Opposition to Ex Parte Application for Order for Protective Order — USA v. Ayvazyan et al. (Dkt. 74, C.D. Cal.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 74 · 2020-12-09 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION 
 
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Ashwin J. Ram (SBN 227513) 
aram@steptoe.com 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 439-9400 
Facsimile: (213) 439-9599 
 
[Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page] 
 
 
Counsel for Defendant Richard Ayvazyan 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                              Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD AYVAZYAN,  
MARIETTA TERABELIAN, 
ARTUR AYVAZYAN, 
TAMARA DADYAN, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 Case No.  20-CR-00579-SVW 
 
OPPOSITION TO 
GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE 
APPLICATION FOR A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
REGARDING DISCOVERY 
CONTAINING PERSONAL 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION, 
ACCESS DEVICE MATERIALS, 
AND PRIVACY ACT 
INFORMATION 
 
Hon. Stephen V. Wilson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION 
 
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Michael A. Keough (SBN 327037) 
mkeough@steptoe.com 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 
One Market Plaza 
Spear Tower, Suite 3900 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
Telephone: (415) 365-6700 
Facsimile: (415) 365-6699 
 
Nicholas P. Silverman (pro hac vice) 
nsilverman@steptoe.com 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 
1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington D.C., 20036 
Telephone: (202) 429-8096 
Facsimile: (202) 429-3902 
 
Counsel for Defendant Richard Ayvazyan 
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OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION 
 
