to Continue Holding in
Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Preliminary
Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file their reply brief in support of their motions for
class certification and preliminary injunction by no later than June 18, 2021.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 6/9/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
06/09/2021)
49
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06/10/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply Brief In Support Of Their Motions For
Class Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 6/18/2021. (mac)
(Entered: 06/10/2021)
06/18/2021
109 
Joint MOTION to Continue in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 6/21/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 06/18/2021)
06/22/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 109 Joint Motion to Continue Holding in
Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Preliminary
Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file their reply brief in support of their motions for
class certification and preliminary injunction by no later than July 2, 2021.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 6/22/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
06/22/2021)
06/22/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply Brief In Support Of Motions For Class
Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 7/2/2021. (mac) (Entered:
06/22/2021)
07/02/2021
110 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D.
JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S.
SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY, XAVIER BECERRA. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 7/6/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 07/02/2021)
07/09/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 110 Joint Motion to Continue Holding in
Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Preliminary
Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file their reply brief in support of their motions for
class certification and preliminary injunction by no later than July 16, 2021.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 7/9/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
07/09/2021)
07/09/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply Brief In Support Of Their Motions For
Class Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 7/16/2021. (mac)
(Entered: 07/09/2021)
07/16/2021
111 
Joint MOTION to Continue Holding in Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction by XAVIER BECERRA, WILLIAM
A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean)
Modified on 7/19/2021 to correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 07/16/2021)
07/19/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 111 Joint Motion to Continue Holding in
Abeyance Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification and Preliminary
Injunction. Plaintiffs shall file their reply brief in support of their motions for
class certification and preliminary injunction by no later than August 2, 2021.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 7/19/2021. (lcegs1) (Entered:
07/19/2021)
07/19/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiffs Reply Brief In Support Of Their Motions For
Class Certification And Preliminary Injunction due by 8/2/2021. (mac)
(Entered: 07/19/2021)
50
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08/02/2021
112 
Joint MOTION for Briefing Schedule on Plaintiffs' Motions for Class
Certification and Classwide Preliminary Injunction by ALL PLAINTIFFS.
(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered: 08/02/2021)
08/02/2021
MINUTE ORDER. In view of 112 joint motion to reset briefing schedule, in
which the parties indicated that efforts "to resolve or narrow the dispute in this
case have reached an impasse," the parties are DIRECTED to file a joint status
report by no later than August 4, 2021 informing the Court whether this case
would benefit from referral to a magistrate judge, mediation, or any other form
of alternative dispute resolution that can be tailored to the needs of their case.
Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 8/2/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered:
08/02/2021)
08/02/2021
113 
MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration by XAVIER
BECERRA, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P.
WALENSKY. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of David Shahoulian)(Tepe,
Sean) (Entered: 08/02/2021)
08/02/2021
114 
NOTICE NOTICE OF CDC PUBLIC HEALTH ORDER by XAVIER
BECERRA, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P.
WALENSKY (Tepe, Sean) (Entered: 08/02/2021)
08/03/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 8/4/2021 (mac) (Entered:
08/03/2021)
08/04/2021
115 
RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re Order,, Joint Response to
Court's August 2, 2021 Order Concerning Further Mediation or Alternative
Dispute Resolution filed by XAVIER BECERRA, WILLIAM A. FERRARA,
TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER,
RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (Tepe, Sean) (Entered:
08/04/2021)
08/05/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting nunc pro tunc 112 joint motion to reset briefing
schedule on Plaintiffs' motions for class certification and classwide preliminary
injunction. It is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants shall file their
supplemental declaration in support of their combined opposition to Plaintiffs'
motions for class certification and classwide preliminary injunction by no later
than August 2, 2021; and that Plaintiffs shall file their combined reply in
support of those motions by no later than August 11, 2021. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 8/5/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 08/05/2021)
08/05/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 113 motion for leave to file supplemental
declaration. The Clerk of Court is directed to file the supplemental declaration,
ECF No. 113−1, as a separate docket entry. Signed by Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan on 8/5/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 08/05/2021)
08/06/2021
Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants Supplemental Declaration In Support Of
Their Combined Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motions For Class Certification And
Classwide Preliminary Injunction due by 08/02/2021. Plaintiffs Reply In
Support Of Those Motions due by 08/11/2021. (mac) (Entered: 08/06/2021)
08/06/2021
116 
DECLARATION of David Shahoulian re Combined Opposition (ECF No. 76 )
to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 23 ) and Motion for
51
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Classwide Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 57 ). by XAVIER BECERRA,
NORRIS COCHRAN, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON,
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT,
ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY. (zjf) (Entered: 08/06/2021)
08/11/2021
117 
MOTION for Oral Argument by XAVIER BECERRA, WILLIAM A.
FERRARA, TAE D. JOHNSON, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, TROY
MILLER, RODNEY S. SCOTT, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY re 57
MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (Tepe, Sean) Modified on 8/12/2021 to
correct docket event/text (zjf). (Entered: 08/11/2021)
08/11/2021
118 
REPLY to opposition to motion re 23 MOTION to Certify Class , 57 MOTION
for Preliminary Injunction filed by ALL PLAINTIFFS. (Attachments: # 1 Text
of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Index of Exhibits, # 3 Declaration of Taylor
Levy, # 4 Declaration of Julia Neusner, # 5 Declaration of Jennifer K. Harbury,
# 6 Declaration of Erika Pinheiro, # 7 Declaration of Savitri Arvey, # 8
Declaration (Supplemental) of Former CDC Officials, # 9 Declaration of 32
Medical and Public Health Experts, # 10 Declaration (Second) of Ming
Cheung, # 11 Declaration of Linda Rivas, # 12 Declaration of Marisa Limn
Garza, # 13 Declaration of Astrid Dominguez, # 14 Declaration of Chelsea
Sachau, # 15 Declaration of Mdecins Sans Frontires Medical Coordinator in
Mexico, # 16 Declaration of Teresa Cavendish, # 17 Declaration of Kate Clark,
# 18 Declaration of Aaron Reichlin−Melnick, # 19 Declaration of Alan E.
Valdez Jurez, # 20 Declaration of Edgar Ramrez Lpez, # 21 Declaration of
Samuel Thomas Bishop, # 22 Declaration of Luis Alberto Lizarraga Tolentino,
# 23 Declaration of Cecilia Menjvar, Ph.D.)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered:
08/11/2021)
08/11/2021
119 
MOTION for Leave to File Reply Declarations by ALL PLAINTIFFS.
(Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Gelernt, Lee) (Entered:
08/11/2021)
08/16/2021
120 
NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel S. Volchok on behalf of T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF, DEBORAH ANKER, JAMES C. HATHTAWAY, GERALD
L. NEUMAN (Volchok, Daniel) (Entered: 08/16/2021)
08/16/2021
121 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF, DEBORAH ANKER, JAMES C. HATHTAWAY, GERALD
L. NEUMAN. Attorney Paul R.Q. Wolfson terminated. (Wolfson, Paul)
(Entered: 08/16/2021)
09/13/2021
MINUTE ORDER granting 119 unopposed motion for leave to file reply
declarations. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 9/13/2021. (lcegs3)
(Entered: 09/13/2021)
09/16/2021
122 
ORDER granting 23 Motion to Certify Class; granting 57 Motion for
Preliminary Injunction; denying 117 Motion for Hearing. Signed by Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan on 9/16/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 09/16/2021)
09/16/2021
123 
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on
9/16/2021. (lcegs3) (Entered: 09/16/2021)
09/17/2021
124 
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 122 Order on Motion
to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion
for Hearing, 123 Memorandum & Opinion by TAE D. JOHNSON, TROY
52
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MILLER, ROCHELLE P. WALENSKY, ALEJANDRO J. MAYORKAS,
XAVIER BECERRA, WILLIAM A. FERRARA, RODNEY S. SCOTT. Fee
Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit
District Court Order, # 2 Exhibit District Court Memorandum Opinion)(Tepe,
Sean) (Entered: 09/17/2021)
53
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, on 
behalf of herself and others similarly situated,  
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, et al.,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
      
 
Civ. A. No. 21-100 (EGS) 
 
 
NOTICE OF APPEAL  
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that all Defendants appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from this Court’s September 16, 2021 Order (ECF 
No. 122) and Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 123) granting a preliminary injunction.  
 
Dated:  September 17, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS, D.C. Bar #415793 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
BRIAN P. HUDAK 
Acting Chief, Civil Division 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 /s/ Sean M. Tepe 
                                            
SEAN M. TEPE, DC Bar #1001323 
Assistant United States Attorney 
555 Fourth St., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Phone: (202) 252-2533 
Email: sean.tepe@usdoj.gov 
 
54
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1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, et 
al., 
 
 
Plaintiffs,    
 
v. 
 
 
 
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his 
official capacity as Secretary 
of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civ. Action No. 21-100(EGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum 
Opinion, it is hereby  
 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is 
GRANTED; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court certifies a class pursuant to Rules 
23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
consisting of all noncitizens who: (1) are or will be in the 
United States; (2) come to the United States as a family unit 
composed of at least one child under 18 years old and that 
child’s parent or legal guardian; and (3) are or will be 
subjected to the Title 42 Process; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Nancy Gimena Huisha-Huisha and her 
minor child I.M.C.H.; Valeria Macancela Bermejo and her minor 
55
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2 
 
daughter, B.A.M.M.; Josaine Pereira-De Souza and her minor 
children H.N.D.S.; E.R.P.D.S.; M.E.S.D.S.; H.T.D.S.D.S.; Martha 
Liliana Taday-Acosta and her minor children D.J.Z.; J.A.Z.; 
Julien Thomas, Fidette Boute, and their minor children D.J.T.-
B.; T.J.T.-B.; and Romilus Valcourt, Bedapheca Alcante, and 
their minor child, B.V.-A., are appointed as Class  
Representatives; and it is further 
ORDERED that ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project is appointed 
Lead Class Counsel, and the Texas Civil Rights Project, the ACLU 
of Texas, the ACLU of the District of Columbia, the Refugee and 
Immigrant Center for Legal Education and Legal Services 
(RAICES), the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, and Oxfam 
America are appointed as Class Counsel; and it is further 
 
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Oral Argument is 
DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
is GRANTED; and it is further  
 
ORDERED that, pursuant to this Order, Defendants are HEREBY 
ENJOINED from applying the Title 42 Process, including the CDC’s 
August 2021 Order, to the Class Members; and it is further  
 
ORDERED that this Order shall be stayed for 14 days from 
the date of its entry; and it is further 
56
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3 
 
 
ORDERED that any request to stay this Order pending appeal 
will be denied for the reasons stated in the accompanying 
Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed:  Emmet G. Sullivan  
  
United States District Judge  
  
September 16, 2021 
57
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1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, et 
al., 
 
 
Plaintiffs,    
 
v. 
 
 
 
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his 
official capacity as Secretary 
of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civ. Action No. 21-100(EGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Plaintiffs—a group of asylum-seeking families who fled to 
the United States—bring this lawsuit against Alejandro Mayorkas,1 
in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
various other federal government officials (“Defendants” or the 
“government”) for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.; the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 note; and the Public Health Service Act of 1944, 42 U.S.C 
§ 201, et seq. Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Class Certification and Motion for Classwide Preliminary 
 
1 Alejandro Mayorkas is substituted pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 25(d). 
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Injunction. See Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1; Mem. Supp. 
Pls.’ Mot. Classwide Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.”), 
ECF No. 57-1.2 Upon careful consideration of the motions, the 
responses, and replies thereto, the applicable law, and the 
entire record, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Classwide 
Preliminary Injunction.3 
I. 
Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
1. 
The U.S. Asylum Process 
“For almost a century, Congress has recognized that 
citizens of foreign states are sometimes forced to flee from 
persecution in their home countries, and it has been the policy 
of the United States government that this country ought to serve 
 
