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Home Court filings USA v. Keough — U.S. District Court, S.D. Fla., West Palm Beach SENTENCING MEMORANDUM by Gregory Scott Keough — USA v. Keough (Dkt. 55)

Court filing

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM by Gregory Scott Keough — USA v. Keough (Dkt. 55)

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Filed2024-02-06

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 9:23-cr-80154-DMM · Doc. 55 · 2024-02-06 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

A sentencing memorandum in support of a request for variance, filed February 6, 2024 as Document 55 in United States v. Gregory Scott Keough, Case No. 9:23-cr-80154-DMM, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Filed by defense counsel David J. Joffe and Patrick R. McKamey, it asks the court to impose a sentence below the advisory guideline range under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). The memorandum argues that probation or supervised release, authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3561(c)(1) for not less than one year and no more than five years, would be sufficient but not greater than necessary. It states that the defendant pled guilty to Counts 4, 5 and 8 of the Indictment, has criminal history category I, cooperated with agents, and received the CIA Intelligence Star. The filing is ten pages and closes with a certificate of service.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO.:  23CR80154 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 
 
   
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
vs. 
 
GREGORY SCOTT KEOUGH, 
 
 
Defendant. 
______________________________/ 
 
 
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR VARIANCE  
 
 
COMES NOW the Defendant,  GREGORY SCOTT KEOUGH (hereinafter 
“KEOUGH”), by and through undersigned counsel, David J. Joffe and Patrick R. McKamey, 
pursuant to the Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and would hereby file this his Sentencing Memorandum, in which it is 
requested that this Court impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” in order 
to achieve individual accountability and just punishment.  See generally, United States v. Irey, 
612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010).  For the reasons argued herein, KEOUGH and counsel submit 
that a variance from the proposed guideline sentence should be ordered and that a sentence 
below the advisory guideline range is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to achieve the 
sentencing objectives of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).   
As a threshold matter, KEOUGH continues to fully and completely accept responsibility 
for his offense conduct.  The Court should consider a sentence appropriate to reflect KEOUGH’S 
willingness to cooperate, the cooperation he has already provided, his lack of criminal history, 
and his personal history.   
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The request for a variance is as a result of detailed discussions with KEOUGH who has 
provided relevant input into said request.   KEOUGH’S request for a variance is as follows: 
VARIANCE SENTENCE 
 
 
A “variance” occurs when a judge imposes a sentence that is below or above the 
otherwise properly calculated final sentencing range based on application of the other statutory 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).  United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012).  
KEOUGH’S request for a variance comports with the sentencing procedures that have evolved 
since the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 
(2005), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007).  See, United States v. 
Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 2008) (summarizing current sentencing procedures in 
Eleventh Circuit).   
 
The Sentencing Court must properly determine the guideline range, then the Court must 
determine whether to apply any of the guidelines’ departure policy statements to adjust the 
guideline range and finally the court must consider all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
3553(a) as a whole, including whether a variance is warranted.    Gall v. United States 552 US 
38,, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97 (2007); See, United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 
2008); .  After “consult[ing] and correctly determine[ing] the sentencing range prescribed by the 
Sentencing Guidelines … [t]he court must then impose a reasonable sentence in light of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).” United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir 
2007).   Among the factors which the sentencing Court “shall consider” under Section 3553(a)(1) 
are “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant” and under (a)(2) “the need for the sentence imposed – (A) to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to 
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afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”.   
 
