REPLY to Response to Motion re 84 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by… — Marshall Prestamos (Dkt. 89)

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Reply in support of Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc.'s renewed motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc., Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, filed 11/03/23 as Document 89. In it, CPLC argues the court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over it because the plaintiffs concede some alter ego factors weigh against jurisdiction and cannot show CPLC exercised day-to-day control over Prestamos. It argues that common leadership, its status as Prestamos's sole member parent corporation, and shared marketing, trademarks and logos do not support alter ego jurisdiction, nor does registration as a charitable entity. It also argues the unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed. These are CPLC's arguments.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
ALICIA MARSHALL, DANIEL 
PRONSKY, PARIS TOWNSEND, 
NANCILEE HOLLAND, LEONA 
OWSLEY, KOLAWOLE AHMADOU, 
KIANA DERVIN, KRISTINA 
HENDERSON, DUSTIN INNIS, KELLY 
STALNAKER and JAMIE JONES, 
individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC and 
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC., 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
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Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC.’S 
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
 
 
 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
HERRERA ARELLANO LLP 
 
Marcel S. Pratt (Pa. ID 307483) 
Roy Herrera (admitted pro hac vice) 
Timothy D. Katsiff (Pa. ID 75490) 
Daniel A. Arellano (admitted pro hac vice) 
Alexa L. Levy (Pa. ID 327973) 
Jillian Andrews (admitted pro hac vice) 
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor 
Austin T. Marshall (admitted pro hac vice) 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
1001 North Central Avenue, Suite 404 
T: 215-665-8500 
Phoenix, AZ 85004 
F: 215-864-8999 
T: 602-567-4820 
PrattM@ballardspahr.com 
Roy@ha-firm.com 
KatsiffT@ballardspahr.com 
Daniel@ha-firm.com 
LevyA@ballardspahr.com 
Jillian@ha-firm.com 
 
Austin@ha-firm.com 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1 
I. 
The Court Should Not Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over CPLC .................................... 1 
A. Plaintiffs Concede That Certain Factors From the Alter Ego Test Weigh 
Against Personal Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 2 
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish that CPLC Exercised Day-to-Day Control Over 
Prestamos ..................................................................................................................... 2 
C. The Other Facts Plaintiffs Identify Do Not Show CPLC Dominating or 
Controlling Prestamos ................................................................................................. 6 
1. 
Common Leadership Does Not Create Alter Ego Jurisdiction ................... 6 
2. 
CPLC’s Status As Prestamos’s Sole Member Parent Corporation 
Does Not Support Alter Ego Jurisdiction ................................................... 7 
3. 
CPLC’s Marketing Image & Use of Trademarks and Logos Does 
Not Support Alter Ego Jurisdiction............................................................. 7 
D. Registration as Charitable Entity Does Not Support Personal Jurisdiction ................ 9 
E. Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim Must be Dismissed ........................................... 9 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10 
 
 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 
844 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988).........................................................................................................6 
In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig. (In re Chocolate I), 
602 F. Supp. 2d 538 (M.D. Pa. 2009) ....................................................................................4, 7 
In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig. (In re Chocolate II), 
674 F. Supp. 2d 580 (M.D. Pa. 2009) ................................................................................1, 2, 5 
Deardorff v. Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc., 
No. 19-cv-2642, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18444 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2022) ..............................5, 6 
In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 
735 F. Supp. 2d 277 (W.D. Pa. 2010) ................................................................................2, 6, 8 
Greathouse v. Capital Plus Financial LLC, 
No. 4:22-0686, 2023 WL 5759250 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023) ..................................................1 
Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., 
No. 3:17-cv-4827, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69191 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) ................................7 
Khasin v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 
12-cv-02204-WHO, 2015 WL 5569161 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) .......................................10 
Klein v. Chevron USA, Inc., 
202 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (2012) ................................................................................................10 
Maras v. Cohen, 
No. 1:21-CV-00317, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84265 (E.D. Tenn. May 10, 
2022) ..........................................................................................................................................9 
Patterson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 
684 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Ariz. 2010) .......................................................................................8 
Prescott v. LivaNova PLC, 
Nos. 4:16-cv-00472 & 3:16-cv-00103, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95830 (S.D. 
Iowa June 12, 2017) ...................................................................................................................8 
Reynolds v. Turning Point Holdings Co., LLC, 
No. 2:19-cv-01935, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33163 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2020) ...........................4 
Riad v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 
No. 18-5175, 2023 U.S. Dist LEXIS 31221 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2023) ..................................3, 6 
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Spring Pharms., LLC v. Retrophin, Inc., 
No. 18-4553, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213901 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2019) ...................................3 
United States v. Bestfoods, 
524 U.S. 51 (1998) .................................................................................................................6, 7 
ValveTech, Inc. v. Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc., 
17-cv-6788-FPG, 2018 WL 4681799 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) ..........................................10 
Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 
312 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Cal. 2003) ......................................................................................8 
In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 
260 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 2009) .................................................................................................9 
Wiseman v. Groep, N.V., 
No. 16-cv-07587, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161465 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) .........................8 
Statutes 
15 Pa. C.S. § 4145 ............................................................................................................................9 
 