2  When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page 
number of the filed document. 
3 On August 11, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for oral argument 
on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Mot. Oral 
Argument, ECF No. 117. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 65(d), “[o]n 
request of the moving party together with a statement of the 
facts which make expedition essential, a hearing on an 
application for preliminary injunction shall be set by the Court 
no later than 21 days after its filing, unless the Court earlier 
decides the motion on the papers or makes a finding that a later 
hearing date will not prejudice the parties.” Here, while 
Plaintiffs filed their motion on February 5, 2021, briefing on 
the motion was stayed until August 5, 2021. See Min. Order (Aug. 
5, 2021). Thus, the Court finds that there is no prejudice to 
the parties in declining to hold a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion 
and shall instead decide the motion on the papers. Defendants’ 
motion for oral argument is therefore denied. 
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as a place of refuge for persons who are in such distress.” 
Kiakombua v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2020). In 
keeping with this policy, Congress has codified various 
procedures governing how the United States evaluates and 
processes the admission requests of refugees. As relevant here, 
there are three primary protections for asylum seekers in place 
under current immigration laws. 
First, in 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, which amended the INA, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in sections of 8 
U.S.C.). The Refugee Act created a statutory procedure for 
refugees seeking asylum and established the standards for 
granting such requests. The INA currently governs this 
procedure, and it provides that “[a]ny alien who is physically 
present in the United States or who arrives in the United States 
(whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ), 
irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General is granted the 
discretion to grant asylum. Id. § 1158 (b)(1)(A). However, that 
relief can only be granted if the alien is a “refugee,” as 
defined by federal law. Id. Pursuant to the INA, a “refugee” is 
“any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality” and who is “unable or unwilling to return to . . . 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
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persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Thus, the ‘persecution or well-founded 
fear of persecution’ standard governs the Attorney General’s 
determination [of] whether an alien is eligible for asylum.” INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987). Furthermore, even 
when a noncitizen is subject to a rapid expulsion process known 
as “expedited removal” because they fit within an established 
category of persons who can be summarily removed without full 
hearings or other process, such noncitizen can only be so 
removed if she does not have “an intention to apply for asylum 
under [8 U.S.C. § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
Second, at the same time the Refugee Act of 1980 
established the asylum process, it amended the statutory scheme 
governing a related form of relief—“withholding of deportation”—
to remove the Attorney General’s discretion to decide whether to 
grant that form of relief. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428–29. 
As amended by the 1980 Act, the INA “requires the Attorney 
General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates 
that his ‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on account of one 
of [a list of factors] if he is deported.” Id. at 423. A grant 
of withholding is mandatory if the individual meets the 
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statutory criteria. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 
(1999). 
Third, Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) 
provides that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) 
or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 
3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, p. 20, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 114. Congress has implemented Article 3 of CAT as part 
of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 
(“FARRA”). Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
FARRA further declares it “the policy of the United States not 
to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return 
of any person to a country in which there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” Id. (quoting Pub.L. No. 105–277, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681–761, 822 (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 
note).  
2. 
COVID-19 Pandemic and the CDC Orders  
Since 1893, federal law has provided federal officials with 
the authority to stem the spread of contagious diseases from 
foreign countries by prohibiting, “in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such countries.” Act 
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of February 15, 1893, ch. 114, § 7, 27 Stat. 449, 452 (“1893 
Act”). Under current law: 
Whenever the Surgeon General determines that 
by reason of the existence of any communicable 
disease in a foreign country there is serious 
danger of the introduction of such disease 
into the United States, and that this danger 
is so increased by the introduction of persons 
or 
property 
from 
such 
country 
that 
a 
suspension of the right to introduce such 
persons and property is required in the 
interest of the public health, the Surgeon 
General, 
in 
accordance 
with 
regulations 
approved by the President, shall have the 
power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such 
countries or places as he shall designate in 
order to avert such danger, and for such 
period of time as he may deem necessary for 
such purpose. 
42 U.S.C. § 265 (“Section 265”). In 1966, the Surgeon General’s 
Section 265 authority was transferred to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which in turn delegated this 
authority to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) Director. See P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 503 
(D.D.C. 2020); 31 Fed. Reg. 8855 (June 25, 1966), 80 Stat. 1610 
(1966). 
On March 20, 2020, as the COVID-19 virus spread globally, 
HHS issued an interim final rule pursuant to Section 265 that 
aimed to “provide[] a procedure for CDC to suspend the 
introduction of persons from designated countries or places, if 
required, in the interest of public health.” Interim Final Rule, 
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Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension 
of Introduction of Persons Into United States From Designated 
Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 16559-01, 2020 WL 1330968, (March 24, 2020) (“Interim Final 
Rule”). Pursuant to the Interim Final Rule, the CDC Director 
could “suspend the introduction of persons into the United 
States.” Id. at 16563. The Interim Final Rule stated, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Introduction into the United States of 
persons from a foreign country (or one or more 
political subdivisions or regions thereof) or 
place means the movement of a person from a 
foreign country (or one or more political 
subdivisions or regions thereof) or place, or 
series of foreign countries or places, into 
the United States so as to bring the person 
into contact with persons in the United 
States, or so as to cause the contamination of 
property in the United States, in a manner 
that the Director determines to present a risk 
of transmission of a communicable disease to 
persons or property, even if the communicable 
disease 
has 
already 
been 
introduced, 
transmitted, or is spreading within the United 
States;  
(2) Serious danger of the introduction of such 
communicable disease into the United States 
means the potential for introduction of 
vectors of the communicable disease into the 
United States, even if persons or property in 
the United States are already infected or 
contaminated with the communicable disease; 
and  
(3) The term “Place” includes any location 
specified by the Director, including any 
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carrier, as that term is defined in 42 CFR 
71.1, whatever the carrier’s nationality. 
Id. at 16566-67.  
The CDC’s Interim Rule went into effect immediately. Id. at 
16565. The CDC explained that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) 
of the APA, HHS had concluded that there was “good cause” to 
dispense with prior notice and comment. Id. Specifically, the 
CDC stated that “[g]iven the national emergency caused by COVID-
19, it would be impracticable and contrary to the public health—
and, by extension, the public interest—to delay these 
implementing regulations until a full public notice-and-comment 
process is completed.” Id.  
Pursuant to the Interim Final Rule, the CDC Director issued 
an order suspending for 30 days the introduction of “covered 
aliens,” which he defined as “persons traveling from Canada or 
Mexico (regardless of their country of origin) who would 
otherwise be introduced into a congregate setting in a land Port 
of Entry [(“POE”)] or Border Patrol station at or near the 
United States borders with Canada and Mexico.” Notice of Order 
Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act 
Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where 
a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17060-02, 17061, 
2020 WL 1445906 (March 26, 2020) (“March 2020 Order”). The March 
2020 Order declared that “[i]t is necessary for the public 
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health to immediately suspend the introduction of covered 
aliens” and “require[d] the movement of all such aliens to the 
country from which they entered the United States, or their 
country of origin, or another location as practicable, as 
rapidly as possible.” Id. at 17067. The CDC Director then 
“requested that [the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)] 
implement th[e] [March 2020 Order] because CDC does not have the 
capability, resources, or personnel needed to do so.” Id. The 
CDC Director also noted that U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), a federal law enforcement agency of DHS, had already 
“developed an operational plan for implementing the order.” Id. 
Soon thereafter, the CBP issued a memorandum on April 2, 
2020 establishing its procedures for implementing the March 2020 
Order. See Ex. E to Cheung Decl. (“CAPIO Memo”), ECF No. 57-5 at 
15; see also Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 14-15. The 
CAPIO Memo instructed that agents may determine whether 
individuals are subject to the CDC’s order “[b]ased on training, 
experience, physical observation, technology, questioning and 
other considerations.” CAPIO Memo, ECF No. 57-5 at 15. If an 
individual was determined to be subject to the order, they were 
to be “transported to the nearest POE and immediately returned 
to Mexico or Canada, depending on their point of transit.” Id. 
at 17. Those who are “not amenable to immediate expulsion to 
Mexico or Canada, will be transported to a dedicated facility 
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for limited holding prior to expulsion” to their home country. 
Id. The CAPIO Memo “provide[d] no instructions on medical 
screenings or other procedures for determining whether a covered 
noncitizen may have COVID-19.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶ 60.  
On April 22, 2020, the March 2020 Order was extended for an 
additional 30 days. See Extension of Order Under Sections 362 
and 365 of the Public Health Service Act; Order Suspending 
Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where a 
Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 22424-01, 2020 WL 
1923282 (April 22, 2020) (“April 2020 Order”). The order was 
then extended again on May 20, 2020 until such time that the CDC 
Director “determine[s] that the danger of further introduction 
of COVID-19 into the United States has ceased to be a serious 
danger to the public health.” Amendment and Extension of Order 
Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act; 
Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries 
Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 31503-02, 
31504, 2020 WL 2619696 (May 26, 2020) (“May 2020 Order”).  
On September 11, 2020, the CDC published its final rule. 
See Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: 
Suspension of the Right To Introduce and Prohibition of 
Introduction of Persons Into United States From Designated 
Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 56424-01, 2020 WL 5439721, (Sept. 11, 2020) (Effective 
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October 13, 2020) (“Final Rule”). The Final Rule “defin[ed] the 
phrase to ‘[p]rohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction 
into the United States of persons’ to mean ‘to prevent the 
introduction of persons into the United States by suspending any 
right to introduce into the United States, physically stopping 
or restricting movement into the United States, or physically 
expelling from the United States some or all of the persons.’” 
Id. at 56445. The CDC Director then replaced the March, April, 
and May 2020 Orders with a new order on October 13, 2020. Order 
Suspending the Right To Introduce Certain Persons From Countries 
Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 
65806, 65808 (Oct. 16, 2020) (“October 2020 Order”).  
On August 2, 2021, the CDC issued its most recent order, 
“Public Health Assessment and Order Suspending the Right to 
Introduce Certain Persons from Countries Where a Quarantinable 
Communicable Disease Exists,” which replaced and superseded the 
October 2020 Order. See Public Health Assessment and Order 
Suspending the Right to Introduce Certain Persons from Countries 
Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists (Aug. 2, 
2021), Attach. A to Notice CDC Public Health Order (“August 2021 
Order”), ECF No. 114. The August 2021 Order states that “CDC has 
determined that an Order under 42 U.S.C. § 265 remains necessary 
to protect U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, lawful permanent 
residents, personnel and noncitizens at the ports of entry (POE) 
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and U.S. Border Patrol stations, and destination communities in 
the United States during the COVID-19 public health emergency.” 
Id. at 5. Thus, the August 2021 Order continues to prohibit the 
introduction of “covered noncitizens”—which is defined to 
include “family units”—into the United States along the U.S. 
land and adjacent coastal borders. Id. at 7. The Court will 
refer to the process developed by the CDC and implemented by the 
August 2021 Order as the “CDC Order” or the “Title 42 Process.” 
3. 
CDC Order’s Effect on Asylum Seekers 
Plaintiffs and the proposed class member are families from 
countries “that are among the most dangerous in the world due to 
gang, gender, family membership, and other identity-based 
violence.” Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 31. 
Plaintiffs are currently detained and in the custody of DHS. Am. 
Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 14-19. As such, they are subject to 
expulsion from the United States pursuant to the CDC Order. 
Plaintiffs assert that prior to the Title 42 Process, and 
“pursuant to longstanding immigration statutes protecting asylum 
seekers, Plaintiffs were entitled to assert claims for asylum 
and related forms of humanitarian protection, and to procedures 
Congress established to ensure the fair determination of their 
right to remain in the United States.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs claim 
that if they and others like them are expelled pursuant to the 
CDC Order, they “would face grave danger in their home 
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countries.” Id. ¶ 10. According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants 
subjected approximately 21,500 members of families to the Title 
42 Process between March and December 2020.” Pls.’ Mot. Class 
Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 10. 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. 
Related Litigation 
On November 18, 2020, this Court adopted Magistrate Judge 
Harvey’s Report and Recommendation, provisionally granted the 
plaintiff’s motion to certify class, and issued a preliminary 
injunction barring enforcement of the Title 42 Process as to 
unaccompanied minors in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 
520-22 (D.D.C. 2020). The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) later stayed the preliminary 
injunction pending appeal. Order, P.J.E.S. v. Mayorkas, No. 20-
5357 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2021).  
In February 2021, the CDC issued a notice “temporarily 
except[ing] . . . unaccompanied noncitizen children” from 
expulsion under the Title 42 Process. CDC, Notice of Temporary 
Exception from Expulsion of Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children 
Encountered in the United States Pending Forthcoming Public 
Health Determination, 86 Fed. Reg. 9942-01, 2021 WL 600683 (Feb. 
11, 2021). The notice stated that CDC was “in the process of 
reassessing” the Title 42 Order and that the temporary exception 
for unaccompanied minors would “remain in effect until CDC has 
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completed its public health assessment and published any notice 
or modified Order.” Id. Magistrate Judge Harvey and the D.C. 
Circuit granted the parties’ motion to hold the case in abeyance 
on February 24, 2021. See Min. Order (Feb. 24, 2021); Order, 
P.J.E.S. v. Mayorkas, No. 20-5357 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 2021). 
In July 2021, the CDC issued an order “except[ing] 
unaccompanied noncitizen children . . . from the [CDC’s] October 
[13, 2020] Order.” See Order Under Sections 362 & 365 of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 265, 268) and 42 CFR 71.40; 
Public Health Determination Regarding an Exception for 
Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children From the Order Suspending the 
right to Introduce Certain Persons From Countries Where a 
Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 86 Fed. Reg. 38717, 
38718 (July 22, 2021). The CDC explained that the July 16 Order 
“supersede[s]” the notice issued on February 11, 2021. Id. at 
38720. On August 2, 2021 the CDC issued another order that 
superseded the October 2020 Order. Public Health Reassessment 
and Order Suspending the Right To Introduce Certain Persons From 
Countries Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 86 
Fed. Reg. 42828-02 (Aug. 5, 2021). The July 16 Order was “made a 
part of [the August 2021 Order] and incorporated by reference as 
if fully set forth” in the August 2021 Order. Id. at 42829 n.5. 
 
 
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2. 
Proceedings in this Case 
Plaintiffs filed this action on January 12, 2021. See 
Compl., ECF No. 1. The same day, Plaintiffs filed an emergency 
motion to stay their removal from the United States, and 
Defendants orally objected to Plaintiffs’ request during the 
hearing on the motion. See Pls.’ Emergency Mot. Stay Removal, 
ECF No. 5. The Court entered a Minute Order granting Plaintiffs’ 
emergency motion over objection “[i]n view of the arguments 
presented by Plaintiffs in their motion, the representations 
made by the Government, and for the reasons stated on the record 
at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference.” Min. Order (Jan. 12, 
2021). The Court also granted thirteen subsequent emergency 
motions to stay the removal of other families on January 19, 
2021; January 27, 2021; January 29, 2021; February 1, 2021; 
February 4, 2021; February 5, 2021; February 6, 2021; February 
9, 2021; February 18, 2021; February 19, 2021; and February 22, 
2021. See Min. Orders (Jan. 19, 2021; Jan. 27, 2021; Jan. 29, 
2021; Feb. 1, 2021; Feb. 4, 2021; Feb. 5, 2021; Feb. 6, 2021; 
Feb. 9, 2021; Feb. 18, 2021; Feb. 19, 2021; Feb. 22, 2021). 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on 
January 28, 2021, see Mot. Certify Class, ECF No. 23; and they 
filed a motion for preliminary injunction on February 5, 2021, 
see Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57. Defendants filed a combined 
opposition to both motions on February 17, 2021. See Defs.’ 
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Opp’n, ECF No. 76. On February 23, 2021, the Court granted the 
parties’ joint motion to hold in abeyance Plaintiffs’ motions 
for class certification and classwide preliminary injunction. 
Min. Order (Feb. 23, 2021). The motions were held in abeyance 
until August 5, 2021, when the Court granted the parties’ motion 
for a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs’ motions. Min. Order (Aug. 
5, 2021). On August 6, 2021, Defendants filed a supplemental 
declaration in support of their combined opposition. See 
Shahoulian Decl., ECF No. 116. Plaintiffs filed their combined 
reply brief on August 11, 2021. See Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118. 
The motions are now ripe for the Court’s adjudication. 
II. 
Legal Standard 
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] 
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 
favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 
(D.C. Cir. 2011)). Where the federal government is the opposing 
party, the balance of equities and public interest factors 
merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). A 
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only 
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
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to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). “The purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be 
held.” Univ. of Tex. V. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In 
this Circuit, the four factors have typically been evaluated on 
a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes an unusually 
strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not 
necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” 
Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), “the D.C. 
Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four 
preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 
71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley, 644 
F.3d at 393 (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to 
hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, 
freestanding requirement for a preliminary injunction.”) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, “the 
Circuit has had no occasion to decide this question because it 
has not yet encountered a post-Winter case where a preliminary 
injunction motion survived the less rigorous sliding-scale 
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analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
III. 
Analysis 
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 
parties only.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) 
(quotation marks omitted). Rule 23(a) establishes four 
requirements for class certification: (1) that “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; (2) that 
“there are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3) 
that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class”; and (4) that 
“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition 
to satisfying Rule 23(a), a putative class must also meet one of 
the Rule 23(b) requirements. Here, Plaintiffs seek certification 
under Rule 23(b)(2), claiming that Defendants have “acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so 
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Pls.’ Mot. 
Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 8 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2)). 
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“The party seeking certification bears the burden of 
persuasion, and must show that the putative class[] meet[s] the 
requirements of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
Garnett v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 204 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(citing Hoyte v. District of Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 491 
(D.D.C. 2017)). To carry that burden, Plaintiffs must 
“affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule—that 
is, [they] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact 
sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, 
etc.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
The Court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” to confirm that 
the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. 
of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).  
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 
23(b)(2), Plaintiffs have sought certification of the following 
class:  “All noncitizens who (1) are or will be in the United 
States; (2) come to the United States as a family unit composed 
of at least one child under 18 years old and that child’s parent 
or legal guardian; and (3) are or will be subjected to the Title 
42 Process.” Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 7. For the 
reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs meet 
all of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements. As 
Defendants’ sole challenge to Plaintiffs’ class certification 
motion is that the term “Title 42 Process” is not adequately 
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defined, Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 16; the Court shall first 
address the sufficiency of the class definition before briefly 
analyzing the remaining Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
requirements. 
1. 
Class Definition 
“[I]t is far from clear that there exists in this 
[D]istrict a requirement that a class . . . must demonstrate 
ascertainability to merit certification.” Ramirez v. USCIS, 338 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Hoyte v. District of 
Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 489 n.3 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that 
“[t]he ascertainability requirement, while adopted by some 
courts in this district, has been recently disavowed by four 
federal appellate courts” and explaining that “the D.C. Circuit 
has not opined on the requirement”). However, the requirement of 
“definiteness” has been imposed by some courts as an “implied 
requirement” for class certification, in addition to the express 
requirements in Rule 23. See DL v. District of Columbia, 302 
F.R.D. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). This “common-sense requirement,” 
Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 346 (D.D.C. 1998); is 
designed primarily to ensure the proposed class is 
administratively manageable, see Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 
1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “It is not designed to be a 
particularly stringent test, but plaintiffs must at least be 
able to establish that ‘the general outlines of the membership 
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21 
 
of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation.’” 
Pigford, 182 F.R.D. at 346 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1760 at 118).  
“[W]here the plaintiff seeks certification of an injunctive 
class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), ‘actual membership of the class 
need not . . . be precisely delimited’ because such cases will 
not require individualized notice, opt-out rights, or individual 
damage assessments, and the defendant will be required to comply 
with the relief ordered no matter who is in the class.’” Brewer 
v. Lynch, No. 08-1747, 2015 WL 13604257, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 
2015). In those cases, the definiteness requirement is satisfied 
as long as plaintiffs can establish the “existence of a class” 
and propose a class definition that “accurately articulates ‘the 
general demarcations’ of the class of individuals who are being 
harmed by the alleged deficiencies.” See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. 
Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 264 (D.N.H. 2013); see also DL, 302 
F.R.D. at 17 (“Because the rationale for precise 
ascertainability is inapposite in the 23(b)(2) context, . . . it 
is not required in cases such as this where only injunctive 
relief is sought and notice is not required.”). 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and Rule 23(b)(2) because the phrase “Title 42 Process” is not 
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defined within the class definition. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 
16.  They argue that, due to the lack of a definition, 
“Plaintiffs have not established that the conduct they seek to 
enjoin or declare unlawful will be ‘as to all of the class 
members or as to none of them.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2)). While Defendants concede that “it is no secret that 
Plaintiffs challenge the ‘practice of summary expulsion under 
the Title 42 Process’ and the alleged lack of access to asylum,” 
they argue that the Amended Complaint and Class Certification 
Motion include statements that suggest that the “class 
definition might include practices that Plaintiffs do not 
challenge as unlawful.” Id. at 17. Specifically, Defendants note 
that Plaintiffs refer to the “Title 42 Process” as a “system 
established in a set of agency documents—a new regulation, 
several orders, and an implementation memo,” and that the 
Amended Complaint states that, “[a]mong other things, the Title 
42 Process authorizes the summary expulsion of noncitizens, 
including vulnerable families seeking asylum in this country, 
without any of the procedural protections guaranteed by 
Congress.” Id. (quoting Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 1, 3) (cleaned 
up). 
The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the Court notes 
that a “vague and ambiguous class definition” is not 
automatically “fatal[]” to a motion for class certification. 
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Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 15-17. The case law is clear that 
the mere existence of a problematic class definition does not 
automatically mandate denial of class certification. See Brewer, 
2015 WL 13604257, at *7. Rather, “[w]hen appropriate, district 
courts may redefine classes . . . sua sponte prior to 
certification.” Borum v. Brentwood Village, LLC, 324 F.R.D. 1, 8 
(D.D.C. 2018); see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 589-90 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that district courts may “exercise . . 
. broad discretion to redefine and reshape the proposed class to 
the point that it qualifies for certification under Rule 23”). 
Here, however, the proposed class is not so poorly defined 
as to require sua sponte redefinition by the Court. First, 
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, motions, and reply brief each set 
forth a fairly descriptive definition of the Title 42 Process as 
referring to the practice of summarily expelling asylum-seeking 
families since late March 2020. See Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF 
No. 23-1 at 7 (“A class action lawsuit is appropriate to 
challenge Defendants’ unlawful practice of summarily expelling 
vulnerable families with minor children under their shadow 
deportation system, referred to here as the ‘Title 42 Process’ 
or ‘Title 42 Policy.’”); Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 
at 9 (“Defendants moved to summarily deport [Plaintiffs] based 
on an unprecedented and unlawful expulsion process, invoking the 
public health powers of the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention (‘CDC’), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 265 (the ‘Title 42 
Process’).”); Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 29 (“Plaintiffs have 
identified and challenged ‘a uniform policy or practice’ of 
‘expulsion,’ and sought relief enjoining application of the 
challenged CDC orders to the class.”); Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶ 
3 (“Among other things, the Title 42 Process authorizes the 
summary expulsion of noncitizens, including vulnerable families 
seeking asylum in this country, without any of the procedural 
protections guaranteed by Congress—even if the families show no 
signs of having COVID-19.”).  
Second, although Plaintiffs do use the phrase “among other 
things” in one sentence within their Amended Complaint, 
Defendants’ argument is weakened by their own acknowledgment 
that the focus of this litigation is the “‘practice of summary 
expulsion under the Title 42 Process’ and the alleged lack of 
access to asylum.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 16.  
And third, Defendants’ reliance on the Seventh Circuit case 
Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008), is misplaced. 
In Rahman, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of citizens 
defined as “[a]ll United States citizens who now are and/or in 
the future will be subjected to detentions upon reentry to the 
United States as a result of defendants’ contested policies, 
practices and customs.” Id. at 625. However, the class 
definition did not specify what “defendants’ contested policies, 
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practices and customs” were. Id. The Seventh Circuit therefore 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify, explaining that “[a] 
class of all persons now or in the future subject to unspecified 
practices may have nothing to do with the named representatives’ 
injuries, or what caused them.” Id. at 626. The court also noted 
that the undefined class was “hard to evaluate” and 
“incompatible” with the “typicality” requirement. Id. at 627.  
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ class definition 
“suffers from similar infirmities.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 
16. But not only is Rahman non-binding on this Court, it is also 
distinguishable on the facts. Significantly, though Plaintiffs 
refer to the “Title 42 Process” generally as a “system 
established in a set of agency documents—a new regulation, 
several orders, and an implementation memo,” id. at 17; 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and motions briefing also 
separately identify and describe each regulation, order, and 
memo. See, e.g., Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 41-66. Thus, unlike 
in Rahman, the Court is able to easily evaluate the application 
of specific policies and procedures on the proposed class 
members, and any “administrative feasibility requirement” is 
satisfied because identifying the class members under this 
definition would not require much, if any, individual factual 
inquiry. See Brewer, 2015 WL 13604257, at *6. 
 
