Court filing
Reply to Response to Motion re 311 Motion to Stay Individual — In re BofA Unemployment Litigation (Dkt. 325)
Filed September 9, 2024 in In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation; one of 1415 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2024-09-09 |
Full text
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Reply to Response re Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings
CASE No: 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB
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Joshua B. Swigart (SBN 225557)
Josh@SwigartLawGroup.com
SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
2221 Camino del Rio S, Ste 308
San Diego, CA 92108
josh@swigartlawgroup.com
P: 866-219-3343
F: 866-219-8344
Liaison Counsel for Individual Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CASE: 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS PENDING
RESOLUTION OF RELATED
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
Date: September 9, 2024
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Crtrm.: 2D – 2nd Floor
Judge: Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
IN RE BANK OF AMERICA
CALIFORNIA
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
LITIGATION
This Document Relates to All
Actions
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Reply to Response re Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings
CASE No: 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The 133 Individual Plaintiffs submit this reply in support of their request that the
Court stay their cases until the common issues of law and fact are adjudicated in the
consolidated Class Case. As explained in their moving papers, a temporary stay will
serve the interests of judicial and party economy by permitting Class Counsel, Bank of
America (BANA), and this Court to focus on the class certification motion and related
classwide issues, which would likely decrease the number of individual cases to be
litigated and streamline the proceedings.
BANA’s Opposition does not negate any of these points. Instead, it misstates the
record and the Individual Plaintiffs’ arguments, casts false aspersions on counsel for the
Individual Plaintiffs, and greatly exaggerates the negative effect of a stay. Because
BANA has not shown that a stay would cause it any prejudice—including because
nearly 260 other individual plaintiffs’ similar cases are already stayed by order of the
JPML—BANA cannot overcome the Individual Plaintiffs’ showing of the harm (and
inefficiencies and potential inconsistent adjudications) that could result if the requested
stay is denied.
Nor can BANA reasonably dispute that this litigation would proceed in a far more
streamlined manner if the stay is granted. While BANA may be hoping to use the
pendency of the 133 non-stayed Individual Plaintiffs’ cases to take two-a-day
depositions for its use in preparing its brief in opposition to class certification, BANA
has not identified any reason why it needs those depositions now, in the Individual
Plaintiffs’ cases, rather than after the principal disputed issues are sorted out in MDL
class proceedings.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts have the inherent power to manage their dockets. Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Incidental to this power is the discretion to stay
proceedings. See id.; see also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863
(9th Cir. 1979) (“A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket
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Reply to Response re Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings
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and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending
resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.”).
That discretion is guided by balancing the harms and benefits that may arise from
a stay. In particular, courts weigh three factors: (1) “the possible damage which may
result from the granting of a stay;” (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may
suffer in being required to go forward;” and (3) “the orderly course of justice measured
in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law.”
Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v.
Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)).
III.
ARGUMENT
A. BANA’s Preliminary Contentions
Before turning to the propriety of a stay, the Individual Plaintiffs first address
several baseless contentions made by BANA in its opposition. To begin, the Individual
Plaintiffs did not bring their motion “in the twilight of discovery” or “hastily.” To the
contrary, the December 12, 2024 discovery deadline was set only recently — on June
27, 2024 — and the instant motion was filed just a few weeks later and only after BANA
changed its position and sent notice for approximately 122 individual depositions
packed tightly into the period between when Class Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification and when BANA’s opposition to class certification is due. That is not
dilatory behavior on the part of the Individual Plaintiffs.
As for not previously contesting Judge Burns’s July 2021 Order, it was entirely
unnecessary for the Individual Plaintiffs to have done so earlier, because there were no
practical consequences of that order until recently. Based on conversations with Class
Counsel, and as discussed with Judge Burns at the July 19, 2021 status conference, the
Individual Plaintiffs understood that individual litigation would be paused “at least until
the summary judgment stage, and even discovery will be limited only to the extent the
bank has unique defenses as to any individual plaintiff will the bank take discovery or
the individuals take discovery.” (ECF No. 55 at 27:5–14.) In all other regards, the
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individual cases would be put “on hold” until “the MDL is over.” (Id. at 27:20–25; see
also Class Action Plaintiffs’ Status Conference Statement, ECF No. 31 at 10 [“Counsel
further agree that, with the exception of discovery relating to the specific records of the
individual plaintiffs at Bank of America, all discovery requests and depositions will be
made by and through interim co-lead counsel for the Class Action Plaintiffs in
coordination with counsel for the individual plaintiffs.”].)
