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Home Court filings USA v. Crowther United States v. Casey David Crowther — M.D. Fla., No. 2:20-cr-114-JES-MRM Response to Motion re 140 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or Alternatively — USA v. Crowther (Dkt. 146, M.D. Fla. No. 2:20-mj-01094, docketed in No. 2:20-cr-00114)

Court filing

Response to Motion re 140 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or Alternatively — USA v. Crowther (Dkt. 146, M.D. Fla. No. 2:20-mj-01094, docketed in No. 2:20-cr-00114)

Filed April 23, 2021 in USA v. Crowther; one of 318 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Filed2021-04-23

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida · No. 2:20-cr-00114 · Doc. 146 · 2021-04-23 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
FORT MYERS DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
CASE NO. 2:20-cr-114-JES-MRM 
 
CASEY DAVID CROWTHER 
 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION  
TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF  
ACQUITTAL AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
 
 
The United States responds in opposition to the defendant’s renewed 
motion for judgment of acquittal and alternative motion for new trial. In 
viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
government, there was more than sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict of guilty on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.  Further, the 
defendant’s claim that the government’s case was marked with inconsistencies 
and uncertainties is without merit and does not warrant a new trial. The 
evidence at trial preponderated heavily in favor of a verdict of guilt, not 
against it.  Accordingly, the defendant’s motion and alternative motion should 
be denied.  
LEGAL STANDARDS 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) applies when a motion for 
judgment of acquittal is made after a jury verdict. “The sole ground for a post-
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trial motion under Rule 29(c) is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction.” United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 962 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting United States v. Fozo, 904 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir. 1990)).  In 
considering such a motion, the Court must view the evidence at trial in the 
light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and 
credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Williams, 390 
F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2004).  
Upon reviewing the evidence, the Court is to determine whether a 
reasonable jury could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983). 
A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. Id.  
Thus, the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt. Id. In the 
end, the Court should not overturn a jury’s verdict “if any reasonable 
construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 
1284 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1308 
(11th Cir. 2015)). Under this well-settled legal standard, the jury’s verdict in 
this case should not be disturbed.  
 
A motion for new trial is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal 
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Procedure 33, which provides the Court discretion to “vacate any judgment 
and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. 
Motions for new trial based on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are 
not favored. United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 1985). 
Thus, “[c]ourts are to grant them sparingly and with caution, doing so only in 
those really ‘exceptional cases.’” Id. Specifically, the Court must find that the 
evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. Id. at 1312-13. Courts, therefore, 
have only granted such motions in rare instances where the government’s 
witnesses have been impeached and the government’s case had been marked 
by uncertainties and discrepancies. Butcher v. United States, 368 F.3d 1290, 
1297 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004); Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1313.  
DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS 
 
In support of his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, the 
defendant argues a number of reasons why the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilty.1 The defendant argues he  
complied with the CARES Act, and that the governing law was ambiguous 
because the CARES Act and Interim Final Rules conflicted with one another. 
 
1 Most of these arguments were previously made in the defendant’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal that was filed at the close of all the evidence and denied 
by this Court. Docs. 123, 125. 
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Doc. 140 at 14-21. The defendant further argues that, given this purported 
ambiguity, the government cannot prove the falsity of the defendant’s 
representations. Id. at 21-24. The defendant also argues his acts were only 
deceitful and did not rise to the level of fraud which he claims is supported by 
the Takhalov case, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements 
of counts three and four. Id. at 24-27.  Finally, the defendant argues the 
evidence did not establish the defendant knowingly engaged in criminal 
conduct. Id.at 27-28. 
 
