Information - United States v. Tracy and Carolyn Wade

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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW · Doc. 301 · 2026-03-20 · Docket on CourtListener

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The Eleventh Circuit's mandate, judgment and per curiam opinion in United States v. Carolyn Denise Wade and Tracy D. Wade, No. 25-11132, entered in No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 20, 2026 as Document 301. The opinion, before Chief Judge William Pryor and Circuit Judges Luck and Lagoa, addresses the Wades' appeal of their convictions for wire fraud, false statements to the Small Business Administration, and conspiracy. It recounts that each applied for $20,833 loans as sole proprietors, and that Carolyn was sentenced to three years of probation and Tracy to 90 days of imprisonment. The court holds that any error in admitting an uncharged loan application was harmless, that refusing a good-faith jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, and that sufficient evidence supported Carolyn's convictions, and affirms.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
David J. Smith 
Clerk of Court  
 
 
March 20, 2026  
For rules and forms visit
www.ca11.uscourts.gov
Clerk - Southern District of Florida 
U.S. District Court  
400 N MIAMI AVE 
MIAMI, FL 33128-1810 
 
Appeal Number:  25-11132-DD  
Case Style: USA v. Carolyn Wade, et al 
District Court Docket No: 0:23-cr-60173-KMW-1 
 
The enclosed copy of the judgment is hereby issued as mandate of the court. The court's opinion 
was previously provided on the date of issuance.  
A copy of this letter, and the judgment form if noted above, but not a copy of the court's 
decision, is also being forwarded to counsel and pro se parties. A copy of the court's decision 
was previously forwarded to counsel and pro se parties on the date it was issued.  
Clerk's Office Phone Numbers 
General Information: 404-335-6100  Attorney Admissions:    404-335-6122 
Case Administration: 404-335-6135  Capital Cases:       404-335-6200 
CM/ECF Help Desk: 404-335-6125  Cases Set for Oral Argument: 404-335-6141 
 
 
 
 
 
Enclosure(s)  
MDT-1 Letter Issuing Mandate 
 
USCA11 Case: 25-11132     Document: 66-1     Date Filed: 03/20/2026     Page: 1 of 1 
JG
Mar 20, 2026
MIAMI
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In the 
United States Court of Appeals 
For the Eleventh Circuit 
____________________ 
No. 25-11132 
____________________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
versus 
CAROLYN DENISE WADE, 
TRACY D. WADE, 
a.k.a. Sealed Defendant 2,
Defendants-Appellants. 
____________________ 
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida 
D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW-1
____________________
JUDGMENT 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the opinion issued 
on this date in this appeal is entered as the judgment of this Court. 
Entered: February 18, 2026 
For the Court: DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court 
ISSUED AS MANDATE: March 20, 2026
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
In the 
United States Court of Appeals 
For the Eleventh Circuit 
____________________ 
No. 25-11132 
Non-Argument Calendar 
____________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
versus 
 
CAROLYN DENISE WADE, 
TRACY D. WADE, 
a.k.a. Sealed Defendant 2, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
____________________ 
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida 
D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW-1 
____________________ 
 
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and LAGOA, Circuit 
Judges. 
PER CURIAM: 
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Opinion of the Court 
25-11132 
Carolyn and Tracy Wade appeal their convictions for wire 
fraud, making false statements to the Small Business Administra-
tion, and conspiracy. They challenge an evidentiary ruling, the re-
fusal to give a jury instruction, and the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting Carolyn’s convictions. No reversible error occurred. 
We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A grand jury indicted the Wades for conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, wire fraud, id. § 1343, and conspiracy 
to make false statements to the Administration, id. § 371. The in-
dictment also charged Carolyn separately with making false state-
ments to the Administration, 15 U.S.C. § 645(a), and Tracy with 
wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and making false statements to the 
Administration, 15 U.S.C. § 645(a). The indictment alleged that the 
Wades conspired with Haydee Rivero to obtain fraudulent loans 
from the Paycheck Protection Program and to secure their later 
forgiveness by the Administration through the submission of ficti-
tious tax forms and false payroll data.  
 