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2. 
Rule 23(a) Requirements 
a. Numerosity 
Because of the general rule in favor of confining 
litigation to the named parties only, a class action is 
appropriate only when “the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
Although Plaintiffs need not clear any “specific threshold,” as 
a general benchmark, “courts in this jurisdiction have observed 
that a class of at least forty members is sufficiently large to 
meet this requirement.” Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 241 
F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiffs may satisfy the 
requirement by supplying estimates of putative class members, 
see Pigford, 182 F.R.D. at 347–48; “[s]o long as there is a 
reasonable basis for the estimate provided,” Kifafi v. Hilton 
Hotels Ret. Plan, 189 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1999).  
Here, Defendants do not dispute that the proposed class 
satisfies the numerosity requirement. Plaintiffs have provided 
evidence that, between March 2020 and December 2020, 
approximately 21,515 members of family units4 were subject to the 
CDC Order and its previous iterations, see Kang Decl., ECF No. 
23-2 ¶ 4; and that, between April 2020 and December 2020, 
 
4 The CBP defines a “family unit” as “the number of individuals 
(either a child under 18 years old, parent or legal guardian) 
apprehended with a family member.” See Kang Decl., ECF No. 23-2 
¶ 3. 
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“approximately 21,018 members of family units (81%) were 
expelled under Title 42,” id. ¶ 6. Accordingly, the Court finds 
that the numerosity requirement is met. See O.A. v. Trump, 404 
F. Supp. 3d 109, 155 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding numerosity 
established by evidence in the administrative record estimating 
that the class consisted of “thousands of migrants who have 
crossed and will cross the United States’ southern border 
outside ports of entry”). 
b. Commonality 
A plaintiff seeking class certification must also establish 
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This requires more than the 
identification of the purported violation of the same provision 
of law. See DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 127–30 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating an order certifying a class composed 
of students who were purportedly each denied a free appropriate 
public education on the ground that plaintiffs had identified 
only sufferers of a violation of the same provision of law and 
had not met the commonality requirement). Instead, the claims 
must depend on “a common contention [that] is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth 
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 
of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–Mart Stores, 564 
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U.S. at 350. “Even a single common question will do.” Id. at 359 
(cleaned up).  
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, commonality is satisfied 
where there is “a uniform policy or practice that affects all 
class members.” DL, 713 F.3d at 128; see also O.A., 404 F. Supp. 
3d at 156 (finding commonality satisfied where “[a]ll members of 
the proposed class, and all of the proposed class 
representatives, face the same threat of injury” and where 
“[a]ll challenge the same Rule on the same grounds, and all seek 
the same remedy—invalidation of the Rule”). Here, Plaintiffs are 
challenging the lawfulness of the Title 42 Process, which is a 
uniform policy that applies to each Plaintiff and all members of 
the proposed class. Moreover, “[n]ot only do all class members 
present the same challenge to the policy, but there also is no 
evident variation among them concerning their ultimate 
entitlement to relief: if any person in the class has a 
meritorious claim, they all do.” J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 
1321 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court can, therefore, conclude that 
“common questions of law and fact” unite the class members’ 
claims. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 332 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(finding that “the allegation that the five ICE Field Officers 
are no longer providing the ‘individualized determinations’ of 
parole eligibility and procedural protections required by the 
Parole Directive” satisfied the commonality requirement). 
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c. Typicality 
A class representative satisfies the typicality requirement 
if the representative’s “claims are based on the same legal 
theory as the claims of the other class members” and her 
“injuries arise from the same course of conduct that gives rise 
to the other class members’ claims.” Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 35. 
Put another way, a representative’s claims are typical of those 
of the class when “[t]he plaintiffs allege that their injuries 
derive from a unitary course of conduct by a single system.” 
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997). Here, 
Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class face the same 
injury: the threat of expulsion pursuant to the Title 42 
Process. All challenge the same policy on the same grounds, and 
all seek the same remedy—invalidation of the Title 42 Process. 
Thus, the typicality requirement is met. 
d. Adequacy 
“The adequacy requirement aims to ensure that absent class 
members will not be bound by the outcome of a suit in which they 
were not competently and fairly represented.” J.D., 925 F.3d at 
1312. “Adequacy embraces two components: the class 
representative (i) ‘must not have antagonistic or conflicting 
interests with the unnamed members of the class’ and (ii) ‘must 
appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class 
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through qualified counsel.’” Id. (quoting Twelve John Does v. 
District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
Defendants also do not dispute that Plaintiffs have 
satisfied the adequacy requirement. First, Defendants have not 
identified—and the Court is unaware of—any interest Plaintiffs 
have that is antagonistic to or conflicts with the putative 
class members. Rather, courts have found that where, as here, 
the plaintiffs “seek identical relief for all class members, . . 
. there are no conflicting interests that might derail 
certification on this prong.” Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District 
of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2015). Second, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs’ current counsel are “willing and have 
the ability vigorously to litigate this case and to protect the 
interests of absent class members.” O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 
157. 
3. 
Rule 23(b)(2) Requirement 
Having determined that Plaintiffs meet the requirements of 
Rule 23(a), the Court must next determine whether they meet the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) applies if “the 
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “The 
key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the 
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injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the 
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful 
only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Wal-
Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Rule 23(b)(2) imposes “two requirements: (1) that 
defendant’s actions or refusal to act are ‘generally applicable 
to the class’ and (2) that plaintiffs seek final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief on behalf of the 
class.” Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 37. 
 
Plaintiffs have satisfied both requirements here. The 
relief Plaintiffs seek—among other things, a declaration that 
the Title 42 Process is unlawful and an injunction prohibiting 
Defendants from applying the Title 42 Process to Plaintiffs and 
proposed class members—is “generally applicable to the class” 
and is indivisible. See Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 334–35 
(finding Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied where plaintiffs were not 
asking the court “to remedy discrete errors in their parole 
determinations,” but rather “only . . . address an alleged 
systematic harm”); R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 182 
(D.D.C. 2015) (finding Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied where plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin ICE from consideration of particular factor in 
making detention determination). Plaintiffs also do not seek 
individualized relief, and thus this is not a case where “each 
individual class member would be entitled to a different 
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32 
 
injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal–
Mart, 564 U.S. at 360; see also Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 48 
(finding Rule 23(b) satisfied where plaintiffs “d[id] not seek a 
court order mandating any particular outcome with respect to any 
particular [individual plaintiff]”). 
 
For all these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion 
for class certification. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
1. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the 
Merits 
Plaintiffs argue that the CDC Orders instituting the Title 
42 Process exceed the authority granted by Congress pursuant to 
Section 265 because “[n]othing in [Section] 265, or Title 42 
more generally, purports to authorize any deportations, much 
less deportations in violation of” statutory procedures and 
humanitarian protections, including the right to seek asylum. 
Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 17-18. The Court agrees 
and finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claim. 
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), provides the framework for reviewing an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged 
with administering. See 467 U.S. at 837. The first step in this 
review process is for the court to determine “whether Congress 
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has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 
842. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–
43. In determining whether the statute unambiguously expresses 
the intent of Congress, the court should use all the 
“traditional tools of statutory construction,” including looking 
to the text and structure of the statute, as well as its 
legislative history, if appropriate. See id. at 843 n.9; see 
also Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). If the court concludes that the statute is either 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at 
issue, the second step of the court’s review process is to 
determine whether the interpretation proffered by the agency is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843. The court must defer to agency interpretations 
that are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.” Id. at 844. 
The Court’s analysis begins with the statutory text. See S. 
Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 195 F.3d 17, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Here, Section 265 states in full: 
Whenever the Surgeon General determines that 
by reason of the existence of any communicable 
disease in a foreign country there is serious 
danger of the introduction of such disease 
into the United States, and that this danger 
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is so increased by the introduction of persons 
or 
property 
from 
such 
country 
that 
a 
suspension of the right to introduce such 
persons and property is required in the 
interest of the public health, the Surgeon 
General, 
in 
accordance 
with 
regulations 
approved by the President, shall have the 
power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such 
countries or places as he shall designate in 
order to avert such danger, and for such 
period of time as he may deem necessary for 
such purpose. 
42 U.S.C. § 265.  
As Plaintiffs point out, Section 265 simply contains no 
mention of the word “expel”—or any synonyms thereof—within its 
text. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 18. The lack 
of express terms within the statute is significant: even “broad 
rulemaking power must be exercised within the bounds set by 
Congress,” Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
385 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92, 94 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 962 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that “agencies are ‘bound, not only by 
the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it 
has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those 
purposes’”); and the CDC “does not [have the] power to revise 
clear statutory terms,” Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 
302, 327 (2014).  
Indeed, particularly where the statute in question regards 
such a “severe ‘penalty’” as deportation, Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United 
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States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); the Court is loathe to 
recognize an implied power of forced removal from the country, 
see Util. Air Reg. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (“We expect Congress to 
speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of 
vast ‘economic and political significance.’”). Rather, as this 
Court explained in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 512 
(D.D.C. 2020), “when Congress wants to grant the power to expel 
individuals out of the United States, it does so plainly.” 
P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 512; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(2)(A), (C) (allowing an alien who has arrived on land 
from a contiguous country and who is “not clearly and beyond a 
doubt entitled to be admitted” to be “return[ed] . . . to that 
territory pending a proceeding”); id. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (“Except 
as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered 
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the 
United States within a period of 90 days . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 
3186 (authorizing a fugitive from another country found in the 
United States to be “take[n] . . . to the territory of such 
foreign government” by an agent of that government). Moreover, 
“Congress has made clear when public health concerns merit 
disallowing a non-citizen to remain in the United States.” 
P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 539; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) 
(providing that “aliens who are inadmissible” are those 
determined “to have a communicable disease of public health 
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significance”); id. § 1222 (providing for medical detention and 
examination as part of immigration processing). As the Supreme 
Court “ha[s] stated time and again[,] . . . courts must presume 
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citations omitted); see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The 
classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over 
time, and getting them to make sense in combination, necessarily 
assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). And here, the plain language of Section 265, 
particularly when read in conjunction with the above statutes 
governing immigration under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, evinces no 
intention to grant the Executive the authority to expel or 
remove persons from the United States.  
The Court also finds that the plain text of Section 265 is 
supported by the statutory context. See Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33 (2000) (“It is a ‘fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must 
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))). For example, in Section 
271, Congress provided for specific “penalties” for those 
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persons who or vessels that violated public health regulations 
prescribed under the relevant sections, including Section 265. 
42 U.S.C. § 271. For individuals, Section 271 states that any 
violation “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.” Id. § 
271(a). Removal from the United States, however, is not included 
as a penalty. Moreover, Section 271 refers to the regulations 
prescribed under Section 265 and others as “quarantine laws,” 
further suggesting that the CDC’s powers were limited to 
quarantine and containment. Id. § 271 (emphasis added). 
Neither does neighboring Section 264 contemplate the 
removal of persons from the United States. Section 264 
authorizes the Secretary to use various public health measures 
to “prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases.” 42 U.S.C. § 264. Although Defendants 
rely on Section 264 as evidence of the Secretary’s “sweeping 
authority to protect the country from potentially devastating 
communicable diseases,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 23; the 
provision only mentions regulations that provide for the 
“apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional release of 
individuals” if the individual is “coming into a State or 
possession from a foreign country or possession.” 42 U.S.C. § 
264(c). Again, the authority to remove is not mentioned. “That 
is, in a section where one would expect the term to appear—where 
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Congress has delineated the government’s power to prevent the 
spread of contagious disease from individuals coming into the 
United States from a foreign country—it does not.” P.J.E.S., 502 
F. Supp. 3d at 537-38.  
Furthermore, even beyond Sections 264 and 271, the statute 
as a whole does not contain “a word about the power of the [CDC] 
to expel anyone who has come into the country.” Id. at 513-14 
(citing 42 U.S.C., Chap. 6A, Subchap. II, Part G (entitled 
“Quarantine and Inspection”)); 42 U.S.C. § 267 (entitled 
“Quarantine stations, grounds, and anchorages”); id. § 268 
(entitled “Quarantine duties of consular and other officers”); 
id. § 270 (entitled “Quarantine regulations governing civil air 
navigation and civil aircraft”); id. § 271 (entitled “Penalties 
for violation of quarantine laws”); id. § 272 (entitled 
“Administration of oaths by quarantine officers”). Rather, the 
statutory scheme reflects Congress’s focus on the public’s 
health, authorizing the CDC to create regulations that allow for 
the “apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional 
release of individuals” entering from foreign countries to stop 
the spread of communicable diseases from those countries, id. § 
264; and then in times of serious danger, to halt the 
“introduction of persons” from designated foreign countries, id. 
§ 265. 
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Defendants argue, however, that the findings above 
“ignore[] the purely public health purpose of the statute,” 
because “[t]he absence of the terms ‘expel’ or ‘removal’ has no 
special significance in the public health context even if its 
absence might be meaningful in the immigration context.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 19-20. They further contend that Section 
265’s phrase “prohibit[ing] . . . the introduction” does not 
demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the Executive’s 
authority at “stopping a person precisely at the Nation’s 
borders.” Id. at 18. Instead, “the term ‘introduction’ refers to 
a continuing process and is most naturally read to extend beyond 
a person’s immediate physical crossing of the border,” and “to 
‘prohibit . . . the introduction’ naturally means to intercept 
or prevent such a process.” Id. at 18-19. Thus, in Defendants’ 
view, “the Section 265 authority includes intercepting and 
halting persons who have already crossed the border—but who are 
in the process of being introduced—into the United States.” Id. 
at 19. 
Defendants arguments are unpersuasive. First, regardless of 
whether the words “expel” or “remove” are specific to the 
immigration context, Defendants do not explain the lack of 
synonyms of either word within the statute. Moreover, “[i]t is a 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that absent 
provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.” Rotkiske v. 
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Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “[W]hen 
Congress wants to mandate [certain] procedures[,] it knows 
exactly how to do so.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1626 (2018). In view of current immigration laws, which 
speak to deportation by using words such as “remove” and 
“return,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (“The Attorney General 
shall prescribe conditions . . . to . . . return . . . 
inadmissible aliens . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 1182(h)(2) 
(“No waiver shall be granted . . . for a period of not less than 
7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of 
proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.” 
(emphasis added)); this Court recognizes, as have other courts 
in this District, that “[t]here’s a serious question about 
whether [Section 265’s] power includes the power . . . to remove 
or exclude persons who are already present in the United 
States,” Hr’g Tr., J.B.B.C. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-1509, ECF No. 39 
at 50 (June 26, 2020). Put simply, the “fact that Congress did 
not use [words such as ‘return’ or ‘remove’] . . . suggests at a 
minimum that the power to remove is not granted by [S]ection 
265.” Id.5 
 
5 Citing to dicta in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 
(1983), the government argues that “language in one statute 
usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different 
language in another statute.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 19-20. 
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Second, even accepting the government’s position that the 
phrase “prohibit . . . the introduction of” means “to intercept 
or prevent” the “process” of introduction, Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 18-19; this phrase also does not encompass expulsion from 
the United States, nor do any of the definitions provided by the 
Government contain the word “expel” or synonyms thereof. Rather, 
to “prohibit . . . the introduction of” merely means that the 
process of introduction can be halted. And “[e]xpelling persons, 
as a matter of ordinary language, is entirely different from 
interrupting, intercepting, or halting the process of 
introduction.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. at 512; see also id. at 
536 (finding that the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definitions of 
“prohibit,” “intercept,” and “prevent” each “connote stopping 
something before it begins, rather than remedying it 
afterwards”). In other words, “interrupting, intercepting, or 
halting the process of introduction does [not] inexorably lead 
to expulsion.” Id. at 512. 
 
