PLEA AGREEMENT filed by Plaintiff USA as to Defendant Edvard Paronyan — USA v. Ayvazyan et al (Dkt. 469)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 469 · 2021-06-09 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

A plea agreement for defendant Edvard Paronyan, filed June 9, 2021 as Document 469 in United States of America v. Richard Ayvazyan, et al., No. CR 20-579(A)-SVW, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The defendant agrees to plead guilty to count six of the first superseding indictment, charging wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and agrees to forfeiture of assets derived from that offense. The agreement states a statutory maximum of 20 years' imprisonment, a three-year supervised release term, a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or loss, and a $100 special assessment, and says the parties believe restitution is about $430,187. It requires a Financial Disclosure Statement within 30 days and consent to remote hearings under Section 15002(b) of the CARES Act. In return the United States agrees to move to dismiss the remaining counts.

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TRACY L. WILKISON 
Acting United States Attorney 
SCOTT M. GARRINGER 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
SCOTT PAETTY (Cal. Bar No. 274719) 
BRIAN FAERSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 274850) 
CATHERINE S. AHN (Cal. Bar No. 248286) 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
Major Frauds/Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Sections 
1100/1300 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Telephone: (213) 894-6527/3819/2424 
Facsimile: (213) 894-6269/0141 
E-mail: 
Scott.Paetty@usdoj.gov 
 
Brian.Faerstein@usdoj.gov 
 
Catherine.S.Ahn@usdoj.gov 
 
DANIEL S. KAHN 
Acting Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
CHRISTOPHER FENTON 
Trial Attorney, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
1400 New York Avenue NW, 3rd Floor 
Washington, DC 20530 
Telephone: (202) 320-0539 
Facsimile: (202) 514-0152 
E-mail: 
Christopher.Fenton@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Richard Avazian” and 
    “Iuliia Zhadko,” 
MARIETTA TERABELIAN, 
  aka “Marietta Abelian” and     
      “Viktoria Kauichko,” 
ARTUR AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Arthur Ayvazyan,” and 
TAMARA DADYAN, 
MANUK GRIGORYAN, 
  aka “Mike Grigoryan,” and 
No. CR 20-579(A)-SVW 
PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT 
EDVARD PARONYAN  
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW   Document 469   Filed 06/09/21   Page 1 of 25   Page ID #:5787

 
 
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      “Anton Kudiumov,” 
ARMAN HAYRAPETYAN, 
EDVARD PARONYAN, 
aka “Edvard Paronian” and 
    “Edward Paronyan,” and 
VAHE DADYAN, 
 
Defendants, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
This constitutes the plea agreement between EDVARD 
PARONYAN, also known as “Edvard Paronian” and “Edward Paronyan” 
(“defendant”) and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Central 
District of California and the United States Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section (collectively referred to herein as 
the “United States”), in the above-captioned case.  This agreement is 
limited to the United States and cannot bind any other federal, 
state, local, or foreign prosecuting, enforcement, administrative, or 
regulatory authorities. 
DEFENDANT’S OBLIGATIONS 
 