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Defendant Richard Ayvazyan, through undersigned counsel, opposes the 
government’s ex parte application (Dkt. 65) and responds as follows: 
I. 
THE COURT SHOULD DENY THE GOVERNMENT’S APPLICATION 
AND GRANT THE DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR DISCOVERY 
BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED GOOD 
CAUSE OR NARROWLY TAILORED ITS PROPOSED RELIEF 
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, case law, and ethical rules entitle Defendant Richard Ayvazyan to 
receive discovery so that he can investigate the allegations against him and prepare for 
his January 12, 2021 trial.  The government’s attempt to hold all of this discovery 
hostage violates each of these entitlements and is unsupported by law.   
“Protective orders are the exception, not the rule, and appropriate reasons must 
be given for their entry.”  United States v. Stone, No. 10-cr-20123, 2012 WL 137746, at 
*3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012) (denying motion for protective order “to protect the 
privacy and security interests of government witnesses” because “[t]he government has 
not met its burden to show disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury”).  
Where, as here, the government’s proposed protective order would restrict a defendant 
from possessing any of the discovery to investigate the allegations against him and 
prepare for trial, the government bears a heavy burden to show good cause to believe 
disclosure of discovery would result in a clearly defined and serious injury, and that the 
restrictions are narrowly tailored to prevent overburdening a defendant’s constitutional 
rights.  Here, the government has (A) failed to satisfy show good cause to believe a 
particular injury would result from disclosure; (B) misrepresented Ayvazyan’s 
conditions of release to the Court about in an attempt to manufacture good cause; and 
(C) failed to engage in any tailoring or balancing at all.  Accordingly, the government’s 
ex parte application (Dkt. 65) should be denied and the defendant’s ex parte application 
(Dkt. 63) should be granted. 
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A. 
The Government Fails to Show Good Cause to Believe Disclosure 
Would Result in a Clearly Defined and Serious Injury 
It is the government’s burden to show, “with specificity,” good cause to believe 
certain disclosures will cause “clearly defined and serious injury.”  United States v. 
Arredondo, No. 12-cr-1055, 2012 WL 1946955, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2012) (quoting 
United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The government’s 
application fails to meet this burden.  Instead of narrowing in on specific harm, the 
government’s application argues broadly1 that somewhere within the sea of discovery 
materials there exist unspecified documents that, if turned over to a defendant, could 
“risk[] the privacy and security of the information’s [unspecified] owners.”  Dkt. 65 ¶ 2.  
But “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 
reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.”  United States v. Calderon, 14-cr-
103-CAS, 2014 WL 1401941, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014) (quoting Arredondo and 
Wecht and denying government application for protective order except as to agreed-
upon matters and grand jury proceedings).  The government’s application has done just 
that—it is devoid of specific examples of the documents underpinning its concern, the 
specific people that might be harmed, or the specific way in which these materials 
could be misused.  This is not enough. 
Setting aside the lack of a specific alleged harm, the government also fails to 
provide good cause to believe that the generalized and speculative harms to privacy or 
safety referenced in Dkt. 65 will occur.  The government argues that good cause exists 
“due to the nature of the allegations against defendant R. Ayvazyan.”  Dkt. 65 ¶ 15.  
But many defendants are accused of fraud or identity theft, and yet that accusation is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 The government’s application even broadens the proposed risk of harm by claiming that this 
“may expose” any third-party member of the general public to “potential safety risks.”  Dkt. 
65 ¶ 2.  The accusation that Ayvazyan represents a threat to public safety has no basis in fact.  
Ayvazyan respectfully refers the Court to page 10 of his Application (Dkt. 63), which explains 
that Ayvazyan has no violent history, is a respected businessman, and has been a long-time 
member of the local Armenian community.  He is not a safety risk to anyone. 
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not sufficient cause to justify tying their hands behind their back during trial 
preparation.  See Dkt. 63 at 4 (providing eight examples of recent fraud and identity 
theft cases in which the same government counsel appearing in the present case or his 
co-counsel stipulated that such restrictions were not necessary).  The government 
argues that Ayvazyan’s prior conviction standing alone increases the risk of danger to 
public (Dkt. 65 at 2).  But the government does not identify (because it cannot) what 
about this conviction makes him a danger to others—especially where, as here, 
Ayvazyan is subject to conditions of supervised release that include home detention, 
location monitoring, and prohibit him from accessing the bank accounts of others.  The 
fact that Ayvazyan plead guilty to a non-violent charge a decade ago is not probative of 
whether he presents a safety risk today.  See Vincent v. Mendoza-Powers, No. 06-cv-
5482, 2010 WL 143455, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010) (noting that a prior non-violent 
conviction was not “not a valid indicator of whether he is a danger to the public”). 
Ayvazyan, if anything, presents a lower risk of harm than similarly situated 
defendants.  He is physically incapable of applying for any Paycheck Protection 
Program loans because the program is no longer open to new applications.2  Any 
similar federal program fraud would be immediately spotted by the government or 
Probation given that Ayvazyan is under pretrial supervision.  Ayvazyan has compliantly 
submitted bank account information and statements to probation upon request and he 
will continue to do so.  Moreover, Ayvazyan would be reviewing discovery through 
Steptoe’s eDiscovery system, which will track every document he views.  It would be 
fundamentally illogical for Ayvazyan to misuse data or information when he knows that 
there will be an easily collectible record of his access.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., James T. Madore, $134B in Untapped Loan Guarantees Remain as PPP 
Applications End, Newsday (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.newsday.com/business/coronavirus/
ppp-paycheck-loans-sba-businesses-1.48052017 (noting that the PPP program closed for new 
loan applications on August 8, 2020). 
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The government’s argument to the contrary is without merit.  The only 
distinction the government draws is that, in 2012, Ayvazyan pleaded guilty to 
misrepresenting his income to obtain a loan and successfully completed his sentence of 
probation without incident.  Dkt. 65 ¶ 15.  Ayvazyan’s offense did not involve the 
misuse of a third party’s private information or, for that matter, any conduct that 
inflicted harm on a third party.  It provides no reason to believe that he would do so 
now.3  
B. 
The Government Misrepresents Ayvazyan’s Pretrial Conditions in an 