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For the reasons set forth in Defendant Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc.’s (CPLC) opening brief 
and below, the Court should dismiss CPLC from this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Court Should Not Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over CPLC 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition Brief (the “Opposition”) is more notable for what it does not say than 
what it says.  Plaintiffs decline to address a number of factors from the alter ego test, implicitly 
conceding that they weigh against personal jurisdiction over CPLC.  Plaintiffs fail to show that 
CPLC exercised atypical or domineering influence over Prestamos, especially regarding the 
administration of Prestamos’s PPP program.  Plaintiffs do not identify any legal authority 
indicating that the facts they set forth in their Opposition Brief are sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction.  And, in multiple instances where Plaintiffs purport to describe facts obtained during 
jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs simply get the facts wrong. 
Plaintiffs aim to analogize this case to Greathouse v. Capital Plus Financial LLC, No. 4:22-
0686, 2023 WL 5759250 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023), see Opp. Br. at 1, but their analogy is inapposite 
and falls apart when confronted with the actual facts.  Plaintiffs identify allegedly analogous 
facts—“unfulfilled payments” and “improperly used government benefits”—that speak to the 
merits rather than the personal jurisdiction analysis.  And the facts simply do not show that the 
“upstreamed money” that Plaintiffs point to here involved anything beyond the normal actions of 
a subsidiary distributing profits or paying dividends to a parent that is commonplace in corporate 
America.  See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig. (In re Chocolate II), 674 F. Supp. 2d 
580, 599–600 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (subsidiary distribution of profits to parent is normal and expected).  
If the actual jurisdictional facts of Greathouse were truly analogous to this case, Plaintiffs would 
have pointed them out with specific citations to Greathouse in the body of their Opposition.  But 
Plaintiffs did not, because they are not. 
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In short, Plaintiffs say that some alter ego test factors support personal jurisdiction, but 
they do not show that these factors are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 
A. 
Plaintiffs Concede That Certain Factors From the Alter Ego Test Weigh 
Against Personal Jurisdiction 
Plaintiffs implicitly concede that multiple factors from the alter ego test weigh against 
personal jurisdiction by declining to address them.  Notably, Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not 
address (1) capitalization and solvency; (2) observation of corporate formalities; (3) maintenance 
of separate adequate records; or (4) improper siphoning of funds.  See Opp. Br. at 6–16.  Plaintiffs 
thereby concede that (1) Prestamos is well capitalized and solvent; (2) CPLC and Prestamos 
observed corporate formalities; (3) Defendants separately maintained adequate records; and (4) 
the payment of dividends was proof of a corporate formality and there is no evidence of siphoning 
funds.  These four factors all weigh against personal jurisdiction over CPLC. 
B. 
Plaintiffs Cannot Establish that CPLC Exercised Day-to-Day Control Over 
Prestamos 
The uncontroverted facts Plaintiffs elicited in jurisdictional discovery show that CPLC did 
not exercise atypical influence over Prestamos, especially regarding Prestamos’s administration of 
the PPP program.  “[T]he alter-ego test looks to whether the degree of control exercised by the 
parent is greater than normally associated with common ownership and directorship and whether 
the parent controls the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary such that the subsidiary can be said 
to be a mere department of the parent.”  In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices 
Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 319 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis added, cleaned up).  Specifically, as 
the sole member of Prestamos, CPLC is “entitled to ordain [Prestamos]’s officers and directors, 
influence executive compensation, approve budgets, gather information about corporate 
performance, and receive distributions of subsidiary profits.”  In re Chocolate II, 674 F. Supp. 2d 
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at 599–600.  “These activities typify standard parent-subsidiary interactions and do not reflect 
daily, operational control that is the sine qua non of an alter ego relationship.”  Id. at 600. 
Rather than focus on what the alter ego test actually requires—atypical, parent control over 
subsidiary day-to-day operations—Plaintiffs overemphasize the services and employees CPLC 
provides to Prestamos pursuant to Intercompany Services Agreements (“ISAs”).  See Opp. Br. at 
12–15.  But intercompany agreements between parents are subsidiaries are commonplace, and do 
not, without more, support an alter ego relationship.  Riad v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., No. 18-
5175, 2023 U.S. Dist LEXIS 31221, at *16-17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2023) (intercompany agreement 
between Porsche AG and Porsche NA did not support an alter ego relationship).  Similarly, the 
usage of common employees does not, without more, establish an alter ego relationship.  Spring 
Pharms., LLC v. Retrophin, Inc., No. 18-4553, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213901, at *19 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 11, 2019) (common employees did not establish alter ego relationship). 
Tellingly, Plaintiffs identify no legal authority indicating that a parent’s provision of 
services and employees to a subsidiary pursuant to an intercompany service agreement can suffice 
to establish personal jurisdiction.  See Opp. Br. at 12–15.  Nor do Plaintiffs identify any legal 
authority indicating that any particular portions or aspects of CPLC’s ISAs with Prestamos can 
establish personal jurisdiction.  See id.  Rather, all Plaintiffs point to are a sampling of facts 
evidencing that CPLC and Prestamos in fact adhered to the ISAs.   
None of the examples Plaintiffs identify demonstrates or otherwise contradicts the 
testimony of CPLC’s 30(b)(6) witnesses Jose Martinez and Alicia Nunez, that Prestamos was 
responsible for its own day-to-day management and operations, not CPLC.  CPLC Br., Ex. 1 
(Deposition of A. Nunez) at 38:17–20 (
), 38:21–25 (
 
