Memo of Points and Authorities — Bofa Ca Unemployment (Dkt. 415.1)

Summary

Bank of America's memorandum in support of its motion to stay pending Supreme Court review, in In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3:21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, filed 02/07/25 as Document 415-1 (13 pages) for an April 25, 2025 hearing. It notes that one week after the January 17, 2025 class certification hearing, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis on whether a class may be certified when some members lack any Article III injury. The bank argues that question bears on its argument that uninjured cardholders, including people who defrauded EDD, preclude certification. It asks the court to stay all proceedings, including any class certification ruling, until the Supreme Court decides the case, expected by June 2025.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000 
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
Attorneys for Defendant  
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK] 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 3:21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO STAY PENDING 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
 
   
Date:   
April 25, 2025 
Time:   
1:30 P.M. 
Ctrm:   
2D – 2nd Floor  
Judge:  
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 
 
   
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25495 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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As the Court is aware, this multidistrict litigation involves Plaintiffs’ challenge 
to a short-lived anti-fraud strategy that Bank of America N.A. (“BANA”) used to 
respond to the massive explosion of fraud in connection with the prepaid debit cards 
that BANA issued to Plaintiffs and class members pursuant to a contract with 
California’s Employment Development Department (“EDD”). On August 29, 2024, 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification (Dkt. 324), which was argued before 
the Court on January 17, 2025 (Dkt. 408).   
On January 24, 2025—only one week after the Court’s hearing on Plaintiff’s 
motion—the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis, No. 24-0304.  
The Court specified that it will decide this question: “Whether a federal court may 
certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some 
members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.” 2025 WL 288305 (U.S. 
Jan. 24, 2025). At a minimum, the outcome of Laboratory Corp. will be relevant to 
the pending motion due to BANA’s argument that the presence of uninjured class 
members precludes certification when the process of identifying them before 
judgment would predominate over individual issues (Dkt. 349, at 34–35), and 
Plaintiffs’ response that Rule 23 “does [not] preclude certification of a class that 
potentially includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members” 
(Dkt. 378, at 3). Briefing in Laboratory Corp. will be complete by April 21, 2025, 
meaning the case will be argued in April and decided by June 2025 (before the end 
of the Supreme Court’s current Term). 
Therefore, given both the imminent Supreme Court guidance that has the 
potential to reverse the course of this litigation and the short delay involved, this 
Court should exercise its discretion and stay all proceedings in this case, including 
the issuance of any order on class certification, pending the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Laboratory Corp. 
/// 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25496 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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BACKGROUND 
I. 
BANA’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 
BANA’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (“Opposition” 
or “Opp.”) argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
594 U.S. 413 (2021), precludes class certification in this case. Dkt. 349, at 34–35. 
Specifically, BANA argued that TransUnion established that “[e]very class member 
must have Article III standing”—i.e., a “concrete injury in fact”—“in order to recover 
individual damages,” and that “Plaintiffs’ putative classes include multiple types of 
cardholders with no injury,” including: “(i) criminals who defrauded the EDD with 
fraudulent benefits claims; (ii) legitimate beneficiaries and criminals alike who 
defrauded BANA with fraudulent transaction disputes; (iii) legitimate cardholders 
who disputed their own transactions by honest mistake; and (iv) legitimate 
cardholders already compensated for their potential injuries.” Id. (citing TransUnion, 
594 U.S. 413, 431–33). BANA further argued that the consumer-specific evidentiary 
process required to distinguish class members who were actually injured from those 
who were not “defeats predominance,” and therefore precludes certification of the 
class. Id. 
In support of these arguments, BANA cited multiple reports from government 
bodies regarding the rampant and unprecedented rates of benefits fraud infiltrating 
the system at the time, including the California State Auditor’s determination that 
this “criminal assault on the benefits system” involved more than $32 billion in stolen 
funds (id. at 1, citing DX 111) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 
report that 11 to 15% of unemployment benefits paid during the pandemic were 
fraudulent, and that the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, in particular, 
 