The defendant also offers two arguments in support of his alternative 
motion for new trial. The defendant argues that uncertainties and 
discrepancies mark the record, mandating a new trial to serve the ends of 
justice. Id. at 28-29. The defendant also argues that the admission of evidence 
concerning the 39 fake employees confused the jury, was unduly prejudicial, 
and warrants a new trial. Id. at 29.  
ARGUMENT 
 
During the trial, the United States proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed bank fraud, false statement to a financial 
institution, and illegal monetary transactions. The defendant, on the other 
hand, suggests the government’s evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction. See Doc. 140. Specifically, the defendant claims that since he did 
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not violate the CARES Act, he cannot be found guilty of the crimes he was 
charged with. Id. at 14-16. In support of this claim, the defendant, in his 
motion, argues “the only law Crowther was required to follow was the 
CARES Act” Id. at 16. While the CARES Act and Paycheck Protection 
Program (PPP) are relevant to the case, the laws the defendant was obligated 
to follow were those contained within 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1014, and 1957. The 
defendant further claims he did not commit bank fraud because he never 
sought forgiveness of his PPP loan. See id. However, the defendant was 
charged with making false and fraudulent representations to a lender to secure 
a forgivable loan with a 1% interest rate. The defendant was not charged with 
making false and fraudulent representations to secure loan forgiveness.  
A. The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to prove the 
defendant committed Bank Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344.  
 
The evidence the government presented at trial was more than sufficient 
to prove the defendant committed bank fraud, by both alternative methods, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. These two alternative methods required the 
government to prove the “defendant carried out or attempted to carry out a 
scheme (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain money owned by 
or under the custody or control of a financial institution by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Doc. 126 at 10-11.  
 
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1. The defendant’s scheme to defraud.   
“A ‘scheme to defraud’ includes any plan or course of action intended 
to deceive or cheat someone out of money or property by using false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises relating to a material fact.” 
Id. at 12.   In general, the defendant’s scheme was to use his company, Target 
Roofing, to secure a PPP loan from Sanibel Captiva Bank by false and 
fraudulent pretenses and to use the PPP loan funds for his own personal 
enrichment.  These misrepresentations caused Sanibel Captiva Bank to 
approve Target Roofing’s initial PPP loan application for approximately $1.5 
million and their revised PPP loan application for approximately $2.1 million. 
The PPP loan funds were deposited in a segregated bank account, that only 
the defendant had control over, and a large portion of the funds were used for 
the defendant’s own personal enrichment. As will be discussed further below, 
the defendant’s scheme to defraud not only encompassed false and fraudulent 
representations made to secure a $2.1 million forgivable loan, but it also 
included disguising the defendant’s misuse of PPP funds, and the hiring of 39 
fake employees to further the scheme.  
2. The false and fraudulent representations to Sanibel Captiva Bank. 
 
