REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 37 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State… — United States v. Visa Inc. (Dkt. 59)

Summary

A reply in support of Visa Inc.'s motion to dismiss in United States of America v. Visa Inc., Case No. 1:24-cv-07214-JGK-SLC, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed February 7, 2025 as Doc. 59. The cover states ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED. Visa argues that the Court should not adopt the Government's "minimum attributes" test and that the Government's market-power allegations are irrelevant to market definition. It also argues that the Government's challenge to Visa's merchant agreements is a challenge to Visa's pricing, and that the Government cannot rely on expired agreements for its "Agreements-Not-To-Compete" challenge concerning Apple, PayPal and Square.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Record facts

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VISA INC., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:24-cv-07214-JGK-SLC 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF VISA INC.’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 1 of 17

i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 1 
I.
THE 
GOVERNMENT’S 
ALLEGED 
PRODUCT 
MARKET 
IS
IMPLAUSIBLE. .......................................................................................................... 1 
A.
The Court Should Not Adopt the Government’s “Minimum
Attributes” Test. ............................................................................................... 1 
B.
The Functional Similarity of Interbank Payment Networks to Other
Debit Networks Is Relevant. ............................................................................ 2 
C.
The Government’s Market-Power Allegations Are Irrelevant. ....................... 2 
D.
The Government Concedes Its Allegations’ Inconsistencies. ......................... 3 
II.
THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ALLEGE ANTICOMPETITIVE
CONDUCT. ................................................................................................................. 4 
A.
The Government’s Challenge to Visa’s Merchant Agreements Is a
Challenge to Visa’s Pricing. ............................................................................ 4 
B.
The Government Cannot Rely on Expired Agreements to
Resuscitate its “Agreements-Not-To-Compete” Challenge. ........................... 7 
1.
Apple .................................................................................................... 7
2.
PayPal .................................................................................................. 9 
3.
Square .................................................................................................. 9 
C.
Visa’s Other Alleged Conduct Does Not Constitute an Antitrust
Violation. ....................................................................................................... 10 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 11 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 2 of 17

ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 10 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962) .................................................................................................................... 2 
Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 
515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 4, 11 
City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 
662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981) ..................................................................................................... 11 
Cohen v. Primerica Corp., 
709 F. Supp. 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ............................................................................................... 2 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 
207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................... 4 
Dean v. Blumenthal, 
577 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009) ......................................................................................................... 7 
FTC v. Syngenta Crop Protection, 
711 F. Supp. 3d 545 (M.D.N.C. 2024) ............................................................................... 5, 6, 7 
FTC v. Tapestry, Inc., 
2024 WL 4647809 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2024) .............................................................................. 2 
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig., 
729 F. Supp. 3d 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) .................................................................................... 6, 7 
In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., 
345 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D. Pa. 2018) ...................................................................................... 5, 7 
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 
783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................ 5, 7 
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 8 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 
585 U.S. 529 (2018) .................................................................................................................. 10 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 3 of 17

iii 
Pulse Network, LLC v. Visa Inc., 
30 F.4th 480 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................... 6, 7 
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG, 
96 F.4th 327 (2d Cir. 2024) .................................................................................................... 1, 2 
Valassis Commc’ns, Inc. v. News Corp., 
2019 WL 802093 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019) ............................................................................. 11 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
549 U.S. 312 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 4 
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 
696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 4, 6 
Other Authorities 
Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application (5th ed. 2024) .........................................................................5 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 4 of 17

