Memo of Points and Authorities — Bofa Ca Unemployment (Dkt. 567.1)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 567-1 · 2025-10-17 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

Bank of America, N.A.'s memorandum of points and authorities supporting its motion to exclude the expert opinions of Greg J. Regan, filed October 17, 2025 as Document 567-1 in In re: Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. It argues that Regan, a certified public accountant offered by the plaintiffs as a damages expert for five classes certified June 16, 2025, does not reliably exclude uninjured class members. It challenges his consequential damages method, including an assumed 20% credit card interest rate, his actual damages calculation for the customer service class from excess hold time and the minimum wage, and his disgorgement method, asking exclusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. The 32-page memorandum was filed provisionally under seal.

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BANA’S MEM. ISO MOT. TO EXCLUDE REGAN 
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JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice)
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA 02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000 
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
Attorneys for Defendant  
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK] 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
Case No. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
DEFENDANT BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A.’S 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PURPORTED EXPERT OPINIONS 
OF GREG J. REGAN 
Date: 
April 17, 2026 
Time: 
1:30 p.m. 
Dept: 
12A – 12th Floor 
Judge: 
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED PROVISIONALLY UNDER SEAL 
PURSUANT TO STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3 
I.
Plaintiffs’ Claims and Damages Theories ....................................................... 3 
II.
The Regan Report ............................................................................................ 5 
III.
The Stango Rebuttal ........................................................................................ 7 
STANDARD OF LAW ............................................................................................. 9 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 10 
I.
Regan Does Not Reliably Exclude Uninjured Class Members. ................... 10 
II.
Regan’s Methodologies Produce No Evidence of Damages. ....................... 13 
A.
Regan’s “consequential damages” opinions are inadmissible. ........... 13 
1.
Regan’s 20% interest rate is not a reliable measure of
harm. ......................................................................................... 13 
2.
Regan’s method for calculating “consequential damages”
from “delayed benefits payments” is unreliable for further
reasons. ..................................................................................... 20 
B.
Regan’s opinions for the customer-service class are
inadmissible. ....................................................................................... 22 
C.
Regan’s “disgorgement” method should be excluded. ....................... 23 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 25 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Bakst v. Cmty. Mem’l Health Sys., Inc., 
2011 WL 13214315 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011) ................................................... 17 
Bradley v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
2023 WL 2574572 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2023) ..................................................... 19 
Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. RK Texas Leather Mfg., 
923 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (Curiel, J.) .............................................. 9 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
569 U.S. 27 (2013) ............................................................................................. 13 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993) ............................................................................................. 3  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc. (Daubert II), 
43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................ 9 
Domingo v. T.K., 
289 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 9 
Duncan v. Blackbird Prods. Grp., LLC, 
2021 WL 7708670 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2021) .................................................... 25 
Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 
233 F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 2000) ............................................................................... 18 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997) ........................................................................................... 16 
Greenwell v. Boatwright, 
184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 18 
Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC, 
2024 WL 4894840 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024) .............................................. 16, 24 
Liu v. SEC, 
591 U.S. 71 (2020) ............................................................................................. 25 
Oliver v. Am. Express Co., 
2024 WL 100848 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2024) ......................................................... 23 
Orshan v. Apple Inc., 
2024 WL 4353034 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) ................................................... 19 
In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 
934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019)............................................................................ 10 
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Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 
835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 10 
SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 
617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 24 
Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
935 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 22, 23 
United States v. Rushing, 
388 F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 17 
Utne v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 
2022 WL 16857061 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022) ................................................. 12 
Waine-Golston v. Time Warner Ent.-Advance/New House P’ship, 
2013 WL 1285535 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013) .................................................... 21 
Statutes 
15 U.S.C. § 1693 ............................................................................................ 4, 10, 13 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.010 ............................................................................... 14 
Other Authorities 
12 C.F.R. § 1005.2 ................................................................................................... 10 
12 C.F.R. § 1005.11 ................................................................................................. 20 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 ....................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
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Plaintiffs bear the burden of producing evidence of actual damages for 
themselves and their classes. Plaintiffs proffer the opinions of Greg Regan, a 
certified public accountant, on whom they rely (i) to identify the members of 
each of the five proposed classes, and (ii) to propose methodologies for calculating 
the various types of “damages” allegedly incurred by those class members. 
Because Regan’s methodologies are admissible for neither purpose, Bank of 
America (BANA) moves to exclude his opinions from the record in their entirety.      
Plaintiffs carry the burden of proffering a methodology that culls uninjured 
plaintiffs from the class—those class members who engaged in benefits fraud or filed 
fraudulent or mistaken claims. At the class certification stage, the Court held that the 
presence of uninjured class members did not defeat commonality or predominance 
because it believed “identifying non-injured class members” could readily be done at 
the “damages phase.” ECF 494 at 45. Regan concedes that such cardholders should 
be excluded, but rather than proffer a methodology that does so for each of the five 
classes, Regan simply determines class membership based on 
 
 
 But Regan admits 
 
 
 
 HX1 39 at 77:3-80:3. Thus, 
 
 
 