Attempt to Manufacture Good Cause 
Understanding that it cannot show good cause, the government inexplicably 
claims that another court has made findings precluding Ayvazyan from receiving 
discovery by prohibiting him from “possessing ‘any identification, mail matter, access 
devices, or any identification-related material other than in [their] own legal or true 
name[s].”  Dkt. 65 ¶ 7 (citing Dkt. 5).  The government is wrong. 
The cited language is not part of Richard Ayvazyan’s conditions of release.  
Ayvazyan’s conditions of release prohibit only accessing bank accounts belonging to 
others, a condition he has followed and will continue to follow.  See Dkt. 47, 48 
(conditions of release for Ayvazyan).  The document the government cites is the 
conditions of release for co-defendant Artur Ayvazyan, not Richard.  But even 
assuming arguendo that the government was not mistaken, and Artur’s conditions of 
release applied to all defendants, those conditions do not expressly prohibit possession 
of identification-related materials produced by the government for the purpose of 
preparing for trial.  Indeed, such an outcome—setting a condition of release that is then 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 The government also claims there may exist information protected by the Privacy Act.  The 
government fails to describe that information with sufficient particularity much less the harm 
that disclosure would cause.  Any information provided to the government for use in law 
enforcement activity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7), however, would necessarily be 
producible in discovery because discovery would be a core part of that law enforcement 
activity for which the information was provided. 
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used to deny the defendant access to mandatory pre-trial discovery—would violate the 
Sixth Amendment rights afforded to the defendant.  
C. 
Any Good Cause Would Be Insufficient to Justify the Requested 
Protective Order 
The government’s proposed protective order is not limited to personal, private 
information that, if disclosed, would subject its owner to a specific injury.  Instead, the 
government wishes to prevent Ayvazyan from possessing, controlling, or even taking 
notes on any document that contains “a name” or any other information that could 
conceivably be used to identify a person such as a business or email address.  Dkt. 65 
¶ 13.h, .i, .k (incorporating ¶ 13.a, .c).  In a case involving allegedly fraudulent loan 
applications, such a broad brushstroke would include even the very documents that the 
government will have to present at trial to meet its burden of proof (access to which 
would be a critical part of the defendant’s preparation for trial).  The government 
defines “Confidential Information” so broadly that it applies to every document, then 
applies onerous strictures to any and all Confidential Information.  Good cause to redact 
one subset of documents “does not [provide] good cause to restrict the entirety of 
discovery with an overbroad protective order.”  United States v. Cross, No. 20-cr-9, 
2020 WL 2542818, at *3 (E.D. Wisc. May 19, 2020).  This is the equivalent to 
indiscriminately shutting down the main water valve to an office building under the 
belief that a single sink might flood.  The reasonable solution is to turn off the water to 
that sink.4  The government insists on going beyond the reasonable solution and 
entering what is, in effect, a blanket order shutting off the main water valve and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 “Turning off the water to that sink” is what Ayvazyan proposed immediately upon learning 
that the government was unwilling to abide by the protective orders it had agreed to in similar 
cases: produce all discovery regarding Ayvazyan and his alleged co-conspirators, and propose 
narrowly tailored redactions necessary to protect Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 information belonging to 
the alleged identity theft victim M.Z.  See Dkt. 63-5 at 1-2.  The government refused to 
discuss the proposal. 
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denying the defendant the right to search through discovery to investigate the 
allegations against him and prepare for his case. 
In the Ninth Circuit, to prevent access to unfiled discovery materials, “[a] party 
asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, 
of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.”  
Dkt. 63 at 9 (citing Arredondo, 2012 WL 1946955, at *1 (quoting Foltz v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003))); see also Beckman Indus. v. 
Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).  Assuming arguendo that the 
government demonstrated good cause for a protective order (it has not), this would not 
justify the blanket protective order requested by the government. 
This kind of blanket order, while “useful and expeditious in large scale litigation 
… can be overbroad and unnecessary” in criminal cases.  United States v. Williams, No. 
No. 15-cr-10145, 2015 WL 5923551, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 9, 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).  It is therefore necessary 
that “in determining the appropriate level of protection,” the court “‘ensure[s] that a 
protective order is no broader than is necessary to serve the intended purposes.’”  Id.; 
see also Cross, 2020 WL 2542818, at *3 (vacating protective order as “overbroad” 
because the government failed to show that the defendant was a threat to the particular 
witness being protected).  The government’s core response is that its proposed 
protective order is “necessary” to produce any discovery.  Dkt. 65 at 2.  The 
government does not cite any legal authority for this remarkable proposition because 
there is none.  There is no conceivable need to limit Ayvazyan’s access to the vast 
majority of the documents at issue in this case including, for example, Ayvazyan’s own 
escrow documents (containing names and contact information) or the very loan 
applications (containing names and business information) for which Ayvazyan will be 
tried.  Ayvazyan previous demonstrated the existence of narrower orders that would 
protect the government’s interests in Dkt. 63-2 and Dkt. 63-5.  The government’s 
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failure to follow these examples to ensure that its proposed order is as narrow as 
possible is fatal to its application. 
After ensuring the order is as narrow as possible to achieve a government 
interest, that purported interest must be balanced against Ayvazyan’s constitutional 
right to investigate the allegations against him.  See United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 1093, 1101 (D. Mont. 2005) (holding that due process required that 
defendants have an opportunity to inspect key records “without the arbitrary removal of 
portions of the records by the prosecution”); Williams, 2015 WL 5923551, at *4 
(“Balancing all of the concerns raised by the government and the defendants, the 
restrictions [proposed by the government] are overly burdensome and … broader than 
necessary in light of the showing made by the government relative to witness 
intimidation and retaliation.”).  The government’s proposal to withhold everything from 
Ayvazyan makes no attempt to balance anything.   
The government’s proposed order would use a narrow fear to justify restrictions 
on every document in discovery.  A drastic measure like that is grossly overbroad.  The 
