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REPLY (re 150 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal ) REPLY IN… — Brooks v. Thomson Reuters Corporation (Dkt. 170)
No. 3:21-cv-01418-EMC · Doc. 170 · Docket on CourtListener
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Case 3:21-cv-01418-EMC Document 170 Filed 03/09/23 Page 1 of 23
1 Eric H. Gibbs (SBN 178658) Geoffrey A. Graber (SBN 211547)
Andre M. Mura (SBN 298541) Karina G. Puttieva (SBN 317702)
2 Amy M. Zeman (SBN 273100) COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL
3 Mark H. Troutman (pro hac vice) PLLC
Ezekiel S. Wald (SBN 341490) 1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
4 Hanne Jensen (SBN 336045) Washington, DC 20005
GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP Telephone: (202) 408-4600
5 1111 Broadway, Suite 2100 Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
6 Oakland, CA 94607 ggraber@cohenmilstein.com
Telephone: (510) 350-9700 kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com
7 Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
ehg@classlawgroup.com
8 amm@classlawgroup.com
amz@classlawgroup.com
9
mht@classlawgroup.com
10 zsw@classlawgroup.com
hj@classlawgroup.com
11
12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
13
14
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
16 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
17 CAT BROOKS and RASHEED SHABAZZ, Case No. 3:21-cv-01418-EMC-KAW
individually and on behalf of all others
18 similarly situated, REDACTED – PUBLIC VERSION
19
Plaintiffs, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
20 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
v.
21 Date: April 20, 2023
22 THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION, Time: 1:30 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 5, 17th Floor
23 Defendant. Judge: Hon. Edward M. Chen
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
3
ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................................................. 1
4
Plaintiffs have Article III standing.............................................................................................................. 1
5
Rule 23(a) is met. ........................................................................................................................................... 3
6
A. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives with typical claims. .............................................................. 3
7
B. Commonality .......................................................................................................................................... 5
8
Rule 23(b) is met............................................................................................................................................ 6
9
A. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is ripe for certification under (b)(2). .............................................................. 6
10
B. Common questions predominate for both claims. ........................................................................... 7
11
1. UCL ................................................................................................................................................. 7
12
13 2. Unjust Enrichment. .....................................................................................................................11
14 3. Calculating unjust enrichment classwide. .................................................................................12
15 C. A class trial is superior to litigation alternatives and would be manageable. ...............................14
16 CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................................................15
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
2 Cases Page(s)
3 Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc.,
125 F. Supp. 3d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ..................................................................................................................... 5
4
Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc.,
5 ---F. Supp. 3d---, 2023 WL 27356 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2023) ................................................................................. 2
6
Am. Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd.,
7 225 Cal. App. 4th 1451 (2014) ................................................................................................................................11
8 Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997) ..................................................................................................................................................14
9
10 B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder,
922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................................................... 7
11
Backus v. Gen. Mills,
12 122 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .............................................................................................................. 9, 10
13 Beck v. Maximus, Inc.,
14 457 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................................................... 4
15 Beck-Ellman v. Kaz USA, Inc.,
283 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Cal. 2012) .............................................................................................................................12
16
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
17 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................................................14
18
Buckeye Tree Lodge and Sequoia Village Inn, LLC v. Expedia, Inc.,
19 2019 WL 1170489 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019) ......................................................................................................14
20 California ex rel. Becerra v. United States Dep't of the Interior,
381 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ................................................................................................................... 1
21
22 Callahan v. PeopleConnect, Inc.,
2021 WL 5050079 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2021) .......................................................................................................... 4
23
Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal.,
24 142 Cal. App. 4th 1394 (2006) .................................................................................................................................. 8
25 Castillo v. Bank of Am., NA,
26 980 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2020) ..................................................................................................................................... 6
27 Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.,
20 Cal.4th 163 (1999) .......................................................................................................................................... 8, 14
28
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1 Comcast v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) ..............................................................................................................................................12
2
Cottle v. Plaid Inc.,
3
536 F. Supp. 3d 461 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ..................................................................................................................... 1
4
CTC Real Est. Servs. v. Lepe,
5 140 Cal. App. 4th 856 (2006) ............................................................................................................................... 2, 4
6 Diacakis v. Comcast Corp.,
7 2013 WL 1878921 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) .........................................................................................................14
8 Ehret v. Uber Techs.,
68 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................................................................ 5, 7
9
Elkies v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc.,
10 2018 WL 11223465 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2018) ....................................................................................................... 4
11
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
12 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).............................................................................................................................. 7
13 Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
2014 WL 2734953 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014)................................................................................................ 10, 12
14
Ghirardo v. Antonioli,
15
14 Cal.4th 39 (1996) .................................................................................................................................................11
16
Grace v. Apple, Inc.,
17 328 F.R.D. 320 (N.D. Cal. 2018)....................................................................................................................... 9, 12
18 Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C.,
19 61 Cal.4th 988 (2015) ................................................................................................................................................. 6
20 Heeger v. Facebook, Inc.,
509 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ................................................................................................................... 1
21
Herskowitz, v. Apple,
22 301 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. Cal. 2014)................................................................................................................... 6, 8, 10
23
Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,
24 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................................................... 9
25 IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra,
962 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................................................... 4
26
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.,
27
162 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ..................................................................................................................... 8
28
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1 In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
2013 WL 12333442 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) ........................................................................................................13
2
In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig.,
3
402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ..................................................................................................................... 3
4
In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation,
5 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................................................ 1, 2, 3
6 In re Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig.,