 Id. And the discovery record reinforces that 
 
 The Court should 
exclude all of Regan’s “damages” opinions for these reasons alone. 
Regan’s proposed methodologies for calculating consequential damages, 
1 Exhibits to the Declaration of Lindsay E. Hoyle shall be referred to as “HX.” 
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actual damages, and disgorgement should also be excluded because they are not 
based on the records, data, or asserted experiences of even a single class 
representative, individual plaintiff, or class member. Instead, Regan’s tabulation of 
“consequential damages” is based on his assessment of the experiences of a 
hypothetical “typical” consumer, unmoored from evidence reflecting the actual 
experiences of any class member. He assumes that a typical class member would 
have needed to obtain substitute funds when BANA allegedly denied or rescinded 
their claim or froze their account balance, and that the “most likely” source of such 
funds would have been increased credit card utilization at a 20% interest rate for the 
full amount of the at-issue funds. But Regan fails to validate either of those 
assumptions. And, in fact, both assumptions are contradicted by 
 
  
Likewise, Regan calculates “consequential damages” arising from “delayed 
benefits payments”—i.e., purported delays in cardholders receiving new benefit 
payment checks from California’s Employment Development Department (EDD) 
when their prepaid card account was frozen. Here, too, Regan simply assumes that 
every class member had the same experience: that they remained eligible for and 
continued to receive additional unemployment insurance (UI) benefits at the average 
payment amount for all EDD cardholders during the 2020-2021 time period during 
the freeze. But Regan made no attempt to validate any of these implausible 
assumptions by reference to the record of any class representative or class member.   
Regan calculates “actual damages” for the Customer Service Class by 
multiplying so-called excess hold time by the then-effective California minimum 
wage. In much the same way, Regan’s methodology is based on no analysis of 
whether any class member—all of whom had been receiving unemployment 
benefits—could have earned minimum wage but for the time spent on hold.  
Finally, to calculate disgorgement of profits, Regan assumes that 
 
 
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 This assumption, too, is not based on an assessment of the 
account records of even a single class representative, individual plaintiff, or class 
member. And it is refuted by the data that Regan himself relies on in his report, which 
shows that 
 
 
For these reasons and others described below, Regan’s opinions are unreliable, 
irrelevant, unhelpful to the trier of fact, and should be excluded under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
BACKGROUND 
I. 
Plaintiffs’ Claims and Damages Theories 
On June 16, 2025, this Court certified five classes of California UI benefits 
recipients alleging that they contacted BANA claiming unauthorized use of their 
benefits prepaid debit card, but had those claims denied because BANA’s records 
showed that the disputed transactions were made in-person at ATMs requiring the 
cardholder’s physical card and a claim that their private PIN passcode was somehow 
compromised. ECF 494 at 96-97. The relevant time period runs about seven-and-a-
half months, from September 28, 2020, when BANA implemented the challenged 
fraud-detection process (CFF-1), to June 8, 2021, when BANA ceased using CFF-1 
to deny claims. See id. Although the Court acknowledged that the certified classes 
may include some uninjured cardholders, it held that their presence did not defeat 
commonality or predominance because “identifying non-injured class members” 
could be readily done at the “damages phase.” ECF 494 at 45.  
Separately, in July 2022, BANA entered into a settlement agreement with the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) that included a framework providing full compensation 
for cardholders whose claims might have been inaccurately denied by the filter. See 
generally HX 28; HX 29. 
 
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ECF 497 at 97. Further, 
 
 
 See HX 31 at 5-13; HX 40 ¶¶ 73-75. 
II. 
The Regan Report 
Greg Regan is a certified public accountant. HX 41 ¶ 24. Plaintiffs proffer him 
as a damages expert, primarily as to “methodologies to measure the impact on each 
Class of the Bank’s policies and practices.” Id. ¶ 5. Regan first identifies the members 
of each of the five classes, using the class definitions he was provided by counsel. 
Regan then excludes “person[s] whom the Bank has determined, pursuant to its 
Remediation Plan” should be excluded from its remediation framework, specifically 
anyone who “(i) has been disqualified by [EDD] from Program eligibility; (ii) has 
previously engaged in fraudulent Program conduct, such as submission of fraudulent 
claims or other abuses of the claims process; or (iii) has had their card frozen due to 
legal order processes, as a result of Internal/Vendor fraud investigations, or by Global 
Financial Crimes Compliance.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 65, 77, 88-90, 98. Regan thus determines 
class membership based on the Remediation Plan: 
 
 
  
Regan then purports to provide methodologies to tabulate “class damages”—
which he deems actual damages, consequential damages, treble damages, statutory 
damages, and disgorgement—for members of each class. Id. ¶ 15. For the Claim 
Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze Classes, Regan calculates “actual 
damages” as the amount of funds that were temporarily unavailable to the cardholder 
due to CFF-1—i.e., 
 