1 “DX” refers to documents cited in the Appendix of Exhibits to the Declaration of 
Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Dkt. 350-1.   
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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had an improper payment rate of 35.9% (id. at 6, citing DX 14).2 BANA also directed 
the Court to various examples of class members as to whom BANA has compelling 
evidence that they lack injury sufficient to support standing, including photographs 
of putative class members making the transactions that they denied making. See id. 
at 19–23, 34–37; see also DX 3; DX 7; DX 55; DX 56; DX 57; DX 58; DX 59; DX 
60; DX 61; DX 62.   
These examples were illustrative, but not exhaustive. BANA has reason to 
believe many more criminal fraudsters are embedded in Plaintiffs’ proposed class for 
multiple reasons. The first is the extremely high levels of benefits enrollment fraud 
that the state and federal agencies determined occurred but has not been and may 
never be caught. Id. at 36 (citing DX 79). BANA also opposed Plaintiffs’ notion that 
all of these people have already been filtered out by virtue of the claims process in 
the regulatory settlement on several grounds. As discussed at length in the Opposition 
and during argument, many of the class member claims were paid for reasons other 
than individual determinations that the claims were valid. Id. at 3, 13. In many other 
cases, the evidence available is not as conclusive as the cases where fraudsters were 
caught on camera: photographs are not always available. So while photographs can 
implicate some class members as fraudsters, the lack of photographs does not 
exonerate anybody or legitimize their claims. The borderline cases where the parties 
would have to litigate whether the class member is a fraudster or not based on 
disputed evidence obviously require even more extensive individual mini-trials than 
those where the existing evidence is conclusive.  
 
2 See also, e.g., DX 13 (Jan. 26, 2021 report by California Legislative Analyst); DX 
14 (Sept. 10, 2024 report by U.S. House Oversight Committee); DX 16 (June 2021 
report by EDD to California Legislature); DX 17 (Nov. 19, 2020 letter from 
California State Auditor); DX 54 (Dec. 15, 2023 report by U.S. Office of Inspector 
General); DX 79 (Feb. 8, 2023 testimony by U.S. Inspector General); DX 87 (May 
2022 report by U.S. Government Accountability Office); DX 88 (Jan. 2021 report by 
California State Auditor); and DX 89 (Jan. 2021 report by California State Auditor). 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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II. 
Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief 
Plaintiffs responded to BANA’s argument by directing the Court repeatedly to 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee 
Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). See, e.g., Dkt. 378 at 2, 3, 15. 
Plaintiffs argued, based on Olean, that in this Circuit, “Rule 23 does not preclude 
‘certification of a class that potentially includes more than a de minimis number of 
uninjured class members.’” Id. at 2 (quoting Olean, 31 F.4th at 669). 
When presented with airtight evidence that their class as defined includes not 
just members lacking Article III injury but actual criminal fraudsters, Plaintiffs 
argued that the presence of these fraudsters “would not be enough to preclude 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. at 15 (citing Olean, 31 F.4th at 669). In 
Plaintiffs’ view, false claimants “can be managed through Phase 2 proceedings or a 
claim administration process, after a classwide trial on the predominating common 
issues.” Id. at 2.   
III. 
The Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari in Laboratory Corp. 
The Supreme Court is now primed to decide whether the rule of law adopted 
by the Ninth Circuit in Olean is correct. In Laboratory Corp., the Supreme Court will 
hear and decide “[w]hether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class 
lack any Article III injury.”3 The Supreme Court further set an expedited schedule 
for briefing in Laboratory Corp., ordering the petitioner’s brief to be filed by March 
5, 2025, the respondent’s brief to be filed by March 31, 2025, and the petitioner’s 
reply brief to be filed by April 21, 2025, setting the case up for oral argument in the 
session that ends April 30, 2025, and a decision before the end of the Supreme 
Court’s current Term in June 2025. See id. 
 
 
3 Laboratory Corp., 2025 WL 288305. 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Legal Standard 
This Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings under its inherent 
authority. “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 
every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of 
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 
U.S. 248, 254 (1936). This power includes the power to stay proceedings “pending 
resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified 
Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). Exercising this discretion is 
appropriate when the resolution of another matter will directly affect the issues before 
the court. Mediterranean Enters v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 
1983); San Diego Padres Baseball P’ship v. United States, 2001 WL 710601, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. May 10, 2001). 
The propriety of a “Landis Stay” requires the court to weigh “the competing 
interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay.” Lockyer v. 
Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 
F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). These competing interests include “the possible 
damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which 
a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice 
measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions 
of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. (quoting CMAX, Inc., 300 
F.2d at 268). 
II. 
The Court Should Stay This Action Pending the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling in Laboratory Corp. 
The interests of efficiency and judicial economy will be served if the Court 
exercises its discretion to stay this case, including deferring any entry of an order on 
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, pending the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Laboratory Corp. Given that the Supreme Court’s decision is expected by the end of 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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the Term in June, the short pause will not cause any undue hardship to Plaintiffs, and 
would prevent both parties from expending substantial resources on proceedings that 
may need to be re-litigated, or may even be rendered unnecessary, based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
First, a stay will promote judicial economy because the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Laboratory Corp. will resolve a critical—and potentially case 
dispositive—issue before this Court. As the grant of certiorari reflects, the Courts of 
Appeals are divided on the question of whether a class that includes members lacking 
Article III standing can be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The Ninth Circuit is in the 
minority in taking the view that the presence of even a significant number of 
uninjured class members does not prohibit certification.4 Other Circuits require the 
number of uninjured class members to be de minimis.5 And some hold that a class 
may not be certified at all if it includes any members who have suffered no Article 
III injury.6 Before Olean, that was the rule in this Circuit, too. See Mazza v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2012) (“‘[No] class may be certified 
that contains members lacking Article III standing.’”) (quoting Denny, 443 F.3d at 
264). 
 