7 465 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ..................................................................................................................... 1
8 In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.,
926 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................................................... 5
9
In re Lenovo Adware Litig.,
10 2016 WL 6277245 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) .......................................................................................................13
11
In re Tobacco II Cases,
12 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009) ............................................................................................................................................ 7, 9
13 In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,
308 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 2015).............................................................................................................................. 6
14
In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
15
888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................................................... 3
16
James v. Uber Techs.,
17 338 F.R.D. 123 (N.D. Cal. 2021)............................................................................................................................14
18 Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,
19 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................................................................... 3
20 Longest v. Green Tree Servicing LLC,
308 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ............................................................................................................................10
21
Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
22 504 F.3d 718 (9thCir. 2007) ...................................................................................................................................... 8
23
Lytle v. Nutramax Labs., Inc.,
24 2022 WL 1600047 n.21 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) .................................................................................................13
25 MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co.,
37 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ..................................................................................................................... 8
26
Mastel v. Miniclip SA,
27
549 F. Supp. 3d 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2021).................................................................................................................... 2
28
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1 Moore v. Ulta Salon, Cosms. & Fragrance, Inc.,
311 F.R.D. 590 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ............................................................................................................................15
2
Muir v. Navy Federal Credit Union,
3
529 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................................................ 3
4
Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc.,
5 2015 WL 3614197 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2015) ..........................................................................................6, 8, 10, 11
6 O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc.,
7 278 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Cal. 2011)............................................................................................................................15
8 Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC,
31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) ...................................................................................................................................... 5
9
Parsons v. Ryan,
10 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................................................................... 7
11
PFA Ins. Mktg. Litig.,
12 2021 WL 5994908 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2021) .......................................................................................................... 8
13 Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.,
780 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................................................15
14
Pulaski & Middleman LLC v. Google, Inc.,
15
802 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................................................14
16
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC,
17 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015) ..................................................................................................................................... 3
18 Richie v. Blue Shield of Cal.,
19 2014 WL 6982943 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) ........................................................................................................14
20 Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons, Inc.,
835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................................................ 9, 11
21
Smith v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc.,
22 2020 WL 5630051 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020) ......................................................................................................12
23
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,
24 51 Cal.4th 1191 (2011) ............................................................................................................................................... 5
25 TransUnion v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ................................................................................................................................................ 2
26
U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press,
27
489 U.S. 749 (1989) .................................................................................................................................................... 2
28
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1 United States v. Abouammo,
2022 WL 17734424 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) ....................................................................................................13
2
United States v. Real Property Located at 13328 and 13324 State Hwy. 75 N.,
3
89 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................................................13
4
Williams v. Apple, Inc.,
5 338 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Cal. 2021)......................................................................................................................... 7, 9
6 Other Authorities
7
1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5.60 .....................................................................................................................12
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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21
22
23
24
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1 INTRODUCTION
2 In opposing class certification, Thomson Reuters (TR) never contests the classwide evidence that
3 Californians are not afforded control over the personal information that CLEAR makes commercially
4 available about them. Nor does TR contest that it uses uniform data collection, aggregation, and
5 dissemination practices to profit off that personal information. All TR does is try to reframe Plaintiffs’ theory
6 of liability and misstate California’s UCL and unjust enrichment causes of action as inherently unsuited to
7 class treatment for any type of privacy claim. But Plaintiffs’ claims and evidence are precisely the sort that fit
8 the mold for class treatment under both the UCL and unjust enrichment theories.
9 TR’s arguments do not counsel against class certification but instead preview its merits defense that
10 CLEAR is a benign compendium of public information. E.g., ECF No. 150-4 (Opp.) at 2. Discovery tells a
11 different story. ECF No. 124-3 (Mot.) at 2-7. Indeed, just two weeks ago, a CLEAR product manager testified
12 that, for at least a limited time, CLEAR had —which includes potentially “ ” and
13 “ ” information that . Ex. 1 at 253:11-23;
14 254:22-255:19; 257:5-258:23; 261:20-269:6. TR’s merits arguments—while meritless—are for another day.
15 ARGUMENT1
16 Plaintiffs have Article III standing.
17 TR argues (at 7-8) that Plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to show (1) a concrete injury
18 (2) traceable to TR’s unlawful conduct. It is wrong on both counts.
19 First, courts in this district have repeatedly found that “collect[ing]” and “sell[ing]” individuals’
20 “personal data to third parties” without consent causes Article III injury. Cottle v. Plaid Inc., 536 F. Supp. 3d
21 461, 481 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see, e.g., In re Google Referrer Header Priv. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1012 (N.D. Cal.
22 2020); Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2020). Indeed, binding circuit precedent
23 compels that conclusion. In In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that the
24 plaintiffs suffered concrete privacy harms as a result of Facebook’s “tracking and collection practices”—
25 which allowed the company to create “a cradle-to-grave profile without users’ consent” that deprived
26
1
27 The amici either repeat TR’s arguments, which fail for the same reasons, or improperly seek to raise
classwide merits defenses such as preemption that TR does not. ECF No. 156 at 8-15; California ex rel. Becerra
28 v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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1 individuals of “a meaningful opportunity to control” their personal information. 956 F.3d 589, 598–99 (9th
2 Cir. 2020). And the court held that the plaintiffs separately demonstrated an economic injury “sufficient to
3 confer Article III standing” based on Facebook’s “unjust enrichment”—namely, its nonconsensual sale of
4 users’ personal data for profit. See id. at 599–601.
5 Those are precisely the injuries here. TR collects Californians’ data without their consent and offers
6 it for sale through subscriptions to access searchable profiles on the CLEAR platform. And then it unjustly
7 profits from the sale—again, without ever obtaining consent from the individuals whose data is sold. Yet TR
8 doesn’t even mention the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Instead, it simply asserts (at 8) that Plaintiffs’ privacy
9 harms are not concrete because they do “not bear a ‘close relationship’ to harms ‘traditionally recognized as
10 providing a basis for a lawsuit.’” But Facebook concluded exactly the opposite: The “historically recognized
11 right to privacy,” the Ninth Circuit explained, “encompass[es] the individuals’ control of information
12 concerning his or her person.” Facebook, 956 F.3d at 598–99 (quotations omitted); see U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps.