The evidence at trial proved the defendant made false and fraudulent 
representations in his initial and revised PPP loan applications in furtherance 
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of the scheme to defraud.  Specifically, the defendant made false and 
fraudulent representations that Target Roofing would use PPP loan funds “to 
retain workers and maintain payroll or make mortgage payments, lease 
payments, and utility payments.” Gov’t Ex. 6, 8. Other false and fraudulent 
representations made by the defendant included that “all SBA loan proceeds 
would be used for business related purposes…”, and that “current economic 
uncertainty makes the loan request necessary to support the ongoing 
operations of the [a]pplicant.” Id.  The defendant made further false and 
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning his intended use of PPP loan funds 
in loan agreement documents executed with Sanibel Captiva Bank. Gov’t Ex. 
10, 12-14.  
The defendant’s representations were false or fraudulent because, as the 
government established at trial, they were about a material fact the defendant 
knew was untrue or made with reckless indifference as to the truth and with 
the intent to defraud. Doc. 126 at 13. To establish the defendant made false 
and fraudulent representations to Sanibel Captiva Bank, the government 
presented evidence of the defendant’s conduct leading up to his application for 
a PPP loan, including but no limited to, his shopping for a boat that cost 
approximately $700,000 and the timing of the transaction, his communication 
with his former business partner S.A. about paying down the principal on the 
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note related to the sale of the former partner’s share of Target Roofing, and the 
defendant’ subsequent use of the PPP loan proceeds inconsistent with his 
representations to Sanibel Captiva Bank. The defendant claims the record 
clearly showed he utilized the PPP loan proceeds for payroll expenses. Doc. 
140 at 10. However, the evidence the government presented at trial, which 
included bank statements and documents, wire transfer records, summary 
exhibits, and testimony from Diane Knott proved a bulk of the PPP loan funds 
were never utilized for payroll expenses.   
The April 2020 bank statement for Sanibel Captiva account ending in 
6781 showed that, on April 14, 2020, $2,098,700 in PPP loan funds were 
deposited in the account. Gov’t Ex. 107. Before the date of the deposit, the 
account’s balance was $0.  Id. The first transaction following the deposit was a 
$126,000 transfer of funds to Target Roofing’s operating account (account 
ending in 1791) titled “loan from casey” on April 16, 2020. Id.; Gov’t Ex. 73.  
These funds were then used to pay off the balance of a JP Morgan Chase 
credit card on April 17, 2020. Gov’t Ex. 73 at 3, 161; Knott, Tr. at 12-17. The 
PPP loan application and loan documents executed by the defendant did not 
contain a provision that permitted the use of funds on existing credit card debt, 
nor did the defendant represent his intent of doing so to the bank. See. Gov’t 
Ex. 6, 8-10, 12-15.  
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The second transaction, dated April 21, 2020, was a $100,000 wire 
transfer to the defendant’s former business partner. Gov’t Ex. 31, 32, 107.  The 
third transaction was a transfer of $3,300 to his Sanibel Captiva personal 
checking account on April 22, 2020. Gov’t Ex. 94, 107. The fourth transaction 
was a $689,417 wire to Sara Bay Marina on April 24, 2020. Gov’t Ex. 33, 34, 
107. In total, $918,737 in PPP funds were used between the dates of April 14-
24, 2020. Gov’t Ex. 107. None of the $918,737 was used for payroll, rent, 
utilities, or mortgage interest. $1,179,963 of the PPP loan funds remained and, 
on May 7, 2020, the funds were transferred to Target Roofing’s operating 
account. Gov’t Ex. 74 at 2, 108; Knott, Tr. at 19-20. 
 
Following the transfer of the remaining PPP loan funds into Target 
Roofing’s operating account, $800,000 was used to pay down a $1.5 million 
line of credit on the same date. Gov’t Ex. 74 at 2; Knott, Tr. at 20.  Thereafter, 
approximately $379,000 in PPP loan funds remained in Target Roofing’s 
operating account. Gov’t Ex. 74. The defendant’s clear misuse of PPP funds is 
evidence that the defendant falsely represented his intended use of the funds. 
Coupled with his prior activity related to shopping for a boat and discussions 
with his former business partner, S.A., there was clear intent to defraud and 
not just mere deception as claimed by the defendant.  Further, approximately 
$918,737 in PPP funds were misused within 10 days of the date the funds were 
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deposited into Target Roofing’s PPP account.  
 
The defendant asserts his representations were not false or fraudulent 
and cites to loan officer Kyle DeCicco’s testimony on cross examination. Doc. 
140 at 12, 26. However, the defendant makes no mention of DeCicco’s 
testimony on redirect examination. On redirect examination, DeCicco 
confirmed the defendant used PPP funds to buy a boat. DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 45.  
DeCicco also confirmed the defendant made misrepresentations in his PPP 
loan application and in loan documents executed with the bank. Id. at 47, 51-
52. Most importantly, DeCicco’s testimony was clear that there were no 
changes or amendments to the PPP loan program that would have allowed for 
the purchase of a boat with the funds. Id. at 52.  
3. The defendant’s false and fraudulent representations to Sanibel 
Captiva Bank were material.  
 