Before trial, the parties contested the admissibility of Tracy’s 
prior uncharged loan application and the propriety of the Wades’ 
request for a good-faith jury instruction. The government notified 
the Wades that it intended to introduce the application under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent and absence of mis-
take. The Wades argued that the uncharged application should be 
excluded as inadmissible character evidence, and they separately 
requested a good-faith jury instruction. The district court deferred 
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3 
ruling on the admissibility of the evidence until the government 
offered it at trial and explained that the giving of any good-faith 
jury instruction would depend on whether the evidence at trial sup-
ported it. 
 
At trial, the government presented testimony about the 
Paycheck Protection Program, which was intended to help small 
businesses pay their employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The Administration oversaw the program but allowed private 
lenders to manage the loan application and disbursement process. 
Applicants submitted proof of eligibility and certified the veracity 
of their application under penalty of fine or imprisonment. 
 
The government also presented evidence about the fraudu-
lent nature of the Wades’ applications. Tracy and Carolyn each ap-
plied for $20,833 loans as sole proprietors, reporting gross incomes 
of $112,430 and $113,560, respectively, based on 2019 Schedule C 
forms. They each sought forgiveness for the full amount of each 
loan and certified under penalty of perjury that they had used the 
loan proceeds exclusively on payroll. But Internal Revenue Service 
records proved that, although the Wades filed individual tax re-
turns between 2018 and 2020, they never filed Schedule C returns 
for those sole proprietorships. 
 
Rivero—who pleaded guilty to the conspiracy—testified 
that she and her husband were “good friends” with the Wades 
through their work in the funeral home industry. Tracy owned 
Wade Funeral Home, and Rivero’s husband operated another fu-
neral home where she worked as an administrative assistant. 
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Opinion of the Court 
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Rivero explained that she prepared and uploaded fraudulent Sched-
ule C forms for both Tracy and Carolyn. She testified that the pur-
pose of the conspiracy was to obtain money from the government 
based on false information and that she worked with Tracy and 
Carolyn. 
 
On cross-examination, the defense attacked Rivero’s credi-
bility by highlighting her cooperation agreement and by probing 
her interactions with Tracy. The defense sought to portray Tracy 
as an unwitting participant who provided his personal identifiers to 
the Riveros in good faith with no knowledge that they would sub-
mit fraudulent tax documents on his behalf. To rebut this theory, 
the government, on redirect of Rivero, introduced an email she re-
ceived with the subject line “Wade Funeral Home.” Rivero testi-
fied that the email contained an attachment that reported a “loan 
overview” for a loan estimated at $701,873. Although she stated 
that she did not work on that specific application, she printed the 
document and gave it to her husband. On recross, Rivero reiterated 
that she had received voided checks from both Tracy and Carolyn 
to facilitate the loan process, and that Carolyn paid her $1,000. 
 
Digital evidence from Womply, a platform used to process 
applications for the Program, established that the Wades person-
ally reviewed and approved the fraudulent filings. Womply’s rec-
ords linked the applications to the Wades’ phone numbers, email 
addresses, and internet protocol addresses, and confirmed that Car-
olyn signed applications on May 18 and May 28, 2021, and that 
Tracy responded to one-time verification codes. Because the 
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5 
Wades signed their documents through DocuSign, the entire appli-
cation—including the misrepresented gross income—was visible 
to them during the signing process. 
 
Additional evidence established the Wades’ direct involve-
ment through identity verification and device tracking. Using Per-
sona, an identity verification service, the Wades authenticated their 
applications with government-issued identification and “selfie” 
photographs taken from their mobile devices. Digital forensics fur-
ther linked the Wades to the fraud by tracing their activity to spe-
cific internet protocol addresses. Carolyn accessed the Womply 
portal from her home and employer networks, while Tracy used 
his smartphone and his business network at Wade Funeral Home 
to manage his accounts. 
 