Defendant agrees to: 
a. 
At the earliest opportunity requested by the United 
States and provided by the Court, appear and plead guilty to count 
six of the first superseding indictment in United States v. Richard 
Ayvazyan et al., CR No. 20-579(A), which charges defendant with wire 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
b. 
Agree that all court appearances, except his 
sentencing hearing, may proceed by video-teleconference (“VTC”) or 
telephone, if VTC is not reasonably available, so long as such 
appearances are authorized by Order of the Chief Judge 20-097 or 
another order, rule, or statute.  Defendant understands that, under 
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the United States Constitution, the United States Code, and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (including Rules 11 and 43), he 
may have the right to be physically present at these hearings.  
Defendant understands that right and, after consulting with counsel, 
voluntarily agrees to waive it and to proceed remotely.  Defense 
counsel also joins in this consent, agreement, and waiver.  
Specifically, this agreement includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
i. 
Defendant consents under Section 15002(b) of the 
CARES Act to proceed with his change of plea hearing by VTC or 
telephone, if VTC is not reasonably available.   
ii. 
Defendant consents under 18 U.S.C. § 3148 and 
Section 15002(b) of the CARES Act to proceed with any hearing 
regarding alleged violations of the conditions of pretrial release by 
VTC or telephone, if VTC is not reasonably available. 
c. 
Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement. 
d. 
Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained 
in this agreement. 
e. 
Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered 
for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey 
any other ongoing court order in this matter. 
f. 
Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be 
excluded for sentencing purposes under United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) § 4A1.2(c) are not 
within the scope of this agreement. 
g. 
Be truthful at all times with the United States 
Probation and Pretrial Services Office and the Court. 
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h. 
Pay the applicable special assessment at or before the 
time of sentencing unless defendant has demonstrated a lack of 
ability to pay such assessment. 
i. 
At or before the time of sentencing, satisfy any and 
all restitution/fine obligations based on ability to pay by 
delivering a certified check or money order to the Fiscal Clerk of 
the Court in the amount of $430,187, to be held until the date of 
sentencing and, thereafter, applied to satisfy defendant’s 
restitution/fine balance.  Payments may be made to the Clerk, United 
States District Court, Fiscal Department, 255 East Temple Street, 
11th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90012.   
j. 
Ability to pay shall be assessed based on the 
Financial Disclosure Statement, referenced below, and all other 
relevant information relating to ability to pay. 
k. 
Defendant agrees that any and all restitution/fine 
obligations ordered by the Court will be due in full and immediately.  
The government is not precluded from pursuing, in excess of any 
payment schedule set by the Court, any and all available remedies by 
which to satisfy defendant’s payment of the full financial 
obligation, including referral to the Treasury Offset Program. 
l. 
Complete the Financial Disclosure Statement on a form 
provided by the United States and, within 30 days of defendant’s 
entry of a guilty plea, deliver the signed and dated statement, along 
with all of the documents requested therein, to the United States by 
either email at usacac.FinLit@usdoj.gov (preferred) or mail to the 
United States Financial Litigation Section at 300 N. Los Angeles St., 
Suite 7516, Los Angeles, CA 90012. 
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m. 
Authorize the United States to obtain a credit report 
upon returning a signed copy of this plea agreement.  
n. 
Consent to the United States inspecting and copying 
all of defendant’s financial documents and financial information held 
by the United States Probation and Pretrial Services Office. 
3. 
Defendant further agrees: 
a. 
To forfeit all right, title, and interest in and to 
any and all monies, properties, and/or assets of any kind, derived 
from or acquired as a result of the illegal activity to which 
defendant is pleading guilty (collectively, the “Forfeitable 
Assets”). 
b. 
To the Court’s entry of an order of forfeiture at or 
before sentencing with respect to the Forfeitable Assets and to the 
forfeiture of the assets. 
c. 
To take whatever steps are necessary to pass to the 
United States clear title to the Forfeitable Assets, including, 
without limitation, the execution of a consent decree of forfeiture 
and the completing of any other legal documents required for the 
transfer of title to the United States. 
d. 
Not to contest any administrative forfeiture 
proceedings or civil judicial proceedings commenced against the 
Forfeitable Assets.  If defendant submitted a claim and/or petition 
for remission for all or part of the Forfeitable Assets on behalf of 
himself or any other individual or entity, defendant shall and hereby 
does withdraw any such claims or petitions, and further agrees to 
waive any right he may have to seek remission or mitigation of the 
forfeiture of the Forfeitable Assets. 
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e. 
Not to assist any other individual in any effort 
falsely to contest the forfeiture of the Forfeitable Assets. 
f. 
Not to claim that reasonable cause to seize the 
Forfeitable Assets was lacking. 
g. 
To prevent the transfer, sale, destruction, or loss of 
any and all assets described above to the extent defendant has the 
ability to do so. 
h. 
That forfeiture of Forfeitable Assets shall not be 
counted toward satisfaction of any special assessment, fine, 
restitution, costs, or other penalty the Court may impose.   
THE UNITED STATES’ OBLIGATIONS 
 
