RESPONSE by USA to response 116 , sentencing memorandum 110 AMENDED RESPONSE TO… — USA v. Distefano (Dkt. 117)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · No. 1:24-cr-00424 · Doc. 117 · 2026-03-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FRANCESCO DISTEFANO 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
No. 24 CR 424-1 
 
Judge Jeremy C. Daniel 
 
 
GOVERNMENT’S AMENDED1 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PSR, 
SENTENCING SUBMISSION AND REQUEST FOR A BELOW GUIDELINES SENTENCE 
 
Now comes the United States of America, by its attorney, ANDREW S. 
BOUTROS, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and in 
response to defendant FRANCESCO DISTEFANO’s Objections to the PSR, 
Sentencing Submission and Request for a Below Guidelines Sentence (hereinafter, 
“Memorandum”), respectfully states as follows:  
I. 
DEFENDANT’S “FACTUAL CONCERNS” WITH THE PSR 
A. Defendant’s Post-Indictment Fraud Scheme 
 
While this case was pending defendant engaged in a identity theft scheme 
wherein defendant enrolled “customers” for merchant processing services without 
their knowledge or permission. See PSR, ¶ 57; GV at 18-20; GX 2-A; GX 2-B; Supp 
GV at 1; GX 4 (reports of interview with four “customers” who are unaware of All In 
One Swype). The scheme generates funds for defendant’s business (presently, All In 
 
1 This amended response removes what was Section II.A in the government’s original 
response filed at dkt. 116, concerning the effect of proposed amendments to the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines’ § 2B1.1 economic loss table. The government’s argument in that 
section was based on an erroneous understanding of the proposed amendments. The 
observation set forth in Defendant’s memorandum concerning the effect of the amendments, 
if adopted (i.e., there would be only a 16-level increase for a loss between $1,500,000 and 
$9,500,000), is correct.  
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One Swipe) in the form of “commissions” or “residuals” paid by the payment 
processing company.2 From May 2025 through October 2025, one such payment 
processor, Fiserv Inc., paid commissions to All In One Swipe of approximately 
$136,389. Second Supp. GV at 1; GX 9. There is cause to believe that All In One Swype 
continues to receive funds on account of “customers” previously signed up for services. 
See GX 10 (Victim BB has continued to incur fraudulent charges as recently as 
February 3, 2026, when a $514.49 recurring charge hit his account.) 
In objecting to the PSR, defendant attempts to minimize the scale of this latest 
scheme, suggesting that the PSR should reflect only that defendant told Probation 
that he received residuals of $5,000 to $7,000 per month and that his December 2025 
and January 2026 bank statements showed residual deposits of only $343.99 and 
$12.59, respectively.3 Def. Memorandum at 4. The inherent flaw in this approach is 
that Fiserv was paying residuals into All In One Swipe accounts at Thread Bank, not 
defendant’s personal account at Green State Bank.4  
The All In One Swipe scheme is separate and apart from the PPP/EIDL fraud 
scheme that defendant is being sentenced for. However, that defendant engaged in a 
new fraud scheme while this case was pending is relevant to determining the 
 
2 Defendant’s business is essentially a sales entity that, at least theoretically, receives its 
revenues from the payment processor.  
3 In support of this suggestion, defendant attaches two months of statements for his personal 
checking account at Green State Bank. Id.; see also, DX 2. 
4 The government does not presently possess current statements for the Thread Bank 
accounts, but as of August 2025, the Fiserv payments were going to accounts at that 
institution.  
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sentence in this case as it is probative of the need for specific deterrence, among other 
things.  
B. Defendant’s Threat to Shoot Victim MK 
Defendant objects to the PSR’s reference to the allegation that defendant 
threatened to kill Victim MK. Def. Memorandum at 4-5. This allegation—that 
defendant, while on house arrest in the Northern District of Illinois, called Victim 
MK by telephone on July 16, 2025, while Victim MK was in St. Tropaz, France, and 
threatened to shoot Victim MK, and thus violated 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)—was one of two 
bases cited by the government in its motion seeking revocation of defendant’s pretrial 
release. Defendant is correct that the Court did not find “probable cause based on the 
record in front of” it on July 23, 2025, to sustain the allegation. See Dkt. 109, 7/23/25 
Transcript at 25. However, at the time of that hearing, Victim MK was still in Europe 
and unavailable to testify. Victim MK will be available to testify at defendant’s 
sentencing hearing about the events that occurred in mid-July 2025. Should the 
government present further evidence, and should the Court determine that probable 
cause exists and sustain the government’s allegation, then the conduct will be 
relevant to consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
C. Defendant’s Nonconsensual Creation and Distribution of a Sex 
Video with Victim KP  
 