13 Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“both the common law and the literal understandings of
14 privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person”). 2
15 TR’s next argument—that Plaintiffs have not established Article III injury based on the company’s
16 failure to pay them for using and selling their data—is likewise foreclosed by Facebook. There, the Ninth
17 Circuit rejected Facebook’s similar argument “that unjust enrichment is not sufficient to confer standing, and
18 that Plaintiffs must instead demonstrate that they either planned to sell their data, or that their data was made
19 less valuable through Facebook’s use.” 956 F.3d at 599. That the plaintiffs’ personal data “carr[ied] financial
20 value” and “Facebook profited from this valuable data”—both of which are true here—was enough to entitle
21 the plaintiffs to Facebook’s “profits unjustly earned.” See id. at 600–01; cf. CTC Real Est. Servs. v. Lepe, 140
22 Cal. App. 4th 856, 860 (2006) (“A person’s identifying information is a valuable asset, the misuse of which
23 can have serious consequences to that person.”).
24
2
TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), does not change this analysis. “TransUnion involved a
25 fundamentally different type of alleged injury than the one here”—“a claim akin to defamation, not invasion
of privacy.” Mastel v. Miniclip SA, 549 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1138–39 (E.D. Cal. 2021). And TransUnion specifically
26
noted that “disclosure of private information” and “intrusion upon seclusion” are “traditionally recognized”
27 privacy injuries sufficient to support Article III standing. 141 S. Ct. at 2204; see also Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., -
--F. Supp. 3d---, 2023 WL 27356, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2023) (holding post-Ramirez that Twitter’s
28 unauthorized disclosure of both publicly available and private information caused concrete injury).
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1 Second, Plaintiffs’ injuries are traceable to TR’s collection and sale of their information through
2 CLEAR. The company’s only traceability argument (at 8) is that Plaintiffs never had “control” over their
3 personal information in the first place because it was already publicly available. That’s wrong. Plaintiffs have
4 shown that CLEAR provides an array of information about them and other Californians that is not publicly
5 available or easily accessible, including live cell phone records, location data from billions of license plate
6 detections, real-time booking information, motor vehicle service records, unclaimed assets, historical utility
7 records, and more. Mot. at 3. More importantly, TR takes all of that information—some potentially public,
8 some proprietary—and melds it together into something wholly new and uniquely harmful: A
9 comprehensive, cradle-to-grave profile that exists nowhere else. See, e.g., ECF No. 54 at 16; Mot. at 4-6; ECF
10 No. 124-7 (Turow Rep.) at 10-11, 13; ECF No. 151-9 (CLEAR report for Cat Brooks, which includes her
11 non-public social security number); ECF No. 151-10 (same for Rasheed Shabazz). The harms that Plaintiffs
12 suffer as a result of TR’s nonconsensual collection and sale of this information are therefore traceable to TR
13 alone. See Facebook, 956 F.3d at 599–600.
14 In any event, the fact that a different data broker or other third party “might have caused [Plaintiffs’]
15 personal information to be exposed does nothing to negate [their] standing to sue.” See Remijas v. Neiman
16 Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). “Merely identifying potential alternative causes does
17 not defeat standing.” Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 2016). TR’s argument,
18 in other words, “is less about standing and more about the merits of causation and damages.” In re Zappos.com,
19 Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2018). And “in determining whether plaintiffs have standing,” courts
20 “must assume that on the merits they would be successful in their claims.” Muir v. Navy Federal Credit Union,
21 529 F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up); see In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402
22 F. Supp. 3d 767, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
23 Rule 23(a) is met.
24 A. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives with typical claims.
25 TR claims (at 9-10) Plaintiffs face “unique” defenses, making them inadequate to represent and
26 atypical of the class. But the defenses are not only meritless but classwide, posing no obstacle to certification.
27 First, TR claims (at 9) that Plaintiffs have not “lost money or property” and therefore lack UCL
28 standing. But as this and other courts have recognized, personal information is property—and having that
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1 “intellectual property” taken without compensation is economic injury. Callahan v. PeopleConnect, Inc., 2021
2 WL 5050079, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2021); see also Lepe, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 860 (“A person’s identifying
3 information is a valuable asset.”). More importantly, the theory of UCL standing is the same for all class
4 members. So UCL standing isn’t a typicality or adequacy problem; rather, it’s a common question that supports
5 certification. See Elkies v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 11223465, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2018).
6 Second, TR argues (at 9-10) that Plaintiffs are public figures and thus face “unique First Amendment
7 defenses unless the speech at issue is of purely private concern.” But this Court has already concluded that
8 TR’s “private and unauthorized sale of Plaintiffs’ personal information is ‘an inherently private exchange
9 between private parties,’ not a matter of public concern.” ECF No. 54 at 27 (quoting IMDb.com Inc. v. Becerra,
10 962 F.3d 1111, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2020). So it doesn’t matter whether Plaintiffs are public or private figures.