Bank records and related testimony detailed the use of the 
loan proceeds for personal expenses. Tracy and Carolyn each re-
ceived $20,833 in personal accounts and issued checks for “reim-
bursement,” “payroll,” or “salary” to themselves and each other, 
despite never having made such payments previously. The Wades 
also used a portion of these funds to pay Rivero for her role in the 
scheme. After the government rested, the district court denied the 
Wades’ motion for a judgment of acquittal.  
The Wades introduced evidence that the Riveros—not the 
Wades—perpetrated the fraud and had a pattern of using false tax 
information without their clients’ knowledge. Tracy testified that 
he relied in good faith on the Riveros and was “puzzled” by the 
fraudulent information. But on cross-examination, he admitted 
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that he performed activities in Carolyn’s Womply account and that 
the evidence “undeniably” established that Carolyn had logged 
into her account several times. The government also questioned 
Tracy regarding a separate, uncharged loan application for Wade 
Funeral Home, which sought over $700,000 in funds for pandemic 
assistance. On redirect examination, Tracy reaffirmed that he 
never saw the fraudulent Schedule C forms during the signing pro-
cess and maintained that he never agreed with the Riveros to de-
fraud the government.  
After they rested, the Wades renewed their motion for a 
judgment of acquittal on all counts. The district court again denied 
the motion. 
Although a good-faith instruction was included in the pro-
posed jury instructions, the district court stated that it did not be-
lieve that the instruction applied to the facts of the case and asked 
the Wades for supporting case law. When the Wades made no fur-
ther argument, the district court removed the good-faith instruc-
tion from the final charge. 
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of the 
offenses. As to the wire fraud counts, the district court explained 
that the government was required to prove the defendants acted 
with the “intent to defraud,” which meant acting knowingly and 
with the specific intent to use false pretenses to cause loss or injury. 
The district court defined “knowingly” as an act done voluntarily 
and not because of a mistake or accident, and “willfully” as an act 
committed purposely with the “specific intent to do something the 
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7 
law forbids.” Afterward, the Wades stated that they had no addi-
tional requests for or objections to the instructions. 
The jury found the Wades guilty on all counts. The Wades 
then moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied 
the motion and ruled that the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, was sufficient to permit a rational 
jury to find the Wades guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all 
charges. It determined that the electronic data and Tracy’s own tes-
timony established that the Wades knowingly and willingly partic-
ipated in a scheme to obtain loans from the paycheck loan program 
based on fraudulent information with the intent to defraud. The 
district court sentenced Carolyn to three years of probation and 
Tracy to 90 days of imprisonment, followed by three years of su-
pervised release. 
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two standards govern our review. “We review a denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence de novo, but we view all evidence in the light most favor-
able to the government, resolving any conflicts in favor of the gov-
ernment’s case.” United States v. Brown, 125 F.4th 1043, 1052 (11th 
Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A 
jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction 
of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). “We are bound by the jury’s credibility 
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choices, and by its rejection of the inferences raised by the defend-
ant.” United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We review evi-
dentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” Brown, 125 F.4th at 1052.  
The parties dispute which standard governs our review of 
the refusal to give a good-faith jury instruction. The Wades argue 
that we should review for abuse of discretion. The government ar-
gues that we should review for plain error. Because the result is the 
same under either standard, we review for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083, 1092 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 144 S. Ct. 2592 (2024) (“We review a district court’s refusal to 
give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.”). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain 
that any error in the admission of evidence regarding Tracy’s un-
charged loan application was harmless. Second, we explain that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give a 
good-faith jury instruction. Third, we explain that sufficient evi-
dence supported Carolyn’s convictions for wire fraud, making false 
statements, and conspiracy to commit both offenses. 
A. Any Error in the Admission of Evidence Regarding Tracy’s Uncharged 
Loan Application Was Harmless. 
 
The Wades argue that the district court erred by admitting 
evidence of an uncharged $700,000 loan application for Wade Fu-
neral Home. They contend it was inadmissible character evidence 
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9 
when introduced during Rivero’s testimony on redirect and im-
proper impeachment evidence during Tracy’s cross-examination. 
The government responds that the evidence was admissible to re-
but Tracy’s claim of a mistake or, in the alternative, that any error 
was harmless. We agree that any error was harmless. 
 