1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Government’s rhetoric cannot remedy its failure to address core deficiencies in its 
Complaint. Among other things, the Government: 
•
Ignores fundamental inconsistencies in its market-definition allegations, instead relying on
a “minimum attributes” test that is contrary to law;
•
Repackages its challenge to Visa’s prices—bending the caselaw and its own allegations—
to suggest without support that Visa’s merchant agreements contain non-price terms that
could plausibly support an antitrust claim; and
•
Asks the Court to disregard explicit terms in Visa’s agreements with Apple, PayPal, and
Square in favor of contrary terms in long-expired agreements or statements allegedly made
during decade-old negotiations.
This attempted misdirection only confirms the Government’s claims should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I.
THE GOVERNMENT’S ALLEGED PRODUCT MARKET IS IMPLAUSIBLE.
The Government’s product-market arguments ignore the law and its Complaint’s own 
fundamental inconsistencies.  
A.
The Court Should Not Adopt the Government’s “Minimum Attributes” Test.
The Government’s “minimum attributes” test is contrary to law. Opp. 9. Courts regularly 
dismiss claims where plaintiffs define the market solely by reference to minimum attributes. MTD 
13–14.  
None of the cases cited by the Government even discuss a “minimum attributes” test, let 
alone adopts it. Opp. 8-12. In Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG, the 
Second Circuit held plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient because they alleged: (1) a hypothetical 
monopolist could impose a small but significant non-transitory increase in price without losing 
sales to the excluded products; and (2) the proposed market satisfied Brown Shoe’s “practical 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 5 of 17

2 
indicia” test. 96 F.4th 327, 339–41 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 325 (1962)). In FTC v. Tapestry, Inc., the district court likewise applied the “practical 
indicia” test. 2024 WL 4647809, at **11–24 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2024). 
The Government’s claims should be dismissed because its market-definition allegations do 
not satisfy “established legal frameworks such as the ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test or the Brown 
Shoe factors.” Regeneron, 96 F.4th at 340. 
B.
The Functional Similarity of Interbank Payment Networks to Other Debit
Networks Is Relevant.
The Government incorrectly asserts that the functional similarity of Interbank Payment 
Networks to other debit networks is irrelevant. Opp. 10. Two products’ functional similarity is a 
“prima facie indication that two products may be in the same market.” Regeneron, 96 F.4th at 340. 
When functional similarity exists, as it indisputably does here, the plaintiff must allege meaningful 
“economic factors” to plausibly exclude Interbank Payment Networks. Id. The Government has 
failed to do that. 
C.
The Government’s Market-Power Allegations Are Irrelevant.
The Government’s last-ditch attempt to exclude Interbank Payment Networks is to 
repackage its market-power allegations as market-definition allegations. Opp. 11. This flawed 
approach cannot resuscitate its claims. 
The Government asserts without legal support that Visa’s alleged market share and 
operating margins warrant exclusion of Interbank Payment Networks. Opp. 11. But that puts the 
cart before the horse: “When examining market share, a court must first determine the parameters 
of the relevant market, and then examine the defendant’s share in that market.” Cohen v. Primerica 
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (emphasis added). The Government’s market-share 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 6 of 17

3 
allegations are circular because they are premised on excluding Interbank Payment Networks from 
the relevant market. Nor has the Government cited any case where market share or operating 
margins were deemed relevant to market definition, as opposed to market power. 
The Government also suggests that it has properly defined the market because “Visa has 
successfully imposed new, unfavorable pricing structures without losing debit volume.” Compl. 
¶ 175; Opp. 11. But that allegation makes no mention of Interbank Payment Networks. And by the 
Government’s logic, PIN Networks should also be excluded from the relevant market, because 
allegedly raising prices did not cause Visa to lose volume to PIN Networks either. But the 
Government does not suggest excluding PIN Networks from the relevant market, because its 
theory of anticompetitive harm necessitates including PIN Networks.   
D.
The Government Concedes Its Allegations’ Inconsistencies.
The Government does almost nothing to reconcile or explain the numerous inconsistent 
allegations identified in Visa’s opening brief, MTD 14–17, relying instead on its legally 
unsupported “minimum attributes” test. Opp. 12–13.  
The Government, for example, fails to address its inclusion of PIN Networks in the relevant 
market even though its own allegations concede these networks lack sufficient fraud protection, 
Compl. ¶¶ 101, 105, one of the Government’s identified “minimum attributes.” Nor can it explain 
why slower processing times warrant excluding ACH from the market, but not Fintech Debit 
Networks that rely on ACH—and thus necessarily process transactions at the same speed. Id. 
¶¶ 61, 156, 159.  
The Government’s implicit concession that its core market-definition allegations are 
contradictory independently requires dismissal.  
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 7 of 17