The sentencing Court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to comply with the purposes set forth” in Section 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).  See, e.g., United States v. 
McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2007).  The Court “may not presume that the 
[advisory] guidelines range is reasonable”.  Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97 (emphasis added); see 
also, United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We do not in this 
Circuit presume reasonable a sentence within the properly calculated guidelines range”).  Thus, 
after making an “individualized assessment” of the Section 3553(a) factors based on the facts 
presented, the sentencing Court has the power to grant a variance from the advisory guidelines 
range to whatever extent the Court deems warranted by the facts of each defendant.  Gall, 128 
S.Ct. at 595-97; Livesay, 525 F.3d at 1090; McBride, 511 F.3d at 1297-98.   
Here, the strict application of the advisory sentencing guidelines produces a sentence 
greater than necessary for punishment under Section 3553(a) This Court must consider 
KEOUGH’S   individual history, i.e., his lack of prior criminal history, the accommodations he 
received while serving our government, his medical history regarding PTSD, the fact that he was 
cooperative and has agreed to fully assist the agents in their investigation, and that he pled guilty 
to Counts  4, 5 and 8 of the Indictment.    The fact that KEOUGH  pled guilty support a sentence 
beneath the advisory guidelines range for the offense conduct in this case and supports a 
sentence of supervised release and/or probation with no prison time for a term of not less than 
one year and no more than five years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3561(c)(1).  The statutory factors 
set forth in Section 3553(a) weigh strongly in favor of a sentence outside of and below the 
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advisory sentencing guidelines, i.e., supervised release and/or probation without any prison time.  
Where circumstances warrant, the District Courts can impose a sentence that varies downward 
significantly from the advisory guidelines range and the Appellate Court will affirm such 
sentences as reasonable.  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007).  As set 
out below, each of the applicable sentencing factors set forth in Section 3553(a) amply justify a 
variance from the advisory guideline sentence. 
A Sentencing Court may in fact consider factors under the broader Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 3553(a), even though the same factors might be prohibited or discouraged under 
the guidelines.  Under the factors as set forth in Section 3553(a), undersigned counsel 
respectfully submits that a variance sentence is appropriate for KEOUGH, considering his lack 
of criminal history, the fact that he was cooperative and the fact that KEOUGH was employed by 
the United States Central intelligence Agency as a covert employee and during his employment 
he received the CIA Intelligence Star which is an award given to officers “for a voluntary act or 
acts of courage performed under hazardous condition or for outstanding achievements or services 
rendered with distinction under conditions of grave risk” (PSI:98) and that he pled guilty to 
Counts 4, 5 and 8 of the Indictment.  The Intelligence Star is one of the rarest and highest valor 
awards awarded by the US government.  There have only been 140 Intelligence Stars awarded, 
compared to the congressional medal of honor, in which 3,520 have been handed out to military 
service members.  In fact, most Intelligence Stars are awarded posthumously, which makes Mr. 
Keough one of only a few dozen still living, and who received this award.  As described by 
fellow CIA officers Charlie Gilbert and Don Pepper in their character letters, Mr. Keough's 
actions on July 19, 1992, demonstrated bravery and selflessness related to saving the lives of his 
colleagues and demonstrating true heroism. Section 3553(a) directs the Court to impose a 
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sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary based upon the statutory objectives and 
relevant factors.  A variance is further supported by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582, 
which provides: 
(a) 
Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Term of Imprisonment.– The 
court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of 
imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall 
consider the factors set forth is section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation….   
 
 
The post-Booker reinstatement of judicial discretion requires the Court to consider the 
personal background of the offender as well as the offense itself.  This is particularly important 
in this case as the facts of this case and KEOUGH’S personal dynamics are important in 
considering the proper sentence, i.e., his lack of criminal history, him suffering from PTSD and 
receiving the CIA Intelligence Star which is an award given to officers “for a voluntary act or 
acts of courage performed under hazardous condition or for outstanding achievements or services 
rendered with distinction under conditions of grave risk”. (PSI:98) 
(1) 
The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and the History and Characteristics of 
the Defendant.  Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a)(1). 
Now that the guidelines are advisory only, they are simply “one sentencing factor among 
many”.  United States v. Reinhart, 442 F.3d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 2006).  The Court should look past 
the four corners of the offense conduct portion of the Presentence Investigation Report to assure 
the proper sentence is given.  Accordingly, the Court has full discretion to sentence below the 
advisory guideline range as long as the resulting sentence is reasonable.  Therefore, based on   
the fact that KEOUGH has no prior criminal history, was cooperative and accepted full 
responsibility for his actions, the fact that he received the CIA Intelligence Star which is an 
award given to officers “for a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous 
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condition or for outstanding achievements or services rendered with distinction under conditions 
of grave risk” (PSI:98) and the fact that KEOUGH pled guilty to Counts 4, 5 and 8 of the 
Indictment, the Court should grant his request.   
Not only is Mr. Keough not a future threat in any way to his community, but he has also 
demonstrated a long-standing dedication to charitable giving, both in Palm Beach County as well 
as down in El Salvador where his family currently resides.  He has spearheaded efforts to 
provide the underprivileged in Belle Glade as well as El Salvador, food at gifts during the 
holidays.  That is simply who Mr. Keough is.  Charitable giving is in his DNA, and he will 
continue to give back to any community in which he resides after this case is resolved. 
In addition, KEOUGH is entitled to a variance since his criminal history category is I, the 
fact that he accepted responsibility and reaffirmed his participation. Also, the fact that KEOUGH 
is not a threat to the community entitles KEOUGH to a sentence at the low end of the guideline 
with a variance. See generally, United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Furthermore, as pointed out throughout the PSR, KEOUGH has returned funds on his 
own and has voluntarily liquidated his assets to pay back the monies owed the SEC. (PSR:52). 
Also, KEOUGH has filed various character letters and recommendations that support 
KEOUGH’S request for a variance due to his character and past accomplishments. 
(2) 
The Need for the Sentence Imposed to Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense, to 
Promote Respect for the Law and to Provide Just Punishment for the Offense, to Afford 
Adequate Deterrence to Criminal Conduct, to Protect the Public from Further Crimes of the 
Defendant and to Provide the Defendant with Needed Training or Services.  Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). 
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Imprisonment is clearly not warranted in this case considering that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§3561(c)(1) probation is authorized for a term of not less than one year and no more than five 
years.  Probation and/or home detention or a similar mechanism would reflect the seriousness of 
this offense and would promote respect for the law and provide just punishment, especially 
considering  KEOUGH has no criminal history, he was cooperative, he received the CIA 
Intelligence Star which is an award given to officers “for a voluntary act or acts of courage 
performed under hazardous condition or for outstanding achievements or services rendered with 
distinction under conditions of grave risk” (PSI:98) and the fact that KEOUGH pled guilty to 
Counts 4, 5 and 8 of the Indictment. Based on the above facts, KEOUGH should be given a 
substantial variance to his guideline sentence. 
 
