Sentencing Memorandum by USA — Sentencing Memorandum by USA as to Anuli Okeke — USA v. Okeke (Dkt. 61) (Dkt. 61, E.D.N.Y.)

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U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York · No. 1:22-cr-00020-FB · Doc. 61 · 2025-02-28 · Docket on CourtListener

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U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
United States Attorney 
Eastern District of New York 
 
FTB:CWE/AA/JB 
271 Cadman Plaza East 
F. #2020R00955 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
February 28, 2025 
 
By ECF and E-mail  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Honorable Frederic Block 
United States District Judge 
Eastern District of New York 
225 Cadman Plaza East 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
Re: 
United States v. Anuli Okeke 
Criminal Docket No. 22-20 (FB) 
 
Dear Judge Block: 
 
The government respectfully submits this letter in advance of the defendant Anuli 
Okeke’s sentencing, which is scheduled for March 7, 2025.  The defendant was the mastermind 
and beneficiary of a multi-million-dollar fraud and money laundering conspiracy that warrants a 
substantial penalty.  As the government demonstrated at trial, Okeke’s actions were deliberate 
and sophisticated, and they inflicted substantial harm on financial institutions, the integrity of the 
banking system, and the American taxpayer.  The defendant exploited the programs created to 
assist struggling businesses to line her and her co-conspirators’ pockets—diverting desperately 
needed financial aid away from the businesses that needed it—all while thousands of Americans 
were sick or dying from a pandemic.  For these reasons, and the reasons stated below, a 
Guidelines sentence of 108 to 135 months imprisonment is necessary to ensure justice, deter 
future financial crimes, and reaffirm the principle that bank employees who abuse their positions 
of trust—particularly during times of devastation like the pandemic—will face serious 
consequences.   
I. 
Background 
 