However, the Supreme Court routinely points to other statutes as 
evidence that Congress knows how to legislate in particular 
ways. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019) (“A 
textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate 
when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the 
omitted language or provision. Congress has enacted statutes 
that expressly include the language [the petitioner] asks us to 
read in . . . .”); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 
1626 (2018) (explaining that “when Congress wants to mandate 
[certain] procedures[,] it knows exactly how to do so,” and 
“Congress has spoken often and clearly” to the issue in other 
statutes). 
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The Government next contends that, “rather than specifying 
that the power to prohibit the introduction of persons is 
limited to the Nation’s borders,” Congress expressly delegated 
the power to issue regulations that accomplish Section 265’s 
purpose. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 20. But the government's 
argument is beside the point; if Section 265 does not provide 
the authority to expel persons, then it does not delegate the 
authority to issue regulations to expel persons. In addition, 
the Court also notes that the legislative history cited by the 
government—that Section 265’s predecessor statute would have 
given the President the power to suspend “immigration,” see 
Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 22—does not provide support for its 
position that Section 265 authorizes it to expel persons. 
Finally, in view of the above discussion and finding that 
Section 265 is not ambiguous, the Court need not reach step two 
of the Chevron analysis. However, even if the statute was 
ambiguous, deference would not be justified. First, “the 
‘reconciliation’ of distinct statutory regimes ‘is a matter for 
the courts,’ not agencies,” Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 
(quoting Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 685-86 
(1975)); and here, “[t]he question for this claim is purely 
legal: does Section 265 authorize expulsions from the United 
States, or does it not?” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 544 n.15. 
And while the government contends that the interpretation of 
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43 
 
“introduction” is within the Secretary’s expertise, see Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 33-34; the Court disagrees. “The CDC’s 
‘scientific and technical knowledge’ . . . has no bearing on 
that question of statutory interpretation.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. 
Supp. 3d at 544 n.15. Moreover, government has not explained how 
its scientific and technical expertise would lead it to 
interpret “introduction” to encompass “expulsion.” Cf. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (noting that “[a] court 
must make an independent inquiry into whether the character and 
context of the agency interpretation entitled it to controlling 
weight”); see also NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (“The Service cannot rely on ‘reminders that its 
scientific determinations are entitled to deference’ in the 
absence of reasoned analysis ‘to cogently explain’ why its 
additional recommended measures satisfied the Fishery Act’s 
requirements.”). Accordingly, the CDC is not entitled to 
deference with respect to its interpretation.6 
2. Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Injury 
“The failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is ‘grounds 
for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the 
 
6 Because the Court finds that Title 42 does not authorize 
expulsion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ additional 
arguments that Section 265 was designed to regulation 
transportation or that, even if Section 265 authorized 
expulsions, the Title 42 Process would violate the immigration 
statutes. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 21, 27. 
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other three factors . . . merit such relief.’” Nat’l Mining 
Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (RBW) 
(quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 
290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “In this Circuit, a litigant seeking 
a preliminary injunction must satisfy ‘a high standard’ for 
irreparable injury.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting 
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297). The movant 
must demonstrate that it faces an injury that is “both certain 
and great; it must be actual and not theoretical,” and of a 
nature “of such imminence that there is a clear and present need 
for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. 
v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and 
emphasis omitted). 
 
Plaintiffs contend that they are likely to suffer 
irreparable harm if they are expelled without the opportunity to 
seek humanitarian relief pursuant to the Title 42 Process. Pls.’ 
Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 31. Plaintiffs have presented 
as evidence United States Department of State reports and 
multiple declarations asserting that the home countries of the 
proposed class members “are among the most dangerous in the 
world due to gang, gender, family membership, and other 
identity-based violence.” Id. at 32. The declarations submitted 
to the Court specify in detail Plaintiffs’ fear of violence, 
persecution, and other victimization if they are removed, yet 
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they remain subject to the Title 42 Process and face the threat 
of removal prior to receiving any of the protections the 
immigration laws provide. See, e.g., Sealed Decl., ECF No. 9; 
Sealed Decl., ECF No. 17; Sealed Decl., ECF No. 27; Sealed 
Decl., ECF No. 32; Sealed Decls., ECF Nos. 63-67; Sealed Decl., 
ECF No. 70; Sealed Decls., ECF Nos. 84; Sealed Decls., ECF No. 
88-89. Plaintiffs further assert that many of the families “are 
expelled to Mexico, where they are often victimized by criminal 
cartels and gang members and face numerous barriers to finding 
safe places to shelter.” Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 
at 33. Defendants do not dispute the potential harms that 
Plaintiffs could face if removed from the United States.  
 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown 
they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary 
injunction. Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would likely be “beyond 
remediation.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 
297. First, pursuant to the Title 42 Process, Plaintiffs and the 
proposed class members face the prospect of expulsion without 
any opportunity to apply for asylum or withholding of removal. 
And once expelled from the United States and outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court, a judicial remedy may be unavailable. 
See Doe v. Mattis, 928 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding 
irreparable harm likely to flow from the transfer of a dual 
citizen detained in Iraq to an unidentified third country 
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46 
 
because he would then be in the custody of that third country 
“without any continuing oversight by—or recourse to—the United 
States”); P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 545; Tefel v. Reno, 972 
F. Supp. 608, 619–20 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[T]he Court finds . . . 
that Plaintiffs and class members would suffer irreparable harm 
if they are deported to their native countries after having been 
denied an opportunity to have a hearing on their claims for 
suspension of deportation.”); Velasquez v. Velasquez, No. 14-cv-
1688, 2014 WL 7272934, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2014) (finding 
irreparable harm where children could be removed from 
jurisdiction because that would “frustrate the effort of th[e] 
Court in resolving the [dispute]”). Second, members of the 
proposed class also do not seek monetary compensation for their 
injuries; instead, they seek injunctive and declaratory relief 
invalidating the Title 42 Process. Unlike economic harm, the 
harm resulting from expulsion from the United States pursuant to 
an unlawful policy likely cannot be remediated after the fact. 
Cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that economic losses are typically 
not irreparable because compensation can be awarded after a 
merits determination). 
 
In addition, “[i]t is well-established that acts by 
[g]overnment agencies in derogation of statutory rights of the 
public or certain individual members of the public can 
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47 
 
constitute irreparable injury.” Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 285 
F. Supp. 3d 21, 42 n.22 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Gates v. 
Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D.D.C. 1973)). Here, the 
Court has explained that Section 265 likely does not authorize 
expulsion, thereby denying the proposed class members’ the 
opportunity to seek humanitarian benefits pursuant to the 
immigration statutes. 
Defendants argue, however, that the “inherently 
individualized nature” of Plaintiffs’ potential harms does not 
demonstrate that the harms are “likely” to occur in the absence 
of a preliminary injunction. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 35. But 
while the decision whether to eventually grant asylum to 
individuals is undoubtedly fact-intensive, as explained above, 
Plaintiffs have provided ample unrebutted evidence demonstrating 
that they are collectively deprived of certain statutory 
procedures to seek protection under the Title 42 Process, and 
they face real threats of violence and persecution if they were 
to be removed from the United States. See, e.g., Neusner Decl., 
ECF No. 118-4 ¶ 8; Harbury Decl., ECF No. 118-5 ¶¶ 1, 10; Arvey 
Decl, ECF No. 118-7 ¶ 16; Pinheiro Decl., ECF No. 118-7 ¶ 37; 
Suppl. Levy Decl., ECF No. 118-3 ¶ 16; Rivas Decl., ECF No. 118-
11 ¶ 16. In addition, as Plaintiffs point out, “Defendants offer 
no evidence that class members face materially disparate dangers 
once expelled.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 20. As other courts 
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have noted, “similar showings” of “bona fide clams for 
humanitarian relief, including fear of persecution on the basis 
of protected characteristics,” have been found to be “sufficient 
to demonstrate irreparable injury.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 
544 (citing cases); see also J.B.B.C. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-1509, 
2020 WL 6041870, at *2 (D.D.C. June 26, 2020) (stating that 
sealed “declaration describing the possible harms that would 
result from plaintiff’s return to Honduras” was sufficient); 
Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 296-97 (D. Mass. 2018) 
(finding unrebutted evidence showing threat of persecution or 
torture if deported established likely irreparable harm, despite 
“no individualized evidence concerning the specific threats each 
Petitioner faces in Indonesia”); Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 
3d 96, 146 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds sub nom., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(“[P]laintiffs credibly alleged at their credible fear 
determinations that they feared rape, pervasive domestic 
violence, beatings, shootings, and death in their countries of 
origin. Based on plaintiffs’ declarations attesting to such 
harms, they have demonstrated that they have suffered 
irreparable injuries.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. 
Supp. 1488, 1504–05 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that plaintiffs 
would suffer irreparable harm if they were summarily removed 
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49 
 
without being afforded the opportunity to exercise their right 
to apply for asylum). 
Defendants also contend that “the [g]overnment’s 
implementation of the Order provides a process for determining a 
covered alien’s claim for protection under the Convention 
Against Torture. Thus, Plaintiffs would not be expelled without 
some opportunity to seek humanitarian relief.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 
No. 76 at 35. However, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs 
and proposed class members would still be deprived of the 
protections and procedures provided for under the immigration 
statutes. See id. 
Plaintiffs have thus shown a likelihood of suffering 
irreparable harm. 
3. The Balance of the Equities and Public 
Interest Favors an Injunction 
The balance-of-equities factor directs the Court to 
“balance the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the 
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the 
requested relief.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (quoting 
Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). “When the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, while preventing harm to one party, causes injury to 
the other, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting 
preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Serono Labs., Inc. 
v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1998). By contrast, 
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the balance of equities may favor a preliminary injunction that 
serves only “to preserve the relative positions of the parties 
until a trial on the merits can be held.” Rufer v. FEC, 64 F. 
Supp. 3d 195, 206 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 
395). “The purpose of . . . interim relief is not to 
conclusively determine the rights of the parties, . . . but to 
balance the equities as the litigation moves forward. In 
awarding a preliminary injunction a court must also ‘conside[r] 
. . . the overall public interest’. . . .” Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (second 
alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs contend that issuing a preliminary injunction 
“would not substantially injure the government and would be 
consistent with public health” because (1) “families who come to 
the border . . . can be processed quickly by Border Patrol 
agents and released to sponsors in the interior,” where they can 
quarantine and be subject to local health restrictions; (2) 
“insofar as Defendants choose to detain families upon their 
apprehension at the border, Defendants operate family detention 
facilities where the family can be housed together,” as well as 
tested and quarantined; and (3) “Defendants keep many families 
in custody for weeks before expulsion,” where the families are 
tested for COVID-19. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 
34-35. Defendants, in opposition, argue that “an injunction will 
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51 
 
increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission, which for some could 
have deadly consequences, and undoing the mitigation measures 
put in place by the Order is not in the public interest.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 36.  
Here, the Court ultimately finds that the balance of the 
equities and the public interest weigh in favor of an 
injunction.  
First, “[t]here is generally no public interest in the 
perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” League of Women Voters 
of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also 
Ramirez v. ICE, 310 F. Supp. 3d 7, 33 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The public 
interest surely does not cut in favor of permitting an agency to 
fail to comply with a statutory mandate.”); R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 
3d at 191 (“The Government ‘cannot suffer harm from an 
injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice or reads a 
statute as required to avoid constitutional concerns.’”). As 
explained above, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs are 
likely to succeed on their claim that the Title 42 Process is 
unlawful. Accordingly, because “there is an overriding public 
interest . . . in the general importance of an agency’s faithful 
adherence to its statutory mandate,” Jacksonville Port Auth. v. 
Adams, 556 F.2d 52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977); the Court finds that 
Plaintiffs likelihood of success “is a strong indicator that a 
preliminary injunction would serve the public interest,” Newby, 
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838 F.3d at 12; see also A.B.-B. v. Morgan, No. 20-cv-846, 2020 
WL 5107548, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“[T]he Government and 
public can have little interest in executing removal orders that 
are based on statutory violations . . . .”). 
Second, “the public has an interest in ‘ensuring that we do 
not deliver aliens into the hands of their persecutors,’ Leiva-
Perez [v. Holder], 640 F.3d [962,] 971 [(9th Cir. 2011)], and 
‘preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly 
to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm,’ 
Nken, 556 U.S. at 436.” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 
993 F.3d 640, 678 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, the Title 42 Process 
deprives Plaintiffs and the proposed class members of an 
opportunity to seek humanitarian protections under the asylum 
and withholding of removal statutes. Proceeding to the merits of 
this litigation without preliminary injunctive relief thus 
“risks [P]laintiffs being returned to home countries where they 
face significant risk of physical harm.” A.B.-B., 2020 WL 
5107548, at *9. Defendants do not question that Plaintiffs face 
substantial harm if returned to their countries of origin. 
Accordingly, “[t]hese life-or-death consequences weigh heavily 
in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also 
Devitri, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 297 (D. Mass. 2018) (“The public’s 
interest in providing due process for non-citizens to ensure 
that they are not removed to a country where they will be 
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persecuted is an extremely weighty one.”); Chaudhry v. Barr, No. 
19-cv-00682, 2019 WL 2009307, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2019) 
(“[T]here is . . . ‘a public interest in preventing aliens from 
being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they 
are likely to face substantial harm.’” (quoting Sied v. Nielsen, 
No. 17-cv-06785, 2018 WL 1142202, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2018))). 
Defendants argue, however, that “an injunction will 
increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission, which for some could 
have deadly consequences, and undoing the mitigation measures 
put in place by the Order is not in the public interest.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 36. According to Defendants, (1) “CBP 
facilities ‘are not structured or equipped for quarantine or 
isolation for COVID-19’”; (2) “[t]he numbers of aliens and the 
size and capacity of the congregate holding areas are not at all 
conducive to effective social distancing”; and (3) “CBP is not 
equipped to provide on-site care to infected persons.” Id. 
(quoting March Order at 14; Final Rule, 85 Fed Reg. at 56,433). 
Due to these constraints, Defendants fear that U.S. Border 
Patrol’s facilities “may rapidly become overcrowded” if the 
Title 42 Process is rescinded. Id. But despite the government’s 
warnings regarding the capacity of its facilities and staff, the 
fact remains that “86% of families arriving at the southwest 
border are already allowed into the United States and processed 
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for regular removal proceedings.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 
22. Moreover, although Defendants have expressed concerns 
regarding its inability to provide for quarantine space or 
“effective social distancing” if the Title 42 Process were not 
in effect, expulsion pursuant to the CDC Orders still results in 
“plac[ing] families on crowded planes and buses from the Rio 
Grande Valley,” without first testing the individuals and 
isolating those who test positive, and transporting them “to 
other locations in Texas, or places as far away as Arizona and 
San Diego,” before expelling them or releasing them into the 
United States. Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 25.  
Citing an increased number of “enforcement encounters” from 
April 2020 to January 2021, Defendants further contend that an 
injunction in this case could “create a ‘pull factor’ leading to 
additional attempts to enter the United States and in turn more 
apprehensions.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 37 (citing Miller 
Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 16). However, as Plaintiffs point out, 
Defendants’ only evidence in support of their prediction is “a 
16% increase in encounters of unaccompanied children in the 
weeks after entry of this Court’s injunction in P.J.E.S. in 
November 2020,” which was actually “part of a larger upward 
trend that predated the injunction by many months—and it was 
smaller than the percentage increase for each month from April 
to October 2020, when Title 42 was being enforced against 
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unaccompanied children.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 26 (citing 
Menjívar Decl., ECF No. 118-23 ¶ 15). Moreover, though 
Defendants contend that there has been a “historic” level of 
enforcement encounters at the border, the statistics Defendants 
cite “overstate the number of unique individuals arriving at the 
border.” Reichlin-Melnick Decl., ECF No. 118-18 ¶¶ 15-16. For 
example, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that, after the 
implementation of the Title 42 Process, the recidivism rate of 
individuals crossing the border increased from less than 7% to 
40%. Id. ¶ 11. In other words, under the Title 42 regime, 
individuals seeking an asylum hearing have attempted to cross 
the border multiple times, “sometimes 10 times or more, and each 
attempt is counted as a new ‘encounter.’” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 
118 at 22. Such evidence casts doubt on Defendants’ claims that 
an injunction in this matter would create a “pull factor.” See 
Flores v. Sessions, No. 85-cv-4544, 2018 WL 4945000, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. July 9, 2018) (finding argument that border crossings would 
surge due to court order lacked merit). 
Defendants also note that “the pandemic has taken a toll on 
the CBP workforce,” with many CBP employees contracting COVID-19 
and several others dying from the virus. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 37 (citing Miller Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 18). Defendants 
assert that “[w]ith personnel on sick leave or quarantining, the 
ability of CBP to perform its functions is diminished.” Id. 
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(citing Miller Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 14). The loss of life 
resulting from COVID-19 contraction is undeniably tragic, and 
the Court agrees that “promoting public health—especially during 
a pandemic—is in the public interest.” Nat’l Immigration Project 
of Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Exec. Off. of Immigration Review, 456 
F. Supp. 3d 16, 34 (D.D.C. 2020). However, Defendants provide no 
evidence that the CBP employees who tested positive for COVID-19 
contracted the virus from any of the asylum seekers crossing the 
border into the United States. And, significantly, since 
Defendants filed its opposition brief in this matter, vaccines 
protecting against the risk of serious disease and 
hospitalization have become widely available in the United 
States. See Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 25. The Court does not 
doubt that a preliminary injunction issued in this matter would 
force the government “to make difficult decisions about 
allocation of resources to mitigate the risks caused by COVID-
19.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 549. But in view of the wide 
availability of testing, vaccines, and other minimization 
measures, the Court is not convinced that the transmission of 
COVID-19 during border processing cannot be significantly 
mitigated. Indeed, the government has successfully implemented 
mitigation measures with regard to processing unaccompanied 
minors in order to minimize risk of COVID-19 transmission. See 
Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 21-22. 
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Finally, Defendants argue that “[a]ny time [the government] 
is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by 
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable 
injury.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 38 (quoting Maryland v. 
King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012)). But, as explained above, the 
Title 42 Process is likely unlawful, and “[t]here is generally 
no public interest in the perpetuation of an unlawful agency 
action.” Newby, 838 F.3d at 12. 
4. The Court Will Not Require Plaintiffs to 
Post a Bond 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that “[t]he 
court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the 
movant gives security in an amount that the court considers 
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found 
to have been wrongfully enjoined.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 
“Courts in this Circuit have found the Rule ‘vest[s] broad 
discretion in the district court to determine the appropriate 
amount of an injunction bond,’ including the discretion to 
require no bond at all.” Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. 
Supp. 2d 90, 107 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting DSE, Inc. v. United 
States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal citation 
omitted). Here, Plaintiffs are families allegedly fleeing 
persecution in their home country and do not have the ability to 
post a bond. Additionally, they are seeking to vindicate 
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important procedures and protections under the immigration laws. 
Accordingly, the Court will waive the requirement for an 
injunction bond. See id. 
5. The Court Shall Stay the Preliminary 
Injunction  
Defendants request that the Court stay its Order enjoining 
the Title 42 Process for 14 days “to give Defendants sufficient 
time to explore their appellate options.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 39. Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ request. Pls.’ 
Reply, ECF No. 118 at 30. Accordingly, the Court shall stay its 
Order for 14 days from the date of its entry. However, the Court 
declines to stay this decision pending appeal for substantially 
the same reasons as those articulated in this Opinion. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 23, and GRANTS 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 57. The 
preliminary injunction shall be stayed for 14 days. An 
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed:  Emmet G. Sullivan  
  