4 
II.
THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ALLEGE ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT.
A.
The Government’s Challenge to Visa’s Merchant Agreements Is a Challenge
to Visa’s Pricing.
The Government appears to agree that its challenge to Visa’s volume-based discounts only 
survives if it plausibly alleges that the relevant merchant agreements contain non-price terms 
sufficient to establish an antitrust violation. But the purportedly non-price terms it identifies, Opp. 
16–17, do not satisfy that requirement.  
Market Share and Entry Barriers. Having a high share of a market with high entry 
barriers is not an antitrust violation, and courts routinely apply the price-cost and discount-
attribution test to price discounts offered by alleged monopolists. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315–19 (2007) (65% market share); Cascade 
Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891, 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (75% market share).  
“Cliff Pricing.” All volume-based discounts come with a “cliff”—the point at which the 
discount will not be earned because the volume threshold is not met. Nonetheless, courts routinely 
apply the price-cost test to volume-based discounts. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060–63 (8th Cir. 2000). The only case the Government cites—ZF Meritor, 
LLC v. Eaton Corp.—declined to apply the price-cost test not because the defendant engaged in 
“cliff pricing” but because of the defendant’s other non-price conduct, including threatened supply 
shortages. 696 F.3d 254, 265–67, 277, 281 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Early-Termination Fees. Though the Government does not allege what portion of Visa’s 
agreements have early-termination fees, any such fees are nonetheless price terms. Even accepting 
the Government’s allegations, early-termination fees are repayments of some “incentives that Visa 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 8 of 17

5 
had previously paid the merchant.” Compl. ¶ 77. In other words, early-termination fees allow 
merchants to receive discounts earlier rather than rebates later.  
The Government’s citation to FTC v. Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Opp. 16, is unavailing 
because Syngenta did not involve early-termination fees; it only included “threats to retract unpaid 
rebates or claw back discounts” in an exemplary list of potential non-price terms. 711 F. Supp. 3d 
545, 576 (M.D.N.C. 2024). Tellingly, the Government does not mention McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 
783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015), the case Syngenta cited for this example. For good reason: In 
McWane, the defendant unilaterally imposed repayments; there was no pre-negotiated early-
termination fee in the agreements. Moreover, similar to ZF Meritor, the defendant threatened to 
“cut off” distributors from its supply for twelve weeks if the distributors bought from an emergent 
competitor. 783 F.3d at 820–21.  
“Non-Contestable” Transactions. The Government has cited no legal support for its 
assertion that the inclusion of “contestable” and “non-contestable” transactions in a single volume-
based discount is a non-price term. The Government’s only cited case—In re Remicade Antitrust 
Litig., 345 F. Supp. 3d 566 (E.D. Pa. 2018)—does not address the question of price predominance. 
In any event, to the extent single-product bundling raises antitrust concerns, the leading 
antitrust treatise explains that courts should apply the discount-attribution test to evaluate such 
“bundles.” Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application ¶ 749e (5th ed. 2024) (where a discount that groups “contestable” 
and “incontestable” demand is challenged, apply the discount-attribution test—i.e., “attribute the 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 9 of 17

6 
entire discount to the goods that are still in competitive play”—to determine whether the discount 
could plausibly drive out equally efficient competitors). 
Rivals’ Costs. The Government claims that anything that imposes a unilateral cost on a 
competitor is a non-price term. The Government’s only purported support for that illogical 
proposition is a quote from Syngenta. Opp. 17. But the Government omitted a crucial part of that 
quote, which recommends applying “the rule of reason where there are mechanisms beyond price-
cutting that exclude competition by imposing unilateral costs on competitors.” 711 F. Supp. 3d at 
574 (excluded language emphasized). As the full quote makes clear, the imposition of costs on 
competitors is only relevant if those costs are imposed by non-price terms. And the Government 
has not explained how Visa’s discounts, which allegedly raise its competitors’ costs, are non-price 
terms.  
Agreement Length. The Government’s reliance on three agreements attached to Visa’s 
motion to dismiss to support its assertion that “Visa’s incentive agreements can last for a very long 
time” is inapt. Opp. 17. The Complaint does not allege anything about the duration of hundreds of 
routing agreements at issue. Nor has the Government cited any case holding that agreement length 
by itself is sufficient to avoid application of the price-cost and discount-attribution tests. 
The Government attempts to recharacterize its price-based claims as exclusive dealing 
claims, but every case the Government cites involved severe, non-price-based methods of 
exclusion that are not alleged here.1 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 277 (threatened supply shortages); 
1 The Government cites Pulse Network, LLC v. Visa Inc., 30 F.4th 480 (5th Cir. 2022), and
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 729 F. Supp. 3d 298 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 10 of 17