. HX 40 ¶¶ 33, 83, 90. For the 
Customer Service Class, Regan proposes calculating actual damages based on 
multiplying the “average excess hold time” estimated by one of Plaintiffs’ other 
experts, Jay Minnucci, by “how many times each class member called during the 
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relevant period” and “the applicable minimum wage—or other reasonable metric—
to calculate the total value of class members’ lost time.” HX 41 ¶ 19.3 
Regan also proposes a “methodology for measuring the economic harm caused 
by a wrongful denial of funds”—what he terms “consequential damages.” Id. ¶¶ 43-
44. Regan characterizes this supposed “economic harm” in a variety of ways, 
including the “time value of money,” “lost ability to use [] funds,” “reduced 
consumption,” and/or “the inability to pay down existing debt.” Id. ¶¶ 44, 46. The 
“foundation” by which Regan proposes measuring these supposed harms is “the cost 
of borrowing.” Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Regan opines that “impacted cardholders would have 
needed to mitigate the unexpected inability to access their funds otherwise available,” 
and “the most likely source of funds accessible to an impacted cardholder would have 
been increased credit card utilization.” Id. ¶ 46-47. Regan calculates “consequential 
damages” using two interest rates: a 10% interest rate he claims is “consistent with 
the interest rate applied to judgments in California,” (id. ¶ 46), and a 20% credit card 
interest rate (id. ¶ 49). He calls the latter rate a “conservative” measure of the “time 
value of money,” and says it is consistent with BANA’s consequential harm 
payments. Id.  
Despite using “credit card interest rates” as the basis for his measure of 
“consequential damages” (id. ¶¶ 48, 49), Regan does not claim that any class 
members actually did turn to credit card borrowing and pay this interest rate, or that 
they borrowed any funds at all. HX 39 at 223:20-224:16. Even if any did, the 
conceded effect of Regan’s methodology is that every class member has already 
received full compensation for all of their claimed injuries, consisting of the full 
amount of their disputed claim and/or the funds that were temporarily inaccessible to 
them, 
 
. HX 41 ¶¶ 56-57; HX 39 at 114:19-116:15. 
 
3 BANA has also moved to exclude Minnucci’s opinions because the methodologies 
he uses to derive these inputs do not satisfy Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert. ECF ###. 
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Regan opines that the Account Freeze Class suffered additional “consequential 
damages” because 
 
 HX 41 ¶¶ 83-86. Though Regan 
acknowledges 
 
 and thus “the cardholder 
was forced to access alternative funds during this time.” Id. ¶¶ 83-84. Regan proposes 
calculating “consequential damages” for delayed benefit payments by multiplying 
“the average bi-weekly benefit payment to [] EDD cardholders” by the “length of the 
delayed receipt of their subsequent benefit payments.” Id. Regan does not explain 
how he proposes to determine when each class member would have received their 
benefit check(s) from EDD, nor does he know if they in fact received further UI 
benefits while their accounts were frozen. See HX 39 at 251:6-19. 
Finally, Regan proposes a method of measuring “disgorgement of profits the 
Bank earned” from the “
”—i.e., income it derived from the funds held 
on deposit in class members’ accounts. HX 41 ¶¶ 60-62. Regan theorizes that 
 
 
 
 
 Id. ¶ 61. Thus, Regan tabulates “disgorgement” by multiplying BANA’s 
 
 
 Id. ¶ 62.   
III. 
The Stango Rebuttal 
Economist Dr. Victor Stango identified a litany of “methodological flaws” in 
Regan’s damages methodologies and conclusions. HX 40 ¶ 8. To start, Regan’s 
methodology for identifying impacted class members fails to “distinguish individuals 
who were harmed by the Bank’s alleged misconduct from those who were 
unharmed.” Id. ¶¶ 75-79. Regan simply assumes that the claims of any class members 
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who 
 would have been paid 
in a but-for world. Id. But determining whether the class member had fraudulently 
obtained benefits or made a fraudulent or mistaken claim instead requires individual 
inquiry that Regan did not perform. Id. Regan has proffered no reliable methodology 
for excluding such cardholders from his damages tabulations, “rendering it an 
unreliable methodology for isolating harm from the alleged misconduct on a class-
wide basis.” Id. ¶ 79.       
Further, Regan’s proposed methodology for calculating actual damages 
“makes no economic sense” because the amounts that class members temporarily lost 
access to have either been restored to them 
 
. Id. ¶¶ 33, 83, 90. For the proposed Customer Service Class, 
Regan’s methodology does not measure economic harm because it assumes without 
any proffered facts or data that class members who were receiving and/or had 
recently received UI benefits would have earned California minimum wage but-for 
having been on hold. Id. ¶¶ 99-102. 
Regan’s proposed “consequential damages” methodology “cannot estimate 
economic harm on a class-wide basis” because it is based on “assumptions about 
proposed class members’ economic circumstances and behaviors that are not derived 
from class data,” and “obscure[s] important heterogeneity in alleged damages.” Id. 
¶¶ 10, 36-70. By failing to consider facts or data concerning the specific economic 
circumstances and heterogeneity of the class, Regan’s credit card interest rate 
methodology “overstate[s] economic harm for proposed class members.” Id. For the 
Account Freeze Class, moreover, Regan proposes estimating the “cost of delayed 
benefit payments” but such estimations are unreliable where Regan is “silent on how 
he plans to calculate, on a class-wide basis, 
 
 
 Id. ¶ 94.   
 
Finally, Regan’s disgorgement methodology also does not reliably estimate 
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BANA’s profits because it assumes that all proposed class members 
 
 
 Id. ¶¶ 80-81. Not only are these assumptions bereft of 
factual support, data from Regan’s report shows that “
 