United States District Judge  
  
September 16, 2021 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, et 
al., 
 
 
Plaintiffs,    
 
v. 
 
 
 
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his 
official capacity as Secretary 
of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civ. Action No. 21-100(EGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Plaintiffs—a group of asylum-seeking families who fled to 
the United States—bring this lawsuit against Alejandro Mayorkas,1 
in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
various other federal government officials (“Defendants” or the 
“government”) for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.; the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 note; and the Public Health Service Act of 1944, 42 U.S.C 
§ 201, et seq. Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Class Certification and Motion for Classwide Preliminary 
 
1 Alejandro Mayorkas is substituted pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 25(d). 
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Injunction. See Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1; Mem. Supp. 
Pls.’ Mot. Classwide Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.”), 
ECF No. 57-1.2 Upon careful consideration of the motions, the 
responses, and replies thereto, the applicable law, and the 
entire record, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Classwide 
Preliminary Injunction.3 
I. 
Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
1. 
The U.S. Asylum Process 
“For almost a century, Congress has recognized that 
citizens of foreign states are sometimes forced to flee from 
persecution in their home countries, and it has been the policy 
of the United States government that this country ought to serve 
 
2  When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page 
number of the filed document. 
3 On August 11, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for oral argument 
on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Mot. Oral 
Argument, ECF No. 117. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 65(d), “[o]n 
request of the moving party together with a statement of the 
facts which make expedition essential, a hearing on an 
application for preliminary injunction shall be set by the Court 
no later than 21 days after its filing, unless the Court earlier 
decides the motion on the papers or makes a finding that a later 
hearing date will not prejudice the parties.” Here, while 
Plaintiffs filed their motion on February 5, 2021, briefing on 
the motion was stayed until August 5, 2021. See Min. Order (Aug. 
5, 2021). Thus, the Court finds that there is no prejudice to 
the parties in declining to hold a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion 
and shall instead decide the motion on the papers. Defendants’ 
motion for oral argument is therefore denied. 
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as a place of refuge for persons who are in such distress.” 
Kiakombua v. Wolf, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2020). In 
keeping with this policy, Congress has codified various 
procedures governing how the United States evaluates and 
processes the admission requests of refugees. As relevant here, 
there are three primary protections for asylum seekers in place 
under current immigration laws. 
First, in 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, which amended the INA, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in sections of 8 
U.S.C.). The Refugee Act created a statutory procedure for 
refugees seeking asylum and established the standards for 
granting such requests. The INA currently governs this 
procedure, and it provides that “[a]ny alien who is physically 
present in the United States or who arrives in the United States 
(whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ), 
irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General is granted the 
discretion to grant asylum. Id. § 1158 (b)(1)(A). However, that 
relief can only be granted if the alien is a “refugee,” as 
defined by federal law. Id. Pursuant to the INA, a “refugee” is 
“any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality” and who is “unable or unwilling to return to . . . 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
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persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Thus, the ‘persecution or well-founded 
fear of persecution’ standard governs the Attorney General’s 
determination [of] whether an alien is eligible for asylum.” INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987). Furthermore, even 
when a noncitizen is subject to a rapid expulsion process known 
as “expedited removal” because they fit within an established 
category of persons who can be summarily removed without full 
hearings or other process, such noncitizen can only be so 
removed if she does not have “an intention to apply for asylum 
under [8 U.S.C. § 1158] or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
Second, at the same time the Refugee Act of 1980 
established the asylum process, it amended the statutory scheme 
governing a related form of relief—“withholding of deportation”—
to remove the Attorney General’s discretion to decide whether to 
grant that form of relief. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428–29. 
As amended by the 1980 Act, the INA “requires the Attorney 
General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates 
that his ‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on account of one 
of [a list of factors] if he is deported.” Id. at 423. A grant 
of withholding is mandatory if the individual meets the 
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statutory criteria. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 
(1999). 
Third, Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) 
provides that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) 
or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 
3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, p. 20, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 114. Congress has implemented Article 3 of CAT as part 
of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 
(“FARRA”). Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
FARRA further declares it “the policy of the United States not 
to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return 
of any person to a country in which there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” Id. (quoting Pub.L. No. 105–277, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681–761, 822 (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 
note).  
2. 
COVID-19 Pandemic and the CDC Orders  
Since 1893, federal law has provided federal officials with 
the authority to stem the spread of contagious diseases from 
foreign countries by prohibiting, “in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such countries.” Act 
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of February 15, 1893, ch. 114, § 7, 27 Stat. 449, 452 (“1893 
Act”). Under current law: 
Whenever the Surgeon General determines that 
by reason of the existence of any communicable 
disease in a foreign country there is serious 
danger of the introduction of such disease 
into the United States, and that this danger 
is so increased by the introduction of persons 
or 
property 
from 
such 
country 
that 
a 
suspension of the right to introduce such 
persons and property is required in the 
interest of the public health, the Surgeon 
General, 
in 
accordance 
with 
regulations 
approved by the President, shall have the 
power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such 
countries or places as he shall designate in 
order to avert such danger, and for such 
period of time as he may deem necessary for 
such purpose. 
42 U.S.C. § 265 (“Section 265”). In 1966, the Surgeon General’s 
Section 265 authority was transferred to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which in turn delegated this 
authority to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) Director. See P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 503 
(D.D.C. 2020); 31 Fed. Reg. 8855 (June 25, 1966), 80 Stat. 1610 
(1966). 
On March 20, 2020, as the COVID-19 virus spread globally, 
HHS issued an interim final rule pursuant to Section 265 that 
aimed to “provide[] a procedure for CDC to suspend the 
introduction of persons from designated countries or places, if 
required, in the interest of public health.” Interim Final Rule, 
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Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension 
of Introduction of Persons Into United States From Designated 
Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 16559-01, 2020 WL 1330968, (March 24, 2020) (“Interim Final 
Rule”). Pursuant to the Interim Final Rule, the CDC Director 
could “suspend the introduction of persons into the United 
States.” Id. at 16563. The Interim Final Rule stated, in 
relevant part: 
(1) Introduction into the United States of 
persons from a foreign country (or one or more 
political subdivisions or regions thereof) or 
place means the movement of a person from a 
foreign country (or one or more political 
subdivisions or regions thereof) or place, or 
series of foreign countries or places, into 
the United States so as to bring the person 
into contact with persons in the United 
States, or so as to cause the contamination of 
property in the United States, in a manner 
that the Director determines to present a risk 
of transmission of a communicable disease to 
persons or property, even if the communicable 
disease 
has 
already 
been 
introduced, 
transmitted, or is spreading within the United 
States;  
(2) Serious danger of the introduction of such 
communicable disease into the United States 
means the potential for introduction of 
vectors of the communicable disease into the 
United States, even if persons or property in 
the United States are already infected or 
contaminated with the communicable disease; 
and  
(3) The term “Place” includes any location 
specified by the Director, including any 
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carrier, as that term is defined in 42 CFR 
71.1, whatever the carrier’s nationality. 
Id. at 16566-67.  
The CDC’s Interim Rule went into effect immediately. Id. at 
16565. The CDC explained that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) 
of the APA, HHS had concluded that there was “good cause” to 
dispense with prior notice and comment. Id. Specifically, the 
CDC stated that “[g]iven the national emergency caused by COVID-
19, it would be impracticable and contrary to the public health—
and, by extension, the public interest—to delay these 
implementing regulations until a full public notice-and-comment 
process is completed.” Id.  
Pursuant to the Interim Final Rule, the CDC Director issued 
an order suspending for 30 days the introduction of “covered 
aliens,” which he defined as “persons traveling from Canada or 
Mexico (regardless of their country of origin) who would 
otherwise be introduced into a congregate setting in a land Port 
of Entry [(“POE”)] or Border Patrol station at or near the 
United States borders with Canada and Mexico.” Notice of Order 
Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act 
Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where 
a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17060-02, 17061, 
2020 WL 1445906 (March 26, 2020) (“March 2020 Order”). The March 
2020 Order declared that “[i]t is necessary for the public 
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health to immediately suspend the introduction of covered 
aliens” and “require[d] the movement of all such aliens to the 
country from which they entered the United States, or their 
country of origin, or another location as practicable, as 
rapidly as possible.” Id. at 17067. The CDC Director then 
“requested that [the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)] 
implement th[e] [March 2020 Order] because CDC does not have the 
capability, resources, or personnel needed to do so.” Id. The 
CDC Director also noted that U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), a federal law enforcement agency of DHS, had already 
“developed an operational plan for implementing the order.” Id. 
Soon thereafter, the CBP issued a memorandum on April 2, 
2020 establishing its procedures for implementing the March 2020 
Order. See Ex. E to Cheung Decl. (“CAPIO Memo”), ECF No. 57-5 at 
15; see also Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 14-15. The 
CAPIO Memo instructed that agents may determine whether 
individuals are subject to the CDC’s order “[b]ased on training, 
experience, physical observation, technology, questioning and 
other considerations.” CAPIO Memo, ECF No. 57-5 at 15. If an 
individual was determined to be subject to the order, they were 
to be “transported to the nearest POE and immediately returned 
to Mexico or Canada, depending on their point of transit.” Id. 
at 17. Those who are “not amenable to immediate expulsion to 
Mexico or Canada, will be transported to a dedicated facility 
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for limited holding prior to expulsion” to their home country. 
Id. The CAPIO Memo “provide[d] no instructions on medical 
screenings or other procedures for determining whether a covered 
noncitizen may have COVID-19.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶ 60.  
On April 22, 2020, the March 2020 Order was extended for an 
additional 30 days. See Extension of Order Under Sections 362 
and 365 of the Public Health Service Act; Order Suspending 
Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries Where a 
Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 22424-01, 2020 WL 
1923282 (April 22, 2020) (“April 2020 Order”). The order was 
then extended again on May 20, 2020 until such time that the CDC 
Director “determine[s] that the danger of further introduction 
of COVID-19 into the United States has ceased to be a serious 
danger to the public health.” Amendment and Extension of Order 
Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act; 
Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons From Countries 
Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 31503-02, 
31504, 2020 WL 2619696 (May 26, 2020) (“May 2020 Order”).  
On September 11, 2020, the CDC published its final rule. 
See Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: 
Suspension of the Right To Introduce and Prohibition of 
Introduction of Persons Into United States From Designated 
Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 56424-01, 2020 WL 5439721, (Sept. 11, 2020) (Effective 
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October 13, 2020) (“Final Rule”). The Final Rule “defin[ed] the 
phrase to ‘[p]rohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction 
into the United States of persons’ to mean ‘to prevent the 
introduction of persons into the United States by suspending any 
right to introduce into the United States, physically stopping 
or restricting movement into the United States, or physically 
expelling from the United States some or all of the persons.’” 
Id. at 56445. The CDC Director then replaced the March, April, 
and May 2020 Orders with a new order on October 13, 2020. Order 
Suspending the Right To Introduce Certain Persons From Countries 
Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 
65806, 65808 (Oct. 16, 2020) (“October 2020 Order”).  
On August 2, 2021, the CDC issued its most recent order, 
“Public Health Assessment and Order Suspending the Right to 
Introduce Certain Persons from Countries Where a Quarantinable 
Communicable Disease Exists,” which replaced and superseded the 
October 2020 Order. See Public Health Assessment and Order 
Suspending the Right to Introduce Certain Persons from Countries 
Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists (Aug. 2, 
2021), Attach. A to Notice CDC Public Health Order (“August 2021 
Order”), ECF No. 114. The August 2021 Order states that “CDC has 
determined that an Order under 42 U.S.C. § 265 remains necessary 
to protect U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, lawful permanent 
residents, personnel and noncitizens at the ports of entry (POE) 
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and U.S. Border Patrol stations, and destination communities in 
the United States during the COVID-19 public health emergency.” 
Id. at 5. Thus, the August 2021 Order continues to prohibit the 
introduction of “covered noncitizens”—which is defined to 
include “family units”—into the United States along the U.S. 
land and adjacent coastal borders. Id. at 7. The Court will 
refer to the process developed by the CDC and implemented by the 
August 2021 Order as the “CDC Order” or the “Title 42 Process.” 
3. 
CDC Order’s Effect on Asylum Seekers 
Plaintiffs and the proposed class member are families from 
countries “that are among the most dangerous in the world due to 
gang, gender, family membership, and other identity-based 
violence.” Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 31. 
Plaintiffs are currently detained and in the custody of DHS. Am. 
Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 14-19. As such, they are subject to 
expulsion from the United States pursuant to the CDC Order. 
Plaintiffs assert that prior to the Title 42 Process, and 
“pursuant to longstanding immigration statutes protecting asylum 
seekers, Plaintiffs were entitled to assert claims for asylum 
and related forms of humanitarian protection, and to procedures 
Congress established to ensure the fair determination of their 
right to remain in the United States.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs claim 
that if they and others like them are expelled pursuant to the 
CDC Order, they “would face grave danger in their home 
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countries.” Id. ¶ 10. According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants 
subjected approximately 21,500 members of families to the Title 
42 Process between March and December 2020.” Pls.’ Mot. Class 
Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 10. 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. 
Related Litigation 
On November 18, 2020, this Court adopted Magistrate Judge 
Harvey’s Report and Recommendation, provisionally granted the 
plaintiff’s motion to certify class, and issued a preliminary 
injunction barring enforcement of the Title 42 Process as to 
unaccompanied minors in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 
520-22 (D.D.C. 2020). The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) later stayed the preliminary 
injunction pending appeal. Order, P.J.E.S. v. Mayorkas, No. 20-
5357 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 2021).  
In February 2021, the CDC issued a notice “temporarily 
except[ing] . . . unaccompanied noncitizen children” from 
expulsion under the Title 42 Process. CDC, Notice of Temporary 
Exception from Expulsion of Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children 
Encountered in the United States Pending Forthcoming Public 
Health Determination, 86 Fed. Reg. 9942-01, 2021 WL 600683 (Feb. 
11, 2021). The notice stated that CDC was “in the process of 
reassessing” the Title 42 Order and that the temporary exception 
for unaccompanied minors would “remain in effect until CDC has 
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completed its public health assessment and published any notice 
or modified Order.” Id. Magistrate Judge Harvey and the D.C. 
Circuit granted the parties’ motion to hold the case in abeyance 
on February 24, 2021. See Min. Order (Feb. 24, 2021); Order, 
P.J.E.S. v. Mayorkas, No. 20-5357 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 2021). 
In July 2021, the CDC issued an order “except[ing] 
unaccompanied noncitizen children . . . from the [CDC’s] October 
[13, 2020] Order.” See Order Under Sections 362 & 365 of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 265, 268) and 42 CFR 71.40; 
Public Health Determination Regarding an Exception for 
Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children From the Order Suspending the 
right to Introduce Certain Persons From Countries Where a 
Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 86 Fed. Reg. 38717, 
38718 (July 22, 2021). The CDC explained that the July 16 Order 
“supersede[s]” the notice issued on February 11, 2021. Id. at 
38720. On August 2, 2021 the CDC issued another order that 
superseded the October 2020 Order. Public Health Reassessment 
and Order Suspending the Right To Introduce Certain Persons From 
Countries Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists, 86 
Fed. Reg. 42828-02 (Aug. 5, 2021). The July 16 Order was “made a 
part of [the August 2021 Order] and incorporated by reference as 
if fully set forth” in the August 2021 Order. Id. at 42829 n.5. 
 