11 See Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 300 (3d Cir. 2006) (meritless defense cannot defeat adequacy or
12 typicality). Whatever interest the public might have in their or any other class member’s personal information
13 is immaterial because CLEAR is not part of the public discourse; it involves the private sale of Californians’
14 information for TR’s private financial gain. ECF No. 54 at 17 (“Thompson Reuters is not a journalist
15 performing a ‘public benefit’ by making Plaintiffs’ personal information available to the public. Rather, the
16 company’s dissemination of this information only benefits the private parties who purchase the CLEAR
17 dossiers.”); see ECF No. 124-10 at 15 (individuals cannot use CLEAR); Turow Rep. at 22 (journalists cannot
18 use CLEAR).3
19 Finally, TR asserts (at 10) that Plaintiffs are atypical in that some “information” about them may be
20 available “elsewhere.” But the whole point of CLEAR, according to TR itself, is to make available a 360-
21 degree profile of Californians that is unavailable elsewhere. See Mot. at 1, 2-7; Turow Rep. at 11; see also ECF
22 No. 54 at 16 (reasoning that even if all information in CLEAR were publicly available, connecting and
23 compiling that information constitutes “a significant invasion of privacy”). And, in any event, the company
24 does not even attempt to argue that Plaintiffs are any different from the rest of the class in this regard, so
25 any defense on this basis would be classwide anyway.
26 3
TR’s example of how CLEAR could theoretically advance the “public interest”—it mentions U.S.
27 Representative George Santos, who reportedly lied about his biography—is ironic given that TR disclaims
the veracity of any biographical information in CLEAR, including, presumably, that of Representative Santos.
28 See Opp. at 10 n.26; Mot. at 9.
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1 B. Commonality
2 Plaintiffs have identified, for each of their claims, central common questions whose resolution will
3 drive the litigation. Mot. at 11-12. For example, TR never contests that its failure to obtain consent before
4 making class members’ information available through CLEAR applies equally to all class members. See Mot.
5 at 10-12. Whether that failure, before selling access to Californians’ information, violates California public
6 policy, makes TR’s retention of profits attributable to that practice “unjust,” or on balance creates a more
7 substantial harm to Californians than any countervailing benefits, are all central, common questions. See id.
8 Accordingly, commonality is easily met here.
9 TR’s contrary arguments miss the mark. It first contends (at 11) that the class is too broad because
10 it includes people who were not injured in California, and consequently this action would impermissibly apply
11 California law beyond its borders. Not so: “[T]he UCL reaches any unlawful business act or practice
12 committed in California.” Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1208 (2011). And here, each putative class
13 member’s claim is connected to California because the class is defined to include only those persons “who,
14 during the limitations period, both resided in the state of California and whose information Thomson Reuters
15 made available for sale through CLEAR without their consent.” Mot. at 10 (emphasis added). That an absent
16 class member may have moved to another state during the class period does not change the fact that they
17 would be suing over harm that had occurred in California while they were a state resident. See Sullivan, 51
18 Cal.4th at 1207-09. Nor is TR’s conjecture (at 11) that foreign law, rather than California law, might apply to
19 such a class member’s claims any basis to deny class certification of this proposed single-state class action.
20 Cf. In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 561 (9th Cir. 2019) (court adjudicating multistate class
21 action not obligated to address undeveloped choice-of-law arguments). But even if the class definition were
22 over-inclusive, that would be no reason to deny certification. At most, it would require “refining the class
23 definition.” See Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 669 n.14 (9th Cir. 2022).4
24 Faring no better is TR’s odd argument (at 14) that the unfair business practices here are “too vague
25 to allow the Court even to assess whether any issue is common.” Plaintiffs have thoroughly detailed, based
26
4
27 TR’s authorities, neither of which addressed class certification, both support the conclusion that the UCL
may properly apply to the proposed class. See Opp. at 11 (citing Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F.
28 Supp. 3d 945, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2015), and Ehret v. Uber Techs., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
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1 on the record, how TR collects, analyzes, and aggregates Californians’ personal information and offers it for
2 sale on CLEAR without consent or compensation. Mot. at 3-7; see Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 2015 WL
3 3614197, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2015) (certification warranted under UCL when plaintiff describes a “series
4 of practices amenable to some degree of precise definition”). Plaintiffs’ showing here is critically different
5 from that in Herskowitz, v. Apple, where there was “no evidence that Apple ha[d] a common, let alone uniform
6 or ‘blanket,’ practice of denying refunds to customers.” 301 F.R.D. 460, 476 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
7 Finally, TR suggests in passing (at 12) that because Plaintiffs’ and the putative class’s relationships
8 with TR differ, including as to privity, an unjust enrichment claim would not yield common answers. But
9 privity is not required. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 61 Cal.4th 988, 998 (2015). And anyway,
10 TR points to no evidence of differing relationships or circumstances, and the key evidence is otherwise: The
11 putative class members uniformly did not consent to CLEAR, and many do not even know CLEAR exists.
12 Mot. at 1, 21. More importantly, whether class members have a right to unjust enrichment even absent privity
13 with CLEAR is a legal question that is resolvable classwide.
14 As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, “[e]ven a single common question of law or fact that resolves a
15 central issue will be sufficient to satisfy this mandatory requirement for all class actions.” Castillo v. Bank of
16 Am., NA, 980 F.3d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs here have demonstrated that all key questions of law
17 and fact are common. They have therefore satisfied Rule 23(a).5
18 Rule 23(b) is met.
19 A. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is ripe for certification under (b)(2).
20 TR opposes a (b)(2) class on the same grounds that it opposes a (b)(3) class. See Opp. at 23-24. But
21 Rule 23(b)(2) requires a different analysis. “Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff does not need to show
22 predominance of common issues or superiority of class adjudication to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Rather,
23 only a showing of cohesiveness of class claims is required.” In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D.