.” Id.  
STANDARD OF LAW 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert “impose[] a special ‘gatekeeping obligation’ 
on trial judges” presented with expert testimony. Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. RK 
Texas Leather Mfg., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (Curiel, J.). Under 
Rule 702, a witness proffered as an expert must satisfy the following requirements: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) 
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
Under Daubert, district courts must “carefully apply[] Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
to ensure that specialized and technical evidence is ‘not only relevant, but reliable.’” 
Brighton Collectibles, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1253. The reliability standard tests: 
(1) whether the scientific theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether the 
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) 
whether there is a known or potential error rate; and (4) whether the theory or 
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. 
Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, “one very significant 
fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters 
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of 
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes 
of testifying.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
“[T]he burden of proving the expert’s testimony satisfies Rule 702” and the 
Daubert standard rests on the Plaintiffs, as “[t]he proponent of the evidence.” 
Brighton Collectibles, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1253. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proffering a damages methodology that winnows 
out uninjured class members. Plaintiffs’ claims also require them to furnish evidence 
of “actual damage sustained by [Plaintiffs] as a result of” the defendant’s conduct. 
15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(1). Regan’s methodology does neither because none of his 
opinions are based on a consideration of data or evidence reflecting the actual facts, 
circumstances, and experiences of a single class representative, individual plaintiff, 
or class member, let alone the class writ large.  
I. 
Regan Does Not Reliably Exclude Uninjured Class Members.  
To assert EFTA claims, plaintiffs must show their accounts were “established 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” not criminal purposes. 12 
C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(1). Fraudulently obtained accounts get no protection. Likewise, 
cardholders who either intended to file fraudulent disputes or who simply reported 
authorized transactions by mistake cannot recover. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(12)(B) 
(transaction “initiated with fraudulent intent” cannot be appealed to card issuer as 
“unauthorized”). Though the Court has held that the presence of uninjured class 
members does not defeat commonality or predominance, it premised that decision on 
a belief that “identifying non-injured class members” could be readily done at the 
“damages phase.” ECF 494 at 45; see also Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 
F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (presence of injured class members did not defeat 
class certification because “the district court is well situated to winnow out those non-
injured members at the damages phase of the litigation”); In re Rail Freight Fuel 
Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 934 F.3d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Uninjured class 
members cannot prevail on the merits, so their claims must be winnowed away as 
part of the liability determination.”). 
Regan has proffered no reliable methodology for the Court to use to perform 
the requisite “winnowing out” of non-injured class members. Though Regan 
acknowledged that non-injured class members should be excluded from the class, 
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and excluded from his damages tabulations certain class members 
 
 Regan 
confirmed under oath that he “didn’t form an opinion” as to whether those exclusions 
were sufficient or appropriate for purposes of calculating class damages. HX 39 at 
72:17-25. Because Regan has proposed no reliable method of excluding non-injured 
class members, his method of determining class damages is inadmissible.  
To identify members of the class, Regan relied on the class definitions 
provided to him by counsel. See id. at 69:18-70:13. Regan then reviewed “the Bank’s 
records” to identify cardholders who met the class definition criteria provided to him 
by counsel. See, e.g., HX 41 ¶ 33. Finally, Regan “[e]xcluded from the class [] any 
person whom the Bank has determined, pursuant to its Remediation Plan,” had “(i) 
has been disqualified by [EDD] from Program eligibility; (ii) has previously engaged 
in fraudulent Program conduct, such as submission of fraudulent claims or other 
abuses of the claims process; or (iii) has had their card frozen due to legal order 
processes, as a result of Internal/Vendor fraud investigations, or by Global Financial 
Crimes Compliance.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 65, 77.   
Though Regan opines that he “
 
” HX 39 at 73:2-14 (emphasis added), his methodology does 
not reliably do so. Regan acknowledges that not every class member has been injured, 
 
 HX 41 ¶¶ 32, 65, 77. 
 
 
—i.e., that they did not make a fraudulent or 
mistaken claim, or were not ineligible for benefits. 
 
 HX 31 at 4 n. 16; 
see also ECF 350-9 ¶ 11 (describing Remediation Plan as 
 
). To those ends, BANA provided 
compensation 
 HX 31 at 12. For 
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example, 
 
 
 Id. at 4. 
 
4 
 
 
 See ECF 350-8 ¶¶ 8-15.  
Regan performed no review of those procedures, nor does he 
 
 
 HX 39 at 77:3-80:3. Likewise, Regan testified that it was “
 
” (not BANA’s) to determine 
 
 but acknowledged that he had not reviewed any information 
concerning 
: “That wasn’t the 
nature of my assignment.” Id. at 96:6-97:14. 
The inclusion in the class of cardholders who filed fraudulent or mistaken 
claims is no mere hypothetical concern. 
 
 
 ECF 350-8 ¶¶ 9-14. Regan acknowledges 
 
 
 HX 39 at 82:16-84:9. Instead, his methodology is premised on 
determinations made by others, based on a process he did not review, and concerning 
which he offers no opinions. Thus, it should come as little surprise that 
 
 
 
 Id. at 77:3-16. Because 
Regan’s methodology does not reliably exclude uninjured class members from his 
 