  
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); CPCL Br., Ex. 2 (Deposition of J. Martinez) at 46:12–22 (
 
); see also CPLC 
Br., Ex. 13 (CPLC Objs. and Resps. to Plfs’ First RFAs) ¶¶ 6–9 (denying that CPLC communicated 
with PPP borrowers, the government, or Blueacorn about PPP loans).  Ad hoc examples of CPLC 
and Prestamos complying with the ISAs do not suffice for what is necessary to establish alter ego 
jurisdiction—“actual control over the daily affairs” of Prestamos by CPLC.  In re Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust Litig. (In re Chocolate I), 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 571 (M.D. Pa. 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs also claim that CPLC exercised control over Prestamos because Martinez “sought 
Adame’s approval for the payment of PPP-related bonuses related to the 10,797 PPP loans that 
were generated independently of Prestamos’s service provider Blueacorn.”  Opp. Br. at 14.  But 
Plaintiffs ignore Martinez’s testimony that 
 
.  See CPLC Br., Ex. 2 
(Deposition of J. Martinez) at 52:25–53:1–3 (
 
 
); see also Reynolds v. Turning Point Holdings Co., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-
01935, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33163, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2020) (parent maintaining payroll 
for subsidiary is immaterial for establishing alter ego relationship).  Prestamos made the decision; 
CPLC simply had to implement it.  Plaintiffs fail to explain why Adame’s alleged approval of PPP 
related bonuses shows an atypical level of control that supports personal jurisdiction.  As the sole 
member of Prestamos, CPLC is entitled to influence compensation and approve budgets.  Plaintiffs 
point to no more than a common practice in corporate America. 
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Plaintiffs’ discussion of CPLC’s Board Meeting Minutes, see Opp. Br. at 6, does them no 
better.  Like a normal parent company, CPLC’s Board Meeting Minutes reflect CPLC gathering 
and summarizing information about Prestamos’s, one of its subsidiaries, PPP lending performance.  
See In re Chocolate II, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 599–600 (parent entitled to “gather information about 
corporate performance” of its subsidiary).  Plaintiffs identify no legal authority indicating that 
monitoring or commenting on a subsidiary’s performance, including how it may affect the parent 
company, is atypical or domineering.  See Opp. Br. at 6–8.1   
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs cite to and rely on an excerpt of CPLC’s June 23, 2021 Board of 
Directors Meeting Minutes (the “Board Meeting Minutes”) where Mr. Adame referred to “CPLC’s 
PPP lending” in isolation while failing to disclose the full quote to the Court.  Opp. Br. at 7–8.  
The relevant portion of the Board Meeting Minutes reads as follows: 
 
 
 
Opp. Br., Ex. 1 at P-00296808 (emphasis added).  There is no confusion in either the Board 
Meeting Minutes or the factual record in this case about the entity that did the PPP lending— 
Prestamos was the lender.  Id.  (“Prestamos did the largest amount of loans.”).2   
                                                 
1  
Nor would a consolidated reference to CPLC and Prestamos in CPLC’s Board Meeting 
Minutes suggest an alter ego relationship.  See Deardorff v. Cellular Sales of Knoxville, 
Inc., No. 19-cv-2642, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18444, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2022) 
(consolidated financial statements did not establish that parent “exercised daily control 
over” subsidiary necessary to establish alter ego jurisdiction). 
2  
Plaintiffs misquote the Board Meeting Minutes by stating, 
 