24 Cal. 2015). That showing is easily met here because TR does not deny it acts uniformly towards the class.
25
5
TR also argues (at 12-13) that Plaintiffs’ UCL and unjust enrichment claims will require “individualized”
26
analysis. But this argument is not about commonality at all; it’s a predominance argument. And, as explained
27 below, TR is simply wrong that predominance is not met here. The core questions for establishing TR’s
liability do not implicate individualized inquiries; rather, they turn entirely on common legal questions and
28 classwide facts.
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1 And contrary to TR’s suggestion that their request is insufficiently developed, Plaintiffs have specifically
2 described the business practices they seek to enjoin, which is all that is required at this stage. See Mot. at 3-5,
3 9, 17 (describing TR’s uniform data-collection, aggregation, and analysis practices to offer Californians’
4 personal information for sale, in a uniform way, through CLEAR, all without those Californians’ consent);
5 B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957, 972 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he ‘general contours of an injunction’ are
6 enjoining [defendant] to abate the nine policies identified by the district court as amenable to class-wide
7 litigation. That [is] enough.”); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 674 (9th Cir. 2014) (similar).6 Plaintiffs thus seek
8 a single injunction relieving Californians from those generally applicable, centralized, and unfair practices.
9 TR nevertheless argues (at 24) that each class member may be impacted differently by CLEAR. But
10 “Rule 23(b)(2) suits remain appropriate mechanisms for obtaining injunctive relief in cases where [such] a
11 centralized policy is alleged to impact a large class of plaintiffs, even when the magnitude (and existence) of
12 the impact may vary by class member.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 503 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
13 In any event, Plaintiffs’ theory of the case does not turn on the specific data collected (or disclosed), the
14 customer(s) who access it, or the purposes those customers profess in so doing. See Mot. at 22-28. All class
15 members are harmed by TR’s nonconsensual collection and sale of their personal information—and so all
16 class members are entitled to an injunction enjoining TR’s unfair practices.
17 B. Common questions predominate for both claims.
18 1. UCL
19 Plaintiffs challenge TR’s uniform business practice of using Californians’ information without their
20 consent. That practice is common to all class members and violates class members’ right to control whether
21 and how TR uses their information in the same way. Ignoring this evidence, TR seeks to elevate differences
22 in how its customers use information about Californians as the predominant merits issue. But “the UCL’s focus
23 is ‘on the defendant’s conduct, rather than the plaintiff’s damages, in service of the statute’s larger purpose
24 of protecting the general public against unscrupulous business practices.’” Ehret, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 1130–31
25 (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 312 (2009)). Predominance is therefore routinely found in cases
26
6
27 The situation here is a far cry from that in Williams v. Apple, Inc., 338 F.R.D. 629, 657-58 (N.D. Cal. 2021),
where the plaintiffs waived a request for a (b)(2) class by failing to properly raise it in their motion and did
28 not provide any meaningful analysis in reply.
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1 involving “a uniform business practice,” such as TR’s decision to use Californians’ personal information for
2 profit without their consent. See Newton, 2015 WL 3614197, at *10–11 (quoting Herskowitz, 301 F.R.D. at 476
3 and citing Lozano, 504 F.3d at 737). So too here, the core merits question for Plaintiffs’ UCL claim—whether
4 TR’s nonconsensual collection and dissemination of the class members’ personal information is “unfair”—
5 is an entirely classwide inquiry relying exclusively on facts common to the class.
6 a. Tethering Test. To start, nothing about applying the UCL’s tethering test here implicates
7 individualized questions. The test asks whether the alleged unfairness of the defendant’s business practices is
8 “tethered to some legislatively declared policy.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th
9 163, 166 (1999). And because the tethering test is an independent and separate basis for establishing TR’s
10 liability under the UCL’s unfairness prong, it suffices to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) here. 7 See In re PFA Ins. Mktg.
11 Litig., 2021 WL 5994908, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2021) (“[T]he predominance requirement could be
12 satisfied with common evidence under either [UCL] test.”).
13 TR has no meaningful response to this. TR first argues (at 20-21) that whether California’s public
14 policy of protecting privacy is implicated will vary based on who its customers are, what information it makes
15 available to them, and how and why the information was used. But that misunderstands Plaintiffs’ theory of
16 harm: Every class member was deprived of the right to control their information when TR made their
17 information available for sale in CLEAR. As this Court recognized, California’s public policy protecting the
18 right to control one’s own information is enshrined in numerous California constitutional and statutory
19 provisions. See ECF No. 54 at 17-18. That policy either does or does not render TR’s business model of
20 offering Californians’ data without consent “unfair.” This significant aspect of the case, then, can and should
21 be resolved in a single adjudication rather than on an individual basis.
22 TR also suggests (at 20-21) that California’s public policy protecting privacy may be outweighed by
23 CLEAR’s utility or competing public policies. But there is no consideration of utility in the tethering test. See
24 In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Even if the law were otherwise,
25
7
Revisiting a debate circa 2006, TR suggests (at 19 n.37) the tethering test may not apply in consumer cases.
26
See Camacho v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1400-01 (2006). But the Ninth Circuit long ago
27 rejected Camacho’s reasoning and recognized both the balancing and tethering tests apply to UCL unfairness
claims. See Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 2007); see also MacDonald v. Ford
28 Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1098-99 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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1 TR does not explain why either CLEAR’s purported utility or any competing public policy would create
2 individualized issues. The question is not, as TR tries to make it seem (at 20), whether the disclosure of a
3 particular piece of information violates California’s public policy protecting privacy or not; it is whether the
4 “challenged act”—TR’s nonconsensual collection and sale of Californians’ personal data—has a “close
5 nexus” to the “legislative policy” protecting Californians’ right to control their information. See Hodsdon v.
6 Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2018). That question is a natural fit for classwide resolution.
