Court filing
ORDER OF 12/5/23 THAT DEFENDANT CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF… — Marshall Prestamos (Dkt. 93)
No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG · Doc. 93 · Docket on CourtListener
Summary
An order dated December 5, 2023, Document 93 in Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC, Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, signed by Judge John M. Gallagher. It grants defendant Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (ECF No.s 84, 85) and directs the Clerk to terminate the case as to that defendant. A footnote states that the plaintiffs argued CPLC is the alter ego of Prestamos and that this was the third time the motion had been before the court. The court reviews four categories of facts from limited discovery, including financial statements, the shared CPLC Prestamos logo, board seats and dividends, and finds that only the defendants cited legal authority on them.
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Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG Document 93 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
ALICIA MARSHALL, DANIEL :
PRONSKY, PARIS TOWNSEND, : Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG
NANCILEE HOLLAND, LEONA :
OWSLEY, KOLAWOLE AHMADOU, :
KIANA DERVIN, KRISTINA :
HENDERSON, DUSTIN INNIS, KELLY :
STALNAKER and JAMIE JONES, :
individually and on behalf of all others :
similarly situated, :
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
v. :
:
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC and :
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC., :
:
Defendants. :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of December, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Chicanos
Por La Causa’s (“CPLC”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 84), Defendant
CPLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (under seal) (ECF No. 85), Plaintiff’s
Response (ECF No. 86), Plaintiff’s Response (under seal) (ECF No. 87), Defendant CPLC’s
Reply (ECF No. 89), and Defendant CPLC’s Reply (under seal) (ECF No. 90), IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion (ECF No.s 84, 85) is GRANTED. 1
1
Plaintiffs’ argue that the Court has personal jurisdiction over CPLC because it is the alter ego of
Defendant Prestamos, see 2d Am. Compl. at ¶ 35; Defendant CPLC disagrees and moves this Court
to dismiss it from the case. This is the third time that CPLC’s motion has been before the Court.
The Court dismissed CPLC’s first motion as moot after Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended
Complaint. See ECF No. 44. The Court denied without prejudice Defendant CPLC’s second
attempt but directed the parties to conduct limited discovery on the subject. See ECF No. 57. For
the reasons stated below, the Court now grants Defendant CPLC’s latest motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG Document 93 Filed 12/05/23 Page 2 of 3
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), in response to a complaint, a defendant may assert as a defense that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. When a defendant raises this defense, “the burden falls
upon the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient facts to establish that jurisdiction is proper.”
Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Carteret
Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992)). However, when reviewing such a motion,
the court “must accept all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor
of the plaintiff.” Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 142 n.1. “Personal jurisdiction [ ] is ‘an essential
element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court,’ without which the court is ‘powerless to proceed to
an adjudication.’” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Emp’rs
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
Courts in this District consider a ten-factor test when deciding whether one entity is the alter ego of
another for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Britax Child Safety, Inc. v. Nuna Int’l B.V., 321 F.
Supp. 3d 546, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2018). Ultimately, “the alter-ego test looks to whether the degree of
control exercised by the parent is greater than normally associated with common ownership and
directorship and whether the parent controls the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary such that
the subsidiary can be said to be a mere department of the parent.” In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage &
Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 319 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted; citation omitted). “[T]he court may consider all relevant evidence to determine whether
the parent exercises actual control over a subsidiary beyond that which is characteristic of a usual
parent-subsidiary relationship.” In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d
538, 570 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
The briefing focuses on four categories of facts: (1) financial statements that referred to
Prestamos/CPLC collectively as “CPLC;” (2) the entities’ common use of the “CPLC Prestamos”
logo; (3) CPLC executives sit on the board of Prestamos; and (4) Prestamos paid dividends to
CPLC.
However, the parties’ briefing differs in one key respect: even though the burden of persuasion lies
with Plaintiffs, only Defendants cited legal authority supporting their position. The Court relies on
litigants to address substantive matters in a meaningful manner. “Fully developed legal argument,
citation to legal authority, and discussion of the relevant facts aid this Court in performing its
duty[;] . . . [a]ny brief in opposition or any other memorandum of law that is lacking even a
modicum of these elements is woefully insufficient and inexcusable.” Copenhaver v. Borough of
Bernville, 2003 WL 26616224 *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2003).
The Court finds Defendant CPLC’s argument convincing in its own right, and does not rule in its
favor merely as a result of Plaintiffs’ wanting Response. For each of the categories identified
during limited discovery, Defendants provided the Court with persuasive authority holding the
absence of an alter ego despite the presence of similar facts. There is no legal authority before the
Court establishing that any one of these facts, or any combination of these facts, is incompatible
with the Court’s ruling. The party presentation principle instructs courts to assess the arguments
before them, and the Court so holds. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008)
(discussing the party presentation principle and remarking that “our adversary system is designed
around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing
the facts and arguments entitling them to relief . . . Courts do not, or should not, sally forth each
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG Document 93 Filed 12/05/23 Page 3 of 3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE
the case as it pertains to Defendant CPLC.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John M. Gallagher
JOHN M. GALLAGHER
United States District Court Judge
day looking for wrongs to right.” (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir.
1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc)).
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