 
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2. 
Proceedings in this Case 
Plaintiffs filed this action on January 12, 2021. See 
Compl., ECF No. 1. The same day, Plaintiffs filed an emergency 
motion to stay their removal from the United States, and 
Defendants orally objected to Plaintiffs’ request during the 
hearing on the motion. See Pls.’ Emergency Mot. Stay Removal, 
ECF No. 5. The Court entered a Minute Order granting Plaintiffs’ 
emergency motion over objection “[i]n view of the arguments 
presented by Plaintiffs in their motion, the representations 
made by the Government, and for the reasons stated on the record 
at the January 12, 2021 Status Conference.” Min. Order (Jan. 12, 
2021). The Court also granted thirteen subsequent emergency 
motions to stay the removal of other families on January 19, 
2021; January 27, 2021; January 29, 2021; February 1, 2021; 
February 4, 2021; February 5, 2021; February 6, 2021; February 
9, 2021; February 18, 2021; February 19, 2021; and February 22, 
2021. See Min. Orders (Jan. 19, 2021; Jan. 27, 2021; Jan. 29, 
2021; Feb. 1, 2021; Feb. 4, 2021; Feb. 5, 2021; Feb. 6, 2021; 
Feb. 9, 2021; Feb. 18, 2021; Feb. 19, 2021; Feb. 22, 2021). 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on 
January 28, 2021, see Mot. Certify Class, ECF No. 23; and they 
filed a motion for preliminary injunction on February 5, 2021, 
see Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57. Defendants filed a combined 
opposition to both motions on February 17, 2021. See Defs.’ 
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Opp’n, ECF No. 76. On February 23, 2021, the Court granted the 
parties’ joint motion to hold in abeyance Plaintiffs’ motions 
for class certification and classwide preliminary injunction. 
Min. Order (Feb. 23, 2021). The motions were held in abeyance 
until August 5, 2021, when the Court granted the parties’ motion 
for a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs’ motions. Min. Order (Aug. 
5, 2021). On August 6, 2021, Defendants filed a supplemental 
declaration in support of their combined opposition. See 
Shahoulian Decl., ECF No. 116. Plaintiffs filed their combined 
reply brief on August 11, 2021. See Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118. 
The motions are now ripe for the Court’s adjudication. 
II. 
Legal Standard 
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] 
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 
favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 
(D.C. Cir. 2011)). Where the federal government is the opposing 
party, the balance of equities and public interest factors 
merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). A 
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only 
be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
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to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). “The purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative 
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be 
held.” Univ. of Tex. V. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In 
this Circuit, the four factors have typically been evaluated on 
a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes an unusually 
strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not 
necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” 
Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), “the D.C. 
Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four 
preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 
71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley, 644 
F.3d at 393 (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to 
hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, 
freestanding requirement for a preliminary injunction.”) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, “the 
Circuit has had no occasion to decide this question because it 
has not yet encountered a post-Winter case where a preliminary 
injunction motion survived the less rigorous sliding-scale 
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analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
III. 
Analysis 
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 
parties only.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) 
(quotation marks omitted). Rule 23(a) establishes four 
requirements for class certification: (1) that “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; (2) that 
“there are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3) 
that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class”; and (4) that 
“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition 
to satisfying Rule 23(a), a putative class must also meet one of 
the Rule 23(b) requirements. Here, Plaintiffs seek certification 
under Rule 23(b)(2), claiming that Defendants have “acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so 
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Pls.’ Mot. 
Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 8 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2)). 
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“The party seeking certification bears the burden of 
persuasion, and must show that the putative class[] meet[s] the 
requirements of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
Garnett v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 204 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(citing Hoyte v. District of Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 491 
(D.D.C. 2017)). To carry that burden, Plaintiffs must 
“affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance with the Rule—that 
is, [they] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact 
sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, 
etc.” Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
The Court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” to confirm that 
the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. Gen. Tel. Co. 
of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).  
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 
23(b)(2), Plaintiffs have sought certification of the following 
class:  “All noncitizens who (1) are or will be in the United 
States; (2) come to the United States as a family unit composed 
of at least one child under 18 years old and that child’s parent 
or legal guardian; and (3) are or will be subjected to the Title 
42 Process.” Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF No. 23-1 at 7. For the 
reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs meet 
all of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements. As 
Defendants’ sole challenge to Plaintiffs’ class certification 
motion is that the term “Title 42 Process” is not adequately 
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defined, Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 16; the Court shall first 
address the sufficiency of the class definition before briefly 
analyzing the remaining Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
requirements. 
1. 
Class Definition 
“[I]t is far from clear that there exists in this 
[D]istrict a requirement that a class . . . must demonstrate 
ascertainability to merit certification.” Ramirez v. USCIS, 338 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Hoyte v. District of 
Columbia, 325 F.R.D. 485, 489 n.3 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that 
“[t]he ascertainability requirement, while adopted by some 
courts in this district, has been recently disavowed by four 
federal appellate courts” and explaining that “the D.C. Circuit 
has not opined on the requirement”). However, the requirement of 
“definiteness” has been imposed by some courts as an “implied 
requirement” for class certification, in addition to the express 
requirements in Rule 23. See DL v. District of Columbia, 302 
F.R.D. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). This “common-sense requirement,” 
Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 346 (D.D.C. 1998); is 
designed primarily to ensure the proposed class is 
administratively manageable, see Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 
1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “It is not designed to be a 
particularly stringent test, but plaintiffs must at least be 
able to establish that ‘the general outlines of the membership 
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of the class are determinable at the outset of the litigation.’” 
Pigford, 182 F.R.D. at 346 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1760 at 118).  
“[W]here the plaintiff seeks certification of an injunctive 
class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), ‘actual membership of the class 
need not . . . be precisely delimited’ because such cases will 
not require individualized notice, opt-out rights, or individual 
damage assessments, and the defendant will be required to comply 
with the relief ordered no matter who is in the class.’” Brewer 
v. Lynch, No. 08-1747, 2015 WL 13604257, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 
2015). In those cases, the definiteness requirement is satisfied 
as long as plaintiffs can establish the “existence of a class” 
and propose a class definition that “accurately articulates ‘the 
general demarcations’ of the class of individuals who are being 
harmed by the alleged deficiencies.” See, e.g., Kenneth R. v. 
Hassan, 293 F.R.D. 254, 264 (D.N.H. 2013); see also DL, 302 
F.R.D. at 17 (“Because the rationale for precise 
ascertainability is inapposite in the 23(b)(2) context, . . . it 
is not required in cases such as this where only injunctive 
relief is sought and notice is not required.”). 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and Rule 23(b)(2) because the phrase “Title 42 Process” is not 
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defined within the class definition. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 
16.  They argue that, due to the lack of a definition, 
“Plaintiffs have not established that the conduct they seek to 
enjoin or declare unlawful will be ‘as to all of the class 
members or as to none of them.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2)). While Defendants concede that “it is no secret that 
Plaintiffs challenge the ‘practice of summary expulsion under 
the Title 42 Process’ and the alleged lack of access to asylum,” 
they argue that the Amended Complaint and Class Certification 
Motion include statements that suggest that the “class 
definition might include practices that Plaintiffs do not 
challenge as unlawful.” Id. at 17. Specifically, Defendants note 
that Plaintiffs refer to the “Title 42 Process” as a “system 
established in a set of agency documents—a new regulation, 
several orders, and an implementation memo,” and that the 
Amended Complaint states that, “[a]mong other things, the Title 
42 Process authorizes the summary expulsion of noncitizens, 
including vulnerable families seeking asylum in this country, 
without any of the procedural protections guaranteed by 
Congress.” Id. (quoting Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 1, 3) (cleaned 
up). 
The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the Court notes 
that a “vague and ambiguous class definition” is not 
automatically “fatal[]” to a motion for class certification. 
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Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 15-17. The case law is clear that 
the mere existence of a problematic class definition does not 
automatically mandate denial of class certification. See Brewer, 
2015 WL 13604257, at *7. Rather, “[w]hen appropriate, district 
courts may redefine classes . . . sua sponte prior to 
certification.” Borum v. Brentwood Village, LLC, 324 F.R.D. 1, 8 
(D.D.C. 2018); see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 589-90 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that district courts may “exercise . . 
. broad discretion to redefine and reshape the proposed class to 
the point that it qualifies for certification under Rule 23”). 
Here, however, the proposed class is not so poorly defined 
as to require sua sponte redefinition by the Court. First, 
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, motions, and reply brief each set 
forth a fairly descriptive definition of the Title 42 Process as 
referring to the practice of summarily expelling asylum-seeking 
families since late March 2020. See Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert., ECF 
No. 23-1 at 7 (“A class action lawsuit is appropriate to 
challenge Defendants’ unlawful practice of summarily expelling 
vulnerable families with minor children under their shadow 
deportation system, referred to here as the ‘Title 42 Process’ 
or ‘Title 42 Policy.’”); Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 
at 9 (“Defendants moved to summarily deport [Plaintiffs] based 
on an unprecedented and unlawful expulsion process, invoking the 
public health powers of the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention (‘CDC’), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 265 (the ‘Title 42 
Process’).”); Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 29 (“Plaintiffs have 
identified and challenged ‘a uniform policy or practice’ of 
‘expulsion,’ and sought relief enjoining application of the 
challenged CDC orders to the class.”); Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶ 
3 (“Among other things, the Title 42 Process authorizes the 
summary expulsion of noncitizens, including vulnerable families 
seeking asylum in this country, without any of the procedural 
protections guaranteed by Congress—even if the families show no 
signs of having COVID-19.”).  
Second, although Plaintiffs do use the phrase “among other 
things” in one sentence within their Amended Complaint, 
Defendants’ argument is weakened by their own acknowledgment 
that the focus of this litigation is the “‘practice of summary 
expulsion under the Title 42 Process’ and the alleged lack of 
access to asylum.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 16.  
And third, Defendants’ reliance on the Seventh Circuit case 
Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008), is misplaced. 
In Rahman, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of citizens 
defined as “[a]ll United States citizens who now are and/or in 
the future will be subjected to detentions upon reentry to the 
United States as a result of defendants’ contested policies, 
practices and customs.” Id. at 625. However, the class 
definition did not specify what “defendants’ contested policies, 
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practices and customs” were. Id. The Seventh Circuit therefore 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify, explaining that “[a] 
class of all persons now or in the future subject to unspecified 
practices may have nothing to do with the named representatives’ 
injuries, or what caused them.” Id. at 626. The court also noted 
that the undefined class was “hard to evaluate” and 
“incompatible” with the “typicality” requirement. Id. at 627.  
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ class definition 
“suffers from similar infirmities.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 
16. But not only is Rahman non-binding on this Court, it is also 
distinguishable on the facts. Significantly, though Plaintiffs 
refer to the “Title 42 Process” generally as a “system 
established in a set of agency documents—a new regulation, 
several orders, and an implementation memo,” id. at 17; 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and motions briefing also 
separately identify and describe each regulation, order, and 
memo. See, e.g., Am. Compl., ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 41-66. Thus, unlike 
in Rahman, the Court is able to easily evaluate the application 
of specific policies and procedures on the proposed class 
members, and any “administrative feasibility requirement” is 
satisfied because identifying the class members under this 
definition would not require much, if any, individual factual 
inquiry. See Brewer, 2015 WL 13604257, at *6. 
 
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2. 
Rule 23(a) Requirements 
a. Numerosity 
Because of the general rule in favor of confining 
litigation to the named parties only, a class action is 
appropriate only when “the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 
Although Plaintiffs need not clear any “specific threshold,” as 
a general benchmark, “courts in this jurisdiction have observed 
that a class of at least forty members is sufficiently large to 
meet this requirement.” Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 241 
F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiffs may satisfy the 
requirement by supplying estimates of putative class members, 
see Pigford, 182 F.R.D. at 347–48; “[s]o long as there is a 
reasonable basis for the estimate provided,” Kifafi v. Hilton 
Hotels Ret. Plan, 189 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1999).  
Here, Defendants do not dispute that the proposed class 
satisfies the numerosity requirement. Plaintiffs have provided 
evidence that, between March 2020 and December 2020, 
approximately 21,515 members of family units4 were subject to the 
CDC Order and its previous iterations, see Kang Decl., ECF No. 
23-2 ¶ 4; and that, between April 2020 and December 2020, 
 
4 The CBP defines a “family unit” as “the number of individuals 
(either a child under 18 years old, parent or legal guardian) 
apprehended with a family member.” See Kang Decl., ECF No. 23-2 
¶ 3. 
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“approximately 21,018 members of family units (81%) were 
expelled under Title 42,” id. ¶ 6. Accordingly, the Court finds 
that the numerosity requirement is met. See O.A. v. Trump, 404 
F. Supp. 3d 109, 155 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding numerosity 
established by evidence in the administrative record estimating 
that the class consisted of “thousands of migrants who have 
crossed and will cross the United States’ southern border 
outside ports of entry”). 
b. Commonality 
A plaintiff seeking class certification must also establish 
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This requires more than the 
identification of the purported violation of the same provision 
of law. See DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 127–30 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating an order certifying a class composed 
of students who were purportedly each denied a free appropriate 
public education on the ground that plaintiffs had identified 
only sufferers of a violation of the same provision of law and 
had not met the commonality requirement). Instead, the claims 
must depend on “a common contention [that] is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth 
or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity 
of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–Mart Stores, 564 
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U.S. at 350. “Even a single common question will do.” Id. at 359 
(cleaned up).  
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, commonality is satisfied 
where there is “a uniform policy or practice that affects all 
class members.” DL, 713 F.3d at 128; see also O.A., 404 F. Supp. 
3d at 156 (finding commonality satisfied where “[a]ll members of 
the proposed class, and all of the proposed class 
representatives, face the same threat of injury” and where 
“[a]ll challenge the same Rule on the same grounds, and all seek 
the same remedy—invalidation of the Rule”). Here, Plaintiffs are 
challenging the lawfulness of the Title 42 Process, which is a 
uniform policy that applies to each Plaintiff and all members of 
the proposed class. Moreover, “[n]ot only do all class members 
present the same challenge to the policy, but there also is no 
evident variation among them concerning their ultimate 
entitlement to relief: if any person in the class has a 
meritorious claim, they all do.” J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 
1321 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court can, therefore, conclude that 
“common questions of law and fact” unite the class members’ 
claims. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 332 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(finding that “the allegation that the five ICE Field Officers 
are no longer providing the ‘individualized determinations’ of 
parole eligibility and procedural protections required by the 
Parole Directive” satisfied the commonality requirement). 
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c. Typicality 
A class representative satisfies the typicality requirement 
if the representative’s “claims are based on the same legal 
theory as the claims of the other class members” and her 
“injuries arise from the same course of conduct that gives rise 
to the other class members’ claims.” Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 35. 
Put another way, a representative’s claims are typical of those 
of the class when “[t]he plaintiffs allege that their injuries 
derive from a unitary course of conduct by a single system.” 
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997). Here, 
Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class face the same 
injury: the threat of expulsion pursuant to the Title 42 
Process. All challenge the same policy on the same grounds, and 
all seek the same remedy—invalidation of the Title 42 Process. 
Thus, the typicality requirement is met. 
d. Adequacy 
“The adequacy requirement aims to ensure that absent class 
members will not be bound by the outcome of a suit in which they 
were not competently and fairly represented.” J.D., 925 F.3d at 
1312. “Adequacy embraces two components: the class 
representative (i) ‘must not have antagonistic or conflicting 
interests with the unnamed members of the class’ and (ii) ‘must 
appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class 
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through qualified counsel.’” Id. (quoting Twelve John Does v. 
District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
Defendants also do not dispute that Plaintiffs have 
satisfied the adequacy requirement. First, Defendants have not 
identified—and the Court is unaware of—any interest Plaintiffs 
have that is antagonistic to or conflicts with the putative 
class members. Rather, courts have found that where, as here, 
the plaintiffs “seek identical relief for all class members, . . 
. there are no conflicting interests that might derail 
certification on this prong.” Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District 
of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 84 (D.D.C. 2015). Second, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs’ current counsel are “willing and have 
the ability vigorously to litigate this case and to protect the 
interests of absent class members.” O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 
157. 
3. 
Rule 23(b)(2) Requirement 
Having determined that Plaintiffs meet the requirements of 
Rule 23(a), the Court must next determine whether they meet the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) applies if “the 
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “The 
key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the 
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injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the 
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful 
only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Wal-
Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Rule 23(b)(2) imposes “two requirements: (1) that 
defendant’s actions or refusal to act are ‘generally applicable 
to the class’ and (2) that plaintiffs seek final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief on behalf of the 
class.” Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 37. 
 