Consistent with this understanding, Judge Burns’s July 2021 Order provided,
“No plaintiff may make any request for or response to discovery … except through
Interim Co-Lead Counsel.” (ECF No. 48 at 3.). It was not until Magistrate Judge Berg’s
June 2024 Amended Scheduling Order that the December 12, 2024 discovery deadline
was, for the first time, applied to “all parties” and not just Class Counsel and defense
counsel as in the June 2023 Scheduling Order. It was only after receiving that June 2024
order that Individual Plaintiffs had the need to move, and did move, for a formal stay.
BANA next contends a stay is unnecessary because the Individual Plaintiffs have
already participated in this case and have conducted discovery. But the Individual
Plaintiffs have never claimed that they have been unable to participate in this case at
all. As BANA points out, counsel for the Individual Plaintiffs attended the September
2021 Early Neutral Evaluation conference, filed an opposition to BANA’s partial
motion to dismiss, and participated in meet and confer efforts with BANA.
The point we have repeatedly made, however, is that per Judge Burns’s July 2021
Order, the Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to conduct discovery was limited in two
meaningful ways. First, their participation in discovery was limited by the
organizational structure set forth in the Order. That is, to streamline the process, Judge
Burns directed Class Counsel to take the lead on discovery. Class Counsel does not
represent the individual Plaintiffs and have focused on their class case, as they should.
It is the job of the Individual Plaintiffs’ Counsel, who have been restricted by the
Court’s CMO, to further the individual matters (specifically the discovery process).
While the Individual Plaintiffs do not challenge this structure, it is undisputed that their
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access to information has been limited; of the hundreds of thousands of pages of
documents produced by BANA, the Individual Plaintiffs have only received access to
a few thousand. BANA’s Opposition confirms this point, noting that when counsel for
the Individual Plaintiffs expressed concern about obtaining documents from Class
Counsel, BANA provided the Individual Plaintiffs a spreadsheet of documents
produced and BANA produced certain documents directly to counsel for the Individual
Plaintiffs. (See ECF No. 321 at 8.)
Second, as noted in the Individual Plaintiffs’ moving papers, most of the
discovery that has been conducted has been limited to the common Class issues. This
conforms with Judge Burns’s July 2021 Order and with the efficient prosecution of the
underlying MDL proceedings. The concern now is that Judge Berg’s June 2024
Amended Scheduling Order has apparently opened discovery for “all parties” (not just
Class Counsel and defense counsel) and, presumably, on all issues (not just common
Class issues). The effect of this sudden free-for-all is that the Individual Plaintiffs must
now scramble to conduct wide-ranging discovery for 133 individuals within a very short
period. Further, BANA seeks to depose four individual plaintiffs per day over a two-
month period, which will require counsel for the Individual Plaintiffs to allocate the
vast majority of their professional resources to the depositions. The court should see
BANA’s request to take the depositions for what it is—simply an attempt to gain more
information that BANA can use to oppose class certification. There is no harm in
allowing the depositions to take place after class certification and dispositive motions
are resolved.
B. The Landis Factors
As for the propriety of a stay, the Landis factors weigh in favor of a stay pending
resolution of the class issues. BANA contends that it will be prejudiced by a stay
because it has already expended considerable effort and resources in completing
discovery. However, BANA conflates the time and costs expended in relation to Class
issues with those related specifically to the Individual Plaintiffs. As the record shows,
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of the hundreds of thousands of pages produced by BANA in response to discovery
requests by Class Counsel, only 14,000 pages relate to the Individual Plaintiffs.
Further, BANA repeatedly asserts that a stay is inappropriate at this “late stage,”
but it overlooks the fact that this matter is in pretrial proceedings, that BANA’s motion
to dismiss was only recently decided, that the scope of discovery was limited by Judge
Burns’s July 2021 Order, and that a class certification motion was not filed until August
29, 2024 and will not be fully briefed until late fall. Moreover, the Bank did not file its
Answer to the operative complaint until August 15, 2024, and that Answer included 38
Affirmative Defenses (EDF 316), none of have been the subject of discovery given how
recently that Answer was filed.