Court should therefore enter Ayvazyan’s proposed order granting discovery (Dkt. 63-1) 
and direct the government to produce discovery. 
II. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD ENTER AYVAZYAN’S 
PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER (DKT. 63-2) 
Ayvazyan’s Proposed Protective Order (filed as Dkt. 63-2) would sufficiently 
protect any of the government’s potential interests for the reasons stated in Section III.B 
of Ayvazyan’s Application for Discovery (Dkt. 63).  The proposed order follows the 
precedent established by Judge Hatter in a recent case in this District, United States v. 
Estopare, No. 20-cr-79 (TJH), Dkt. 110 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020); id. Dkt. 179 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 20, 2020).  See Dkt. 63 § 3.B.   
Critically, the Estopare Order would balance the competing interests by serving 
as “a substantial safeguard against unauthorized disclosure” while ensuring that 
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Ayvazyan can investigate the allegations against him and prepare for trial.  See Dkt. 63 
at 13-14 (quoting United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1101 (D. Mont. 
2005)); United States v. Burgess, No. 18-cr-373, 2018 WL 11211501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 21, 2018) (holding that Defendants could access protected materials 
independently for the purpose of preparing because requiring the presence of attorneys 
for every review session would “impose undue and substantial burdens on the 
defendants and counsel”). 
The government argues that its proposed order should be entered because it 
would “provide the defense with sufficient information to adequately represent [the] 
defendant.”  Dkt. 65 ¶ 5; see also id. ¶ 13.d (defining the “Defense Team” to exclude 
the defendant).  The government’s position represents a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the defendant’s role in protecting his own liberty.  The defendant’s right to 
participate in his own defense is sacrosanct and entitled to heavy weight.  Contrary to 
the government’s proposed protective order: 
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be 
made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make 
his defense.  It is the accused, not counsel, who must be ‘informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the 
witnesses against him,’ and who must be accorded ‘compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’ Although not stated in the 
Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation—to make 
one's own defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure 
of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for 
it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).  The implicit proposition of the 
government’s proposed protective order—that a criminal defendant has no right to 
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investigate the charges against him or prepare his own defense—has no basis in law and 
should be rejected out of hand. 
The government claims that screensharing one document at a time is sufficient to 
protect Ayvazyan’s right to participate in his defense.  The government is wrong for 
three reasons. 
First, screensharing one document at a time might allow Ayvazyan to review 
preselected exhibits like a witness, but see infra, but it would not allow him to be a 
member of the defense team.  Part of Ayvazyan’s role on the defense team is to identify 
key categories of exculpatory evidence.  See Dkt. 63 § III.B.  As noted supra in Section 
I.A, Ayvazyan will identify exculpatory evidence by reviewing discovery on Steptoe’s 
eDiscovery platform.  In normal times, it would be a burden for Ayvazyan to conduct 
this review with counsel present—Ayvazyan would have to come to Steptoe’s office 
and sit at a computer clicking through documents while counsel worked on other trial 
preparation next to him.  Due to COVID, it is an impossibility.  Ayvazyan cannot sit in 
a room with counsel, and the government’s proposed order would transform retained 
counsel into a babysitter, clicking “next document” and awaiting instructions when they 
should be preparing for trial.  See United States v. Baker, No. 20-cr-288, 2020 WL 
4589808, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2020) (emphasizing the “value and [] interest in the 
defendant being able to freely review the evidence against him, on his own time, and 
without a defense lawyer or anyone else looking over his shoulder”).  Ayvazyan is an 
active member of his defense team and needs to be able to do his job without impeding 
the ability of the other members of that team to do their jobs. 
Second, having counsel screenshare exhibits is not even an adequate substitution 
for witness preparation, much less fact investigation.  Courts, defense counsel, and even 
prosecutors have all agreed that screensharing individual documents is an inadequate 
replacement for in-person review.  See, e.g., Baker, 2020 WL 4589808, at *4 (rejecting 
government’s proposed protective order for failure to adequately protect the 
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defendant’s rights); Joint Resp. of USAO & Defense at 2, United States v. Abdelaziz, 
No. 19-cr-10080, Dkt. 1659 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2020) (videoconference screensharing 
“is not an adequate substitute” for preparation sessions because of “unavoidable 
communication lags and other technological issues, as well as the fact that presenting 
exhibits to a witness remotely … can be cumbersome”).  Undersigned counsel has no 
doubt that the Court has noticed that there are occasionally videoconference glitches 
even in short sessions.  Videos cut out, static hits, and people disconnect.  Those 
glitches occur exponentially more when a videocall has been going for eight hours to go 
through hundreds of documents rather than a one-hour hearing.  As prosecutors have 
recognized in other cases, screensharing is not a reliable enough substitute to take the 
place of independent document review. 
Third, setting aside the inadequacy of clicking through each document with 
counsel, the government’s proposed order falls woefully short of even this mark by 
conditioning exhibit-sharing via videoconference on a written certification that there is 
“no way” for the defendant to photograph, record, write down, or memorialize in any 
way the document being shared or any of the information in the document.  Dkt. 65 ¶ 
13.m.  Such a certification would be impossible.  There is no set of restrictions that 
could provide the absolute impossibility required by the government’s proposed order.  
Nor would such restrictions necessary or appropriate.5  As W.R. Grace makes clear 
even in the context of medical records—which, unlike the files in this case, are subject 
to strict statutory protection—protective orders require balancing any potential harm 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 An example of the inappropriateness of the government’s proposed order would be to 
consider the escrow files showing deposits for the purchase of Ayvazyan’s home.  Each page 
of the escrow files would be Confidential Information because they contain names, addresses, 
email addresses, and financial information.  As a result, Ayvazyan would be prohibited from 
possessing any version of the escrow files.  If counsel wished to ask Ayvazyan about the 
circumstances of a particular transfer, Ayvazyan would be prohibited from writing down the 
date of the transfer because that would be “any data or information contained in the 
Confidential Information.”  
 