Plaintiffs have satisfied both requirements here. The 
relief Plaintiffs seek—among other things, a declaration that 
the Title 42 Process is unlawful and an injunction prohibiting 
Defendants from applying the Title 42 Process to Plaintiffs and 
proposed class members—is “generally applicable to the class” 
and is indivisible. See Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 334–35 
(finding Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied where plaintiffs were not 
asking the court “to remedy discrete errors in their parole 
determinations,” but rather “only . . . address an alleged 
systematic harm”); R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 182 
(D.D.C. 2015) (finding Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied where plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin ICE from consideration of particular factor in 
making detention determination). Plaintiffs also do not seek 
individualized relief, and thus this is not a case where “each 
individual class member would be entitled to a different 
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injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal–
Mart, 564 U.S. at 360; see also Ramirez, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 48 
(finding Rule 23(b) satisfied where plaintiffs “d[id] not seek a 
court order mandating any particular outcome with respect to any 
particular [individual plaintiff]”). 
 
For all these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion 
for class certification. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
1. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the 
Merits 
Plaintiffs argue that the CDC Orders instituting the Title 
42 Process exceed the authority granted by Congress pursuant to 
Section 265 because “[n]othing in [Section] 265, or Title 42 
more generally, purports to authorize any deportations, much 
less deportations in violation of” statutory procedures and 
humanitarian protections, including the right to seek asylum. 
Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 17-18. The Court agrees 
and finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claim. 
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), provides the framework for reviewing an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged 
with administering. See 467 U.S. at 837. The first step in this 
review process is for the court to determine “whether Congress 
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has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 
842. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–
43. In determining whether the statute unambiguously expresses 
the intent of Congress, the court should use all the 
“traditional tools of statutory construction,” including looking 
to the text and structure of the statute, as well as its 
legislative history, if appropriate. See id. at 843 n.9; see 
also Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). If the court concludes that the statute is either 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at 
issue, the second step of the court’s review process is to 
determine whether the interpretation proffered by the agency is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843. The court must defer to agency interpretations 
that are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.” Id. at 844. 
The Court’s analysis begins with the statutory text. See S. 
Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 195 F.3d 17, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Here, Section 265 states in full: 
Whenever the Surgeon General determines that 
by reason of the existence of any communicable 
disease in a foreign country there is serious 
danger of the introduction of such disease 
into the United States, and that this danger 
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is so increased by the introduction of persons 
or 
property 
from 
such 
country 
that 
a 
suspension of the right to introduce such 
persons and property is required in the 
interest of the public health, the Surgeon 
General, 
in 
accordance 
with 
regulations 
approved by the President, shall have the 
power to prohibit, in whole or in part, the 
introduction of persons and property from such 
countries or places as he shall designate in 
order to avert such danger, and for such 
period of time as he may deem necessary for 
such purpose. 
42 U.S.C. § 265.  
As Plaintiffs point out, Section 265 simply contains no 
mention of the word “expel”—or any synonyms thereof—within its 
text. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 18. The lack 
of express terms within the statute is significant: even “broad 
rulemaking power must be exercised within the bounds set by 
Congress,” Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
385 F. Supp. 3d 81, 92, 94 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 962 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that “agencies are ‘bound, not only by 
the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it 
has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those 
purposes’”); and the CDC “does not [have the] power to revise 
clear statutory terms,” Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 
302, 327 (2014).  
Indeed, particularly where the statute in question regards 
such a “severe ‘penalty’” as deportation, Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United 
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States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)); the Court is loathe to 
recognize an implied power of forced removal from the country, 
see Util. Air Reg. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (“We expect Congress to 
speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of 
vast ‘economic and political significance.’”). Rather, as this 
Court explained in P.J.E.S. v. Wolf, 502 F. Supp. 3d 492, 512 
(D.D.C. 2020), “when Congress wants to grant the power to expel 
individuals out of the United States, it does so plainly.” 
P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 512; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(2)(A), (C) (allowing an alien who has arrived on land 
from a contiguous country and who is “not clearly and beyond a 
doubt entitled to be admitted” to be “return[ed] . . . to that 
territory pending a proceeding”); id. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (“Except 
as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered 
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the 
United States within a period of 90 days . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 
3186 (authorizing a fugitive from another country found in the 
United States to be “take[n] . . . to the territory of such 
foreign government” by an agent of that government). Moreover, 
“Congress has made clear when public health concerns merit 
disallowing a non-citizen to remain in the United States.” 
P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 539; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) 
(providing that “aliens who are inadmissible” are those 
determined “to have a communicable disease of public health 
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significance”); id. § 1222 (providing for medical detention and 
examination as part of immigration processing). As the Supreme 
Court “ha[s] stated time and again[,] . . . courts must presume 
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citations omitted); see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The 
classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over 
time, and getting them to make sense in combination, necessarily 
assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). And here, the plain language of Section 265, 
particularly when read in conjunction with the above statutes 
governing immigration under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, evinces no 
intention to grant the Executive the authority to expel or 
remove persons from the United States.  
The Court also finds that the plain text of Section 265 is 
supported by the statutory context. See Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33 (2000) (“It is a ‘fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must 
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))). For example, in Section 
271, Congress provided for specific “penalties” for those 
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persons who or vessels that violated public health regulations 
prescribed under the relevant sections, including Section 265. 
42 U.S.C. § 271. For individuals, Section 271 states that any 
violation “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.” Id. § 
271(a). Removal from the United States, however, is not included 
as a penalty. Moreover, Section 271 refers to the regulations 
prescribed under Section 265 and others as “quarantine laws,” 
further suggesting that the CDC’s powers were limited to 
quarantine and containment. Id. § 271 (emphasis added). 
Neither does neighboring Section 264 contemplate the 
removal of persons from the United States. Section 264 
authorizes the Secretary to use various public health measures 
to “prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases.” 42 U.S.C. § 264. Although Defendants 
rely on Section 264 as evidence of the Secretary’s “sweeping 
authority to protect the country from potentially devastating 
communicable diseases,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 23; the 
provision only mentions regulations that provide for the 
“apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional release of 
individuals” if the individual is “coming into a State or 
possession from a foreign country or possession.” 42 U.S.C. § 
264(c). Again, the authority to remove is not mentioned. “That 
is, in a section where one would expect the term to appear—where 
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Congress has delineated the government’s power to prevent the 
spread of contagious disease from individuals coming into the 
United States from a foreign country—it does not.” P.J.E.S., 502 
F. Supp. 3d at 537-38.  
Furthermore, even beyond Sections 264 and 271, the statute 
as a whole does not contain “a word about the power of the [CDC] 
to expel anyone who has come into the country.” Id. at 513-14 
(citing 42 U.S.C., Chap. 6A, Subchap. II, Part G (entitled 
“Quarantine and Inspection”)); 42 U.S.C. § 267 (entitled 
“Quarantine stations, grounds, and anchorages”); id. § 268 
(entitled “Quarantine duties of consular and other officers”); 
id. § 270 (entitled “Quarantine regulations governing civil air 
navigation and civil aircraft”); id. § 271 (entitled “Penalties 
for violation of quarantine laws”); id. § 272 (entitled 
“Administration of oaths by quarantine officers”). Rather, the 
statutory scheme reflects Congress’s focus on the public’s 
health, authorizing the CDC to create regulations that allow for 
the “apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional 
release of individuals” entering from foreign countries to stop 
the spread of communicable diseases from those countries, id. § 
264; and then in times of serious danger, to halt the 
“introduction of persons” from designated foreign countries, id. 
§ 265. 
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Defendants argue, however, that the findings above 
“ignore[] the purely public health purpose of the statute,” 
because “[t]he absence of the terms ‘expel’ or ‘removal’ has no 
special significance in the public health context even if its 
absence might be meaningful in the immigration context.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 19-20. They further contend that Section 
265’s phrase “prohibit[ing] . . . the introduction” does not 
demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the Executive’s 
authority at “stopping a person precisely at the Nation’s 
borders.” Id. at 18. Instead, “the term ‘introduction’ refers to 
a continuing process and is most naturally read to extend beyond 
a person’s immediate physical crossing of the border,” and “to 
‘prohibit . . . the introduction’ naturally means to intercept 
or prevent such a process.” Id. at 18-19. Thus, in Defendants’ 
view, “the Section 265 authority includes intercepting and 
halting persons who have already crossed the border—but who are 
in the process of being introduced—into the United States.” Id. 
at 19. 
Defendants arguments are unpersuasive. First, regardless of 
whether the words “expel” or “remove” are specific to the 
immigration context, Defendants do not explain the lack of 
synonyms of either word within the statute. Moreover, “[i]t is a 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that absent 
provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.” Rotkiske v. 
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Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “[W]hen 
Congress wants to mandate [certain] procedures[,] it knows 
exactly how to do so.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1626 (2018). In view of current immigration laws, which 
speak to deportation by using words such as “remove” and 
“return,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (“The Attorney General 
shall prescribe conditions . . . to . . . return . . . 
inadmissible aliens . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 1182(h)(2) 
(“No waiver shall be granted . . . for a period of not less than 
7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of 
proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.” 
(emphasis added)); this Court recognizes, as have other courts 
in this District, that “[t]here’s a serious question about 
whether [Section 265’s] power includes the power . . . to remove 
or exclude persons who are already present in the United 
States,” Hr’g Tr., J.B.B.C. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-1509, ECF No. 39 
at 50 (June 26, 2020). Put simply, the “fact that Congress did 
not use [words such as ‘return’ or ‘remove’] . . . suggests at a 
minimum that the power to remove is not granted by [S]ection 
265.” Id.5 
 
5 Citing to dicta in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 
(1983), the government argues that “language in one statute 
usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different 
language in another statute.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 19-20. 
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Second, even accepting the government’s position that the 
phrase “prohibit . . . the introduction of” means “to intercept 
or prevent” the “process” of introduction, Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 18-19; this phrase also does not encompass expulsion from 
the United States, nor do any of the definitions provided by the 
Government contain the word “expel” or synonyms thereof. Rather, 
to “prohibit . . . the introduction of” merely means that the 
process of introduction can be halted. And “[e]xpelling persons, 
as a matter of ordinary language, is entirely different from 
interrupting, intercepting, or halting the process of 
introduction.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. at 512; see also id. at 
536 (finding that the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definitions of 
“prohibit,” “intercept,” and “prevent” each “connote stopping 
something before it begins, rather than remedying it 
afterwards”). In other words, “interrupting, intercepting, or 
halting the process of introduction does [not] inexorably lead 
to expulsion.” Id. at 512. 
 
However, the Supreme Court routinely points to other statutes as 
evidence that Congress knows how to legislate in particular 
ways. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019) (“A 
textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate 
when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the 
omitted language or provision. Congress has enacted statutes 
that expressly include the language [the petitioner] asks us to 
read in . . . .”); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 
1626 (2018) (explaining that “when Congress wants to mandate 
[certain] procedures[,] it knows exactly how to do so,” and 
“Congress has spoken often and clearly” to the issue in other 
statutes). 
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The Government next contends that, “rather than specifying 
that the power to prohibit the introduction of persons is 
limited to the Nation’s borders,” Congress expressly delegated 
the power to issue regulations that accomplish Section 265’s 
purpose. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 20. But the government's 
argument is beside the point; if Section 265 does not provide 
the authority to expel persons, then it does not delegate the 
authority to issue regulations to expel persons. In addition, 
the Court also notes that the legislative history cited by the 
government—that Section 265’s predecessor statute would have 
given the President the power to suspend “immigration,” see 
Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 22—does not provide support for its 
position that Section 265 authorizes it to expel persons. 
Finally, in view of the above discussion and finding that 
Section 265 is not ambiguous, the Court need not reach step two 
of the Chevron analysis. However, even if the statute was 
ambiguous, deference would not be justified. First, “the 
‘reconciliation’ of distinct statutory regimes ‘is a matter for 
the courts,’ not agencies,” Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 
(quoting Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 685-86 
(1975)); and here, “[t]he question for this claim is purely 
legal: does Section 265 authorize expulsions from the United 
States, or does it not?” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 544 n.15. 
And while the government contends that the interpretation of 
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43 
 
“introduction” is within the Secretary’s expertise, see Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 33-34; the Court disagrees. “The CDC’s 
‘scientific and technical knowledge’ . . . has no bearing on 
that question of statutory interpretation.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. 
Supp. 3d at 544 n.15. Moreover, government has not explained how 
its scientific and technical expertise would lead it to 
interpret “introduction” to encompass “expulsion.” Cf. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (noting that “[a] court 
must make an independent inquiry into whether the character and 
context of the agency interpretation entitled it to controlling 
weight”); see also NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (“The Service cannot rely on ‘reminders that its 
scientific determinations are entitled to deference’ in the 
absence of reasoned analysis ‘to cogently explain’ why its 
additional recommended measures satisfied the Fishery Act’s 
requirements.”). Accordingly, the CDC is not entitled to 
deference with respect to its interpretation.6 
2. Plaintiffs Face Irreparable Injury 
“The failure to demonstrate irreparable harm is ‘grounds 
for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the 
 
6 Because the Court finds that Title 42 does not authorize 
expulsion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ additional 
arguments that Section 265 was designed to regulation 
transportation or that, even if Section 265 authorized 
expulsions, the Title 42 Process would violate the immigration 
statutes. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 21, 27. 
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other three factors . . . merit such relief.’” Nat’l Mining 
Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (RBW) 
(quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 
290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “In this Circuit, a litigant seeking 
a preliminary injunction must satisfy ‘a high standard’ for 
irreparable injury.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting 
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297). The movant 
must demonstrate that it faces an injury that is “both certain 
and great; it must be actual and not theoretical,” and of a 
nature “of such imminence that there is a clear and present need 
for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. 
v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and 
emphasis omitted). 
 
Plaintiffs contend that they are likely to suffer 
irreparable harm if they are expelled without the opportunity to 
seek humanitarian relief pursuant to the Title 42 Process. Pls.’ 
Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 31. Plaintiffs have presented 
as evidence United States Department of State reports and 
multiple declarations asserting that the home countries of the 
proposed class members “are among the most dangerous in the 
world due to gang, gender, family membership, and other 
identity-based violence.” Id. at 32. The declarations submitted 
to the Court specify in detail Plaintiffs’ fear of violence, 
persecution, and other victimization if they are removed, yet 
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45 
 
they remain subject to the Title 42 Process and face the threat 
of removal prior to receiving any of the protections the 
immigration laws provide. See, e.g., Sealed Decl., ECF No. 9; 
Sealed Decl., ECF No. 17; Sealed Decl., ECF No. 27; Sealed 
Decl., ECF No. 32; Sealed Decls., ECF Nos. 63-67; Sealed Decl., 
ECF No. 70; Sealed Decls., ECF Nos. 84; Sealed Decls., ECF No. 
88-89. Plaintiffs further assert that many of the families “are 
expelled to Mexico, where they are often victimized by criminal 
cartels and gang members and face numerous barriers to finding 
safe places to shelter.” Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 
at 33. Defendants do not dispute the potential harms that 
Plaintiffs could face if removed from the United States.  
 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown 
they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary 
injunction. Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would likely be “beyond 
remediation.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 
297. First, pursuant to the Title 42 Process, Plaintiffs and the 
proposed class members face the prospect of expulsion without 
any opportunity to apply for asylum or withholding of removal. 
And once expelled from the United States and outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court, a judicial remedy may be unavailable. 
See Doe v. Mattis, 928 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding 
irreparable harm likely to flow from the transfer of a dual 
citizen detained in Iraq to an unidentified third country 
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46 
 
because he would then be in the custody of that third country 
“without any continuing oversight by—or recourse to—the United 
States”); P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 545; Tefel v. Reno, 972 
F. Supp. 608, 619–20 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[T]he Court finds . . . 
that Plaintiffs and class members would suffer irreparable harm 
if they are deported to their native countries after having been 
denied an opportunity to have a hearing on their claims for 
suspension of deportation.”); Velasquez v. Velasquez, No. 14-cv-
1688, 2014 WL 7272934, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2014) (finding 
irreparable harm where children could be removed from 
jurisdiction because that would “frustrate the effort of th[e] 
Court in resolving the [dispute]”). Second, members of the 
proposed class also do not seek monetary compensation for their 
injuries; instead, they seek injunctive and declaratory relief 
invalidating the Title 42 Process. Unlike economic harm, the 
harm resulting from expulsion from the United States pursuant to 
an unlawful policy likely cannot be remediated after the fact. 
Cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that economic losses are typically 
not irreparable because compensation can be awarded after a 
merits determination). 
 