4 See HX 42 at Nos. 39 & 42. 
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damages computation, his opinions are inadmissible and should be excluded. See, 
e.g., Utne v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2022 WL 16857061, *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 
2022) (striking calculations where they “almost certainly include damages for 
uninjured class members”). 
II. 
Regan’s Methodologies Produce No Evidence of Damages. 
Plaintiffs’ claims require them to furnish evidence of “actual damage sustained 
by [Plaintiffs] as a result of” the defendant’s conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(1). 
Because Plaintiffs assert their claims on behalf of a class, the method they use to 
evidence actual damages must measure them “across the entire class.” Comcast Corp. 
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013). Regan’s proposed methods for measuring 
damages and “disgorgement” are not admissible for either purpose.  
A. Regan’s “consequential damages” opinions are inadmissible. 
Regan purports to premise his “consequential damages” methodology on his 
research regarding the experience of a hypothetical “typical consumer” and the 
“typical type of harm” they would have incurred when faced with the lost ability to 
use their funds. HX 41 ¶¶ 40-51; HX 39 at 48:7-49:15. Regan opines that this “typical 
consumer” “would have needed to mitigate the unexpected inability to access their 
funds,” and that “the most likely source of funds accessible to an impacted cardholder 
would have been increased credit card utilization.” HX 41 ¶ 46-47. But as this Court 
found in its Class Certification Order, this methodology is “not supported . . . with 
evidence showing that these assumptions are true as to most or even any of the EDD 
cardholder’s experience,” and thus “Plaintiffs have not demonstrate[d] that this 
method measures damages across the entire class and that they stem from BANA’s 
actions that created the legal liability.” ECF 494 at 88. Regan’s “consequential 
damages” methodology is therefore inadmissible.    
1. Regan’s 20% interest rate is not a reliable measure of harm. 
Regan purports to calculate the “economic harm” he believes resulted from 
class members being temporarily unable to access the amount of their denied or 
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rescinded claim, and/or their account balance. Regan characterizes this “economic 
harm” in a variety of ways, including the “time value of money,” “lost ability to use 
[] funds,” “reduced consumption,” “missed payments,” and/or “the inability to pay 
down existing debt.” HX 41 ¶¶ 43, 44, 46. Regan proposes measuring all of these 
disparate harms through “the cost of borrowing.” Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Though to illustrate 
his methodology Regan first applies a 10% interest rate, because that is “the interest 
rate applied to judgments in California,”5 Regan opines that the 10% rate “likely 
understates the cost a consumer would have incurred” because “impacted cardholders 
would have needed to mitigate the unexpected inability to access their funds 
otherwise available.” Id. ¶ 46. For “typical consumers,” “the most likely source of 
funds . . . would have been increased credit card utilization.” Id. ¶ 47. To measure 
the impact of credit card utilization, Regan “selected 20% as the APR for [] 
calculation of the time value of money,” “to be conservative.” Id. ¶ 49. 
The primary flaw in Regan’s methodology is that he is not claiming that every 
class member (or even any class member) had to borrow money or increase his or 
her credit card utilization as a result of a temporary inability to access funds. HX 39 
at 48:7-49:7. Indeed, Regan candidly admits that not every class member would have 
increased their credit card utilization. Id. at 223:20-224:16. For any that did, Regan 
does not opine that they actually incurred debt at either a 10% interest rate or at his 
proposed 20% credit card interest rate. Id.  
Regan’s twin assumptions—that “cardholders would have needed to mitigate 
the unexpected inability to access their funds” and that “the most likely source of 
funds accessible to an impacted cardholder would have been increased credit card 
utilization” (HX 41 ¶ 46-47)—ignore that consumers can fund unanticipated 
expenses from a variety of sources other than credit cards. Indeed, Regan 
 
5 In addition to being unsupported by sufficient facts and data—i.e., the actual 
experiences of class members—Regan’s 10% interest rate is also irrelevant. The 10% 
interest rate applies to judgments in California state courts, not federal courts. See 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.010.(a)(1). 
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acknowledged wide variability in the financial circumstances of class members, 
including the amount of liquid savings or cash that a class member may have had 
available to fund unanticipated expenses. HX 39 at 192:6-193:7. Regan also 
acknowledged that class members could have borrowed funds from family members 
or friends to meet unexpected expenses (id. at 211:14-213:1), or even simply reduced 
their consumption (id. at 224:18-225:8). Class members who borrowed funds from 
family members or friends at 0% interest, or who didn’t need to borrow at all, would 
have incurred zero “consequential damages” from borrowing funds at Regan’s credit 
card interest rate. HX 40 ¶ 57. 
Despite acknowledging wide variability in how consumers could meet 
unexpected expenditures (if any) when faced with the temporary loss of access to 
funds, Regan did not review the records of even a single class representative, 
individual plaintiff, or proposed class member to determine if (i) they incurred such 
expenditures; and (ii) they increased their credit card utilization or incurred credit 
card debt at a 20% APR as a result. HX 39 at 45:2-47:2. He did not review the 
“financial cushion” (i.e., available cash or savings) of any class member (id. at 
210:21-211:5), data or evidence concerning any alternative sources of income or 
assets available to class members (id. at 190:9-21), or any class members’ credit card 
statements or balances to determine whether they incurred additional debt or paid 
credit card interest and at 20% interest (id. at 171:1-172:2). Indeed, 
 
 
 Id. at 183:16-184:11. 
Rather than attempt to support his methodology through review of the actual 
experiences of class representatives, individual plaintiffs, or proposed class 
members, Regan instead relies on inferences from reports and studies indicating that 
“many Americans live paycheck-to-paycheck,” “many families have little to no 
financial cushion,” and “many consumers” would be unable to meet significant 
unexpected expenses. HX 41 ¶¶ 41-43. But these broad brush generalizations 
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regarding the circumstances of “Americans,” “families,” and “consumers” provide 
no reliable insight into the circumstances of the proposed class. Even those studies 
that Regan invokes concerning the circumstances of “unemployed consumers” 
provide no basis for generalizing about the proposed class members, who may have 
been employed or underemployed (rather than unemployed) at the time of the 
asserted economic harm. HX 39 at 188:23-191:19. Thus, as this Court has already 
concluded, Regan’s methodology is “not supported . . . with evidence showing that 
these assumptions are true as to most or even any of the EDD cardholder’s 
experience,” and thus “Plaintiffs have not demonstrate[d] that this method measures 
damages across the entire class and that they stem from BANA’s actions that created 
the legal liability.” ECF 494 at 88.6   
Moreover, by relying on these sweeping generalizations and not validating 
them by reference to the specific facts and circumstance of even a single class 
representative, individual plaintiff, or proposed class member, Regan fails to base his 
method on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). See 
Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 4894840, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024) 
(striking damages computation as not based on “sufficient facts or data,” because “a 
very high-level view” “does not mean that those numbers are sufficiently reliable to 
develop a ratio to compute damages”). Because Regan’s opinions are “connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert,” his opinions are also irrelevant and 
inadmissible. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
Regan tries to bridge this analytical gap by invoking 
 
