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Home Court filings USA v. Buck Response in Opposition by USA as to Dara Buck — USA v. Buck (Dkt. 64, S.D. Ga.)

Court filing

Response in Opposition by USA as to Dara Buck — USA v. Buck (Dkt. 64, S.D. Ga.)

Filed December 20, 2023 in USA v. Buck; one of 69 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
Filed2023-12-20

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia · No. 4:22-cr-00065-RSB-CLR · Doc. 64 · 2023-12-20 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
SAVANNAH DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DARA BUCK 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
 
  CR422-065 
   
   
 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO  
DEFENDANT’S FOURTH 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) MOTION  
 
Defendant Dara Buck spearheaded a prolific fraud scheme in which she and 
others illegally raked in millions of dollars from Covid-19 relief programs and 
federal student loan forgiveness. She was sentenced to serve forty-two months in 
prison for her extensive fraud. Her first act after being sentenced was to ask the 
Court for an extension of her self-report date. She asserted inter alia that she was 
“the sole parent in charge of raising her children and would like additional time to 
make sure her estate is in order.” (Doc. 46 at 1.) The government did not oppose this 
request, and the Court granted it. (Doc. 47.) To date, she has served only around 
eight months. Now before the Court is her fourth motion for early release.  (Doc. 62.) 
This motion should be denied for many of the same reasons as her prior three 
motions. Specifically, Buck has failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons 
that would justify shortening her sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and the 
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counsel against any sentence reduction 
in this case.    
In Buck’s first motion, which she filed after she had been in prison for about 
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three weeks, she claimed to be suffering from a raft of medical ailments—“severe 
headaches, hearing loss, tears in both shoulders, 5 abdominal hernias, irritable 
bowel syndrome with diarrhea, chronic kidney disease stage 3, liver enzymes, 
osteopenia in [her] lower spine, ovarian failure, and arthritis in both shoulders, 
knees, back, and both feet”—and, separately, she expressed concerns about her 
aunt’s ability to care for her three minor children. (Doc. 48 at 1.) In her second and 
third such motions, she abandoned her efforts to be released based on her own 
purported medical issues and instead focused exclusively on her childcare concerns. 
(Doc. 53; 55.) The Court properly denied all three of these motions on the grounds 
that Buck had failed to show administrative exhaustion, that she had failed to show 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, and that even if she had satisfied 
these prerequisites the sentencing factors were strongly against her. (Docs. 52; 61.1) 
Although Buck has now cured her noncompliance with the statute’s threshold 
requirement that she wait thirty days after asking the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to 
move on her behalf before moving herself, nothing has changed on the latter two 
fronts, so the Court should deny this most recent attempt on those grounds. 
For Buck to bring this motion properly, first she must either (1) have actually 
exhausted the administrative process for asking BOP to bring the motion on her 
behalf, or (2) have waited thirty days after asking BOP to do so via a request to her 
warden. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). Based on 
 
1 This latter order addressed both the second and third motions.  
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information provided by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the government understands 
that Buck presented the warden with her most recent request for BOP to seek a 
reduction in sentence on August 29, that the warden routed Buck’s request to BOP’s 
general counsel in late November, and that BOP’s administrative review of the 
request remains ongoing. Therefore, because more than thirty days have lapsed 
since the warden’s receipt of Buck’s request, the Court is not obligated this time 
around to dismiss the motion on failure-to-exhaust grounds. 
However, Buck still has not demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling 
reason for early release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and application note 1 because she 
still has not shown that her children’s caregivers are incapacitated. See United 
States v. Granda, 852 F. App’x 442, 446 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[I]t was Granda’s burden 
to show that his circumstances warranted a reduction.”). In the first iteration of this 
motion, Buck described her aunt as “currently ill[,] a recent cancer survivor still 
battling with recovery.” (Doc. 48 at 1.) In the order denying that motion, the Court 
concluded that “it appears from Buck’s statements that despite her aunt’s condition, 
she is currently not incapacitated . . . .” (Doc. 52 at 6.) In the second and third 
iterations of this motion, Buck claimed that her aunt had abandoned the children 
and that Buck’s twenty-one-year-old daughter, who had stepped into the ostensible 
breach, was not a suitable caregiver. (Doc. 53; 55.) In the order denying those 
motions, the Court explained that “the scant evidence Buck provides does not 
sufficiently prove her claims of the caregivers’ incapacitation.” (Doc. 61 at 1.)  
In response to the Court’s two previous denials, Buck now strains to conform 
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the facts to the legal requirement that she show genuine incapacitation. She now 
claims more definitively that “[her] aunt, Maxine Buck, cannot care for [her] 
children due to her health conditions.” (Doc. 62 at 1.) As support, Buck attaches a 
letter from her aunt, who refers to herself as Maxine Buck-Gailliard, describing the 
daily effects of her various medical issues. However, it is perhaps revealing that 
Buck-Gailliard leads with a series of decidedly non-medical (but admittedly 
sympathetic) complaints: 
1. Her children are used to their mother’s way of everything and not 
mine. I am “old school” and do not believe that a child should tell me 
what they will and will not do.  
2. I am not used to children going behind my back to the older sister to 
get permission after I’ve told them no.  
3. I am not used to kids sneaking out to the house, being “sassy no 
manners” and stomping away when I am speaking. 
 
(Doc. 62 at 4.) 
Buck also attaches a short letter from Buck-Gailliard’s doctor that reads in its 
entirety as follows: “Patient Maxine Buck-Gailliard has progressive chronic diseases 
that make assisting others, lifting, stairs painful and difficult. These put the patient 
at risk of further injury and worsened outcomes. She is not able to provide care for 
the children.” (Doc. 62 at 3.) First, the rather conclusory final sentence of this letter 
does not seem necessarily to follow from the more factual statements that precede 
it. Second, it is an opinion on an ultimate issue that is the province of the Court, 
and the Court is not obligated to assign it controlling weight. See United States v. 
Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that while U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 
establishes a finite list of what can count as extraordinary and compelling 
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circumstances under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), whether the evidence actually does 
establish any of the things on that list is a question within the district court’s 
discretion).  
 