The United States agrees to: 
a. 
Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement. 
b. 
Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing contained 
in this agreement. 
c. 
At the time of sentencing, move to dismiss the 
remaining counts of the first superseding indictment and move to 
dismiss the underlying indictment as against defendant.  Defendant 
agrees, however, that at the time of sentencing the Court may 
consider any dismissed charges in determining the applicable 
Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any 
departure from that range, and the sentence to be imposed. 
d. 
At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant 
demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to 
and including the time of sentencing, recommend a two-level reduction 
in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an 
additional one-level reduction if available under that section. 
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e. 
Recommend that defendant be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment no higher than the low end of the applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines range, provided that the offense level used by the Court 
to determine that range is 16 or higher and provided that the Court 
does not depart downward in offense level or criminal history 
category.  For purposes of this agreement, the low end of the 
Sentencing Guidelines range is that defined by the Sentencing Table 
in U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A. 
NATURE OF THE OFFENSES 
 
Defendant understands that for defendant to be guilty of 
the crime charged in count six of the first superseding indictment in 
United States v. Richard Ayvazyan et al., CR No. 20-579(A), which 
charges defendant with committing wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, the following must be true: (1) defendant knowingly 
participated in a scheme or plan to defraud, or a scheme or plan for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or omitted facts.  Deceitful 
statements or half-truths may constitute false or fraudulent 
representations; (2) the statements made or facts omitted as part of 
the scheme were material, that is, they had a natural tendency to 
influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with 
money or property; (3) defendant acted with the intent to defraud, 
that is, the intent to deceive and cheat; and (4) defendant used, or 
caused to be used, an interstate wire communication to carry out or 
attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme. 
PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION 
 
Defendant understands that the statutory maximum sentence 
that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States 
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Code, Section 1343, is: 20 years’ imprisonment; a three-year period 
of supervised release; a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain or 
gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a 
mandatory special assessment of $100. 
 
Defendant understands that defendant will be required to 
pay full restitution to the victims of the offense to which defendant 
is pleading guilty.  Defendant agrees that, in return for the United 
States’ compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the 
Court may order restitution to persons other than the victims of the 
offense to which defendant is pleading guilty and in amounts greater 
than those alleged in the count to which defendant is pleading 
guilty.  In particular, defendant agrees that the Court may order 
restitution to any victim of any of the following for any losses 
suffered by that victim as a result: (a) any relevant conduct, as 
defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in connection with the offense to which 
defendant is pleading guilty; and (b) any counts dismissed and 
charges not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement as well as all 
relevant conduct, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, in connection with 
those counts and charges.  The parties currently believe that the 
applicable amount of restitution is approximately $430,187, but 
recognize and agree that this amount could change based on facts that 
come to the attention of the parties prior to sentencing.  
 
Defendant understands that supervised release is a period 
of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject 
to various restrictions and requirements.  Defendant understands that 
if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised 
release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part 
of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the 
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offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could 
result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than 
the statutory maximum stated above. 
 
Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant 
may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic 
rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, 
the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury. Defendant 
understands that he is pleading guilty to a felony and that it is a 
federal crime for a convicted felon to possess a firearm or 
ammunition.  Defendant understands that the conviction in this case 
may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, 
including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or 
supervised release in another case and suspension or revocation of a 
professional license.  Defendant understands that unanticipated 
collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw 
defendant’s guilty plea. 
10. 
Defendant and his counsel have discussed the fact that, and 
defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States 
citizen, the conviction in this case make it practically inevitable 
and a virtual certainty that defendant will be removed or deported 
from the United States.  Defendant may also be denied United States 
citizenship and admission to the United States in the future.  
Defendant understands that while there may be arguments that 
defendant can raise in immigration proceedings to avoid or delay 
removal, removal is presumptively mandatory and a virtual certainty 
in this case.  Defendant further understands that removal and 
immigration consequences are the subject of a separate proceeding and 
that no one, including his attorney or the Court, can predict to an 
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absolute certainty the effect of his conviction on his immigration 
status.  Defendant nevertheless affirms that he wants to plead guilty 
regardless of any immigration consequences that his plea may entail, 
even if the consequence is automatic removal from the United States. 
FACTUAL BASIS 
 
Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of the 
offense to which defendant is agreeing to plead guilty.  Defendant 
and the United States agree to the statement of facts provided below 
and agree that this statement of facts is sufficient to support a 
plea of guilty to the charge described in this agreement and to 
establish the Sentencing Guidelines factors set forth in paragraph 13 
below but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts 
relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to 
either party that relate to that conduct.  
Defendant fraudulently obtained federal disaster relief funds 
distributed through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), and 
fraudulently used those funds and federal disaster relief funds 
obtained through the Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program (“EIDL”).  
Established by The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(“CARES”) Act, a federal law enacted in March 2020, the PPP and EIDL 
programs provided emergency financial assistance to Americans 
suffering economic harm as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  PPP 
loans were obtained by submitting applications to participating 
financial institutions, which administered the loans.  EIDL loans 
were obtained by submitting applications to the United States Small 
Business Administration (“SBA”), which disbursed the loans through 
financial institutions.  The PPP and EIDL programs were funded by 
U.S. taxpayers.  In order to obtain and retain funds distributed 
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through the PPP and EIDL programs, recipients were required to 
certify that they would use the funds to pay for specified 
permissible business expenses, for example, payroll and certain 
operating expenses, and to use the funds for those purposes and no 
others.   
Defendant owned Redline Auto Collision, Inc. (“Redline Auto 
Collision”), which at no time had more than five employees.  
Defendant was acquainted with co-defendant Manuk Grigoriyan, who 
visited defendant at Redline Auto Collision’s business premises.  Co-
defendant Grigoryan was familiar with defendant and Redline Auto 
Collision, including the number of defendant’s employees, prior to 
the submission of any PPP or EIDL loan applications on behalf of 
defendant’s business.  
The $130,187 PPP Loan for Redline Auto Collision 
In or about early May 2020, defendant asked co-defendant 
Grigoryan to help defendant obtain a PPP loan.  Co-defendant 
Grigoryan told defendant that he (co-defendant Grigoryan) knew 
somebody who could get defendant a PPP loan.  Defendant understood 
this to mean that co-defendant Grigoryan’s acquaintance would obtain 
a PPP loan for defendant regardless of whether defendant qualified 
for such a loan.  With this understanding, defendant authorized 
defendant Grigoryan to arrange for a PPP loan application to be 
submitted in defendant’s name and on behalf of defendant’s business, 
Redline Auto Collision.  Defendant knew at the time that a PPP loan 
application required supporting payroll records.  Defendant knew that 
he did not have, and would not be able to provide to co-defendant 
Grigoryan any payroll records for Redline Auto Collison.  Defendant 
therefore understood that the PPP loan application submitted for 
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Redline Auto Collision would contain a false and fraudulent 
representation that defendant, as the owner of Redline Auto 
Collision, had payroll records for Redline Auto Collision.   
Co-defendant Grigoryan later told defendant that he would be 
receiving approximately $130,187 in PPP loan proceeds.  Although 
defendant did not then know whether the application had already been 
submitted, as he and co-defendant Grigoryan had agreed it would be, 
he knew the amount co-defendant Grigoryan reported defendant would 
receive was larger than what defendant believed his Redline Auto 
Collision qualified for based on the number of employees defendant 
actually had.  Defendant asked co-defendant Grigoryan how defendant 
was getting the larger amount.  Co-defendant Grigoryan stated that 
the PPP loan application represented or would represent that Redline 
Auto Collision had more employees than it actually had.  Defendant 
knew this representation was false and knew that any records that 
were submitted to support this representation would have to be 