7 b. Balancing Test. The same is true for the UCL’s “balancing” test. The challenged practice is
8 “uniform across the class,” and nothing about TR’s business operations “turn[s] on anything about any
9 particular class member.” Mot. at 2.
10 Evaluating whether TR’s conduct is “unfair” under the UCL’s balancing test—whether the utility of
11 the challenged conduct outweighs the harm to the public—will thus require no individualized inquiries.
12 Indeed, the balancing test explicitly requires that courts weigh the “harm to the public” against the challenged
13 conduct’s utility. Backus v. Gen. Mills, 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Tobacco II Cases, 46
14 Cal.4th at 312 (UCL “protect[s] the general public against unscrupulous business practices” (emphasis added)).
15 But even if the harm inquiry were framed as “harm to the Plaintiffs,” as TR contends (at 13), it would still be
16 a classwide inquiry in this case because all class members have suffered the very same harm as a result of
17 TR’s uniform practices: They have been deprived of the right to meaningfully control their personal
18 information. See Mot. at 2-9; Turow Rep. at 16 (“Regardless of how expansive an individual’s report may be,
19 no Californian has control over the information in or use of dossiers about them. In these critical ways, all
20 Californians face these same harms.”). This is a specific, tangible harm caused by a “precisely defined”
21 uniform practice towards Californians that is unfair. See Grace v. Apple, Inc., 328 F.R.D. 320, 336-43 (N.D.
22 Cal. 2018). Although TR speculates (at 13, 20) that the Court would have to consider some unspecified
23 potential individualized harms that its customers’ use of Californians’ data may have caused, it doesn’t identify
24 any. See Williams, 338 F.R.D. at 648 (defendant cannot defeat predominance with “mere ‘speculation and
25 surmise’”). And even if it had, there is no gainsaying that the common questions Plaintiffs have identified are
26 more apt to drive the resolution of the litigation and thus “must be given more weight in
27 the predominance analysis.” Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons, Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2016).
28 The Court will similarly rely on facts and arguments common to all class members when considering
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1 the utility of the challenged practice to Californians. The law is clear that, when evaluating “utility” under the
2 UCL’s balancing test, the focus is on “the challenged business practice” as a whole. Herskowitz, 301 F.R.D.
3 at 476. TR asserts (at 19) that “the utility of CLEAR will vary among class members and their circumstances,”
4 but again it identifies no reason—aside from speculation—why that’s the case. Nor could it. The utility of
5 the challenged conduct—TR’s nonconsensual collection and sale of Californians’ data—does not turn on
6 whether a CLEAR customer’s particular use of any particular Californians’ information is “good” or “bad.”
7 Rather, the test asks whether “the harm to the public from the business practice is greater than the utility of
8 the practice.” Backus, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (emphasis added). For these reasons, as we have previously
9 explained, this Court and others have repeatedly held that, in cases involving uniform business practices, the
10 question “whether harms outweigh utilities” under the UCL is a “question[] capable of classwide resolution.”
11 Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 2734953, at *28 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); see also Longest v. Green Tree
12 Servicing LLC, 308 F.R.D. 310, 331 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Newton, 2015 WL 3614197, at *10.
13 The utility of the challenged practice under the UCL balancing test will necessarily be measured
14 classwide. TR wouldn’t have it any other way. Its main defense—that CLEAR benefits society because it
15 makes available all Californians’ information—is itself classwide.
16
17 . See ECF No. 151-14 ¶ 14 (Kivetz arguing CLEAR benefits “
18 ”); id. ¶ 136 (describing CLEAR’s benefits as
19 .”); id. ¶ 143 (“
20 ”); ECF No. 151-1 at 23
21 (Bambauer claiming “
22 ”) (emphasis added); id. (“
23 ”); ECF No. 153-2 ¶ 15 (Svonkin claiming personal benefits from “
24
25 ”). 8 Because this core
26 8
Even TR’s attempts to show benefits specific to individual class members turn out to be generalized. For
example, Bambauer suggests “
27
” based on due to .
28 ECF No. 151-1 at 28. But apart from being an entirely speculative conclusion—grounded in nothing more
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1 question—balancing the harm from depriving Californians of their right to control information against the
2 utility to society from a platform that does not require consent—is “apt to drive the resolution of the
3 litigation,” it carries great “weight” in the predominance analysis. Ruiz Torres, 835 F.3d at 1134.
4 For these reasons, class adjudication of the UCL’s balancing test is appropriate because common
5 questions predominate and “the Court may make one uniform determination of whether the utility of the
6 conduct outweighed the harm to class members.” See Newton, 2015 WL 3614197, at *10.
7 2. Unjust Enrichment.
8 TR’s predominance arguments about unjust enrichment fail for similar reasons. TR focuses on how
9 its customers use CLEAR to obscure that TR’s conduct towards the class generates entirely common
10 questions that will drive the resolution of this case. But the actions of TR’s customers have no bearing on
11 Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim—“[t]he emphasis is on the wrongdoer’s enrichment.” See Am. Master Lease
12 LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd., 225 Cal. App. 4th 1451, 1482 (2014). At the merits stage, the Court will need to
13 decide whether letting TR keep of dollars in profits from selling information it did not have
14 Californians’ consent to collect and use would be “just.” Downstream uses by TR’s customers are irrelevant
15 to the unjustness inquiry because the Court will evaluate unjustness “as between the two”—TR and the class
16 members—as TR itself admits. See Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal.4th 39, 51 (1996); Opp. at 19. TR’s conduct
17 towards the class—sweeping in as much data as it can, from everyone and without consent, to make
18 commercially available to its paying customers through CLEAR—does not vary from class member to class
19 member, even if some class members’ have different information in CLEAR or that information is available
20 elsewhere. Whether class members’ information is otherwise publicly available through the third-party data
21 brokers TR uses neither obviates the harm from compiling information into dossiers nor creates
22 individualized questions. See ECF No. 54 at 16.