“Even if a district court abuses its discretion in an evidentiary 
ruling, if the error is harmless, we won’t reverse on the basis of it.” 
United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2025). The 
government bears the burden of proving harmless error. Id. “A 
nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless and must be disre-
garded unless it affected the defendant’s substantial rights at trial.” 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (“If [we] can say 
with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed 
by the nonconstitutional error, [we] must affirm even if the district 
court erred.” (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). “Overwhelming evidence of guilt may render an 
erroneous ruling harmless.” Cremades, 160 F.4th at 1304. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Any error in admitting evidence of Tracy’s uncharged 
$700,000 loan application was harmless. The government’s burden 
to prove harmlessness is met where overwhelming evidence of 
guilt exists. See id. The record contains extensive proof—including 
internet protocol addresses, correspondence, and identity verifica-
tion data—linking Tracy to the fraud. The challenged testimony 
spanned only a few pages of a multi-day trial. The judgment was 
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not substantially swayed by that evidence. See Pon, 963 F.3d at 1227
 
 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Give 
a Good-Faith Jury Instruction. 
 
The Wades argue that the district court committed reversi-
ble error by refusing to provide a good-faith jury instruction on the 
counts for conspiracy and wire fraud—offenses that required the 
government to prove that the Wades acted with an intent to de-
fraud. Relying on United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 
Unit A 1981), they contend that, because there was at least some 
evidence to support the instruction, the district court was required 
to give it. They contend that the other instructions did not ade-
quately cover their good-faith defense. The lack of a standalone in-
struction, they maintain, prevented the jury from considering 
whether they possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the of-
fenses. We disagree. 
 
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of 
defense that has “any foundation in the evidence.” United States v. 
Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). If “any evidentiary 
support” exists and the district court is “directed to the defense,” it 
must charge the jury. United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th 
Cir. Unit A. 1981). Yet a district court’s refusal to do so is reversible 
error only when the instruction was “a correct statement of the 
law,” “not substantially covered by other instructions,” its refusal 
“seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to defend himself,” Mar-
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tinelli, 454 F.3d at 1309 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted), and it “dealt with an issue properly before the jury,” United 
States v. Bell, 112 F.4th 1318, 1336 (11th Cir. 2024). When we deter-
mine whether an instruction was “substantially covered by other 
instructions,” we view the whole charge to ensure that it “fairly 
and correctly states the issues and the law.” Daniels, 91 F.4th at 
1093. A district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a 
good-faith instruction if the other instructions correctly defined 
“knowingly” and “willfully.” See Martinelli, 454 F.3d at 1315–16; 
United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 853–54 (11th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the 
good-faith instruction because the charge as a whole “fairly and 
correctly” stated the law. See Daniels, 91 F.4th at 1093. Because the 
district court correctly defined “knowingly” and “willfully,” the 
jury could not have convicted the Wades if it found that they acted 
in good faith. See Martinelli, 454 F.3d at 1316. The subject matter of 
the requested instruction was substantially covered by the defini-
tions of the requisite mens rea. If the jury had concluded the Wades 
held an honestly formed belief, it could not have found that they 
acted with the “specific intent to do something the law forbids.” 
C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Carolyn’s Convictions. 
  