 
 HX 41 ¶¶ 52-57. But the Court has already concluded “that the 
 
6 In response to the Class Certification Order, Regan removed opinions concerning 
the “cost of late or overdraft fees” from his “consequential damages” analysis. But 
the fundamental flaw identified by the Court remains: his credit card interest rate 
methodology provides for a “range of reasonably possible outcomes amongst 
potential class members,” (HX 41 ¶ 51), but is not supported by evidence showing 
most or even any class members actually experienced these outcomes.  
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Remediation Plan does not support a damages model that satisfies Comcast.” ECF 
494 at 87. The Remediation Plan did not 
 
. See HX 31 at 12 
 
 Rather, 
 
 Id. at 
12; ECF 494 at 87. For 
 
 
 
 HX 31 at 7. That BANA’s 
Remediation Plan 
 
 is irrelevant; the 
Remediation Plan did not 
 
 See ECF 494 at 87. 
Not only is Regan’s consequential harm calculation unsupported by facts and 
data, but also “the facts of the case contradict or otherwise render the opinion 
unreasonable.” United States v. Rushing, 388 F.3d 1153, 1156 (8th Cir. 2004); see 
also Bakst v. Cmty. Mem’l Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 13214315, *19-20 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 7, 2011) (excluding damages calculation “based on factual assumptions that are 
entirely unsupported by the record”). Indeed, Regan’s assumptions about 
“consequential damages” are inconsistent with 
 
. Every class representative answered interrogatories asking them to 
state 
 
 Of the nine class representatives, 
 
 
 
 
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 HX 34 ¶ 75.7 
 
 
 Id. ¶ 75 n.194.  
 
 
 Id. For example, 
 
 
 
,8 
9 See HX 40 
¶ 61. 
 
. Id. For example, 
 
.10 Still 
 
 
 
.11 See HX 40 ¶ 62. Regan thus “renders an opinion about . . . economic harm 
based on economic assumptions not present in the plaintiff’s case,” and therefore his 
opinion “cannot be said to ‘assist the trier of fact’ as Rule 702 requires.” Elcock v. 
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 756 & n. 13 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court 
abused its discretion in not excluding the expert opinion); see also Greenwell v. 
Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Expert testimony . . . is inadmissible 
when the facts upon which the expert bases his testimony contradict the evidence”). 
Though Regan admits that some class members did not actually incur credit 
card debt (HX 39 at 224:12-13), he nonetheless claims that a credit card interest rate 
“can be used to quantify the harm experienced” by class members, including harms 
 
7 HX 37 at 28:26-29:7; see also HX 34 ¶¶ 75-76.  
8 HX 43 at 26:2-6. 
9 HX 44 at 33:15-16; HX 45 at 29:24-25. 
10 HX 46 at 37:2-4. 
11 HX 44 at 33:13-15. 
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arising from “medical expenses” and even “reduced consumption,” Id. at 224:18-
225:8. Regan attempts to justify application of a 20% APR by asserting that it “is a 
conservative measurement because those other types of instances are associated with 
greater rates of harm,” and therefore “credit card rate of interest appropriately 
captures calls-wide damages on an aggregate basis.” Id. at 227:9-20; see also id. at 
225:16-24. Far from being a “conservative” measure, one of plaintiffs’ other experts, 
David Levine, purported to conduct a similar analysis to Regan but measured the cost 
of borrowing money on a credit card at a much-lower 15.9% APR. HX 35 ¶ 45. That 
one of plaintiffs’ own experts disagrees with Regan about the appropriate measure of 
class members’ “consequential damages” further illustrates that Regan’s 
methodology is unreliable. See, e.g., Bradley v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2023 WL 
2574572, *14-15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2023) (striking expert report in part because the 
expert “offers theories of defect and causation that actually contradict those presented 
by its other experts; [the expert’s] report would likely only serve to confuse or 
mislead the jury by introducing conflicting evidence.”). 
Even if both measures were conservative, however, “Daubert asks whether 
expert opinions are reliable and relevant, not whether they are conservative.” Orshan 
v. Apple Inc., 2024 WL 4353034, *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024). “If a damage model 
could survive Daubert by simply underestimating true damages, an expert could 
avoid having a court exclude her opinions by picking an arbitrary damage figure that 
is comfortably below any reasonable amount of true damages even though such an 
opinion would be plainly unreliable.” Id. Regan’s insistence that his credit card 
interest rate is a “conservative” measure of economic harm simply underscores that 
his credit card interest rate is an attempt to measure other supposed harms to “typical 
consumers” (not class members) that have nothing to do with credit card borrowing 
(e.g., reduced consumption). But because nothing about those alleged damages has 
anything to do with a credit card interest rate, Regan’s methodology has no 
connection at all to any class member’s alleged damages.  
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Finally, Regan erroneously applies his methodology to certain specific class 
members in the proposed Claim Denial, Claim Rescission, and Account Freeze 
Classes, compounding its unreliability. For example, Regan calculates consequential 
harm for class members based on a 20% APR even if they were without funds for 
. HX 41 ¶¶ 45, 84 n.119. These cardholders would have received 
credits and/or regained access to their account before any credit card interest 
payments would have become due. HX 39 at 221:18-224:11. Regan also calculates 
consequential harm for class members based on a 20% APR even 
 