7 
Syngenta, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 576–77 (same); McWane, 783 F.3d at 820–21 (same); Remicade, 345 
F. Supp. 3d at 575 (“fail first” provision prohibiting medical providers from prescribing competing
medications unless the patient did not respond to defendant’s medication). These cases only 
confirm that the price-cost or discount-attribution test should be applied to Visa’s volume-based 
discounts.  
B.
The Government Cannot Rely on Expired Agreements to Resuscitate its
“Agreements-Not-To-Compete” Challenge.
The Government asserts that Visa pays Apple, PayPal, and Square not to compete with its 
debit products. Opp. 20. But the Government does not identify provisions in operative agreements 
establishing that alleged quid pro quo, instead relying on expired provisions in non-operative 
agreements and “threats” allegedly made in decade-old negotiations. This approach lacks legal 
support and would be particularly problematic here because the Government seeks only forward-
looking relief. See Compl. ¶ 203; Dean v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009).  
1.
Apple
The Government has not identified any agreement where Visa pays Apple not to compete.2 
(E.D.N.Y. 2024), but neither decision discusses price predominance. Pulse, moreover, evaluated 
only standing and “assume[d] arguendo that [Visa’s] policy violates the antitrust laws.” 30 F.4th 
at 488. And the In re Payment Card court applied the discount-attribution test to Visa’s routing 
agreements. 729 F. Supp. 3d at 325 n.17.   
2 The Government does not rely on any prior Apple agreements or negotiations and does
not explain the import of Visa’s alleged failure to address some current Apple agreements. Opp. 
22–23.   
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 11 of 17

8 
The Government barely grapples with the scope or conditions of the Apple Merchant 
Agreement. MTD Ex. 3. That agreement, among other things, governs 
; it does not involve 
, let alone 
. 
In other words, the Apple Merchant Agreement cannot be an “agreement not to compete” because 
it does nothing to inhibit Apple from launching its own debit product and competing for what the 
Government describes as “billion[s] in network fees.” Compl. ¶ 64. 
To the extent the Government suggests that the Apple Technology Agreement involves 
, that is incorrect. Though it does not cite to any specific provision, 
. 
The Government, moreover, cannot explain why the antitrust laws require Visa to continue 
dealing with Apple if Apple becomes a direct competitor. It cites only one case for the proposition 
that a monopolist may “be held liable for failing to leave its rivals alone.” Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.). But a breath before, that decision—
which rejected the plaintiff’s antitrust challenges—explained that businesses are free to decide 
“whether or not to do business with others,” “free to assign what prices they hope to secure for 
their own products,” and free to withhold their “intellectual property” from rivals. Id. at 1072–74, 
1076–77. 
If Apple becomes a competitor, Visa is entitled to terminate or re-negotiate their business 
relationship.  
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 12 of 17

9 
2.
PayPal
The Government does not cite any provision in the PayPal Agreement prohibiting PayPal 
from creating an ACH-based payment method that competes with Visa.  
The best the Government musters is its assertion that 
. Opp. 23. The contract does not say that. PayPal currently allows consumers 
to make in-person ACH-based payments through use of a QR code. 
Seemingly recognizing that this provision is insufficient to support its challenge, the 
Government relies on alleged “restrictions” on ACH-based payments in an agreement that expired 
in 2021, including a “restrict[ion] [on] in-store ACH funding transactions to a QR code model.” 
Compl. ¶ 123. 
3.
Square
The Government alleges that the Square Agreement prohibits Square from “steer[ing] 
customers toward payment options that bypass the need for . . . debit networks.” Opp. 23. 
 This cannot be the basis for an 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 13 of 17