23 TR is also wrong that unjust enrichment claims “are not amenable to class treatment.” Opp. at 12.
24 Indeed, the very treatise it cites for this proposition explains that “[c]ertification of an unjust enrichment
25 class may be proper if it is clear that the defendant had uniform interactions or transactions with all members
26
than Bambauer’s personal belief that all individuals will be better served with more information sharing, more
27 access, and less privacy—this would not even be an individualized benefit. The theoretical boon that any
class member may experience from having more information (whose veracity TR declines to guarantee)
28 available to be searched in CLEAR is one all class members would share.
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1 of the putative class so that it is reasonable to conclude that no significant equitable differences exist in the
2 status of class members.” 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5.60; see also, e.g., Smith v. Keurig Green Mountain,
3 Inc., 2020 WL 5630051, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020) (noting certification of unjust enrichment class is
4 appropriate when, as here, a claim “raises the same legal issues as to all class members.”). Courts are
5 particularly willing to certify unjust enrichment classes where the defendant’s conduct is identical toward all
6 class members, such as through a material omission or standardized business practice. See Beck-Ellman v. Kaz
7 USA, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 558, 568-69 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Ellsworth, 2014 WL 2734953, at *27-28. Because even TR
8 recognizes (as it must) that its conduct toward the class is uniform, common questions predominate for
9 Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim.
10 3. Calculating unjust enrichment classwide.
11 Consistent with Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), Plaintiffs have proposed a reasonable
12 method of calculating the amount of unjust enrichment stemming from TR’s unjust actions vis-a-vis the
13 class. ECF No. 127-12 (Lloyd Rep.); see generally ECF No. 167-3. TR acquires the information it uses in
14 CLEAR in bulk, accumulating individuals’ information not person-by-person but through access to troves
15 of records. See Mot. at 4-5. Its customers pay for access to that information—some of which is
16 Californians’—largely through subscription plans, not by paying to search for a specific person. Lloyd Rep.
17 at 9. Plaintiffs’ methodology, then, accounts for these business realities along with the legal theories actually
18 at issue in this case. See Mot. at 20; Lloyd Rep. at 7-10. Plaintiffs’ model begins with TR’s direct revenues
19 from CLEAR (derived largely from those customer subscriptions). Lloyd Rep. at 10. Next, because TR has
20 not attributed how much of its revenues are derived from customers seeking to access Californians’
21 information, the model incorporates a step to allocate an appropriate share of TR’s overall CLEAR revenues
22 to its use of Californians’ information without consent. Id. at 11-14. Finally, Plaintiffs’ method offers a step
23 to deduct the costs that are properly attributable to TR’s challenged conduct. Id. at 14-17. That classwide
24 model is reasonable, reliable, and tied directly to Plaintiffs’ theory of liability. See ECF No. 167-3. Comcast
25 requires nothing more. See Grace, 328 F.R.D. at 340.
26 TR sees Comcast problems where none exist. It argues (at 18), first, that Plaintiffs’ method fails to
27 properly measure “net profits” derived from the use of Californians’ personal information. But that is exactly
28 what Plaintiffs’ model does: It shows, based entirely on reliable common evidence, how to calculate the
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1 amount of TR’s profits attributable to its commercial use of Californians’ information in CLEAR. Lloyd Rep.
2 at 2-3, 7-10, 16-17 (including, in Plaintiffs’ methodology, a step to deduct costs and explaining why removing
3 only incremental costs measures the amount of TR’s “net profits” here); United States v. Abouammo, 2022 WL
4 17734424, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) (common law unjust enrichment permits recovery based on a
5 measurement of the defendant’s wrongful gain). TR may disagree with the amount of disgorgement this
6 model calculates, but that is a merits dispute, not a Comcast problem. Lytle v. Nutramax Labs., Inc., 2022 WL
7 1600047, at *18 n.21 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2022) (Comcast does not require plaintiff to run damages model—just
8 present a likely method for measuring classwide relief).
9 Next, TR faults (at 18) Plaintiffs’ model because, in its view, it fails to deduct for the “just” aspects
10 of CLEAR—the benefits its customers derive, and the incidental benefits class members purportedly enjoy
11 from living in a world in which CLEAR is available. Plaintiffs’ theory, however, is that TR was unjustly
12 enriched by selling access to Californians’ information without consent; that CLEAR customers may use this
13 unjustly obtained information for (supposedly) “just” reasons does not make TR’s collection and sale of the
14 class members’ data “just.” Mot. at 20; ECF No. 167-3 at 10. As for incidental benefits that Californians may
15 receive in exchange for TR violating their privacy, California law does not require that a disgorgement
16 calculation account for such downstream (and here, illusory) benefits. See In re Lenovo Adware Litig., 2016 WL
17 6277245, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016). Even so, TR’s disputes about the failure to account for certain
18 benefits can be resolved on an entirely classwide basis; they again go to the merits, not Comcast.