A. 
The Paycheck Protection Program 
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act is a federal 
law enacted in March 2020 that was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the 
millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
PSR ¶ 8.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of up to $349 
billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses 
through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).  Id.  
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  To obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business was required to submit a PPP loan 
application signed by an authorized representative of the business.  Id. ¶ 9.  The PPP loan 
application required the business, through its authorized representative, to acknowledge the 
program rules and to make certain affirmative certifications to be eligible to obtain the PPP loan.  
Id.  In the PPP loan application, the small business was required to state, among other things, its: 
(a) average monthly payroll expenses and (b) number of employees.  Id.  These figures were 
used to calculate the amount of money the small business was eligible to receive under the PPP.  
Id.  In addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan were required to provide documentation 
showing their payroll expenses.  Id.  
B. 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program was a Small Business 
Administration (“SBA”) program that provided low interest financing to small businesses, 
renters and homeowners in regions affected by declared disasters.  PSR ¶ 13.  Another source of 
relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization for the SBA to provide EIDLs of up to 
$2 million to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Id.  Under the program, the SBA was authorized to issue advances of up 
to $10,000 to small businesses within three days of applying for an EIDL Advance.  The amount 
of an EIDL Advance was determined based on the number of employees working for the 
applicant.  The advance did not have to be repaid.  Id.   
To obtain an EIDL or EIDL Advance, a qualifying business was required to 
submit an application to the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the 
number of employees, gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of 
goods sold in the 12-month period preceding the disaster.  PSR ¶ 14.  In the case of EIDLs for 
COVID-19 relief, the 12-month period was the period preceding January 31, 2020.  Id.  The 
applicant also was required to certify that all the information in the application was true and 
correct to the best of the applicant’s knowledge.  Id. 
EIDL applications were submitted directly to the SBA and processed by the SBA 
with support from a government contractor.  PSR ¶ 15.  The amount of the loan, if the 
application was approved, was determined based, in part, on the information provided in the 
application concerning the business’s number of employees, revenue, and cost of goods, as 
described above.  Id. Any funds issued under an EIDL were issued directly by the SBA.  Id.  
EIDL funds could be used for payroll expenses, sick leave, production costs, and business 
obligations, such as debts, rent and mortgage payments.  Id.  If the applicant also obtained a loan 
under the PPP, the EIDL funds could not be used for the same purpose as the PPP funds.  Id. 
C. 
The Defendant’s Fraudulent Scheme 
The defendant Anuli Okeke was a former vice president and the manager of 
Popular Bank, and specifically worked at its branch located at 231 West 125th Street in 
Manhattan.  PSR ¶ 16.  In 2020, the defendant exploited the COVID-19 pandemic’s 
unprecedented economic crisis to enrich herself by orchestrating a scheme to prepare and submit 
fraudulent PPP and EIDL loan applications for millions of dollars in.  Id. ¶¶ 16-17.   
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The defendant and her subordinates at Popular Bank, including Charlene Wint 
and Anthony Castro, recruited and assisted borrowers in completing and submitting fraudulent 
PPP loan applications through Popular Bank to the SBA—even though the defendant knew that 
the borrowers did not qualify for the loans.  PSR ¶ 17.  These applications contained materially 
false and fraudulent representations concerning the business operations and employees.  Id.  The 
defendant further recruited tax preparers, such as Hashim Campbell and Auguste Nipabi, to 
create fraudulent supporting tax documents to support the PPP loan applications.  Id.  As the 
branch manager, the defendant was responsible for reviewing and approving each application 
submitted through her branch and signed each PPP loan agreement on behalf of Popular Bank.  
See PSR ¶ 17; Tr. 281-282, 176.  Despite knowing that the loan applications contained false 
statements and fraudulent supporting documentation, the defendant and her co-conspirators 
submitted them for approval to others at Popular Bank and the SBA.  PSR ¶ 17.  In total, the 
defendant submitted  fraudulent PPP loans for over $2.1 million, as detailed below and in the 
PSR.  Id.  
NO. 
RECIPIENT ENTITY 
AMOUNT 
LENDER 
APPROX. 
DATE 
FUNDED 
1 
R.R. FRANKLYN AVE INC 
(Jose Anormaliza)  
SBA Loan #52183082-10 
See Gov. Exs. 102, 205A-D, 206, 208-211, 312, 
514, 779, 795, 797 
See Tr. 300, 308, 635-84 
$256,660 
Popular 
Bank 
08/17/2020 
2 
CAR EXPERT AUTO GROUP LLC 
(Israel Viloria)  
SBA Loan #47490682-04 
See Gov. Exs. 100-01, 109, 200A-B, 352, 514, 
789, 806, 848-852, 980 
See Tr. 224-31, 308, 339-97, 402-19, 513-14 
$250,000 
Popular 
Bank 
08/18/2020 
3 
AUTONEXT LLC 
(Alicia Viloria)  
SBA Loan #47614782-01 
See Gov. Exs. 100-101, 109, 200A-B, 722, 726, 
787, 917  
See Tr. 308, 339-97, 402-19, 513-14 
$250,000 
Popular 
Bank 
08/18/2020 
4 
LASER CUT BARBER SHOP INC 
(Leonel Lora-Arias) 
SBA Loan #76881581-08 
See Gov. Exs. 757-62, 792, 890, 901  
See Tr. 220-224, 307 
$75,920 
Popular 
Bank 
07/30/2020 
5 
BENNE HAIR BRAIDING 
(Bernadette Kouame) 
SBA Loan #57460782-06 
See Gov. Exs. 109, 318, 704, 711-712, 897, 
909, 914, 918, 922, 930, 1146 
See Tr. 308, 513-514, 563-581, 586-597 
$150,000 
Popular 
Bank 
08/20/2020 
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6 
FATIM’S BEAUTY BRAIDING & 
BUSINESS SPACE 
(Brahima Lengane) 
SBA Loan #57125182-09 
See Gov. Exs. 109, 201B, 201F, 307, 704, 718-
719, 750-751, 790, 930, 986 
See Tr. 307, 443-469, 513-514, 563-581, 586-
597 
$250,000 
Popular 
Bank 
08/19/2020 
7 
HOT SPOT CLOTHING 
(Bakary Diarra) 
SBA Loan #60302881-00 
See Gov. Exs. 704, 709-710  
See Tr. 307, 563-581, 586-597 
$225,000 
Popular 
Bank 
07/28/2020 
8 
MOMMY’S AFRICAN HAIR BRAIDING 
(Tenin Diallo) 
SBA Loan #14596881-02 
See Gov. Exs. 702-04, 716, 766, 914, 918, 922, 
1146 
See Tr. 309, 563-581, 586-597 
$100,000 
Popular 
Bank 
07/14/2020 
9 
NI GLOBAL ENTERPRISES INC 
(Auguste Nipabi) 
SBA Loan #32054481-10 
See Gov. Exs. 109, 704-705, 707-708, 815  
See Tr. 307, 563-581, 586-597 
$150,000 
Popular 
Bank 
07/17/2020 
10 
SORAYAS HOUSE OF BEAUTY  
(Assana Zampaligre) 
SBA Loan #84753279-00 
See Gov. Exs. 109, 704, 784-785, 796, 820-822, 
883-889, 898-900 
See Tr. 308 
$184,170 
Popular 
Bank 
06/23/2020 
11 
ASSANA HAIR SALON LLC 
(Assana Zampaligre) 
SBA Loan #60306780-01 
See Gov. Exs. 109, 700-701, 720-721, 786, 
798-800, 823, 831, 902-908, 939 
See Tr. 307, 218-220, 563-881, 586-597 
$75,000 
Popular 
Bank 
07/09/2020 
 