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against the defendant’s due process rights.  As in W.R. Grace, a similar prohibition on 
misuse of discovery “for improper or illegal purposes” sufficiently mitigates the risk of 
harm without unnecessary infringement on due process rights.6 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Ayvazyan requests that the Court deny the government’s ex parte application and 
grant Ayvazyan’s application for discovery for the reasons stated above in Section I and 
in Dkt. 63 § III.A.  In the event the Court concludes that a protective order is necessary, 
Ayvazyan requests that the Court enter the proposed protective order at Dkt. 63-2, and 
direct the government to immediately produce discovery for the reasons stated above in 
Section II and in Dkt. 63 § III.B. 
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6 Finally, the government’s application highlights the seemingly short turnaround time 
between when defense counsel asked for the government’s position on the defendant’s ex 
parte application and when it was filed.  Dkt. 65 ¶ 20.  In reality, the parties had been 
negotiating the terms of a potential protective order since the defense proposed a draft 
protective order on November 18, 2020, including an offered stipulation from the defense to 
abide by the terms of the protective order until the outstanding issues related to the protective 
order could be brought before the Court.  When the government refused to agree to this 
compromise, it became clear that extraordinary relief was necessary and, pursuant to the 
Court’s individual procedures regarding ex parte applications, defendant filed his ex parte 
application as soon as he became aware that this relief was necessary.  The subject of the ex 
parte applications was not a surprise. 
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW     Document 74     Filed 12/09/20     Page 13 of 14   Page ID
#:450

 
 
12 
 
OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S EX PARTE APPLICATION 
 
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Dated:   December 9, 2020 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Ashwin J. Ram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ashwin J. Ram (SBN 227513) 
aram@steptoe.com 
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 439-9400 
Facsimile: (213) 439-9599 
 
Michael A. Keough (SBN 327037) 
mkeough@steptoe.com 
One Market Plaza 
Spear Tower, Suite 3900 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
Telephone: (415) 365-6700 
Facsimile: (415) 365-6699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicholas P. Silverman (pro hac vice) 
nsilverman@steptoe.com 
1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington D.C., 20036 
Telephone: (202) 429-8096 
Facsimile: (202) 429-3902 
 
 
 
 
Counsel for Defendant Richard Ayvazyan 
 
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW     Document 74     Filed 12/09/20     Page 14 of 14   Page ID
#:451

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