Accordingly, a sentence at the low end of the properly calculated guideline, with a 
variance is sufficient to provide just punishment for KEOUGH, to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant and promote respect for the law.  
 (3) 
The Kinds of Sentences Available.  Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a)(3). 
 
Section 3553(a) expressly dictates that the Court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but 
not greater than necessary.  United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, the 
Court is in a position to fashion a sentence that would punish KEOUGH, protect the public and 
deter others by restricting his freedom.  Under Gall, supra, the sentencing guidelines and policy 
statements are but one factor among all of the other Section 3553(a) factors.  Moreover, in order 
to impose a sentence that is procedurally reasonable, this Court must treat the guidelines as 
advisory and not mandatory and consider the guidelines among all of the statutory factors set 
forth in Section 3553(a).  As noted herein, in fashioning a sentence that is substantially 
reasonable, this Court has considerable discretion as to the weight it decides to give each of the 
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Section 3553(a) factors and the guideline sentence itself. Accordingly, a sentence other than 
imprisonment is warranted based on KEOUGH’S lack of criminal history, his cooperation, him 
accepting responsibility for his involvement, he received the CIA Intelligence Star which is an 
award given to officers “for a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous 
condition or for outstanding achievements or services rendered with distinction under conditions 
of grave risk” (PSI:98) and he is clearly not a threat to the community as he pled guilty to a non-
violent crime.  Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. §3561(c)(1) authorizes a sentence other than 
imprisonment. 
(4) 
The Kinds of Sentence and Sentencing Range Established by the Sentencing 
Guidelines and Pertinent Policy Statements.  Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a)(4). 
KEOUGH’S request for a downward variance would make his sentence more in keeping 
with the policy statements of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).  Said request is 
again supported by the fact that KEOUGH has no criminal history, his cooperation, him 
accepting responsibility for his involvement and that he is clearly not a threat to the community 
as he pled guilty to a non-violent crime.   
(5) 
The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities Among Defendants with Similar 
Records Who Have Been Found Guilty of Similar Conduct.  Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 3553(a)(5). 
 
Although the primary purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act was to “reduce unwarranted 
sentencing disparities”, the guideline regime has led to variants of disparity never contemplated 
by its drafters.  Sentencing is driven in part by the applicable guidelines, the statutory sentencing 
factors and individual judicial discretion. KEOUGH is a defendant whose offense behavior 
requires the Court to consider a multitude of mitigating factors including his status, personal 
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background and other mitigating circumstances argued herein that in fact support a downward 
variance.  
(6) 
The Need to Provide Restitution to Any Victims of the Offense.  Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 3553(a)(6).   
 
 KEOUGH has already paid his responsibility for restitution without the need for any 
further litigation regarding same. 
Conclusion 
KEOUGH does not minimize the seriousness of the offense he committed.    As such, the 
“totality of circumstances” requires the proper exercise of Booker discretion in favor of granting 
KEOUGH’S request for a variance.   
The Presentence Investigation Report’s advisory guideline range of 41 to 51 months 
imprisonment is both inequitable and unreasonable given the facts in the case sub judice.  This 
Court must take into consideration’ KEOUGH’S arguments made herein and in his Objections to 
Presentence Investigation Report and make an individualized assessment of KEOUGH, which 
warrants a substantial variance. 
Mercy and compassion are a part of justice.  “A country which is secure in its institutions, 
confident in its laws should not be ashamed of the concept of mercy.”  Justice Kennedy, ABA 
speech 2003.  Punishment should not be more severe than that necessary to satisfy the goals of 
punishment.  United States v. Carvajal, 2005 WL 476125 (S.D. N.Y. 2005).  A judge must 
sentence “without ever being indifferent to defendant’s plea for compassion, for compassion also 
is a component of justice”.  United States v. Kloda, 133 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).    
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Accordingly, this Honorable Court is respectfully urged to consider the facts and 
circumstances of this case against the backdrop of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), 
and fashion a sentence that is not “greater than necessary”.   
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 6, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOFFE LAW, P.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-Attorney for KEOUGH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 110 Tower Building 
110 S.E. 6th Street, 17th Floor, Suite 1700 
 
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone: 
(954) 723-0007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facsimile: 
(954) 723-0033  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
davidjjoffe@aol.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     DAVID J. JOFFE, ESQUIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     FLORIDA BAR NO. 0814164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law Office of Patrick R. McKamey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-Attorney for KEOUGH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
515 North Flagler Drive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suite P300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
West Palm Beach, Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(561) 370-7424 
 
 
 
 
 
 
patrick@mckameydefenselaw.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     PATRICK R. MCKAMEY, ESQUIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     FLORIDA BAR NO. 103624 
 
 
David J. Joffe
Patrick R. McKamey
Case 9:23-cr-80154-DMM   Document 55   Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2024   Page 10 of 10

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