 
 HX 
41 ¶ 57. That is, class members in the population who had their claim 
 
would have been in the same place but-for the alleged misconduct, and 
therefore suffered no “consequential damages.” See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.11(c). As yet 
another example, Regan calculates consequential harm for class members regardless 
of the claim value or account balance. See, e.g., HX 41 ¶¶ 45, 80-82. He simply 
assumes class members would have needed to incur 20% APR borrowing costs even 
if their claim value and account balance were relatively low (e.g., $2). See id. & 
Sched. 2. These illogical and untested assumptions reinforce the unreliability of 
Regan’s method of measuring “consequential damages.” 
2. Regan’s method for calculating “consequential damages” from
“delayed benefits payments” is unreliable for further reasons.
In addition to the reasons described above, Regan’s “delayed benefits 
payments” “consequential damages” calculations must be excluded because he 
applies his interest rate calculation in an unreliable manner.   
For cardholders in the Account Freeze Class, Regan opines that “[i]f 
a cardholder’s account 
 
.” HX 
41 ¶ 83. Though EDD would 
 
paper
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 Regan opines 
 and, as a 
result, “
.” Id. 
Regan, therefore, calculates the cost of delayed benefits payments as a
 
 
 
 Id. ¶ 84.  
In doing so, Regan admits that he does not actually know either “the amount 
of each class members bi-weekly benefit payment” or “the length of the delayed 
receipt of their subsequent benefit payments,” and that he did not review any data or 
evidence reflecting either input. See HX 39 at 246:23-248:9. He also did nothing to 
verify that each class member remained eligible for EDD benefits after their account 
was frozen and during the pendency of the freeze, such that they would have even 
received additional benefit payments. Id. at 251:6-19.  
Rather, Regan assumes that each proposed class member remained 
unemployed and eligible for benefits while their account remained frozen (i.e., that 
they would have continued receiving new benefits payments). HX 39 at 250:23-
251:12. Further, Regan assumes that “the average EDD benefit payment” for all EDD 
cardholders between 2020 and 2021—a period that includes nine months before and 
seven months after the class period—was the same as the average payment for 
members of this discrete class of cardholders. See HX 41 ¶ 84 n. 118. Although Regan 
claims EDD payment data is readily available, he did nothing to test these 
assumptions. HX 39 at 247:5-248:9. Thus, like the Court previously found for 
Regan’s “consequential damages” opinions, Regan’s delayed benefits damages 
calculations are also inadmissible because they are “based on assumptions rather than 
evidence establishing each cardholder’s experience.” See ECF 494 at 87-88.12  
 
12 See also Waine-Golston v. Time Warner Ent.-Advance/New House P’ship, 2013 
WL 1285535, *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013) (striking expert where his “conclusions 
about the aggregate number [of] under reported hours are not reliable as it includes a 
time period of almost three years that is not asserted in the first amended complaint”), 
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Regan’s delayed benefits opinion is further inadmissible because his 
assumption that each cardholder had a 
 is bereft of factual 
support. See HX 41 ¶ 84. Regan acknowledges that the 
 is a placeholder 
assumption because he “do[es] not have that data.” HX 39 at 248:4-9. He claims that 
he would “plan to consider” that data in his methodology “at the time it becomes 
available.” Id. at 250:2-22. But when asked how EDD’s data could possibly show the 
additional amount of time it took for each cardholder to receive their check, Regan 
conceded: “I don’t know that EDD’s data would have that.” Id. at 249:1-10. Regan 
then suggested that instead he would derive a “median” “estimate” from other, 
unspecified data. Id. at 249:12-19. Because his methodology is premised on the 
existence of unavailable data, it is speculative and inadmissible. See Stephens v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 935 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming exclusion where 
“the evidence in the record [did] not support the experts’ assumption”). 
B. Regan’s opinions for the customer-service class are inadmissible.
Regan uses the minimum wage to attach a value to the alleged “lost time” of
the Customer Service Class, multiplying the then-current California minimum wage 
by the alleged “average excess hold time” of “
” calculated 
by plaintiffs’ call center expert Jay Minnucci. HX 41 ¶ 93; HX 39 at 282:3-284:16. 
BANA has moved to exclude Minnucci’s opinions because the purported “industry 
standard” hold time he proffers has no sound or reliable basis. To the extent the Court 
excludes the relevant opinions of Levine and Minnucci, therefore, Regan’s opinions 
concerning “actual damages” for the customer-service class must also be excluded.  
Additionally, Regan’s proposed methodology is inadmissible to calculate 
“actual damages” for the Customer Service Class because it cannot reliably measure 
economic harm on a classwide basis. Regan’s methodology assumes that “lost time” 
resulted in the same “economic harm” to each class member. HX 41 ¶ 93. But he 
aff’d sub nom. Corbin v. Time Warner Ent.-Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 821 F.3d 
1069 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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does not assert that any member of the class could or would have collected 
compensation for their time at the minimum-wage rate had they not been on hold. 
HX 39 286:4-15. Indeed, as noted above, Regan’s other opinions—including his 
calculation of the impact of delayed benefit payments—are based on the assumption 
that every class member was unemployed during the relevant time period, and so 
would not have earned minimum wage but for the “excess” hold time. See id. at 
285:24-286:3. Opinions that rely on contradictory factual assumptions are inherently 
unreliable. See Oliver v. Am. Express Co., 2024 WL 100848, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 
2024) (reasoning that “the Daubert gatekeeping function is meant to prevent” 
“internally contradictory argument[s]” by experts), amended in part, 2024 WL 
217711 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2024). 
Regan’s methodology would also require facts or data reflecting the number 
of times each class member called and was transferred to the claims call center during 
the relevant period. HX 41 ¶ 93. But 
 