4 Olean, 31 F.4th at 669; Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th 
Cir. 2019). 
5 E.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 934 F.3d 619, 624–25 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (affirming denial of class certification where evidence showed 12.7% of 
proposed class members were uninjured); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 
30–32 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming certification of class where “the number of uninjured 
members [] is not so large as to render the class impractical or improper, or to cause 
non-common issues to predominate”).   
6 Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263 (2nd Cir. 2006) (“no class may be 
certified that contains members lacking Article III standing”); Halvorson v. Auto-
Owners Life Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); Johannessohn v. Polaris 
Indus. Inc., 9 F.4th 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2021) (“If members who lack the ability to 
bring a suit themselves are included in a class, the court lacks jurisdiction over their 
claims.”).   
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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Under this Circuit’s current approach—exemplified by the Laboratory Corp. 
decision—a district court could certify a class that includes even large numbers of 
uninjured members. See Olean, 31 F.4th at 669 (Rule 23(b)(3) “permit[s] the 
certification of a class that potentially includes more than a de minimis number of 
uninjured class members”). But there are limits to this. Under Olean, “[w]hen 
individualized questions relate to the injury status of class members, Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires that the court determine whether individualized inquiries about such matters 
would predominate over common questions.” Id. at 668. Thus, while the Court may 
attempt to “winnow out those non-injured members at the damages phase of the 
litigation,” Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons, Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016), 
if the individualized inquiries necessary to do so are likely to predominate, 
certification is not appropriate. Accord, e.g., Rail Freight, 934 F.3d at 627 (“Given 
the need in this case for at least 2,037 individual determinations of injury . . ., the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on the ground 
that common issues do not predominate.”).   
Which of these competing views the Supreme Court ultimately adopts will 
bear directly on the course of this action. BANA has demonstrated that there are 
uninjured criminal fraudsters in Plaintiffs’ proposed class as defined. See Dkt. 349 at 
19–23, 34–37; see also DX 3; DX 7; DX 55; DX 56; DX 57; DX 58; DX 59; DX 60; 
DX 61; DX 62. Plaintiffs do not dispute that these class members lack injury or 
standing under Article III—they just claim it “would not be enough to preclude 
certification” and is a “tiny percentage,” anyway. Dkt. 378 at 15. The Supreme Court 
is certain to address whether Plaintiffs are correct on whether this is “enough to 
preclude certification.” And, depending on the answer to that question, it may yet 
also give guidance on whether the “percentage” makes a difference and what 
percentage, if any, is too “tiny” to matter. In that event, the parties would likely need 
to present supplemental briefing and argument on the new legal standard and the 
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8 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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percentages of the uninjured—or on the evidentiary inquiries needed even to estimate 
the percentages of the uninjured.  
No matter how the Supreme Court resolves this issue, it will heavily inform 
the Court’s resolution of a key dispute between the parties. It makes little sense for 
either the parties or the Court to expend resources on upcoming motions that may be 
impacted by the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in just a few months. See 
Fernandez v. CoreLogic Credco, 2021 WL 1311270, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) 
(holding that proceeding with a class action when an impending Supreme Court 
decision may “shed[] light on Rule 23 or Article III standing requirements” is “at 
odds with the judicial principles of efficacy”); Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 2020 
WL 773253, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (holding that stay is appropriate where 
proceeding without stay “could result in the Parties unnecessarily expending 
resources engaging in motion practice and planning and preparing for trial . . . based 
on the wrong standard”) (internal quotations omitted). Given that class certification 
orders are “inherently tentative” and subject to amendment or reconsideration “at any 
time” before judgment, it likewise makes little sense for the Court to invest resources 
into issuing a class certification order that it may very well need to reconsider or 
revise under a new legal standard after Laboratory Corp. is decided. Davidson v. 
O'Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 964 n.7 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978)). Thus, the interests of judicial 
economy and efficiency are best served here by a stay pending clarity from the 
Supreme Court on this critical issue.   
Second, a brief stay here would be equitable and result in no undue hardship 
to Plaintiffs. Courts in this district regularly grant requests for brief stays of 
proceedings when the outcome of a pending appeal is likely to clarify key issues in 
the case, recognizing that a short, time-limited stay poses little or no risk of prejudice 
to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Frantz v. Force Factor, LLC, 2020 WL 8666386, 
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020) (granting stay pending outcome of U.S. Supreme 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25503 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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Court case); Nguyen v. Marketsource, Inc., 2018 WL 2182633 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 
2018) (same); Ludlow, 2020 WL 773253, at *2 (granting stay pending resolution of 
question certified to the California Supreme Court). In Nguyen, the district court 
explained that “the possible prejudice or harm to [p]laintiff from granting a stay under 
these circumstances is slight,” given that such a stay “would not be open-ended and 
will likely be relatively short.” 2018 WL 2182633, at *6; see also Ludlow, 2020 WL 
773253, at *2 (no prejudice from stay where the “wait for an answer to [the] 
important issue would be neither indefinite nor unreasonable”). An opinion in 
Laboratory Corp. is anticipated in June 2025, so the requested stay here would 
similarly be of a brief, definite duration.7   
Given that Plaintiffs seek only monetary damages on behalf of the class and 
not injunctive or other equitable relief, any harm from delaying that potential 
recovery does not justify denying the stay. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ putative class is defined 
to include only those people who have already been reimbursed for their 
unauthorized transaction claims, and who have already received additional 
consequential harm payments pursuant to BANA’s regulatory remediation plan.  
Dkt. 324, at 15. A stay here would briefly delay only Plaintiffs’ attempts to treble 
those damages they have already been paid. See Ludlow, 2020 WL 773253, at *2 
(“Mere delay in receiving damages is an insufficient basis to deny a stay.”); see also 
Nguyen 2018 WL 2182633, at *6 (plaintiff “will [] not be unduly prejudiced or 
harmed by a delay in receiving monetary relief”). Plaintiffs also cannot point to any 
risk of harm the requested stay poses to evidence and discovery, given that fact 
discovery is nearly complete. Cf. Frantz, 2020 WL 8666386, at *3 (even where 
discovery is ongoing, a brief stay “minimally delay[ing] discovery” pending a 
 