The Wades argue that the district court erred in denying 
Carolyn’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was in-
sufficient evidence to prove that she knew of the falsified loan in-
formation. They contend that the record established that Tracy 
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submitted her information for a potential loan without evidence of 
Carolyn’s personal knowledge or participation. We again disagree. 
1. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Convictions for Con-
spiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and to Defraud the Government. 
To convict Carolyn of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 
U.S.C. § 1349, the government had to prove “(1) a conspiracy to 
commit [wire fraud]; (2) knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) that 
[Carolyn] knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United 
States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). To convict her of conspiracy to 
defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. § 371, it had to prove “(1) an 
agreement among two or more persons to achieve an unlawful ob-
jective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement; 
and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agree-
ment.” United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 
2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant 
may be convicted even if she “played only a minor role in the over-
all scheme” or “did not have direct contact with other alleged 
co-conspirators.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 
2015). Because an agreement may be proven “by inferences from 
the conduct of the alleged participants,“ it is sufficient for the gov-
ernment to establish “that the defendant knew the essential nature 
of the conspiracy.” United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1273 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s conspiracy convic-
tions. A jury could reasonably have found that Carolyn agreed with 
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Tracy and Rivero to submit fraudulent Schedule C documents to 
obtain a loan from the Paycheck Protection Program. The record 
reflects that Carolyn created a Womply account—reserved for sole 
proprietorships, which she did not possess—and verified her iden-
tity through the Persona program. Carolyn’s repeated access to the 
Womply portal and her review of the loan applications through 
DocuSign established that she viewed the fraudulent materials be-
fore signing them, and her payment of $1,000 to Rivero proved her 
knowing participation in the scheme. 
A jury could also reasonably have found that Carolyn con-
spired to defraud the government. Carolyn agreed with Rivero and 
Tracy to achieve an unlawful objective—obtaining loan for-
giveness—and knowingly participated in the scheme. See Gonzalez, 
834 F.3d at 1214. Carolyn received over $20,000 through fraudulent 
means and applied for forgiveness by falsely asserting that the funds 
were used for a permitted purpose. As evidenced by Tracy’s testi-
mony, Carolyn personally profited when the loans were forgiven 
based on this fraudulent information. 
We reject Carolyn’s argument that the evidence was insuffi-
cient because Tracy’s testimony established that he was the catalyst 
of the scheme. The jury was free to—and did—discredit that testi-
mony. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. A jury could convict Carolyn 
even if her participation was “slight” compared to that of her 
co-conspirators. See Sosa, 777 F.3d at 1290. That she did not com-
municate directly with Rivero is immaterial. See id. The evidence 
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proved that she understood the overarching goal of the conspiracy 
and acted to further it. See id.; Vernon, 723 F.3d at 1273. 
2. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Conviction for Wire 
Fraud. 
To convict her of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the govern-
ment had to prove that Carolyn “(1) intentionally participate[d] in 
a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, and 
(2) use[d] or cause[d] the use of the mails or wires for the purpose 
of executing the scheme or artifice.” United States v. Bradley, 644 
F.3d 1213, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). To support a finding of willfulness, the govern-
ment must present evidence that the defendant intended to de-
fraud by attempting to obtain something she was not entitled to 
through deceptive means. United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1273, 
1287 (11th Cir. 2025). This intent may be established through cir-
cumstantial evidence. For example, “[e]vidence that a defendant 
personally profited from a fraud may provide circumstantial evi-
dence of an intent to participate in that fraud.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 
1239 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s convictions for wire 
fraud. To convict, the government had to prove that Carolyn in-
tentionally participated in a scheme to defraud another of money 
and used wires to execute that scheme. See id. Because the parties 
stipulated to the use of interstate wires, the only issue is Carolyn’s 
intent to defraud. 
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15 
A jury could reasonably have found that Carolyn knowingly 
made material misrepresentations to obtain the loan. The record 
reflects that the Schedule C form used to obtain the loan was fraud-
ulent. No “Carolyn Wade” sole proprietorship existed, and Rivero 
testified to fabricating the data. By affirming that this information 
was “true and correct,” Carolyn made a material misrepresenta-
tion. See id. Carolyn also personally and actively participated in the 
scheme. Internet protocol address data established that she repeat-
edly accessed her Womply account. Carolyn’s identity was further 
verified through the Persona program, which required her to up-
load photographs of her driver’s license and “selfie” images from 
her mobile device. Forensic data confirmed that Carolyn used her 
phone to upload documents and viewed the fraudulent application 
on multiple occasions after it had been signed. 
We reject Carolyn’s arguments regarding her lack of intent. 
Although the Wades presented testimony that the DocuSign soft-
ware did not display the full fraudulent form, the jury was free to—
and did—discredit that testimony in favor of government witnesses 
who testified to the contrary. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. The 
jury was also entitled to reject Tracy’s testimony that he was the 
sole actor, as internet protocol address data connected Carolyn—
not Tracy—to the signing of the second loan. See id. Because Car-
olyn personally profited from the scheme, the jury had ample cir-
cumstantial evidence to find an intent to defraud. See Bradley, 644 
F.3d at 1239; Horn, 129 F.4th at 1287. 
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16 
Opinion of the Court 
25-11132 
3. Sufficient Evidence Supports Carolyn’s Convictions for Making 
False Statements. 
 