In addition to the loans proven false at trial, the defendant and her co-conspirators 
were involved in dozens more fraudulent loans worth more than $750,000.  Hashim Campbell, 
the defendant’s personal accountant and one of the corrupt tax preparers recruited to work at the 
branch, submitted, or has an IP address associated with, numerous other fraudulent sole-
proprietor SBA loans, totaling over $750,000, as detailed in the PSR.   
The defendant also informed and instructed Anthony Castro to complete a 
fraudulent EIDL application, claiming $16,500 on behalf of a non-existent business.  The 
defendant took a cut of his EIDL money when it was disbursed.  See Tr. 234-237; Gov. Exs. 
368-370. 
 
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D. 
Sole Proprietor Loan Fraud 
As part of the scheme, the defendant and her co-conspirators also focused on 
maximizing theft through sole proprietor PPP loans—even though the applicants had no 
legitimate business operations.  Each application contained materially false statements, including 
fabricated occupations, income, business revenue, and tax documentation, designed to mislead 
the government and Popular Bank into approving the maximum allowable loan amount of 
$20,833 per applicant.  A chart of the applications is below. 
NO. 
RECIPIENT ENTITY 
AMOUNT 
LENDER 
APPROX. 
DATE 
FUNDED 
1 
NAEEM COFIELD  
SBA Loan #54412882‐09 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 1023, 1044, 1063, 
1084, 1101 
See Tr. 198-200 
$19,890 
Popular 
Bank 
08/07/2020 
2 
YALITZA SOTO 
SBA Loan #51167182‐03 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 1033-1035, 1047, 
1070-1071, 1090-1091  
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,600 
Popular 
Bank 
08/07/2020 
3 
DAREEN COFIELD 
SBA Loan #32189182‐06 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 998-1000, 1038, 1051, 
1077, 1095-1096, 1098  
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,510 
Popular 
Bank 
08/04/2020 
4 
DONNELL GASKINS 
SBA Loan #15364282‐08 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 1007-1008, 1010, 
1040, 1054 
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,250 
Popular 
Bank 
07/30/2020 
5 
RICARDO MIRANDA 
SBA Loan #35737882‐09 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 1024-1028, 1045, 
1085-1087 
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,600 
Popular 
Bank 
08/04/2020 
6 
CARLOS MALDONADO 
SBA Loan #15091382‐09 
See Gov. Exs. 111, 320, 995-97, 1037, 1048-
1049, 1072-1073 
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,620 
Popular 
Bank 
07/30/2020 
7 
RICHARD PINERO 
SBA Loan #29006982‐10 
See Gov. Exs. 320, 508, 519, 1029-32, 1046, 
1067-1069, 1088-1089, 1106 
See Tr. 198-200, 207-16 
$20,590 
Popular 
Bank 
08/03/2020 
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8 
MICHAEL DE LEON 
SBA Loan #11979782‐03 
See Gov. Exs. 320, 1018, 1020, 1043, 1060-
1061 
See Tr. 198-200 
$19,420 
Popular 
Bank 
07/29/2020 
9 
KIZZILIE DAVIS 
SBA Loan # 29074082‐07 
See Gov. Exs. 320, 1014-1017, 1042, 1057-
1059, 1081-1082 
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,550 
Popular 
Bank 
08/03/2020 
10 
JESSE SCOTT ROLON 
SBA Loan #84753279-00 
See Gov. Exs. 320, 1011-13, 1041, 1055-1056, 
1078-1080, 1093 
See Tr. 198-200 
$20,640 
Popular 
Bank 
07/27/2020 
11 
DAVID THOMAS 
SBA Loan #5077178203 
See Gov. Exs. 320, 1003, 1004. 
$20,580.00 
Popular 
Bank 
08/07/2020 
 