fraudulent.  Defendant nonetheless told co-defendant Grigoryan that 
defendant agreed with submitting the PPP loan application with the 
false statements regarding the number of Redline Auto Collison’s 
employees.   
On or about May 11, 2020, in reliance on the false and 
fraudulent statements in the PPP loan application that defendant and 
co-defendant Grigoryan had agreed would be submitted on behalf of 
defendant’s business Redline Auto Collision, Lender B, i.e., Celtic 
Bank, wired approximately $130,187 in fraudulent PPP loan proceeds to 
the Redline Auto Collision Bank 5 account, a J.P. Morgan Chase bank 
account controlled by defendant (the “RAC account”).  The wire 
traveled interstate.  Defendant then used a portion of the PPP 
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proceeds to pay personal expenses, including large credit card 
charges to, among other vendors, Louis Vuitton, Neiman Marcus, and 
the Bellagio Las Vegas.  Defendant knew that his use of the funds for 
personal expenses violated the requirements of the PPP loan program 
because he was using the money to pay for expenses that were not 
legitimate business expenses. 
Defendant also applied for two EIDL loans on behalf of Redline 
Auto Collision, as follows:  
The $150,000 EIDL Loan for Redline Auto Collision 
On or about April 2, 2020, defendant submitted an application 
for a $150,000 EIDL Loan on behalf of Redline Auto Collision.  
Defendant certified in that application that Redline Auto Collision 
would use the EIDL loan proceeds for permissible business purposes.  
On or about June 8, 2020, in reliance on the statements and 
certifications in the EIDL loan application that defendant had 
submitted, the SBA wired approximately $149,900 in EIDL loan proceeds 
to the RAC account.  
In or about June 2020, after defendant had received the PPP and EIDL 
loan proceeds described above, defendant went with co-defendant 
Grigoryan to a social gathering at which co-defendants Richard 
Ayvazyan and Marietta Terabelian were present.  Co-defendant Richard 
Ayvazyan told defendant that he (co-defendant Richard Ayvazyan) and 
co-defendant Terabelian needed money for a down payment on a new home 
they were purchasing, and asked defendant for a $150,000 loan.  
Defendant agreed and later transferred $150,000 from the RAC account 
to a Bank of America account held by Marietta Terabelian (the 
Terabelian Bank 2 account).  The $150,000 was substantially comprised 
of the EIDL and PPP proceeds defendant had received.  Defendant knew 
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and understood that he was obligated to use the EIDL and PPP proceeds 
for business purposes and that funding a loan to co-defendants 
Richard Ayvazyan and Terabelian via a transfer to co-defendant 
Terabelian was not a permissible use of the funds.  Neither co-
defendant Richard Ayvazyan or co-defendant Terabelian ever repaid any 
portion of the loan. 
The $150,000 EIDL Loan for RAC 
On or about July 16, 2020, defendant submitted to the SBA an 
application for a $150,000 EIDL loan on behalf of “RAC.”  By using 
this acronym, defendant concealed that this EIDL application was in 
fact for Redline Auto Collison.  Defendant also identified the owner 
of the business as “E.G.” instead of himself.  Defendant did so in 
order to hide the fact that defendant had previously applied for, and 
received, an EIDL loan for Redline Auto Collision.  Defendant falsely 
certified that “RAC” had not received compensation from other sources 
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including loans, even though 
defendant knew that Redline Auto Collision had already received a PPP 
loan and an EIDL loan.  Defendant also falsely certified that RAC 
would use all of the loan proceeds for permissible business purposes.  
On or about August 4, 2020, in reliance on the fraudulent statements 
in the application submitted by defendant, the SBA wired 
approximately $150,000 in proceeds from the “RAC” loan to a bank 
account controlled by defendant.  Defendant then used at least some 
of the fraudulently obtained proceeds for his own personal benefit in 
contravention of the EIDL program’s requirements that the proceeds 
only be used for permissible business purposes.   
Defendant agrees that the total loss caused by the above-
described conduct is $430,187. 
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SENTENCING FACTORS 
 