Sufficient evidence supports Carolyn’s convictions for mak-
ing false statements to the Administration. It is unlawful to know-
ingly make a false statement to obtain a loan from the Administra-
tion. See 15 U.S.C. § 645(a). A jury could reasonably have found that 
Carolyn made false statements in both her loan and forgiveness ap-
plications. 
 
Carolyn’s May 18 and May 28 loan applications contained 
material misrepresentations. Although the underlying Schedule C 
forms were fraudulent, Carolyn affirmed—under penalty of per-
jury—that the information was true and correct. Her initials and 
signature on these documents, confirmed by Tracy’s testimony 
and independent internet protocol address data, established her 
personal participation. To be sure, Tracy stated that he acted on 
Carolyn’s behalf, but the jury was free to discredit this testimony. 
See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1277. 
 
Carolyn also made false statements to obtain loan for-
giveness. To qualify for forgiveness, Carolyn was required to use 
the funds for specific, permitted purposes. The jury heard testi-
mony that Carolyn wrote checks to herself to create the appear-
ance of proper use, while instead using the proceeds to pay Rivero 
for the fraudulent Schedule C forms. Although Tracy maintained 
that the forgiveness process was “automatic,” the government pre-
sented evidence that it required several affirmative steps. To secure 
forgiveness, the Wades submitted applications certifying under 
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25-11132  
Opinion of the Court 
17 
penalty of perjury that they had used the proceeds for payroll. The 
jury was entitled to reject Tracy’s testimony and find that Carolyn 
knowingly submitted fraudulent information to profit from the 
scheme. See id. Because a reasonable construction of the evidence 
supports the verdict, the district court correctly denied the motion 
for a judgment of acquittal. See Brown, 125 F.4th at 1052. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We AFFIRM the Wades’ convictions. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 
56 Forsyth Street, N.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
David J. Smith 
Clerk of Court  
 
 
February 18, 2026  
For rules and forms visit
www.ca11.uscourts.gov
 
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES 
 
Appeal Number:  25-11132-DD  
Case Style:  USA v. Carolyn Wade, et al 
District Court Docket No:  0:23-cr-60173-KMW-1 
 
Opinion Issued 
Enclosed is a copy of the Court's decision issued today in this case. Judgment has been entered 
today pursuant to FRAP 36. The Court's mandate will issue at a later date pursuant to FRAP 
41(b).  
Petitions for Rehearing 
The time for filing a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. 
R. 40-2. Please see FRAP 40 and the accompanying circuit rules for information concerning 
petitions for rehearing. 
Costs 
No costs are taxed. 
Bill of Costs 
If costs are taxed, please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the 
Court's website at www.ca11.uscourts.gov. For more information regarding costs, see FRAP 39 
and 11th Cir. R. 39-1.  
Attorney's Fees 
The time to file and required documentation for an application for attorney's fees and any 
objection to the application are governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.  
Appointed Counsel 
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming 
compensation via the eVoucher system no later than 45 days after issuance of the mandate or 
the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or 
cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher 
system.  
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Clerk's Office Phone Numbers 
General Information: 404-335-6100  Attorney Admissions:    404-335-6122 
Case Administration: 404-335-6135  Capital Cases:       404-335-6200 
CM/ECF Help Desk: 404-335-6125  Cases Set for Oral Argument: 404-335-6141 
 
 
 
OPIN-1 Ntc of Issuance of Opinion 
 
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