E. 
The Scheme Used Fraudulent Checks and Other Sophisticated Means to Liquidate 
Government-Funded Accounts, Launder Scheme Proceeds Through the Financial 
System, and Divide the Money 
After the SBA deposited loan proceeds into borrowers’ Popular Bank accounts, 
the defendant and her co-conspirators received unauthorized commissions from the fraudulent 
loans—using sophisticated methods to disguise the flow of funds and exploit bank 
vulnerabilities.  See Tr. 184-185; PSR ¶ 18.  Specifically, the defendant and her co-conspirators 
at times required borrowers to sign “starter” checks, which were legally negotiable instruments 
issued by banks to customers who opened new checking accounts, as part of the fraudulent 
scheme.  See Tr. 186-191; PSR ¶ 18.  The defendant and her co-conspirators used the signed 
starter checks to make withdrawals from borrowers’ accounts—often in cash.  Id.  In particular, 
the defendant and the co-conspirators at times used the starter checks to purchase cashiers’ 
checks, which were used to pay the defendant and her co-conspirators unauthorized commissions 
to which they were not entitled to under the PPP rules.  PSR ¶ 18; Tr. 184-185.  The checks 
contained additional false representations, including false statements in memo lines that the 
checks would be used for “payroll.”  See PSR ¶ 18; Tr. Ex. 109.  At the conclusion of the 
scheme, the defendant took a cut of the stolen cash and deposited the cash into ATMs around the 
New York area.  Tr. 545-546. 
F. 
The Defendant’s Other Unlawful and Deceptive Activities 
 
The defendant engaged in other acts of fraud and deception, even after she learned 
that the scheme was under scrutiny by law enforcement. 
Lies on her EIDL Application.  The defendant submitted a fraudulent EIDL 
application for her supposed small business: Monavie by Gasneo.  See Gov. Exs. 344-345, 308B; 
PSR ¶ 20.  The EIDL application is dated May 29, 2024 and makes certain false representations.  
Id.  Specifically, the EIDL application claims that the defendant’s company earned gross 
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revenues in the amount of $6,000 in the 12 months prior to January 31, 2020.  See Gov. Ex. 344; 
PSR ¶ 20.  But the defendant tax returns for 2019 claim a much smaller figure: $1,900.  See Gov. 
Ex. 308B; PSR ¶ 20.  The defendant’s EIDL loan was denied by the Small Business 
Administration, but she nevertheless unlawfully obtained a $1,000 EIDL Advance.  See Gov. Ex. 
345; PSR ¶ 20.   
 
Failure to Declare Crime Earnings.  The defendant failed to declare her earnings 
from the above-described fraud scheme in her 2020 taxes.  PSR ¶ 21.  As proven at trial, the 
defendant and her co-conspirators stole at least $3 million dollars from pandemic assistance 
programs.  Id.  Looking at only a small sample of the defendant’s bank accounts, law 
enforcement identified approximately $37,000 in ATM cash deposits—including approximately 
$30,000 representing the defendant’s earnings from the scheme—that the defendant did not 
report as wages in her 2020 tax returns.  See Tr. 545-557.1  
 
Cryptocurrency Tax Fraud.  The defendant also lied on her 2020 taxes in another 
respect: the defendant represented that she did not “receive, sell, send, exchange or otherwise 
acquire any financial interest in any virtual currency.”  See Gov. Ex. 308C; PSR ¶ 22.  But the 
defendant engaged in dozens of virtual currency transactions in 2020, buying and selling Bitcoin 
with the platform Square/Cash App.  See Gov. Ex. 371; PSR ¶ 22.  To that end, Square sent the 
defendant a 1099-B tax form related to her cryptocurrency earnings, but the defendant 
nevertheless concealed such on her 2020 tax returns.  Id. 
 
G. 
Procedural History 
On January 12, 2022, the defendant was indicted and charged with conspiracy to 
commit bank and wire fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracy.  See 
ECF Docket No. 12.  On June 18, 2024, at trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of all four 
counts.  See ECF No. 50.   
 
II. 
Applicable Law 
The Supreme Court has explained that “a district court should begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“U.S.S.G.” and “Guidelines”) range.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).  Though 
advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005), the Guidelines nonetheless are 
“the starting point and the initial benchmark,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49; see also Molina-Martinez v. 
United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198–99 (2016) (explaining that “[t]he Guidelines are the framework 
for sentencing and anchor the district court’s discretion” (alternation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
 
1 IRS Publication 525, Taxable and Nontaxable Income.  (“Illegal activities. Income from 
illegal activities, such as money from dealing illegal drugs, must be included in your income on 
Schedule 1 (Form 1040), line 8z, or on Schedule C (Form 1040) if from your self-employment 
activity.”). 
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After calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the court must consider the 
factors outlined in § 3553(a), see Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, and “impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing,” United States v. Cavera, 
550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).  Section 3553(a) directs the 
court “in determining the particular sentence to impose” to evaluate: (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the statutory 
purposes noted above; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the 
sentencing range as set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) the Sentencing Guidelines policy 
statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide 
restitution to any victims of the offense.   
 