The United States is not insensitive to Buck-Gailliard’s medical conditions 
and non-medical childcare travails. However, Buck’s evidence does nothing to 
disturb the Court’s conclusion that Buck-Gailliard is not incapacitated; instead, it 
actually provides further support for that conclusion. Taken together, these letters 
establish that it is challenging but not impossible for Buck-Gailliard to supervise 
the children, none of whom are so young as to require much if anything in the way 
of carrying, holding, rocking, changing, and the like.  
 
In the end, Buck “has shown nothing more than that which innumerable 
defendants could no doubt establish: namely that the imposition of prison sentences 
normally disrupts familial relationships.” United States v. Allen, 87 F.3d 1224, 1226 
(11th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and punctuation omitted). Several other district 
courts in our circuit have, in denying motions very similar to Buck’s, recognized 
that the regrettable difficulties imposed on defendants’ family members are simply 
one of the many inevitable downstream consequences of crime, not a justification for 
release. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 3:19-CR-33-BJD-JBT, 2021 WL 
1238410, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2021) (“[U]nfortunately, it is not uncommon that a 
defendant's children or dependents must be placed in the care of other people as a 
consequence of the defendant's conviction. As such, this is not an extraordinary 
circumstance.”); United States v. Peake, No. 6:13-CR-438-KOB-JHE, 2020 WL 
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7246617, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2020) (“Those arrangements [that the defendant’s 
family members care for his children] may be difficult and take sacrificial actions, 
but they are possible. The court is sympathetic towards Mr. Peake's mother's 
situation, but her situation does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling 
reason to reduce Mr. Peake's sentence.”); United States v. Lemy, No. 20-CR-80062-
RAR, 2023 WL 246895, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2023) (“Although [the defendant’s 
mother] ‘suffers severely from diabetes, hypertension, impaired vision, and other 
minor health problems,’ Mot. at 3, the Court is not at liberty to deviate from the text 
of the policy statement and rewrite the Application Note to accommodate 
Defendant.”). 
Additionally, Buck-Gailliard is not going it alone; rather, Buck’s motion and 
Buck-Gailliard’s letter reveal that Buck-Gailliard has assistance from Buck’s adult 
daughter. To sweep away this inconvenient fact, Buck speculates, wholly without 
explanation, that her adult daughter “will likely be taken into state custody” at a 
December 8 court hearing pertaining to a pending criminal charge. (Doc. 62 at 1.) 
However, Buck’s daughter is at liberty on a personal recognizance bond, (Doc. 62 at 
10), for a felony offense that is alleged to have occurred on the relatively recent date 
of May 12, 2023, (Doc. 62 at 9), and that therefore seems unlikely to reach trial in 
the immediate future. Further, December 8 has come and gone, and Buck’s 
daughter does not appear to be in jail or prison.2 
 
2 See Dorchester County Inmate Lookup, available at 
https://www.dorchestercountysc.gov/government/public-safety/sheriff-
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One additional point on the caregiver issue: Buck’s incapacitation argument 
rests on the threshold notion that her aunt and adult daughter are the only possible 
caregivers. Buck’s thinking here seems to be that if she establishes that they are 
incapacitated, then she establishes extraordinary and compelling circumstances. 
However, the government’s position is that she still has never proven—with 
evidence—that none of the several other adult family members mentioned in the 
presentence report can care for her children. It is her burden to do so. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lambert, No. CR 116-079, 2020 WL 5949627, at 2* (S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 
2020). 
Finally, the United States need not restate the remarkable degree to which 
application of the § 3553(a) factors counsels against a sentence reduction in this 
case. For very good reasons, the Court has already twice indicated that even if Buck 
had established extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the Court would deny 
a sentence reduction on this independent basis anyway. Nothing about Buck’s 
motion or the passage of two months since the Court’s last order effects any change 
here.  
For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the 
Court deny Buck’s motion. Like the Court, the United States “hopes that Buck will 
spend her time in prison contemplating the wrongfulness of her conduct and 
 
soffice/detention-center (last visited Dec. 19, 2023); South Carolina Department of 
Corrections Inmate Search, available at https://www.doc.sc.gov/inmate-search-
disclaimer (last visited Dec. 19, 2023).   
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seeking rehabilitation rather than attempting to shirk the responsibility of a 
sentence that she unquestionably deserves.” (Doc. 52.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JILL E. STEINBERG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Timothy P. Dean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy P. Dean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia Bar No. 506124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tim.dean@usdoj.gov 
 
P.O. Box 8970 
Savannah, Georgia 31412 
(912) 652-4422
Case 4:22-cr-00065-RSB-CLR     Document 64     Filed 12/20/23     Page 8 of 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
On December 20, 2023, I filed this response through this Court’s ECF system 
and served all parties through the Notice of Electronic Filing.  In addition, my office 
mailed a paper copy to: 
Dara Buck, Reg. No. 10895-510 
 
FPC Alderson 
 
Federal Prison Camp 
 
Inmate Legal Mail 
 
Glen Ray Rd. Box A 
 
Alderson, West Virginia  24910 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JILL E. STEINBERG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Timothy P. Dean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy P. Dean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia Bar No. 506124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tim.dean@usdoj.gov 
 
Post Office Box 8970 
Savannah, Georgia 31412 
(912) 652-4422 
 
Case 4:22-cr-00065-RSB-CLR     Document 64     Filed 12/20/23     Page 9 of 9

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