Defendant understands that in determining defendant’s 
sentence the Court is required to calculate the applicable Sentencing 
Guidelines range and to consider that range, possible departures 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the other sentencing factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Defendant understands that the 
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot have 
any expectation of receiving a sentence within the calculated 
Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the 
Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court will 
be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it finds 
appropriate up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of 
conviction. 
 
Defendant and the United States agree to the following 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors: 
Base Offense Level: 
7 
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(a)(1) 
Specific Offense 
Characteristics 
 
 
Loss $250,000 > $550,000  
+12 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1)(G) 
 
Acceptance of Responsibility: 
 
-3 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 
 
 
The United States will agree to a two-level downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility (and, if applicable, move for an 
additional one-level downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)) 
only if the conditions set forth in paragraph 4(d) are met and if 
defendant has not committed, and refrains from committing, acts 
constituting obstruction of justice within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 
§ 3C1.1, as discussed below.  Subject to paragraph 27 below, and with 
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the exception that defendant reserves the right to argue for -- and 
the United States reserves the right to contest -- that an adjustment 
for mitigating role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 applies, defendant and the 
United States agree not to seek, argue, or suggest in any way, either 
orally or in writing, that any other specific offense 
characteristics, adjustments, or departures relating to the offense 
level be imposed.  Defendant agrees, however, that if, after signing 
this agreement but prior to sentencing, defendant were to commit an 
act, or the United States were to discover a previously undiscovered 
act committed by defendant prior to signing this agreement, which 
act, in the judgment of the United States, constituted obstruction of 
justice within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, the United States 
would be free to seek the enhancement set forth in that section and 
to argue that defendant is not entitled to a downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  
 
Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to 
defendant’s criminal history or criminal history category. 
 
Defendant and the United States reserve the right to argue 
for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the 
Sentencing Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), and (a)(7). 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant 
gives up the following rights: 
a. 
The right to persist in a plea of not guilty. 
b. 
The right to a speedy and public trial by jury. 
c. 
The right to be represented by counsel –- and if 
necessary have the Court appoint counsel -- at trial.  Defendant 
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understands, however, that, defendant retains the right to be 
represented by counsel –- and if necessary have the Court appoint 
counsel –- at every other stage of the proceeding. 
d. 
The right to be presumed innocent and to have the 
burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
e. 
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against defendant. 
f. 
The right to testify and to present evidence in 
opposition to the charges, including the right to compel the 
attendance of witnesses to testify. 
g. 
The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if 
defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that 
choice not be used against defendant. 
h. 
Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, 
Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial 
motions that have been filed or could be filed. 
WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION 
 
Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal 
based on a claim that defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary, by 
pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to 
appeal defendant’s conviction on the offense to which defendant is 
pleading guilty.  Defendant understands that this waiver includes, 
but is not limited to, arguments that the statutes to which defendant 
is pleading guilty are unconstitutional, and any and all claims that 
the statement of facts provided herein is insufficient to support 
defendant’s plea of guilty. 
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LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE 
 
Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a total 
term of imprisonment within or below the range corresponding to an 
offense level of 16 and the criminal history calculated by the Court, 
defendant gives up the right to appeal all of the following: (a) the 
procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion 
of the sentence; (b) the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court; 
(c) the fine imposed by the Court, provided it is within the 
statutory maximum; (d) to the extent permitted by law, the 
constitutionality or legality of defendant’s sentence, provided it is 
within the statutory maximum; (e) the amount and terms of any 
restitution order, provided it requires payment of no more than 
$430,187; (f) the term of probation or supervised release imposed by 
the Court, provided it is within the statutory maximum; and (g) any 
of the following conditions of probation or supervised release 
imposed by the Court: the conditions set forth in Second Amended 
General Order 20-04 of this Court; the drug testing conditions 
mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d); and the alcohol and 
drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(7). 
 