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they continue to play a critical 
role in trying to achieve the “basic aim” that Congress sought to meet in enacting the Sentencing 
Reform Act, namely, “ensuring similar sentences for those who have committed similar crimes 
in similar ways.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 252.  “[I]n the ordinary case, the Commission’s 
recommendation of a sentencing range will reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might 
achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 27 (“[I]n the 
overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad 
range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.”).  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that, on appeal, a Guidelines sentence may be presumed to be 
reasonable because “the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the 
[Sentencing] Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives.”  Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007).  “An individual judge who imposes a sentence within the range 
recommended by the Guidelines thus makes a decision that is fully consistent with the 
Commission’s judgment in general.”  Id. at 350.  Furthermore, sentences within the applicable 
Guidelines promote Congress’ goal in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act: “to diminish 
unwarranted sentencing disparity.”  Id. at 354. 
 
At sentencing, “the court is virtually unfettered with respect to the information it 
may consider.”  United States v. Alexander, 860 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1988).  Indeed, “[n]o 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct 
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider 
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3661. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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III. 
Applicable Penalties 
 
For the reasons set forth below, the Guidelines calculation detailed in the PSR is 
accurate and the applicable Guidelines range of imprisonment is 108 months to 135 months.  In 
addition, restitution is mandatory in the full amount of the victims’ losses, which are: (a) $18,500 
for the SBA and (b) $3,399,973.84 (plus interest) for Popular Bank. 
 
A. 
The Applicable Guidelines Range Is 108 Months to 135 Months’ Imprisonment 
 
The appropriate Guidelines calculation is set forth in the PSR and below (PSR ¶¶ 
31-43): 
 
Base Offense Level (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1)) 
 
 
7 
 
Plus: Loss Between $1,500,000 and $3,500,000 
 (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I))  
 
 
 
 
+16 
 
Plus: Sophisticated Means (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)) 
 
+2 
 
Plus: Position of Public Trust (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3)  
 
+2 
 
Plus: Leader of Criminal Activity (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a))  
+4 
 
Total:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
The defendant has a criminal history score of zero, and thus a Criminal History 
Category of I.  PSR ¶ 46.  Based on a total offense level of 31 and a Criminal History Category 
of I, the defendant’s Guidelines range of imprisonment is 108 months to 135 months.  See id. ¶ 
74. 
 
IV. 
The Section 3553(a) Factors Demand a Substantial Term of Incarceration 
 
As explained in greater detail below, a substantial sentence of incarceration is 
warranted given the nature and seriousness of the defendant’s criminal offenses, the requirement 
to promote respect for the law, and the need for both specific and general deterrence.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  For these reasons, the government respectfully submits that a Guidelines 
sentence of imprisonment of 108 to 135 months is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
satisfy the goals of sentencing.  Id. 
A. 
Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
 