10 
antitrust claim because “there is nothing inherently anticompetitive about . . . antisteering 
provisions.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529, 551 (2018). 
Nor does the Government’s allegation about a nearly decade-old negotiation with Square 
change anything. The Government alleges that, in 2016, Visa threatened to terminate the Square 
agreement if Square released a competing product. Opp. 21–22. Nothing in the antitrust laws 
prohibits Visa from terminating an agreement with a competitor. MTD 22. Moreover, it strains 
credulity to suggest the Court should ignore explicit terms of a current agreement based on a 
contrary statement allegedly made nine years ago.   
C.
Visa’s Other Alleged Conduct Does Not Constitute an Antitrust Violation.
The Government wrongly suggests that its Complaint should survive because Visa 
allegedly only tackles “two kinds of exclusionary conduct out of many.” Opp. 13.  
The Government states that Visa has not addressed its alleged inducement of issuers to 
“limit the enablement of rival networks” with contracts offering discounts and other volume 
incentives. Opp. 6, 13. But Visa’s issuer agreements cannot be exclusive because the Durbin 
Amendment requires issuers to enable two unaffiliated debit networks on every debit card. MTD 
4 (citing Compl. ¶ 8). In any event, as with Visa’s merchant agreements, the Government does not 
allege that Visa’s issuer discounts are below cost.  
The Government asserts Visa has “anticompetitive relationships” with Amazon, but the 
Complaint only makes a cursory reference to Amazon. Compl. ¶ 135. These “bare assertions” are 
“conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).  
The Government’s threadbare allegations of credit and debit bundling likewise include no 
factual assertions indicating that claim could survive the discount-attribution test. See 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 14 of 17

11 
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d at 907–09 (bundling claim only anticompetitive if it survives the discount-
attribution test). 
Finally, to the extent the Government asserts a so-called “monopoly broth” theory, this also 
fails. Even if the issues raised by the Government “are interrelated and interdependent,” the Court 
must “analyze the various issues individually.” City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 
F.2d 921, 928 (2d Cir. 1981). And “it is unlikely that multiple independently lawful acts can come
together to create an unlawful monopoly ‘broth.’” Valassis Commc’ns, Inc. v. News Corp., 2019 
WL 802093, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2019).  
CONCLUSION 
The Government’s Complaint should be dismissed. 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 15 of 17

12 
DATED: February 7, 2025 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Beth A. Wilkinson 
Beth Wilkinson (SBN NY 2181592) 
Brian Stekloff (admitted pro hac vice) 
Kieran Gostin (SBN NY 4847653) 
Roxana Guidero (admitted pro hac vice) 
WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP 
2001 M Street NW, 10th Floor 
Washington, DC 20036 
Telephone: (202) 847-4000 
Facsimile: (202) 847-4005 
bwilkinson@wilkinsonstekloff.com 
bstekloff@wilkinsonstekloff.com 
kgostin@wilkinsonstekloff.com 
rguidero@wilkinsonstekloff.com 
Anne P. Davis (admitted pro hac vice)  
Jonathan Ian Gleklen (admitted pro hac vice) 
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER 
LLP  
601 Massachusetts Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20001 
Telephone: (202) 942-6197 
Facsimile: (202) 942-5999 
anne.davis@arnoldporter.com 
jonathan.gleklen@arnoldporter.com 
Counsel for Defendant Visa Inc. 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 16 of 17

13 
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE 
I hereby certify under Section II.D of Judge Koeltl’s individual practices that this 
memorandum contains 2,799 words, exclusive of the cover page, table of contents, table of 
authorities, and this certification. I further certify that this memorandum complies with the 
formatting rules provided in Section II.D of Judge Koeltl’s individual practices. 
      By: /s/ Beth A. Wilkinson 
Beth A. Wilkinson 
Case 1:24-cv-07214-JGK     Document 59     Filed 02/07/25     Page 17 of 17

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.nysd.628802.59.0.pdf

Size

302,745 bytes

SHA-256

b8838040c56265fdd078aedcb4054e77ea208dd7f928a4c818e330dd8ee9b548

Our copy

gov.uscourts.nysd.628802.59.0.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)