The government presented substantial evidence at trial that established 
the defendant’s false and fraudulent representations were material to Sanibel 
Captiva Bank and the SBA. As stated in the Court’s jury instructions at trial, 
“[a] fact is ‘material’ if it has the capacity or natural tendency to influence a 
person’s decision.” Doc. 126 at 13. Moreover, “it does not matter whether the 
decision-maker actually relied on the statement or knew or should have 
known that the statement was false.” Id.   
The false and fraudulent representations on the defendant’s PPP loan 
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applications and loan agreement documents influenced Sanibel Captiva’s 
decision to approve his loan request. To receive a PPP loan, the defendant was 
required to certify that he would use the funds on payroll, mortgage interest, 
rent, or utilities. Miller, Tr. at 9-10; DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 7. The testimony at 
trial was that Sanibel Captiva Bank would not have approved the defendant’s 
PPP loan request had they known he would use a portion of the funds to 
purchase a boat. DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 27-28, 46-47. Furthermore, DeCicco 
confirmed that Sanibel Captiva relied on the defendant’s certifications 
concerning his intended use of PPP loan proceeds in approving the loan. Id. at 
52. The evidence at trial established the defendant’s misrepresentations would 
have the natural tendency to influence a PPP lender’s actions.  
4. The defendant’s intent to defraud Sanibel Captiva Bank.  
 