The defendant’s criminal conduct in this matter was serious in nature and broad in 
scope, as she fraudulently stole millions of dollars in pandemic-related loans and grants offered 
to help those businesses affected the most by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The COVID-19 
pandemic was among the most serious of public health crises in American history and it had 
profound economic ramifications.  This crime was neither a minor financial one—nor a one-time 
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lapse in judgement.  To the contrary, the defendant engaged in a well-conceived and carefully 
calculated fraud scheme over several months.  It required recruiting accomplices, including 
business owners, fake sole proprietors, corrupt tax preparers, and others, to falsify dozens of loan 
applications submitted through her bank with her approval and signature.   
The crime was orchestrated and committed using sophisticated means.  The 
defendant exploited her extensive experience and training at Popular Bank and prior banks to 
know the bank’s vulnerabilities: starter checks, cashier’s checks, cash withdrawals, and blind 
spots in surveillance footage.  See, e.g. Gov. Ex. 514; Tr. 107-109 (describing blind spots in 
bank and training branch managers receive on them). 
The defendant’s leadership role and abuse of trust also warrants a substantial 
penalty.  The defendant was the branch manager and a vice president at Popular Bank.  She 
conceived of the scheme and shared the plan with her bank employees at a lunch.  She notified 
her employees and criminal conspirators when fraudulent applications would be submitted, Tr. 
182, she recruited corrupt tax preparers like Campbell and Nipabi, and she literally oversaw 
stolen money being counted by employees as part of the scheme, Gov. Ex. 514. 
B. 
The Need for the Sentence Imposed to Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense, 
Promote Respect for the Law, and Provide Just Punishment for the Offense 
Particularly acute here is the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the 
offenses, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).  This was not a victimless crime.  The PPP and EIDL programs were not 
a limitless pot of money.  By taking money that she was not entitled to, the defendant defrauded 
taxpayers who helped fund the program, the SBA which guarantees these loans, and Popular 
Bank.  And her greed also diverted funds that could have been used the way PPP loans were 
intended: to assist struggling businesses and to keep people employed.  Instead, the defendant 
took money that was earmarked for struggling small businesses and spent it on herself and 
distributed it among her co-conspirators for their own personal uses.  The defendant and her co-
conspirators also preyed on vulnerable members of our community—like the coffee-cart owner 
who testified at trial that he was misled into signing forms that he did not understand and that he 
was never told that the PPP loan would have to be paid back.  Tr. 140-148.  The defendant’s 
greed at a time of crisis demands accountability. 
C. 
History and Characteristics of the Defendant 
The history and characteristics of the defendant also weigh in favor of a sentence 
of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment.  Although many defendants come before this Court with 
compelling mitigating factors from difficult upbringings, the defendant is not among them.  As 
the Probation Department notes in its sentencing recommendation, there appear to be no 
mitigating factors.  Indeed, the defendant’s needs were met as a child.  She has a bachelor’s and 
graduate degree.  She had a steady job and comfortable living.  Simply put, the defendant chose 
greed and corruption over the well-being of the community—boasting in her journal that she had 
“unlimited cash flow.”  Tr. 716.  To date, the defendant shown no remorse for her criminal 
conduct, and she continued to engage in fraud and deception after the investigation came to light.  
Accordingly, a substantial sentence is warranted here.     
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D. 
Specific and General Deterrence  
Given that criminal conduct like the defendant’s is typically difficult to detect and 
prosecute, principles of general deterrence warrant a substantial penalty.  See, e.g., Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 988-89 (1991) (noting that “since deterrent effect depends not only 
upon the amount of the penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly 
more difficult to detect may warrant substantially higher penalties”).  Because economic and 
fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or 
opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence. See United States v. 
Zukerman, 897 F.3d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for 
punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and 
punish, since both attributes go to increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the 
punishment required to deter it.”) (quoting United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th 
Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006).  
Here, a Guidelines sentence will help to deter the defendant and other fraudsters 
who believe that they can generate income through fraudulent schemes against banks and 
government agencies during a time of crisis.  Such persons should know that the decision to 
deceive government agencies into handing over funds allocated to assist vulnerable groups will 
result in a substantial term of custody.  This is particularly true for a person who is placed in a 
position of trust, as was the defendant, who was the branch manager and vice president of 
Popular Bank.  In addition, the nature of fraud generally renders it more difficult to uncover, 
since individuals engaged in fraud often take affirmative steps to conceal their conduct—like the 
defendant did here—when she exploited gaps in the surveillance footage at the bank and taught 
her co-conspirators to avoid a paper trail.  Accordingly, an additional sanction is necessary to 
counterbalance the lower risk of apprehension.   
The defendant also needs to be specifically deterred.  Even after the scheme was 
discovered and the defendant was terminated from Popular Bank, she continued her fraud and 
deception.  She failed to report scheme earnings on her taxes and lied to prospective employers 
about what happened.  Under these circumstances, the requested sentence is sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing.   
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1:22-cr-00020-FB     Document 61     Filed 02/28/25     Page 11 of 12 PageID #: 1480

 
12
V. 
Conclusion 
 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully requests that the 
Court impose a Guidelines sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
JOHN J. DURHAM 
United States Attorney 
 
By: 
 /s/ Chand Edwards-Balfour  
 
Chand Edwards-Balfour 
 
Adam Amir 
 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
 
(718) 254-7000 
GLENN S. LEON 
Chief, Fraud Section 
 
By: 
/s/ Jennifer Bilinkas 
 
Jennifer Bilinkas   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Trial Attorney, Department of Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cc:  
Clerk of the Court (FB) (by ECF) 
 
Defense Counsel of Record (by ECF and email) 
  
U.S. Probation Officer (by email) 
Case 1:22-cr-00020-FB     Document 61     Filed 02/28/25     Page 12 of 12 PageID #: 1481

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