In addition, “[i]t is well-established that acts by 
[g]overnment agencies in derogation of statutory rights of the 
public or certain individual members of the public can 
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47 
 
constitute irreparable injury.” Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 285 
F. Supp. 3d 21, 42 n.22 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Gates v. 
Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D.D.C. 1973)). Here, the 
Court has explained that Section 265 likely does not authorize 
expulsion, thereby denying the proposed class members’ the 
opportunity to seek humanitarian benefits pursuant to the 
immigration statutes. 
Defendants argue, however, that the “inherently 
individualized nature” of Plaintiffs’ potential harms does not 
demonstrate that the harms are “likely” to occur in the absence 
of a preliminary injunction. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 35. But 
while the decision whether to eventually grant asylum to 
individuals is undoubtedly fact-intensive, as explained above, 
Plaintiffs have provided ample unrebutted evidence demonstrating 
that they are collectively deprived of certain statutory 
procedures to seek protection under the Title 42 Process, and 
they face real threats of violence and persecution if they were 
to be removed from the United States. See, e.g., Neusner Decl., 
ECF No. 118-4 ¶ 8; Harbury Decl., ECF No. 118-5 ¶¶ 1, 10; Arvey 
Decl, ECF No. 118-7 ¶ 16; Pinheiro Decl., ECF No. 118-7 ¶ 37; 
Suppl. Levy Decl., ECF No. 118-3 ¶ 16; Rivas Decl., ECF No. 118-
11 ¶ 16. In addition, as Plaintiffs point out, “Defendants offer 
no evidence that class members face materially disparate dangers 
once expelled.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 20. As other courts 
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48 
 
have noted, “similar showings” of “bona fide clams for 
humanitarian relief, including fear of persecution on the basis 
of protected characteristics,” have been found to be “sufficient 
to demonstrate irreparable injury.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 
544 (citing cases); see also J.B.B.C. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-1509, 
2020 WL 6041870, at *2 (D.D.C. June 26, 2020) (stating that 
sealed “declaration describing the possible harms that would 
result from plaintiff’s return to Honduras” was sufficient); 
Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 287, 296-97 (D. Mass. 2018) 
(finding unrebutted evidence showing threat of persecution or 
torture if deported established likely irreparable harm, despite 
“no individualized evidence concerning the specific threats each 
Petitioner faces in Indonesia”); Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 
3d 96, 146 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds sub nom., Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(“[P]laintiffs credibly alleged at their credible fear 
determinations that they feared rape, pervasive domestic 
violence, beatings, shootings, and death in their countries of 
origin. Based on plaintiffs’ declarations attesting to such 
harms, they have demonstrated that they have suffered 
irreparable injuries.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. 
Supp. 1488, 1504–05 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that plaintiffs 
would suffer irreparable harm if they were summarily removed 
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49 
 
without being afforded the opportunity to exercise their right 
to apply for asylum). 
Defendants also contend that “the [g]overnment’s 
implementation of the Order provides a process for determining a 
covered alien’s claim for protection under the Convention 
Against Torture. Thus, Plaintiffs would not be expelled without 
some opportunity to seek humanitarian relief.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 
No. 76 at 35. However, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs 
and proposed class members would still be deprived of the 
protections and procedures provided for under the immigration 
statutes. See id. 
Plaintiffs have thus shown a likelihood of suffering 
irreparable harm. 
3. The Balance of the Equities and Public 
Interest Favors an Injunction 
The balance-of-equities factor directs the Court to 
“balance the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the 
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the 
requested relief.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (quoting 
Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). “When the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, while preventing harm to one party, causes injury to 
the other, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting 
preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Serono Labs., Inc. 
v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1998). By contrast, 
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the balance of equities may favor a preliminary injunction that 
serves only “to preserve the relative positions of the parties 
until a trial on the merits can be held.” Rufer v. FEC, 64 F. 
Supp. 3d 195, 206 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 
395). “The purpose of . . . interim relief is not to 
conclusively determine the rights of the parties, . . . but to 
balance the equities as the litigation moves forward. In 
awarding a preliminary injunction a court must also ‘conside[r] 
. . . the overall public interest’. . . .” Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (second 
alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs contend that issuing a preliminary injunction 
“would not substantially injure the government and would be 
consistent with public health” because (1) “families who come to 
the border . . . can be processed quickly by Border Patrol 
agents and released to sponsors in the interior,” where they can 
quarantine and be subject to local health restrictions; (2) 
“insofar as Defendants choose to detain families upon their 
apprehension at the border, Defendants operate family detention 
facilities where the family can be housed together,” as well as 
tested and quarantined; and (3) “Defendants keep many families 
in custody for weeks before expulsion,” where the families are 
tested for COVID-19. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 57-1 at 
34-35. Defendants, in opposition, argue that “an injunction will 
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51 
 
increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission, which for some could 
have deadly consequences, and undoing the mitigation measures 
put in place by the Order is not in the public interest.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 36.  
Here, the Court ultimately finds that the balance of the 
equities and the public interest weigh in favor of an 
injunction.  
First, “[t]here is generally no public interest in the 
perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” League of Women Voters 
of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also 
Ramirez v. ICE, 310 F. Supp. 3d 7, 33 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The public 
interest surely does not cut in favor of permitting an agency to 
fail to comply with a statutory mandate.”); R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 
3d at 191 (“The Government ‘cannot suffer harm from an 
injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice or reads a 
statute as required to avoid constitutional concerns.’”). As 
explained above, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs are 
likely to succeed on their claim that the Title 42 Process is 
unlawful. Accordingly, because “there is an overriding public 
interest . . . in the general importance of an agency’s faithful 
adherence to its statutory mandate,” Jacksonville Port Auth. v. 
Adams, 556 F.2d 52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1977); the Court finds that 
Plaintiffs likelihood of success “is a strong indicator that a 
preliminary injunction would serve the public interest,” Newby, 
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838 F.3d at 12; see also A.B.-B. v. Morgan, No. 20-cv-846, 2020 
WL 5107548, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“[T]he Government and 
public can have little interest in executing removal orders that 
are based on statutory violations . . . .”). 
Second, “the public has an interest in ‘ensuring that we do 
not deliver aliens into the hands of their persecutors,’ Leiva-
Perez [v. Holder], 640 F.3d [962,] 971 [(9th Cir. 2011)], and 
‘preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly 
to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm,’ 
Nken, 556 U.S. at 436.” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 
993 F.3d 640, 678 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, the Title 42 Process 
deprives Plaintiffs and the proposed class members of an 
opportunity to seek humanitarian protections under the asylum 
and withholding of removal statutes. Proceeding to the merits of 
this litigation without preliminary injunctive relief thus 
“risks [P]laintiffs being returned to home countries where they 
face significant risk of physical harm.” A.B.-B., 2020 WL 
5107548, at *9. Defendants do not question that Plaintiffs face 
substantial harm if returned to their countries of origin. 
Accordingly, “[t]hese life-or-death consequences weigh heavily 
in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also 
Devitri, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 297 (D. Mass. 2018) (“The public’s 
interest in providing due process for non-citizens to ensure 
that they are not removed to a country where they will be 
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persecuted is an extremely weighty one.”); Chaudhry v. Barr, No. 
19-cv-00682, 2019 WL 2009307, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2019) 
(“[T]here is . . . ‘a public interest in preventing aliens from 
being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they 
are likely to face substantial harm.’” (quoting Sied v. Nielsen, 
No. 17-cv-06785, 2018 WL 1142202, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2018))). 
Defendants argue, however, that “an injunction will 
increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission, which for some could 
have deadly consequences, and undoing the mitigation measures 
put in place by the Order is not in the public interest.” Defs.’ 
Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 36. According to Defendants, (1) “CBP 
facilities ‘are not structured or equipped for quarantine or 
isolation for COVID-19’”; (2) “[t]he numbers of aliens and the 
size and capacity of the congregate holding areas are not at all 
conducive to effective social distancing”; and (3) “CBP is not 
equipped to provide on-site care to infected persons.” Id. 
(quoting March Order at 14; Final Rule, 85 Fed Reg. at 56,433). 
Due to these constraints, Defendants fear that U.S. Border 
Patrol’s facilities “may rapidly become overcrowded” if the 
Title 42 Process is rescinded. Id. But despite the government’s 
warnings regarding the capacity of its facilities and staff, the 
fact remains that “86% of families arriving at the southwest 
border are already allowed into the United States and processed 
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for regular removal proceedings.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 
22. Moreover, although Defendants have expressed concerns 
regarding its inability to provide for quarantine space or 
“effective social distancing” if the Title 42 Process were not 
in effect, expulsion pursuant to the CDC Orders still results in 
“plac[ing] families on crowded planes and buses from the Rio 
Grande Valley,” without first testing the individuals and 
isolating those who test positive, and transporting them “to 
other locations in Texas, or places as far away as Arizona and 
San Diego,” before expelling them or releasing them into the 
United States. Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 25.  
Citing an increased number of “enforcement encounters” from 
April 2020 to January 2021, Defendants further contend that an 
injunction in this case could “create a ‘pull factor’ leading to 
additional attempts to enter the United States and in turn more 
apprehensions.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 37 (citing Miller 
Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 16). However, as Plaintiffs point out, 
Defendants’ only evidence in support of their prediction is “a 
16% increase in encounters of unaccompanied children in the 
weeks after entry of this Court’s injunction in P.J.E.S. in 
November 2020,” which was actually “part of a larger upward 
trend that predated the injunction by many months—and it was 
smaller than the percentage increase for each month from April 
to October 2020, when Title 42 was being enforced against 
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unaccompanied children.” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 26 (citing 
Menjívar Decl., ECF No. 118-23 ¶ 15). Moreover, though 
Defendants contend that there has been a “historic” level of 
enforcement encounters at the border, the statistics Defendants 
cite “overstate the number of unique individuals arriving at the 
border.” Reichlin-Melnick Decl., ECF No. 118-18 ¶¶ 15-16. For 
example, Plaintiffs have provided evidence that, after the 
implementation of the Title 42 Process, the recidivism rate of 
individuals crossing the border increased from less than 7% to 
40%. Id. ¶ 11. In other words, under the Title 42 regime, 
individuals seeking an asylum hearing have attempted to cross 
the border multiple times, “sometimes 10 times or more, and each 
attempt is counted as a new ‘encounter.’” Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 
118 at 22. Such evidence casts doubt on Defendants’ claims that 
an injunction in this matter would create a “pull factor.” See 
Flores v. Sessions, No. 85-cv-4544, 2018 WL 4945000, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. July 9, 2018) (finding argument that border crossings would 
surge due to court order lacked merit). 
Defendants also note that “the pandemic has taken a toll on 
the CBP workforce,” with many CBP employees contracting COVID-19 
and several others dying from the virus. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 37 (citing Miller Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 18). Defendants 
assert that “[w]ith personnel on sick leave or quarantining, the 
ability of CBP to perform its functions is diminished.” Id. 
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(citing Miller Decl., ECF No. 76-2 ¶ 14). The loss of life 
resulting from COVID-19 contraction is undeniably tragic, and 
the Court agrees that “promoting public health—especially during 
a pandemic—is in the public interest.” Nat’l Immigration Project 
of Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Exec. Off. of Immigration Review, 456 
F. Supp. 3d 16, 34 (D.D.C. 2020). However, Defendants provide no 
evidence that the CBP employees who tested positive for COVID-19 
contracted the virus from any of the asylum seekers crossing the 
border into the United States. And, significantly, since 
Defendants filed its opposition brief in this matter, vaccines 
protecting against the risk of serious disease and 
hospitalization have become widely available in the United 
States. See Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 25. The Court does not 
doubt that a preliminary injunction issued in this matter would 
force the government “to make difficult decisions about 
allocation of resources to mitigate the risks caused by COVID-
19.” P.J.E.S., 502 F. Supp. 3d at 549. But in view of the wide 
availability of testing, vaccines, and other minimization 
measures, the Court is not convinced that the transmission of 
COVID-19 during border processing cannot be significantly 
mitigated. Indeed, the government has successfully implemented 
mitigation measures with regard to processing unaccompanied 
minors in order to minimize risk of COVID-19 transmission. See 
Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 118 at 21-22. 
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57 
 
Finally, Defendants argue that “[a]ny time [the government] 
is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by 
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable 
injury.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 76 at 38 (quoting Maryland v. 
King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012)). But, as explained above, the 
Title 42 Process is likely unlawful, and “[t]here is generally 
no public interest in the perpetuation of an unlawful agency 
action.” Newby, 838 F.3d at 12. 
4. The Court Will Not Require Plaintiffs to 
Post a Bond 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that “[t]he 
court may issue a preliminary injunction . . . only if the 
movant gives security in an amount that the court considers 
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found 
to have been wrongfully enjoined.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 
“Courts in this Circuit have found the Rule ‘vest[s] broad 
discretion in the district court to determine the appropriate 
amount of an injunction bond,’ including the discretion to 
require no bond at all.” Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. 
Supp. 2d 90, 107 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting DSE, Inc. v. United 
States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal citation 
omitted). Here, Plaintiffs are families allegedly fleeing 
persecution in their home country and do not have the ability to 
post a bond. Additionally, they are seeking to vindicate 
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58 
 
important procedures and protections under the immigration laws. 
Accordingly, the Court will waive the requirement for an 
injunction bond. See id. 
5. The Court Shall Stay the Preliminary 
Injunction  
Defendants request that the Court stay its Order enjoining 
the Title 42 Process for 14 days “to give Defendants sufficient 
time to explore their appellate options.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 
76 at 39. Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ request. Pls.’ 
Reply, ECF No. 118 at 30. Accordingly, the Court shall stay its 
Order for 14 days from the date of its entry. However, the Court 
declines to stay this decision pending appeal for substantially 
the same reasons as those articulated in this Opinion. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 23, and GRANTS 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 57. The 
preliminary injunction shall be stayed for 14 days. An 
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed:  Emmet G. Sullivan  
  
United States District Judge  
  
September 16, 2021 
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1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, et 
al., 
 
 
Plaintiffs,    
 
v. 
 
 
 
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his 
official capacity as Secretary 
of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civ. Action No. 21-100(EGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum 
Opinion, it is hereby  
 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is 
GRANTED; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court certifies a class pursuant to Rules 
23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
consisting of all noncitizens who: (1) are or will be in the 
United States; (2) come to the United States as a family unit 
composed of at least one child under 18 years old and that 
child’s parent or legal guardian; and (3) are or will be 
subjected to the Title 42 Process; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Nancy Gimena Huisha-Huisha and her 
minor child I.M.C.H.; Valeria Macancela Bermejo and her minor 
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2 
 
daughter, B.A.M.M.; Josaine Pereira-De Souza and her minor 
children H.N.D.S.; E.R.P.D.S.; M.E.S.D.S.; H.T.D.S.D.S.; Martha 
Liliana Taday-Acosta and her minor children D.J.Z.; J.A.Z.; 
Julien Thomas, Fidette Boute, and their minor children D.J.T.-
B.; T.J.T.-B.; and Romilus Valcourt, Bedapheca Alcante, and 
their minor child, B.V.-A., are appointed as Class  
Representatives; and it is further 
ORDERED that ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project is appointed 
Lead Class Counsel, and the Texas Civil Rights Project, the ACLU 
of Texas, the ACLU of the District of Columbia, the Refugee and 
Immigrant Center for Legal Education and Legal Services 
(RAICES), the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, and Oxfam 
America are appointed as Class Counsel; and it is further 
 
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Oral Argument is 
DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
is GRANTED; and it is further  
 
ORDERED that, pursuant to this Order, Defendants are HEREBY 
ENJOINED from applying the Title 42 Process, including the CDC’s 
August 2021 Order, to the Class Members; and it is further  
 
ORDERED that this Order shall be stayed for 14 days from 
the date of its entry; and it is further 
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3 
 
 
ORDERED that any request to stay this Order pending appeal 
will be denied for the reasons stated in the accompanying 
Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed:  Emmet G. Sullivan  
  
United States District Judge  
  
September 16, 2021 
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