  Opp. Br. 
at 8 (citing Ex. 1 at P-00296808 (emphasis in original)). 
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot establish that CPLC exercised day-to-day control over 
Prestamos.  Faced with this reality, Plaintiffs instead point to a jumble of ad hoc examples that 
they contend “support” certain factors of the alter ego jurisdiction test.  See Opp. Br. at 14–15.  
But Plaintiffs’ disjointed allegations cannot overcome the flaw in their position— they do not (and 
cannot) point to facts showing that CPLC had any coordinated “control over the internal workings 
or day-to-day operations of [Prestamos].”  In re Enter. Rent-A-Car, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (cleaned 
up). 
C. 
The Other Facts Plaintiffs Identify Do Not Show CPLC Dominating or 
Controlling Prestamos 
1. 
Common Leadership Does Not Create Alter Ego Jurisdiction 
Some shared common officers between a parent and subsidiary is “to be expected in a 
subsidiary-parent relationship” and is not sufficient to establish an alter ego relationship, 
particularly when there are no overlapping board members.  Deardorff, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18444, at *7; see also Riad, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31221, at *13–14; United States v. Bestfoods, 
524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to serve 
as directors of its subsidiary[.]”); Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(noting, of interlocking directorates: “This commonplace circumstance of modern business does 
not furnish such proof of control as will permit a court to pierce the corporate veil.”). 
Plaintiffs identify that the president of Prestamos serves as a CPLC executive and other 
CPLC executives serve on Prestamos’s board, as well as certain decisions that they made or 
participated in; however, Plaintiffs identify no facts indicating that these persons were acting “for 
the wrong company” when making decisions and supervising activities.  Plaintiffs claim that Jose 
Martinez was “simultaneously wearing both [parent and subsidiary] hats,” but identify absolutely 
no legal authority explaining why this is purportedly the case.  See Opp. Br. at 7.  To the contrary, 
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it is a “well established principle of corporate law that directors and officers holding positions with 
a parent and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’ to represent the two corporations separately, 
despite their common ownership.”  Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot establish personal jurisdiction based upon any common 
leadership among CPLC and Prestamos. 
2. 
CPLC’s Status As Prestamos’s Sole Member Parent Corporation Does Not 
Support Alter Ego Jurisdiction  
Plaintiffs identify no authority indicating that CPLC’s status as Prestamos’s sole member 
is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.  See Opp. Br. at 8.  Nor do Plaintiffs identify any 
authority suggesting that a parent being an “engaged and active owner” of one of its subsidiaries 
is a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.  See id.  Rather, as discussed in Section 1.B., supra, 
the parent’s domination and control of the subsidiary, rather than its simple ownership of it, is the 
touchstone of an alter ego relationship.   
3. 
CPLC’s Marketing Image & Use of Trademarks and Logos Does Not 
Support Alter Ego Jurisdiction 
Plaintiffs allege that CPLC’s use of a shared marketing image as well as certain trademarks 
and logos support an exercise of personal jurisdiction.  As Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, 
“service mark similarity alone is not sufficient to establish alter ego.”  See Opp. Br. at 10 (citing 
In re Chocolate I, 602 F. Supp. 3d at 570–71).  In spite of this, Plaintiffs do not identify any 
standards or case law indicating exactly what constitutes a “common marketing image” or “use of 
trademarks and logos” sufficient to support establishing personal jurisdiction.  See Opp. Br. at 10–
12. 
Plaintiffs do not cite additional case law because existing case law is contrary to their 
position, including their arguments about shared employees using the @cplc.org email domain.  
See  Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-cv-4827, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69191, *24–25 (D.N.J. 
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Apr. 25, 2018) (“[C]ourts have found that common marketing image and joint use of trademark 
logs fail to render entities as alter egos.”(cleaned up)); Prescott v. LivaNova PLC, Nos. 4:16-cv-
00472 & 3:16-cv-00103, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95830, at *25–26 (S.D. Iowa June 12, 2017) 
(granting a motion to dismiss where “[t]he companies share a common branding scheme, including 
a common email domain, but maintain completely separate day-to-day operations, employees, 
officers, and corporate structures”); Wiseman v. Groep, N.V., No. 16-cv-07587, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 161465, at *39–40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017) (“the fact that ReliaStar personnel used 
voya.com email addresses . . . is no more than a different form of the argument that the two 
identified under the same brand, which courts have found insufficient as a matter of law to establish 
alter egos”); Patterson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. Ariz. 2010) 