Defendant objects to the PSR for “call[ing] into question whether Francesco 
engaged in non-consensual sex in 2022 with his then girlfriend.” Def. Memorandum 
at 5. Defendant points out that he was charged with and pled guilty to the 
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nonconsensual dissemination of a sexual image. Id. The issue is that the image (a 
video) depicts Victim KP, who, by her own account, is not conscious in the recording 
defendant created and disseminated without her consent. See Second Supp. GV at 2; 
GX 11 (videorecorded interview of Victim KP). Since Victim KP was not conscious and 
alert when defendant filmed his sexual encounter with her, it is not clear how the 
encounter could have been consensual.  
II. 
DEFENDANT’S GUIDELINES’ ARGUMENTS 
A. Acceptance of Responsibility 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to acceptance of responsibility 
notwithstanding his conduct over the past 8 months. The government disagrees. 
While defendant admitted his conduct and agreed to entry of judgment in the then-
pending civil forfeiture proceeding,5 he immediately returned to criminal and 
fraudulent behavior while on pretrial release. As noted in the government’s 
sentencing memorandum, courts have denied defendants’ acceptance under § 
 
5 Elsewhere in his sentencing memorandum, defendant suggests that co-defendant Urumieh 
sold the real property purchased with scheme proceeds in Glendale, California in August 
2025 and that “[t]he government did not seize or forfeit any of the proceeds Urumieh 
received.” Def. Memorandum at 3. Defendant is incorrect. Urumieh did not sell the property 
in 2025; a grantee who took title to the property from Urumieh several years earlier sold it 
in 2025. And the government required that grantee, who the government believes was not a 
bona fide purchaser for value in its acquisition of the property from Urumieh, to deposit 
$312,421.88 (the amount of PPP proceeds that could be traced to Urumieh’s purchase of the 
property) into an escrow account as substitute res in order for the sale to proceed. Those funds 
will be the subject of future litigation and are referenced in Paragraph 19.a. of Urumieh’s 
plea agreement filed at Dkt. 107. 
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3E1.1(a) for continuing criminality. See United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 141 
(7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).  
Defendant’s contention that he has evidenced his acceptance by “payment of 
losses to individuals involved in the conduct occurring after his release on bond” (Def. 
Memorandum at 10) is revelatory. Defendant paid one victim: Molly Maids. And he 
did this when he was lying to the Glendale Heights Police Department about the 
fraudulent nature of the check (defendant falsely claimed that he had stopped 
payment on a valid check because he was unsatisfied with cleaning services) and 
trying to avoid consequences.  
III. 
CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE 
A. Special Condition 14 (Sex Offender Assessment) 
As discussed in the government’s sentencing memorandum, a sex offender 
assessment is an import condition of release to promote the policy goals of protecting 
the public and defendant’s rehabilitation. See Gov. Memorandum at 33. Multiple 
women have accused defendant of creating and disseminating sexual videos of them 
without consent. And, in at least two of the instances, the victims state that they were 
not fully conscious when defendant created the images. See GX 7 at 37, ¶ 6; GX 11. A 
narrowly drawn condition requiring defendant to undergo a sex offender evaluation 
is a “modest special condition [that will] not deprive [defendant] of more liberty than 
reasonably necessary.” United States v. Russell, 81 F.4th 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2023). 
 
 
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IV. 
DEFENDANT’S COOPERATION 
Defendant’s cooperation in this case did not assist in any investigation or 
prosecution. Defendant did tell the government that a particular individual was in 
the country unlawfully. Def. Memorandum at 24. Defendant advises that individual 
has now been removed from the country. Id. That may very well be correct. However, 
the information defendant provided was not used for an immigration removal 
proceeding. 
The government entered into a cooperation agreement with defendant with the 
expectation that defendant would be available to testify against his codefendant 
Sargis Urumieh. When defendant resumed committing fraud on pretrial release, his 
value as a cooperating witness was destroyed.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the government’s sentencing memorandum, the 
government respectfully submits that a sentence of 108 months’ incarceration 
followed by three years of supervised release is warranted in this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANDREW S. BOUTROS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
Dated: March 3, 2026 
 
By: 
/s/ Jeffrey S. Snell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEFFREY S. SNELL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Attorney=s Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219 S. Dearborn, Suite 500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chicago, Illinois 60604 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone: 312-469-6308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email: Jeffrey.Snell2@usdoj.gov 
 
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