Along these lines, BANA’s reliance on Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.,
2016 WL 9503735 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016) is misplaced. There, the court held that a
stay was not warranted because, inter alia, the parties had completed preemption
discovery and expended resources. (Id., at *2.) In Seufert, the case had been pending
for three years, a summary judgment motion was granted, and the judgment appealed.
By contrast, this case is still in the preliminary stages, with a class certification motion
just recently filed, and any summary judgment motions months away. Thus, the
concerns expressed in Seufert are simply inapplicable here. BANA’s remaining
citations are also inapposite as none concern the factual circumstances presented here,
namely, where discovery has thus far been limited in scope to common Class issues.
BANA next asserts that a stay is not warranted because it would be prejudiced
by a stay of “indefinite” duration. But BANA does not explain how such a stay, if it
could even be characterized as “indefinite,” would be substantively different from the
stay in any of the other 257 individual plaintiffs’ cases already stayed by Judge Burns.
The 133 Individual Plaintiffs merely ask that their cases be tracked alongside the other
257 individual cases except insofar as they relate to common Class issues (as originally
contemplated by Judge Burns). BANA does not and cannot provide a rationale for
treating individual Plaintiffs differently (those who are stayed and those who are not).
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Reply to Response re Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings
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BANA also misstates the prejudice to the Individual Plaintiffs should a stay be
denied. The Individual Plaintiffs do not contend that merely participating in depositions
is prejudicial to them. The prejudice results from the fact that BANA intends to conduct
four depositions per day over a two-month period (which BANA is only doing to gain
an advantage in the class case, not because it needs that many depositions, in that
compressed a time period, in the Individual Plaintiffs’ cases).1 The strain this proposed
schedule would place on counsel for the Individual Plaintiffs cannot be overstated.
Likewise, and to reiterate a point made in the Individual Plaintiffs’ moving papers,
Without a stay, [the Individual Plaintiffs] would be forced to scramble
to propound and respond to discovery in 133 cases (let alone the 257
individual cases that are currently stayed), review hundreds of thousands
of pages of documents, bring motions to compel (should they become
necessary), and conduct an unwieldly number of depositions, all in the
next three months. This would cause severe prejudice to the Individual
Plaintiffs, and it is not necessary for the efficient litigation of their
claims. (Mot. to Stay, at 14.)
Finally, while BANA argues that “it would be more efficient to simply complete
the depositions that have already been noticed,” its argument can only properly be
construed as efficient for BANA only, but as the facts and circumstances show, denying
the stay would be wholly inefficient for Individual Counsel and Class Counsel, who
would attend the depositions of the Individual Plaintiffs instead of focusing their efforts
on class certification and expert discovery; the Individual Plaintiffs, who would be
required to scramble to conduct wide-ranging discovery and to attend over 100
depositions in a short period; and this Court, which would need to address any discovery
motions filed in the respective 133 individual cases.
Stated simply, the Landis factors heavily favor granting the Individual Plaintiffs’
motion to stay their individual cases pending resolution of the common Class issues.
1 We suspect that if the Court were to preclude BANA from using the Individual
Plaintiffs’ depositions for the purpose of opposing class certification, BANA would
lose all interest in taking so many depositions in such a compressed time period.
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Reply to Response re Individual Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Proceedings
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IV.
CONCLUSION
The Individual Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that their motion to stay
until common issues of law and fact are determined in the Class Case be granted.
Granting the motion would not harm BANA while denying it would greatly impact the
Individual Plaintiffs’ ability to litigate their respective cases by forcing them to conduct
extensive discovery during an extremely short time frame. Granting the motion would
also promote judicial economy and efficiency by focusing the litigation on issues
common to both the putative class and the Individual Plaintiffs, reducing duplication of
efforts, and reducing the risk of overlap.
Respectfully submitted,
SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
Date: August 30, 2024
By: /s/ Joshua B. Swigart
Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
Josh@SwigartLawGroup.com
Co-Liaison Counsel for Individual
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