(“[t]he fact the two companies used the same logo and intellectual property pursuant to the 
licensing agreement . . . does not demonstrate that Krause-Werk was the alter ego of the other”); 
Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1301 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (common trade name and 
logo, without more, is not a sufficient basis for establishing personal jurisdiction).  Moreover, a 
company being “portrayed as a single brand to the public . . . does not demonstrate the necessary 
control by defendant parent over the subsidiaries.”  In re Enter. Rent-A-Car, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 
323.   
Further, Plaintiffs’ blanket allegation that Prestamos and CPLC “systematically blur the 
lines between the two entities” is not supported by the limited examples provided in their brief.  
See Opp. Br. at 11–15.  For example, Plaintiffs devote significant effort to describing a single July 
20, 2021 grant proposal sent to the SBA that includes references to “Chicanos Por La Causa – 
Prestamos CDFI.”  See id. at 11.  Portraying CPLC and Prestamos as a single brand to the public 
in this manner does not demonstrate that CPLC maintained day-to-day control over Prestamos’s 
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operations, and Plaintiffs identify no authority saying so.  Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege— and 
cannot show— that CPLC’s marketing image caused any confusion among those who viewed it.  
Accordingly, CPLC’s marketing image and trademarks do not support personal jurisdiction. 
D. 
Registration as Charitable Entity Does Not Support Personal Jurisdiction 
CPLC’s registration with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a charitable entity, 
included as a throwaway towards the end of Plaintiffs’ Opposition, also does not move the 
needle.  Under Pennsylvania law, foreign corporation registration explicitly allows Pennsylvania 
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation.  15 Pa. C.S. § 4145.   
Pennsylvania’s charitable registration rules do not have similar provisions and Plaintiffs 
identify no legal authority holding that charitable registration creates personal jurisdiction 
Pennsylvania.  See Opp. Br. at 16-17.  Nor could they, as existing case law is to the contrary.  
See Maras v. Cohen, No. 1:21-CV-00317, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84265, at *11-12 (E.D. Tenn. 
May 10, 2022) (charitable registration and receipt of donations in a state is not sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction). 
E. 
Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim Must be Dismissed 
Plaintiffs agree that “dismissal of their unjust enrichment as to the states in which they 
were not injured” is proper but continue to assert that the court should keep “the unjust enrichment 
claims for the states where Plaintiffs were injured.”  Opp. Br. at 17.  But Plaintiffs still do not say 
which state’s unjust enrichment laws should govern their claim, even if limited among those states 
in which Plaintiffs reside.  That is, they do not clarify whether each Plaintiff is invoking the unjust 
enrichment standards of his or her respective state or whether one state’s standard is to govern 
them all.  Merely arguing they bring their claim “narrowly and in the alternative,” id., does not 
invoke any particular jurisdiction’s laws.  This is fatal to their unjust enrichment claim.  See In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143, 167 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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Insofar as they pick California law, Plaintiffs are wrong that an unjust enrichment claim is 
independently viable.  See ValveTech, Inc. v. Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc., 17-cv-6788-FPG, 2018 WL 
4681799, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (declining to follow Bruton v. Gerber Prod. Co., 703 
F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2017)), because the California case on which Bruton relied was limited to 
the insurance context and subsequent California cases have rejected unjust enrichment as a 
standalone claim); see also Khasin v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 12-cv-02204-WHO, 2015 WL 5569161, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (same).  Regardless, Plaintiffs have failed to plead in the 
alternative that there was no governing contract, see Klein v. Chevron USA, Inc., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
293, 332–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), and concede that their unjust enrichment claim is “coupled” 
with and depends on other claims rather than being an alternative to them.  Opp. Br. at 19. 
Finally, Plaintiffs fail to dispute that they failed to confer any benefit on Defendants: even 
if Defendants received loan fees or interest on principal pertaining to Plaintiffs’ loans, those funds 
would not have come from Plaintiffs themselves (in fact, it would cost Prestamos money to hold 
on to Plaintiffs’ loan principal).  Plaintiffs cite no authority for their “but for” theory of the benefit 
conferral element for unjust enrichment.  Opp. Br. at 17. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CPLC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss 
CPLC from this action. 
 