The United States agrees that, provided (a) all portions of 
the sentence are at or below the statutory maximum specified above 
and (b) the Court imposes a term of imprisonment within or above the 
range corresponding to an offense level of 16 and the criminal 
history calculated by the Court, the United States gives up its right 
to appeal any portion of the sentence, with the exception that the 
United States reserves the right to appeal the following: (a) the 
amount of restitution ordered if that amount is less than $430,187. 
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Defendant also gives up any right to bring a post-
conviction collateral attack on the conviction or sentence, including 
any order of restitution, except a post-conviction collateral attack 
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim of 
newly discovered evidence, or an explicitly retroactive change in the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing statutes, or statutes of 
conviction.  Defendant understands that this waiver includes, but is 
not limited to, arguments that the statutes to which defendant is 
pleading guilty are unconstitutional, and any and all claims that the 
statement of facts provided herein is insufficient to support 
defendant’s plea of guilty. 
RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA 
 
Defendant agrees that if, after entering a guilty plea 
pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds 
in withdrawing defendant’s guilty plea on any basis other than a 
claim and finding that entry into this plea agreement was 
involuntary, then (a) the United States will be relieved of all of 
its obligations under this agreement; and (b) should the United 
States choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not 
filed as a result of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute 
of limitations will be tolled between the date of defendant’s signing 
of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and 
(ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute 
of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy 
trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent 
that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant’s signing this 
agreement. 
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RESULT OF VACATUR, REVERSAL OR SET-ASIDE 
 
Defendant agrees that if the count of conviction is 
vacated, reversed, or set aside, both the United States and defendant 
will be released from all their obligations under this agreement. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT 
 
This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of 
all required certifications by defendant, defendant’s counsel, and an 
Assistant United States Attorney. 
BREACH OF AGREEMENT 
 
Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the 
effective date of this, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of 
defendant’s obligations under this agreement (“a breach”), the United 
States may declare this agreement breached.  All of defendant’s 
obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is 
sufficient for the United States to declare a breach, and defendant 
shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express 
agreement of the United States in writing.  If the United States 
declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach 
to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered a 
guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to 
withdraw the guilty plea, and (b) the United States will be relieved 
of all its obligations under this agreement. 
 
Following the Court’s finding of a knowing breach of this 
agreement by defendant, should the United States choose to pursue any 
charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this 
agreement, then: 
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a. 
Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of 
limitations is tolled between the date of defendant’s signing of this 
agreement and the filing commencing any such action. 
b. 
Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on 
the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any 
speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the 
extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant’s 
signing this agreement. 
c. 
Defendant agrees that: (i) any statements made by 
defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing 
occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the agreed to factual basis 
statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from such 
statements, shall be admissible against defendant in any such action 
against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any claim under 
the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any 
evidence derived from the statements should be suppressed or are 
inadmissible. 
COURT AND UNITED STATES PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES 
OFFICE NOT PARTIES 
 
Defendant understands that the Court and the United States 
Probation and Pretrial Services Office are not parties to this 
agreement and need not accept any of the United States’ sentencing 
recommendations or the parties’ agreements to facts or sentencing 
factors. 
 
Defendant understands that both defendant and the United 
States are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant 
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information to the United States Probation and Pretrial Services 
Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements 
relating to the Court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and 
determination of sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral 
review that the Court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and the 
sentence it chooses to impose are not error, although each party 
agrees to maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 13 are 
consistent with the facts of this case.  While this paragraph permits 
both the United States and defendant to submit full and complete 
factual information to the United States Probation and Pretrial 
Services Office and the Court, even if that factual information may 
be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, 
this paragraph does not affect defendant’s and the United States’ 
obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement. 
 
Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any 
sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions 
different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the 
maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, 
withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, and defendant will remain bound to 
fulfill all defendant’s obligations under this agreement.  Defendant 
understands that no one –- not the prosecutor, defendant’s attorney, 
or the Court –- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding 
the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within 
the statutory maximum. 
NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, 
there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the 
United States and defendant or defendant’s attorney, and that no 
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