“To act with ‘intent to defraud’ means to act knowingly and with the 
specific intent to use false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises 
to cause loss or injury.” Doc. 126 at 12.  To prove the defendant intended to 
defraud Sanibel Captiva Bank, the government introduced a considerable 
amount of circumstantial evidence at trial. A boat sales associate from Naples 
Bay Marina testified that in late March of 2020, the defendant inquired about 
the purchase of a 40-foot Invincible catamaran boat. Notes of these 
interactions were entered into evidence and revealed that, no later than March 
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30, 2020, the defendant began to inquire about the purchase of the boat.  
Gov’t Ex. 1. After contacting the marina, the defendant sent a text message to 
Senior Loan Officer Kyle DeCicco about the PPP program on April 1, 2020. 
Gov’t Ex.  19.  
The evidence at trial further showed that the PPP loan application 
process and boat negotiation process paralleled one another. After the 
defendant received an email on April 8, 2020, that Target Roofing’s initial 
PPP loan application was approved for $1.5 million, he finalized the purchase 
of the boat on April 10, 2020. Gov’t Ex. 2, 15.  On April 13, 2020, three days 
after finalizing the price of the boat, the defendant sent a text message to 
DeCicco indicating Target Roofing’s initial PPP loan application was wrong 
and that he would be submitting a revised PPP loan application. Gov’t Ex. 20. 
On April 14, 2020, the revised PPP loan application for $2.1 million dollars 
was approved and funded. The timing of the boat’s purchase and the PPP 
application process proves the defendant intended to use the PPP funds for a 
prohibited purpose and not on payroll.  
The PPP loan funds were deposited into stand-alone bank account 
previously opened by the defendant on April 10, 2020. According to the trial 
testimony of  Branch Manager Kristin DiIorio, the defendant directed DiIorio 
to deposit the PPP loan funds in a separate account “to keep it separate from 
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the [Target Roofing] employees that had access to either on-line or other 
accounts.” DiIorio, Tr. at 17-18.  The defendant has suggested that the 
government imposed a stricter condition on the use of PPP funds, which 
included requiring PPP funds to be deposited in a segregated bank account. 
Doc. 140 at 10-11. To the contrary, the government offered evidence of the 
segregated account to show the defendant’s desire to hide his use of PPP funds 
from others in Target Roofing as a means of proving the scheme and his intent 
to defraud. Further, the defendant’s choice to deposit the funds in a segregated 
account made it easier for the government to prove the defendant 
misrepresented his intended use of PPP funds. 
Once the $2.1 million in PPP loan funds were deposited into the 
defendant’s segregated PPP account on April 14, 2020, the defendant made 
two wire transfers which were the focus of the government’s case. Both wire 
transfers occurred within ten days of the defendant’s receipt of the PPP funds. 
Gov’t Ex. 107. The first, was a $100,000 wire to the defendant’s former 
business partner on April 21, 2020. The defendant stated the purpose of this 
wire was a “payroll transfer.” Gov’t Ex. 31, 32; DiIorio Tr. at 21-26. The 
second, was a $689,417 wire to Sara Bay Marina on April 24, 2020. The 
defendant stated the purpose of this wire was an “equipment purchase.” Gov’t 
Ex. 33, 34. The true purpose of the $100,000 wire was a principal payment on 
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a promissory note, and the $689,417 wire was for a 40-foot catamaran boat.  
Evidence of the purpose of the two wires was presented to establish the 
defendant’s intent to defraud. The defendant provided purported wire 
descriptions that were business related or payroll related as a means of 
disguising his misuse of PPP funds. The purpose of the $100,000 wire was 
most illuminating. The defendant stated the wire was for a “payroll transfer,” 
and the amount of the wire ($100,000) was the cap on individual employee 
salary that would be eligible for forgiveness. Gov’t Ex. 16 at 12. This evidence 
showed the defendant intended to disguise his improper use of PPP funds to 
avoid detection which circumstantially established his intent to defraud. 
Further, the government introduced evidence of a $150,000 wire that was later 
sent to the same former business partner on July 17, 2020 from Target 
Roofing’s operating account. Gov’t Ex. 30. The purpose on the wire request 
was “note payment” and not payroll transfer. Id. The defendant argues the 
purpose of a wire transfer is akin to the memo line on a check and is not 
significant to the bank. Doc. 140 at 25.  However, the claimed purpose of the 
wires was significant enough to the defendant that he falsely represented each 
wire’s purpose.  
The “payroll transfer” and “equipment purchase” wires were not the 
only wire transfers the defendant disguised. On June 1, 2020, the defendant 
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disguised a $55,000 wire for the purchase of a horse as a “roofing materials” 
purchase. Gov’t Ex. 35-38. The evidence at trial established the defendant had 
eight weeks from the date of the PPP loan’s funding (April 14, 2020) to use the 
loan funds. Miller, Tr. at 12. The $55,000 horse wire occurred within this 
eight-week period. Additionally, two weeks before the horse wire, DeCicco 
confronted the defendant about his use of PPP funds to purchase a boat. Gov’t 
Ex. 22; DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 33-38. The government introduced evidence that 
demonstrated the lengths to which the defendant went to disguise the horse 
wire. This included an email the defendant sent to Kristin DiIorio requesting 
confirmation that the wire transfer went through “so the guys can pick 
material up now.” Gov’t Ex. 38 at 2. The horse wire was further evidence of 
the defendant’s intent to defraud.  
The government also introduced evidence of the defendant’s hiring of 
39 fake employees during May 2020 as evidence of his intent to defraud. As 
previously discussed, the defendant originally had eight weeks to use the PPP 
funds on payroll, mortgage interest, rent and utilities. Miller, Tr. at 12. If at 
least 75% of the funds were used on payroll after the eight-week period, the 
loan would be forgiven. Id. at 13. In applying for forgiveness, the defendant 
would only be required to supply payroll record and invoices to Sanibel 
Captiva Bank, and a PPP lender was not required to conduct an audit of the 
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borrower’s bank accounts. Id. at 15-16. All that was required was that the 
lender “make a good-faith effort in reviewing the borrower’s forgiveness 
documentation.” Id.  
Additionally, the defendant’s hiring of the 39 fake employees was 
prompted after DeCicco sent the defendant an email notifying him that the 
SBA would further review PPP loans of over $2 million for compliance with 
heightened scrutiny of the loan because of its size. Gov’t Ex. 17, 64, 146. The 
defendant first hired a batch of 20 fake employees on May 15, 2020, two days 
after DeCicco’s $2 million dollar loan email. Id. at 64. The second batch of 19 
fake employees were hired approximately a week later. Id.  The 39 fake 
employees, as well as the defendant’s five family members that were hired but 
were never seen working at Target Roofing, were all fired effective June 5, 
2020. Portinari, Tr. v.1 at 8-17, 29; Gov’t Ex. 64.  This was the same date the 
Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act was signed into law, which gave 
PPP borrowers the option of 24 weeks to use PPP funds instead of 8 weeks. 
Miller, Tr. at 14. The act also changed the required ratio of funds that needed 
to be used on payroll from 75% to 60%. Id.      
The timing of the firings was not a coincidence. The evidence of the 
mass hiring and firing of 39 fake employees proved the defendant intended to 
bolster his payroll number to defraud Sanibel Captiva Bank into granting his 
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future forgiveness request. The hiring of 39 fake employees also proves the 
defendant never intended to use PPP loan funds on payroll.  
The government presented substantial evidence which proved the 
employees were fake.  More than 90 paychecks were issued to the 39 fake 
employees over a three-week period. Gov’t Ex. 64, 65. Only one of the 
paychecks was cashed or deposited. Id. That paycheck, issued to Augustin 
Castillo on May 29, 2020, was deposited into the defendant’s personal 
checking account on August 20, 2020. Id. at 66, 138 at 67.  Moreover, Target 
Roofing’s Human Resource Director never observed any of the 39 employees 
working at Target Roofing and received all their hiring paperwork from the 
defendant. Portinari, Tr. v.1 at 19-29.  
The defendant argues that his intent never rose to an intent to defraud. 
Doc. 140 at 24-25. The case the defendant cites in support of this argument 
states that in order to “intend to defraud,” one must “intend to harm the 
victim.” United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2016). 
Intent to harm is then defined as “to obtain, by deceptive means, something to 
which the defendant is not entitled.” Id. at 1313 (emphasis added). The defendant 
did exactly that – used false and fraudulent representations to trick Sanibel 
Captiva Bank into disbursing $2.1 million in PPP loan funds, a portion of 
which he used to purchase a brand new catamaran boat and pay back 
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$100,000 in principal on a debt with a former business partner. The defendant 
would not have otherwise been able to obtain a 1% interest rate loan for the 
purchase of a $689,417 boat or to repay old debt. See DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 57.    
The fact that Sanibel Captiva Bank does not consider itself a victim2, or 
has yet to suffer a financial loss, does not negate the defendant’s intent to 
defraud. “While an honest, good-faith belief in the truth of the 
misrepresentation may negate intent to defraud, a good-faith belief that the 
victim will be repaid and will sustain no loss is no defense at all.” United States 
v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). The government presented 
sufficient evidence which showed the defendant misrepresented his intended 
use of PPP loan proceeds. Further, Sanibel Captiva Bank would have not 
approved the defendant’s PPP loan request had he indicated the funds would 
be used to purchase a boat. DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 27-28, 46-47.  Further, the 
crime of bank fraud does not require the government to prove the bank 
suffered a financial loss. See Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462 (2016). The 
government presented sufficient evidence that proved the defendant’s intent to 
defraud. 
 