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Dated: November 3, 2023 
 
 
By: /s/ Marcel S. Pratt 
 
Marcel S. Pratt (Pa. ID 307483) 
Timothy D. Katsiff (Pa. ID 75490) 
Thomas J. Gallagher IV (Pa. ID 316269) 
Alexa L. Levy (Pa. ID 327973) 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
T: 215-665-8500 
F: 215-864-8999 
PrattM@ballardspahr.com 
KatsiffT@ballardspahr.com 
GallagherT@ballardspahr.com 
LevyA@ballardspahr.com 
 
HERRERA ARELLANO LLP 
Roy Herrera (admitted pro hac vice)  
Daniel A. Arellano (admitted pro hac vice) 
Jillian Andrews (admitted pro hac vice) 
Austin T. Marshall (admitted pro hac vice) 
1001 North Central Avenue, Suite 404 
Phoenix, AZ 85004 
T: 602-567-4820 
Roy@ha-firm.com 
Daniel@ha-firm.com 
Jillian@ha-firm.com 
Austin@ha-firm.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendants 
 
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 
I, Marcel S. Pratt, hereby certify that on this 3rd day of November 2023, I caused a copy 
of the foregoing Reply in Support of Defendant Chicanos Por La Causa’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and accompanying papers to be served on all counsel of 
record via the Court’s ECF system. 
 
 
 
 
s/ Marcel S. Pratt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marcel S. Pratt  
 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 89     Filed 11/03/23     Page 16 of 16

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