7 If this motion is granted, either BANA or the parties jointly will notify the Court 
within seven (7) days of the issuance of the Laboratory Corp. opinion so that the 
Court can set a status conference to discuss lifting the stay and the effect of the 
opinion on class certification and subsequent proceedings. 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25504 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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relevant Supreme Court decision is appropriate). Plaintiffs thus face no harm from 
the brief stay requested here.   
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, BANA respectfully requests that the Court grant this 
motion and stay all proceedings in this action, including the entering of an order on 
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Laboratory Corp. BANA or the parties jointly will alert the Court within seven (7) 
days of the opinion’s issuance, so that the Court can set a status conference. 
 
 
Dated:  February 7, 2025 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
By: s/ James W. McGarry 
 
 
 
 
 
 JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
THOMAS M. HEFFERON (pro hac vice) 
THefferon@goodwinlaw.com 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N St. NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
Tel: +1 202 346 4000  
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
 
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100) 
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500 
Fax: +1 617 346 4444 
 
VALERIE A. HAGGANS (pro hac vice) 
VHaggans@goodwinlaw.com 
LINDSAY E. HOYLE (pro hac vice) 
LHoyle@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
620 Eighth Avenue 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25505 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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New York, NY 10018  
Tel: +1 212 813-8800  
Fax: +1 212 355-3333 
 
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice) 
YChan@jonesday.com 
JONES DAY 
100 High Street 
Boston, MA  02110 
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939 
Fax: +1 617 449 6999 
 
JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433) 
jbrown@myersnave.com 
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 278405) 
mnazareth@myersnave.com 
MEYERS NAVE 
600 B Street, Suite 1650 
San Diego, CA 92101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25506 
Page 12 of 13

 
 
 
 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO  
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the 
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by 
using the CM/ECF system on February 7, 2025.  I further certify that all participants 
in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the 
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
 
 
Executed: 
February 7, 2025 
 
s/ James W. McGarry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 415-1     Filed 02/07/25     PageID.25507 
Page 13 of 13

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