 
2 At trial, the bank’s loan officer testified he did not know what the elements of 
fraud were and admitted the bank did not know if it was a victim in a criminal 
case. DeCicco, Tr. v.2 at 48-50, 56-57 
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B. The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to prove the 
defendant made a false statement to a financial institution.  
 
The evidence at trial proved the defendant knowingly made false 
statements about his intended use of PPP funds with the intent to influence 
Sanibel Captiva Bank’s approval of the defendant’s $2.1 million PPP loan 
application. As previously discussed, the government proved the defendant’s 
representations that he would use PPP loan funds on payroll, mortgage 
interest, rent, and utilities were false.  Moreover, the defendant knew the 
statements were false. The defendant was negotiating the purchase of a boat 
while he was also engaged in the PPP loan application process. Further, the 
purchase of the boat was finalized two days after the defendant was notified 
that his initial PPP loan application had been approved. Gov’t Ex. 2, 15. 
 The defendant had the PPP funds deposited in a segregated account so 
no one from Target Roofing could see his use of the funds. DiIorio, Tr. at 17-
18. The defendant also disguised his use of PPP funds by misrepresenting the 
purpose of wire transfers as an “equipment purchase,” “payroll transfer,” and 
“materials purchase.” The defendant’s intent was to influence the actions of 
Sanibel Captiva Bank. The defendant knew, that in order to be approved for a 
PPP loan, he had to falsely represent to the bank that the funds would be used 
for payroll, mortgage interest, rent, and utilities.  
 
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C. The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to prove the 
defendant committed both counts charging illegal monetary 
transactions.  
 