19 Finally, TR criticizes Plaintiffs for not proposing an apportionment plan, even as it admits (at 18)
20 that one is not required at the class certification stage. Plaintiffs agree that an apportionment plan is not
21 required now, but they disagree with TR’s suggestion that any apportionment of TR’s ill-gotten gains would
22 require minitrials over the types and amounts of individual information searched. To the contrary, an equal
23 allocation of disgorgement among the class, courts agree, would be appropriate in these circumstances. See,
24 e.g., In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 12333442, at *45 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8,
25 2013) (approving pro rata distribution of disgorgement settlement class based on claims that focused “solely
26 on the alleged behavior of the Settling Defendants and the benefits that they reaped from that behavior”);
27 United States v. Real Property Located at 13328 and 13324 State Hwy. 75 N., 89 F.3d 551, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1996)
28 (approving pro rata allocation of disgorgement settlement to victims of fraudulent investment scheme). After
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1 all, Plaintiffs’ claims in no way turn on the amount or type of information available regarding any one class
2 member, who accessed that information for what purpose, or any downstream consequential harms those
3 individual Californians suffered as a result. Mot. at 20-21. So none of those factors could influence the
4 method of apportioning disgorgement here; nor could such considerations here defeat predominance. Pulaski
5 & Middleman LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2015) (“differences in damage calculations [across
6 individual class members] is not sufficient to defeat class certification”).9
7 C. A class trial is superior to litigation alternatives and would be manageable.
8 TR’s primary superiority argument is that legislative action is better than a class action. Opp. at 22-
9 23. But a “superiority analysis focuses on the relative advantages of a class action suit over whatever other
10 forms of litigation might be realistically available to plaintiffs.” Richie v. Blue Shield of Cal., 2014 WL 6982943,
11 at *22 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (emphasis added). Because Rule 23 “sets the requirements [courts] are bound
12 to enforce,” and a comparison of class actions with legislation is not one of them, the mere possibility of
13 future legislative action cannot defeat superiority.10 Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th
14 Cir. 2017) (quoting Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). Diacakis v. Comcast Corp., 2013 WL
15 1878921 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013), is not to the contrary. The superiority analysis there considered regulatory
16 proceedings before administrative agencies specifically empowered to adjudicate the practices at the crux of
17 that litigation—that is, another form of adjudication, not legislation. Id. at *9. In short, TR’s preference that
18 Californians only vindicate their privacy rights through legislative action is not a reason to find that class
19 adjudication of Californians’ existing legal rights is not superior to individual adjudication of those rights.
20 TR presses other scattershot arguments about superiority, but none persuade. TR claims (at 21), for
21 example, that a class action is not warranted because certain class members might actually like CLEAR. But
22 “district courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely refuse to deny class certification where some—even most—of
23 the putative class members oppose” the litigation itself. James v. Uber Techs., 338 F.R.D. 123, 133 (N.D. Cal.
24 9
TR’s reliance (at 18) on inapposite false advertising cases does nothing to challenge the appropriateness of
25 a pro-rata distribution in this very different case. See Buckeye Tree Lodge and Sequoia Village Inn, LLC v. Expedia,
Inc., 2019 WL 1170489, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019) (because consumer perceptions of false “sold out”
26 notices were material to false advertising claim, they had to be accounted for in damages model).
10
27 Besides, the California Legislature has already acted to proscribe unfair business practices. While TR might
prefer a more targeted law, “[t]he unfair competition law is less specific, [precisely] because the Legislature
28 cannot anticipate all possible forms in which unfairness might occur.” Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 183.
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1 2021) (collecting cases). Class certification here remains appropriate, then, even if some subset of putative
2 class members would prefer that TR’s unfair business practice persist. Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d
3 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1986). And while TR claims (at 22 n.40) the absence of follow-on litigation shows a class
4 action is not a superior means of adjudication, the takeaway should be the opposite. See Moore v. Ulta Salon,
5 Cosms. & Fragrance, Inc., 311 F.R.D. 590, 625 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Plus, the relatively small amount of individual
6 monetary recovery as compared to the costs and difficulty of pursuing this legally and technologically
7 complicated public-interest case on an individual basis weighs strongly in favor of class treatment. O’Donovan
8 v. CashCall, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 479, 504 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
9 Lastly, TR says (at 21) it is not desirable to concentrate this litigation—raising purely California law
10 claims on behalf of Californians injured by TR’s practices—in California. What other forum could possibly
11 be more appropriate? TR doesn’t say. And contrary to TR’s assertions, the fact that a small number of
12 Californians might have moved to another state during the class period does not make these class proceedings
13 unmanageable in any way. In all, Rule 23(b)’s superiority and manageability requirements are met here.
14 CONCLUSION
15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court certify a hybrid (b)(2) and
16 (b)(3) class or, in the alternative, certify both claims for class treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), appoint
17 Plaintiffs Cat Brooks and Rasheed Shabazz as class representatives, and appoint Gibbs Law Group and
18 Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll as class counsel.
19
20 DATED: March 9, 2023 Respectfully submitted,
21 /s/ Andre M. Mura
22 Andre M. Mura
23 Eric H. Gibbs (SBN 178658)
Andre M. Mura (SBN 298541)
24 Amy M. Zeman (SBN 273100)
25 Mark H. Troutman (pro hac vice)
Ezekiel S. Wald (SBN 341490)
26 Hanne Jensen (SBN 336045)
GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
27 1111 Broadway, Suite 2100
28 Oakland, California 94607
Telephone: (510) 350-9700
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Case No.: 3:18-cv-01418-EMC-KAW
15
Case 3:21-cv-01418-EMC Document 170 Filed 03/09/23 Page 23 of 23
Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
1 ehg@classlawgroup.com
2 amm@classlawgroup.com
amz@classlawgroup.com
3 mht@classlawgroup.com
zsw@classlawgroup.com
4 hj@classlawgroup.com
5
Geoffrey A. Graber (SBN 211547)
6 Karina G. Puttieva (SBN 317702)
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL
7 PLLC
8 1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20005
9 Telephone: (202) 408-4600
Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
10 ggraber@cohenmilstein.com
11 kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com
12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Case No.: 3:18-cv-01418-EMC-KAW
16
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