. ECF 350-6 ¶ 
18. This means 
 
 
 See generally Stephens, 856-57 (affirming exclusion of expert opinion 
where “the evidence in the record [did] not support the experts’ assumption”). 
C. Regan’s “disgorgement” method should be excluded. 
Plaintiffs allege that BANA earned so-called 
 
 See ECF 406 ¶ 49. Plaintiffs theorize that BANA 
earned more 
 
 
 See HX 41 ¶ 61. Likewise, 
Plaintiffs assert that 
 
 See id. Regan thus purports to 
measure the 
 
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. Id. 
The fundamental methodological flaw in Regan’s analysis is his assumption 
that in a but-for world, each class member would have immediately withdrawn all of 
their funds. See HX 41 ¶¶ 60-62. Rather than base that premise on a consideration of 
class members’ account records, however, 
 
 HX 39 at 262:11-263:18. 
 
 HX 47 at 63:5-14. But even assuming 
 
 Regan has provided no basis for his assumption that 
observations regarding the general behavior of EDD cardholders are indicative of the 
behavior of class members specifically. See Kewazinga 2024 WL 4894840, *4 
(striking damages computation as not based on “sufficient facts or data,” because “a 
very high-level view” “does not mean that those numbers are sufficiently reliable to 
develop a ratio to compute damages”).  
Regan acknowledged that he did not review specific information for any 
proposed class members to confirm this assumption. HX 39 at 190:9-21. Had Regan 
simply considered Schedule 2 of his own report, he would have identified 
 
 
 HX 41, Schedule 2. Clearly 
 
 
 Further, even if Plaintiffs could show that a “majority” 
of class members would have withdrawn their benefits “immediately” (i.e., the same 
day), Regan miscalculates the disgorgement amount. He calculates disgorgement 
based on an assumption not that a majority of class members would have immediately 
withdrawn their benefits, but that every class member would have done so. Id., ¶¶ 60-
62. Regan provides no basis for assuming that 100% of class members would have
immediately withdrawn their benefits, nor could he 
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 See id., Schedule 2. 
Finally, Regan’s disgorgement calculation is irrelevant and therefore 
inadmissible because it fails to reliably estimate BANA’s “net profits.” The purpose 
of a disgorgement award is to prevent unjust enrichment. See SEC v. Platforms 
Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010). Disgorgement is an 
appropriate remedy, for an alleged wrongdoers’ “net profits.” See generally Liu v. 
SEC, 591 U.S. 71, 79 (2020). Regan’s methodology does not measure “net profits.” 
He considers only the purported “
” earned by BANA, and fails to 
deduct BANA’s operational costs. HX 39 at 266:20-268:4 (emphasis added). 
Regan’s method, therefore, does not even purport to be a measure of “net profits.” 
Regan’s methodology also fails to account for the 
 
 
. See HX 40 ¶ 98; 
HX 39 at 270:22-271:15. Regan claims that but-for BANA’s alleged conduct, an 
additional 
 in benefits payments would have been deposited to prepaid 
debit card accounts. HX 41 ¶ 83. BANA would have earned 
 on these 
amounts but-for the alleged conduct challenged by Plaintiffs. By not factoring in 
these amounts, Regan’s proposed “disgorgement” methodology fails to measure 
BANA’s “net profits,” and is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. See, e.g., Duncan 
v. Blackbird Prods. Grp., LLC, 2021 WL 7708670, *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2021)
(excluding expert testimony because expert’s calculations based on gross profits 
rather than net profits).
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, the Court should strike each and all of 
Regan’s unreliable and irrelevant opinions from the record.  
///
///
///
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Dated: October 17, 2025 
By: 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Matthew L. Riffee 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
KEITH LEVENBERG (pro hac vice) 
KLevenberg@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N St. NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
Tel: +1 202 346 4000  
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA 02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: + 1 617 523 1231 
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100) 
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500 
Fax: +1 617 346 4444 
VALERIE A. HAGGANS (pro hac vice) 
VHaggans@goodwinlaw.com 
LINDSAY E. HOYLE (pro hac vice) 
LHoyle@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
620 Eighth Avenue 
New York, NY 10018 
Tel: +1 212 813-8800 
Fax: +1 212 355-3333 
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice) 
YChan@jonesday.com 
JONES DAY 
100 High Street 
Boston, MA 02110 
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939 
Fax: +1 617 449 6999 
JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433) 
jbrown@myersnave.com 
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 278405) 
mnazareth@myersnave.com 
MEYERS NAVE 
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600 B Street, Suite 1650 
San Diego, CA 92101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the 
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by 
using the CM/ECF system on October 17, 2025. I further certify that all participants 
in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the 
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
 
 
 
Executed: 
October 17, 2025 
 
s/ Matthew L. Riffee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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