The evidence at trial proved the defendant knowingly engaged in two 
monetary transactions. The first was a $100,000 wire transfer to the 
defendant’s former business partner on April 21, 2020. The second was a 
$689,417 wire to Sara Bay Marina on April 24, 2020. Both transactions 
involved the transfer of funds through a financial institution and the parties 
stipulated that the wire transfers affected interstate commerce. Gov’t Ex. 170, 
171. Both transactions were for more than $10,000.  
The defendant knew both transactions involved funds that were the 
proceeds of bank fraud. The PPP funds that the defendant obtained by making 
false and fraudulent representations were deposited into a segregated account 
that the defendant instructed the bank to open. Gov’t Ex. 26, 104, 107. The 
defendant requested the wire transfers himself, and both wires came directly 
from the segregated PPP account. The segregated PPP account had its own 
unique codeword that the defendant was required to provide when wiring 
funds from the PPP account. DiIorio, Tr. at 22. Further, the defendant 
misrepresented the purpose of each wire as “payroll transfer” and “equipment 
purchase.”  Gov’t Ex. 31-34.  
 
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D. The admission of the government’s summary financial exhibits 
was not erroneous and does not warrant a new trial.  
 
The defendant argues that the admission of the government’s summary 
exhibits warrants a new trial because of admitted uncertainties and 
discrepancies. Doc. 140 at 28. In support of this argument, the defendant cites 
to a portion of Diane Knott’s testimony at trial. Id. The defendant claims 
Knott testified that her summary exhibits were not accurate, however that is 
not supported by the record and is a mischaracterization of Knott’s testimony. 
Id.  
Knott’s testimony during cross-examination was that her summary 
exhibit of the defendant’s Bank of America account activity began on March 
13, 2020. Knott, Cross-Ex. Tr. at 17; Gov’t Ex. 156. Knott did not testify that 
the summary exhibit contained any inaccurate or false entries. While the 
summary exhibit did not contain a summary of account activity during the 
months of January and February of 2020, the Bank of America bank 
statements for these months were entered into evidence by the government. 
See Gov’t Ex. 138. Further, the defendant’s argument that uncertainties and 
discrepancies mark the record is without merit. The government presented all 
evidence it deemed was relevant to prove the defendant committed the 
offenses he was charged with. Therefore, the defendant’s request for a new 
trial based on the admission of the government’s summary exhibits should be 
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denied. 
E. Evidence of the 39 fake employees was intrinsic evidence and 
established the defendant’s scheme and intent to defraud.   
 
The defendant claims that the Court’s admission of evidence 
concerning the 39 fake employees was erroneous, confused the jury, was 
unduly prejudicial, and warrants a new trial. The government disagrees. As 
previously detailed in the scheme and intent to defraud sections of this 
response, evidence of the 39 fake employees was directly relevant to proving 
the defendant’s scheme and intent to defraud. The defendant added these fake 
employees to the payroll to meet the initial deadline by which the PPP funds 
were to be spent, to make it appear as if he was using PPP loan funds on 
payroll, and to set Target Roofing up for loan forgiveness. The Court did not 
err in admitting this evidence at trial. 
CONCLUSION  
The government presented more than sufficient evidence that the 
defendant committed bank fraud, false statement to a financial institution, and 
illegal monetary transactions, such that a reasonable jury could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the defendant has 
failed to demonstrate that the evidence preponderates heavily against the 
verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to deny him a new trial.  
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the defendant’s 
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motion for judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, for new trial.  
Respectfully submitted, 
 
KARIN B. HOPPMANN  
Acting United States Attorney  
 
 
By: 
 /s/Trent Reichling              
Trenton J. Reichling  
Assistant United States Attorney 
Florida Bar No. 0084601 
2110 First Street, Suite 3-137 
Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 
Telephone: (239) 461-2200 
Facsimile: 
(239) 461-2219 
E-mail: Trenton.Reichling@usdoj.gov  
 
 
 
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U.S. v. Casey David Crowther   
        Case No. 2:20-cr-114-JES-MRM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that on April 23, 2021, I electronically filed the 
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which 
will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: 
Nicole H. Waid  
nicole.waid@fisherbroyles.com  
 
Brian E. Dickerson 
brian.dickerson@fisherbroyles.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Trent Reichling         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trenton J. Reichling  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
  
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